

The Armies of Classical Greece

Edited by
Everett L. Wheeler



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Series Preface

War and military matters are key aspects of the modern world and central topics in history study. This series brings together essays selected from key journals that exhibit careful analysis of military history. The volumes, each of which is edited by an expert in the field, cover crucial time periods and geographical areas including Europe, the USA, China, Japan, Latin America, and South Asia. Each volume represents the editor's selection of the most seminal recent essays on military history in their particular area of expertise, while an introduction presents an overview of the issues in that area, together with comments on the background and significance of the essays selected.

This series reflects important shifts in the subject. Military history has increasingly taken a cultural turn, forcing us to consider the question of what wins wars in a new light. Historians used to emphasise the material aspects of war, specifically the quality and quantity of resources. That approach, bringing together technological proficiency and economic strength, appeared to help explain struggles for mastery within the West, as well as conflicts between the West and non-West. Now, the focus is rather on strategic culture – how tasks are set and understood – and on how resources are used. It involves exploring issues such as fighting quality, unit cohesion, morale, leadership, tactics, strategy, as well as the organisational cultural factors that affect assessment and use of resources. Instead of assuming that organisational issues were driven by how best to use, move and supply weapons, this approach considers how they are affected by social patterns and developments.

Former assumptions by historians that societies are driven merely by a search for efficiency and maximisation of force as they adapt their weaponry to optimise performance in war ignored the complex process in which interest in new weapons interacted with the desire for continuity. Responses by warring parties to firearms, for example, varied, with some societies, such as those of Western Europe, proving keener to rely on firearms than others, for example in East and South Asia. This becomes easier to understand by considering the different tasks and possibilities facing armies at the time – when it is far from clear which weaponry, force structure, tactics, or operational method can be adopted most successfully – rather than thinking in terms of clear-cut military progress.

Cultural factors also play a role in responses to the trial of combat. The understanding of loss and suffering, at both the level of ordinary soldiers and of societies as a whole, is far more culturally conditioned

than emphasis on the sameness of battle might suggest, and variations in the willingness to suffer losses influences both military success and styles of combat.

Furthermore, war is not really about battle but about attempts to impose will. Success in this involves far more than victory on the battlefield; that is just a pre-condition of a more complex process. The defeated must be willing to accept the verdict of battle. This involves accommodation, if not acculturation – something that has been far from constant in different periods and places. Assimilating local religious cults, co-opting local élites, and, possibly, today, offering the various inducements summarised as globalisation, have been the most important means of achieving it over the years. Thus military history becomes an aspect of total history; and victory in war is best studied in terms of its multiple contexts.

Any selection of what to include is difficult. The editors in this series have done an excellent job and it has been a great pleasure working with them.

JEREMY BLACK

Series Editor

University of Exeter

Introduction

‘Have we not been rather carried off our feet by the great flood of research? Where is it taking us?’ Thus queried in 1920 the later mayor of Oxford (1949–50), Norman Whatley (1864–1965), then Fellow of Hertford College (Oxford) and University Lecturer in Ancient History (1907–23).¹ The question – even for Greek history – is no less apropos in the early twenty-first century after an explosion of conventional print publications in the last quarter of the twentieth. Is this burst of hard copy only an initial volley before a thermonuclear blast of electronic texts? In 1999–2000 alone no less than 14 French-language volumes addressed the theme of war and society in Classical Greece.² Yet between 1993 and 2000 Anglophones produced only four such tomes, of which one can be justified as a *Festschrift*.³

Finding one’s way through the dense smoke of publications requires guidance. Encyclopedic works offer emergency aid. The five volumes of W.K. Pritchett’s *The Greek State at War*, the harvest of a lifetime of meticulous research, collects the ancient literary, documentary and archaeological evidence on battle and campaign procedures, pay, booty, POWs and captives, civil–military relations, burial, religious practices and other topics, but the often idiosyncratic interpretations, unsystematic arrangement of topics and the absence of an index (both for the individual volumes and the work as a whole) do not render this compendium of evidence user-friendly for the novice.⁴ A massive two-volume *Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare* (2007) will devote its first band to Greek affairs and an *Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World* is being planned.

The study of ancient Greek military history certainly remains an active pursuit and reflects a renaissance of interest in military history inside academe. Outside the academy, as popular publishing houses are well aware, the thirst for military history of all periods has been essentially unquenchable, whether we attribute this lust to romanticism, escapism or simply to the passion of the general public for history. Among scholars, the conversion of military history amidst the ever-changing fads of historiography into a form of social history, thus making it palatable within universities, has been combined with a realization that war is an important historical phenomenon. Since the study of war as a legitimate academic pursuit has long flourished in political science, sociology and anthropology, the prejudice against it among historians becomes all the more glaring. From a scholarly perspective, however, new historical approaches adding sizzle to the explosion of publications have been a mixed blessing, for the proliferation of publications need not indicate originality or

perceptive thinking and is often accompanied by doctrinal and methodological prejudices and blinders. Quantity and quality are not the same. To some extent, Whatley's query of 1920, with its subtext of whither and why, seems to remain unanswered nearly a century later.

In the context of such profusion, the goals of a Classical Greek volume for Professor Black's series must remain modest: to present a collection of essays highlighting significant debates in the activities, techniques and performance of Greek armies along with the political, cultural, social, economic and legal as well as military character of Greek warfare between Homer and the Battle of Mantinea (362 BC). The death of the Theban general Epaminondas at the inconclusive Battle of Mantinea offers a suitable terminus for the treatment of Classical Greek armies, as subsequent developments (despite some continuities of practice) best belong to the consideration of the rise of Macedonian power under Philip II and Alexander the Great, the subject of another volume in this series. For the period between Homer and Epaminondas, which witnesses the dawn of the Western military tradition, the political fragmentation of the Greek world and the nature of the sources preclude a focus on the army of a single Greek polis (city-state). Likewise, the term 'armies' in this volume's title must be taken as being synonymous with warfare and the functions, beliefs and practices of citizen-soldiers responding to the exigencies of war. Standing armies (except possibly at Sparta) did not exist, and military professionalism (with due account taken for Greeks in mercenary service) only began to emerge on a grand scale in the wars between major poleis on the Greek mainland in the fifth century. The term 'armies' also indicates an emphasis on terrestrial combat, although no discussion of Greek warfare can exclude naval affairs, treated (with bibliographical references) in many of the essays. Amphibious operations are not a modern invention.

The essays have been selected on the basis of their significance for specific points in debates or their theoretical value in shaping and critiquing controversial viewpoints. Inclusion indicates the editor's belief in the essay's importance but is not necessarily an endorsement of that essay's position. The requirements of the series dictated an exclusively Anglophone collection and the ever-necessary limits on space led to difficult decisions. Neither the wargamer's fascination with battles nor the obsession in some scholarly circles for socioeconomic topics and interpretations is given preference. Instead, an effort has been made to present the totality of issues and debates in the development of Classical Greek warfare. The first section of this Introduction will provide an overview of recent trends in Greek military history with due consideration of the so-called 'new' approaches. By design, the selection of essays has not privileged 'new'

approaches to the detriment of essays based on traditional historical, philological and archaeological methodologies, as if traditional approaches, which often better appreciate the limitations of the sources, are somehow inferior. In this way the common academic error of equating 'new' with 'better' (rather than simply 'different') is avoided. The second section will place the essays into a context of scholarly debate and historical problems, and the remaining five sections will discuss the essays that appear in this volume. The footnotes offer an additional bibliography (including non-Anglophone publications) that directs readers to supplementary discussions and covers topics that were denied inclusion because of limitations of space. Thus armed, readers – even those without prior knowledge of the field – should be properly equipped to tour and evaluate the battlefield of scholarship on Classical Greek armies and warfare. All ancient dates mentioned in this Introduction are BC unless otherwise noted.

Recent Trends in Greek Military History: An Overview

If generalizations may be permitted, throughout most of the twentieth century the field of ancient history in the Anglophone and Germanic worlds remained self-absorbed and dominated by the historicist-inspired pursuits of collecting and analysing documents in order to produce learned *corpora*, narrative synthesis, biography, institutional and constitutional history, prosopography and, occasionally, science and technology. Yes, ancient historical studies largely focused on great men, aristocratic culture and society, historiography and the civilizing mission of Graeco-Roman civilization, but it also demanded rigour, mastery of the Greek and Latin languages in addition to other major modern scholarly tongues, and promoted critical thinking to probe the reality behind stylistically polished, but often tendentiously written, literary sources. Such self-containment had some justification, given the significance of sophisticated auxiliary disciplines, such as archaeology, epigraphy, papyrology, paleography and numismatics. Military history had its place, if enlightened by exploiting new evidence from the auxiliary disciplines or presented from the perspective of biography or political or institutional history. Operational and tactical history, although occasionally tolerated, was frowned upon and not encouraged. Ancient historians shared the prejudice of colleagues in other historical fields that military history was an inferior pursuit on the grounds that, first, it was unscholarly, beneficial only to professional soldiers, and the recreation of retired

generals or amateur wargamers and, second, the lack of new literary sources meant that tactical or operational history could not possibly offer anything original or new; everything that could be argued about an ancient battle had already been said.

Even this generalized picture, however, requires qualification, for Greek military history was even more a curiosity than Roman and remained confined within the permissible rules of practice just outlined.⁵ Yet, in areas of Europe that were once part of the Roman Empire, the Roman army and excavation of Roman frontier sites formed a part of local – indeed, national – history, which justified the detailed study of Roman military history within various national academies. Until the 1990s one could earn a degree in Roman army studies at the University of London.

The extent to which Anglophone ancient historians before 1970, for example, paid attention to historiographical trends in the field of military history as a whole is unclear. It was probably idiosyncratic. During the 1970s and 1980s a ‘war and society’ approach to the study of all things military began to emerge in modern military history. Some (an originator of the phrase is obscure) labelled it the ‘new military history’. Battle and campaign history remained anathema, but the social composition of armies and their economic effects, military policy, sociological issues and so on acquired legitimacy as academic research topics. How new the ‘new military history’ really was and the accuracy of perceiving military history as a narrow field concerned only with operations is debatable.⁶

If the ‘war and society’ approach was new to Anglophone historiography, it was ‘old hat’ in France, the source of many twentieth-century intellectual trends and where the *Annales* school had forged a distinctive brand of socioeconomic historiography that stressed long-term trends (time – *la longue durée*), geography (space), demography and history ‘from the bottom up’ (with an emphasis on non-elite populations). According to this line of thought, major events (for example, wars) and great men became trivialities (epiphenomena) in the sweeping tide of larger historical forces; the individual in the historical process was minimalized into a puppet manipulated by socioeconomic trends and social structures. By privileging socioeconomic views, the *Annales* school, although not originally Marxist-oriented, invited Marxist interpretations (both blatant and cryptic – that is, Marxist views without use of the ‘M’ word, currently a common practice), which varied from none to heavy according to the taste of the individual practitioner. In medieval history the work of Georges Duby, a leader of the *Annaliste* movement, did not shy away from military topics and Philippe Contamine’s now standard survey is also of *Annaliste* inspiration.⁷ Likewise the work of André

Corvisier on the early modern period is also in the *Annaliste* tradition.⁸ André Aymard (1900–64) pioneered the application of the ‘war and society’ approach to Greek military history in several valuable essays⁹ and inspired a generation of distinguished Francophone work on Greek warfare by Yvon Garlan, Raoul Lonis and Pierre Ducrey.

Coeval with the development of the *Annales* school (in which comparative work also flourished), an anthropological/comparativist approach evolved, exploiting the work of Louis Gernet (1882–1962) and Henri Jeanmaire (1884–1960),¹⁰ as well as studies in comparative Indo-European mythology by Georges Dumézil (1898–1986).¹¹ Examination of the ‘warrior function’ in primitive societies and a fascination with initiation rites characteristic of structural anthropology (a label Dumézil disdained) led to views of sacral rhythms and rituals in Archaic Greek and early Roman warfare. A monograph interpreting border wars in Archaic Greece in terms of rituals and initiation rites had already appeared in 1961,¹² but the Parisian circle comprising Jean-Pierre Vernant (Gernet’s student), Marcel Détienne and Pierre Vidat-Naquet went on to develop this cultural approach to its full potential. A Sorbonne conference, headed by Vernant with planning input from Gernet and Aymard, produced a landmark of scholarship, *Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne*, which greatly influenced work on Greek warfare in the 1970s and 1980s and still remains noteworthy.¹³ In Paris Yvon Garlan continued the impetus of this anthropological approach, though indulging his Marxist tendencies, in his *La guerre dans l’antiquité* (1972), and in 1974 Détienne and Vernant produced a study of Greek craftiness, with implications for the cultural context of stratagems, when the now no longer fashionable fad for the history of *mentalités* was nascent.¹⁴

It would be erroneous to imply that it was only French scholars who attempted to exploit anthropology in order to understand Greek civilization, for the anthropological study of warfare in pre-state societies has a long and independent bibliographical history.¹⁵ The possibilities of using ethnological studies of primitive peoples to interpret Greek and Roman religious practices inspired Sir James G. Frazer’s classic *The Golden Bough* (1890) and the ‘Cambridge ritualists’ of the early twentieth century. Nevertheless, it was the French who initiated the trend of applying this approach to ancient Greek warfare.

Infiltration of these French trends into Anglophone scholarship on Greek warfare was not long in coming. In 1975 an English translation of Garlan’s *La guerre dans l’antiquité* appeared in a series edited by Sir Moses Finley (1912–86).¹⁶ In 1954 Finley had already applied anthropological analysis to an evaluation of Greek society in Homer, and his contribution to Vernant’s 1968 volume discusses the social structures of Spartan society, including inequalities within the hoplite

class of full citizenship, the *homoioi* ('similars'). There followed in 1973 Finley's *The Ancient Economy*, which rejected an ancient concept of capitalism in the Mediterranean world in favour of primitivized local economies.¹⁷ Just as Finley's analysis of Spartan society subsequently launched a still flourishing cottage industry of socioeconomic studies of Spartan society, the products of which are not relevant here, so his views of the ancient economy ignited a bonfire of debate that still rages, although his opponents may now have the blaze under control.

Besides Finley's adaptation of *Annaliste* perspectives to his own Marxist-related thought at Cambridge, Paul Cartledge's 1975 Oxford D.Phil, thesis on Sparta drew on *Annaliste* principles, as did his later massive study of the fourth-century Spartan king and mercenary general Agesilaus.¹⁸ Further stimulus came in 1972 with an English translation of the revised 1966 version of *Annaliste* Fernand Braudel's *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, first published in 1949. Among Anglophone ancient historians jumping on the Braudelian bandwagon became not just a fad but a mania from which the field has scarcely recovered. Suddenly, the blind could see and the lame walked! The term 'social structures' gained new technical prominence; history 'from the bottom up' became the preferred view; 'propaganda' disappeared in favour of 'ideology'; and 'aristocrats' turned into 'the ruling elite'. Through the 1980s and into the 1990s transhumance achieved a hitherto unknown status in interpretation and in North America some departments of History and Classical Studies began to restructure ancient Greek and Roman history into a Braudelian Mediterranean world. Mercifully, the passion for transhumance has abated, and critical objections to an ancient Mediterranean unity are now appearing.¹⁹

A new wave, however, crashed ashore in 1985. Finley issued a pounding assault on the supposed poverty of historicism, which coincided with a rip tide of postmodern literary theorists relativizing the use of texts and preaching the impossibility of objectivity. Finley's new research design for ancient history espoused the modelling of social scientists. Models permitted the blanks of evidence (anathema in historicism) to be filled in with hypotheses or an author's self-generated 'evidence' – economic or demographic statistics based on modern tables of statistics or formulae, although such tools might themselves be highly theoretical and based on assumptions. Quantification, increasingly popular in some fields of modern history, was 'in' despite the well-known unreliability of numbers in ancient literary sources. The historiographical genre of 'how they must have done it', based on modern *comparanda*, received a new stimulus. Simultaneously, Finley outlined a model for understanding war as a

structural factor in ancient society: the analysis of profits from war and their distribution could be used to circumvent the literary sources. Of course, what happened in a war militarily and how battles were fought were scorned as of no importance in comparison to financing wars and the profits thereby acquired, since all evidence for battles was unreliable.²⁰

Finley's Marxian version of the *Annales* school has had tremendous influence among Anglophones. Indeed Anglophone disciples of this school, radiant with a true believer's zeal, rarely acknowledge their French roots or their distinct approach and its theoretical assumptions. One speaks now of a 'Cambridge perspective' or a 'Cambridge school'. For present purposes, however, it is significant that, among Anglophones, the phrase 'war and society' has become synonymous with the *Annaliste*-Finleyite perspective. A 1993 volume, the fruit of a series of seminars at the Universities of Leicester and Nottingham held between 1988 and 1990, bore the title *War and Society in the Greek World*, took its departure from Finley's 1985 thoughts on treating war, and pushed an agenda. Notably, the only contributor to this collection with a reputation for Greek military studies, Alastair Jackson, refuted Finley's view on the profit motive in raiding and warfare during the Greek Dark Age (1100–750). Remarkable, too, for a volume lacking ground-breaking papers was Graham Shipley's 'Introduction', which fashionably defended overtly biased scholarship, espoused a presentist perspective on the interpretation of ancient Greece, dutifully mouthed basic *Annaliste* tenets, including the trivialization of war as a mere epiphenomenon, and diluted the definition of war from an act between states to any organized violence, such as piracy or colonization(!).²¹ The same coupling of war and violence appears in Bernard's 1999 French volume, *A l'épreuve de la guerre*, and van Wees' 2000 anthology, *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*.²²

An American anthology of 1999, *War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds* edited by Raaflaub and Rosenstein, was conceived as an expansion of the *Annaliste* war-and-society impetus into a global perspective embracing both the ancient and the medieval periods of Europe, Asia and Mesoamerica. Not all contributors, however, preached *Annaliste* structuralism. Indeed, the editors permitted Victor Davis Hanson and Barry Strauss to counter the *Annaliste* perspective in an appendix that pushed a different (and disappointing) agenda of essentially Western exceptionalism. The outstanding essay of the volume was written by the anthropologist Brian Ferguson, who correctly pointed out gaps in coverage, conceded that the individual just might be important in the historical process (heresy to *Annalistes*) and tried to fit historical work on war and society into the vast maze of anthropological theory.²³

Yet *Annaliste* influence (especially the emphasis on *la longue durée*, social structures and socioeconomic interpretations) also invaded archaeology in the 1970s and 1980s to create the so-called ‘new archaeology’, which represented this discipline’s divorce from its traditional marriage to history and art history. The new archaeology sought to become an independent entity with its own methodology and principles, despite its not-so-secret liaisons with Marxist-inspired cultural anthropology and its embrace of the ‘world systems’ (centre versus periphery) theory of the neo-Marxist, Immanuel Wallerstein. Excavators, whose real genius may lie in fieldwork, were now transformed into sophisticated social theorists, preferring anthropological theories to knowledge of the Greek and Latin languages, no longer considered essential for study of Greek and Roman archaeological materials.²⁴ Archaeologists thought that a new global-comparativist perspective was needed to investigate what was no longer ‘archaeology’ in its traditional mode but ‘material culture’, a change of terminology reminiscent of post-1917 Russia, where Institutes of Archaeology were renamed Institutes of Material Culture. New fields of theoretical, experimental and even feminist archaeology have emerged as the discipline has fragmented and radicalized, although traditional historically-based archaeologists survive, albeit in ever-decreasing numbers among Anglophones, as doctoral programmes delight in emphasizing scholarly fads. Today, an archaeologist who can read Greek or Latin is considered ‘interdisciplinary’. For Greek military history the influence of the new archaeology pales in comparison to its (often not propitious) effects on the study of the Roman Empire, although efforts at primitivizing, modelling and creating economic and demographic statistics are frequent.²⁵

The French societal and anthropological approach to war tended to treat war somewhat abstractly and to bypass its blood and gore. An Anglo-American approach, in contrast, stressed psychology and the details of violence. In 1976 John Keegan’s *The Face of Battle* inaugurated a new type of battle studies. Keegan focused on the experience of the individual soldier in battle. According to his analysis of Western military historiography, an emphasis on grand tactics, strategy and generalship portrayed the individual soldier as a faceless pawn on the battlefield chessboard – an automaton denied his humanity. From Keegan’s perspective, how and why a battle was won mattered not.²⁶ Hence a change in perspective from the general to the soldier was required to recapture the individual’s experience. The historian of battle should examine the prelude to the conflict (what the individual soldier did), weapons and equipment, the soldiers’ organization and motives, morale, fighting techniques, the course of

combat (the killing and wounding in the front lines) and, in the battle's aftermath, wounds and the treatment of the slain. Precedents for this approach came from the *Études sur le combat* (1880, 1903) of Colonel Ardant du Picq (1821–70), a French regimental officer killed at the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War, whose collection of ancient and contemporary material for a study of soldiers' behaviour in battle emphasized the role of morale, and from the work of the American S.L.A. Marshall (1900–77) on combat performance in the Second World War (1939–45) and the Korean War (1950–53).²⁷ Keegan wisely kept his distance from Marshall's controversial views, but cited Ardant du Picq with confidence.

Anglophone reviewers and historians in general ignored the Anglocentrism of a book that built its supposed universal case from studies of English armies at Agincourt (1415), Waterloo (1815) and the Somme (1916). 'Daily life' books on soldiers in particular wars had long anticipated some of Keegan's themes, as did, for example, the work of the semi-popular historian of the American Civil War, Bruce Catton, whose accounts of battle exploited soldiers' diaries and letters, as well as regimental histories, to give an impression of what individuals in the 'killing zone' experienced. But such works lacked the overarching theoretical framework of Keegan's book. Nor did anyone question Keegan's reconstructions of these battles – less a problem for the well-documented battles of Waterloo and the Somme than for Agincourt.²⁸ Furthermore, the psychology of combatants was already being investigated in France, where *esprit* had been a concern not only of French military writers since at least the Chevalier de Folard (1669–1752), but also of the *Annalistes*.²⁹

Keegan's elegant prose won over readers, and many historians, capitalizing on the work's popularity, adopted this approach to create a face of a battle for their own periods of historical specialization. Within the academy military history could now be grudgingly accepted: it was part of the preferred genre of social history. Rejection of the general's perspective of battle coincided with the long-standing prejudice against battle and campaign history and represented a new form of *Annaliste* history 'from the bottom up'. The concern for the minutiae of the soldier's existence echoed another favourite *Annaliste* theme – the trivia of daily life. Indeed Jean-Paul Sartre would have been proud of the 'no exit' quality of the final chapter on the future of the 'empty battlefield'. Recapturing an individual's personal experience likewise plugged into the postmodernist obsession with identity and the brief fad among the trendy set of literary scholars (now thankfully *passé*) for self-reflective autobiographical musings.

In 1989 Victor Davis Hanson (with Keegan's blessing in an 'Introduction') created a Classical Greek face of battle.³⁰ Hanson

copied Keegan's formula, even including a weak chapter on Greek pre-battle alcohol consumption in imitation of Keegan's observance of this phenomenon in modern armies. For 1989 the work represented a remarkable and readable synthesis of what was known about clashes of rival phalanges between the times of Homer and Epaminondas. But there were also problematic innovations. Hanson inserted tenets of 'buddy theory', developed after the Second World War, into the hoplite phalanx: the effective cohesion of small combat units depended on the mutual support and loyalty of members of the 'primary group' and soldiers really fought for their own self-preservation and to avoid shame before their 'buddies' rather than for patriotism, hatred of the enemy or other reasons. Hanson imaged a phalanx of friends, relatives and neighbours, young and old, fighting side by side.

Unlike the combat depicted in Keegan's *Face of Battle*, however, no detailed accounts of Greek battles exist before Herodotus' view of Marathon (490) and only a handful of others thereafter. No single battle could be the basis of reconstructing Greek combat. A mosaic of *tesserae* from different sources (literary as well as historical) spanning four centuries had to be pieced together to create a 'typical' battle for exposition. Imagination and conjecture could fill gaps in the evidence, and changes in Greek warfare, particularly those beginning with the Persian Wars (490, 480–479), were played down.

Furthermore, hoplite battle was elevated into a central feature of Greek culture, the epitome of democracy in action and the handiwork of practical, middle-class, no-nonsense Greek farmers fighting for freedom ('civic militarism') – a view elaborated in some of Hanson's later works. Most dubious, however, was Hanson's undocumented and poorly researched hypothesis that Greek hoplite battle created a concept of 'decisive battle', which became a Western tradition – his so-called 'Western way of war'. This thesis, as well as much else in *The Western Way of War*, was recycled from a diachronic perspective in a 1999 volume in Keegan's *Cassell History of Warfare* series.³¹ But Hanson's view of 'decisive battle' ignored periods of Western military history when battles were shunned, the doctrine of Graeco-Roman military theorists that preached avoidance of battle and advocated stratagems, the problem of transmission of the alleged tradition in the West across the ages, and the occurrence of non-Western 'decisive battles' or, rather, the existence of the same tension between battle and trickery in both Western and non-Western military theory and practice.³² Two years after the appearance of *The Western Way of War*, Hanson edited an anthology on the Greek battle experience. The contributions of other scholars broadened the coverage of the 1989 monograph and one essay essentially demolished Hanson's view of the

role of the general. Remarkably for an anthology, the work has been recently reissued.³³

Like the Braudelian version of *Annaliste* doctrine, the face-of-battle approach produced adulation and imitation rather than critical thinking. A 1993 ‘day school’ at the University of Wales, Swansea, attempted to broaden the ancient face of battle to New Kingdom Egypt, Homer, Alexander the Great and the Romans with very mixed results.³⁴ The Keegan-Hanson formula was adaptable: if the assumptions behind the approach were accepted, selecting ancient literary evidence to create the desired picture became a pedestrian stroll through the sources to cull the right passages. A school that condemned the interpretation of soldiers in battle as automata paradoxically produced its own automata.³⁵

Adrian Goldsworthy even attempted to convert the face-of-battle approach into a method in his Oxford D.Phil, thesis (directed by a papyrologist!), which Oxford University Press rushed into print to exploit the fad. Although occasionally critical of Keegan, Goldsworthy’s treatment of the Roman cohortal legion slavishly followed the Keegan–Hanson model and put blind faith in the views of Ardent du Picq and especially Marshall, whose questionable assertion that only 25 per cent of soldiers in a battle actually fight became a cornerstone of Goldsworthy’s view of Roman tactics. In working from English translations of the ancient sources, he not only sidestepped innumerable philological problems of the meaning of technical military terms in Latin and Greek, but also ignored the rich German tradition of work on the thorny problems of Roman tactics. His confidence in his face-of-battle method allowed him to contradict the sources or ignore their limitations and indulge his imagination in creating his own version of Roman battle tactics. Roman pre-battle drinking (despite the lack of evidence) was inserted, following Hanson’s imitation of Keegan. The result – from a scholarly perspective – was reminiscent of Hans Delbrück’s excesses in *Sachkritik* a century earlier, although Goldsworthy continues to prosper as a popularizer.³⁶

As Leo Tolstoy realized, the novelist and the historian of battle have much in common.³⁷ The ancient face-of-battle enthusiasts often cannot contain their zeal for trying to relive battles, as opposed to re-creating them with an historian’s reserve for what the sources permit to be said. Greek and Latin sources simply do not give all the details we wish to know. Use of *comparanda* from other cultures and time periods or arguing ‘inherent military probability’ (*Sachkritik*) to supplement gaps in evidence offer a topic for legitimate methodological debate among historians. But drawing a composite picture from chronologically scattered sources – a common practice of

social history – seems less satisfying for battles, unique events for which the circumstances can never be precisely duplicated.

Applying ‘buddy theory’, designed for small groups fighting at considerable distances from both each other and the enemy in an age of modern mechanized, long-range weapons seems a dubious approach for an era of closely-ordered mass armies in formal pitched battles using hand-held weapons and fighting in close combat. Discipline and morale were problems of ancient, as well as modern, armies. A preference for willing over compulsory obedience can be traced as early as Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia* (c.362) and a concern for morale is evident in Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, Caesar and Vegetius among others. The issues of discipline, regimentation, morale and automata are much murkier than the face-of-battle school portrays them. Likewise, unit cohesion is a universal concern for armies, but, for Antiquity, identifying the so-called ‘primary unit’ (if one wishes to concede a role for ‘buddy theory’ in Antiquity at all) is very problematic. The building block of the phalanx was the file, not the rank, so Hanson’s hoplites might have their friends and neighbours behind them in the file but not necessarily beside them in the adjacent files. The issue is no less difficult for the Roman legion.³⁸

Remarkable, too, is that other historians have uncritically accepted the face of battle’s foundations – the work of Ardant du Picq. None of the messengers – Keegan, Hanson and Goldsworthy – has ever been in battle, but neither had Ardant du Picq, except for his brief participation in the siege (not a field battle) of Sebastopol (1855) during the Crimean War, where he was captured and held as a POW for several months before reassignment in France. Ardant du Picq’s supposed knowledge of battle reflected avid reading of the debates on shock tactics in the works of eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century military theorists, from which he borrowed extensively without acknowledgement. In addition, he circulated among a limited number of French officers a questionnaire requesting information about their battle experience. It netted a poor rate of response. Ardant du Picq knew the ancient sources only through a popular French translation. In fact, his short monograph on ancient battle had a very restricted private circulation and his ‘book’ on modern battle was a reconstruction of a supposed text from his notes long after his death.

Nor by any means was Ardant du Picq’s work on battle a dispassionate study, but rather a tract of propaganda to protest French army reforms in 1867, which proposed to dilute a small professional army with mass conscripts. The circle of French officers to which he belonged opposed these reforms, and Ardant du Picq’s studies really aimed to demonstrate the superiority of small armies over armed hordes, besides airing his own views on tactical improvements at the

regimental level. His political purpose and lack of originality undercut great confidence in his work which, for unclear reasons, was rediscovered by the French General Staff in the late 1870s and was properly published, in reconstructed form, for the first time in 1880. Its rise to the status of a 'classic' came only after another edition in 1903, when Ardant du Picq's views on the role of morale corresponded to the doctrines of 'the offensive' and the 'will to victory' then widely being disseminated in the French army. Even less need be said about the credibility of Marshall's controversial views, which have been exploded in detail.³⁹

If, from one perspective, the current ancient face-of-battle phenomenon has produced a host of formulaic, unoriginal but imaginative work, riddled with conjectures and either uncritical of the genre's foundations or unscrupulous in use (or disregard) of ancient sources, it has also had paradoxical effects: sneaking into the academy as a form of permissible social history, the phenomenon has intensified battle studies of all sorts, thus proving the Thucydidean-Clausewitzian dictum that war cannot be kept within prescribed bounds, but has its own logic with a propensity to expand. That expansion is now giving birth to the new field of conflict archaeology – apparently a marriage of the new archaeology with the face-of-battle school. In 2005 E.J. Brill launched a new *Journal of Conflict Archaeology* to celebrate these nuptials.⁴⁰ For the medieval period and later eras – less archaeologically explored than Antiquity – one can perhaps look forward to the new field's contributions. There can be no question of the value of topographical studies and even excavation of battle sites to yield new and significant data in cases where the site of the battle is secure (not always the case for Antiquity). But what is 'new' here? The scholarly examination of battlefields by archaeologists and historians has flourished for over a century. Clearly, old wine is being recycled into the new jargonistic archaeology encased in various theoretical frameworks, often of only superficial merit. So far, some contributions to this 'new' genre seem only to be manifestations of traditional battlefield or military archaeology under a new 'sexy' rubric; other practitioners of the 'new' genre claim no interest in understanding the battle itself, but want to study only the 'landscape' of the site. *Cui bono?* It is a sign of the times that disciplines must constantly reinvent themselves (even if dubiously) in order to appear perpetually 'new' or 'at the cutting edge'.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century the new approaches of the twentieth are blending into a hodge-podge of so-called interdisciplinary studies, which often seem to lack the rigour of methodological rules and to promote presentism in interpreting Antiquity (for example, moral judgements on slavery and the status/

treatment of women) and decrying the absence of ‘politically correct’ values. Modelling has blurred the distinction between theory and evidence. Discerning distinct schools is no longer easy, although crypto-Marxism remains rampant. The *Annaliste* perspective of ancient history continues its prolific emissions and seems (if the hiring preferences at Anglophone universities is anything to go by) on the verge of drowning out the voices of non-believers or heretics.

A new field calling itself ‘historical anthropology’ (an absurd self-contradictory label from an historicist’s viewpoint) has produced at least one worthwhile anthology with useful essays by notable scholars on killing in war. Its uneven coverage extends from the ancient Near East through Greece, Rome and the Middle Ages to such varied times and areas as New Guinea, East Africa, the First World War and Germany in the Second World War.⁴¹ A journal of this new ‘discipline’, *Historische Anthropologie*, issued its thirteenth volume in 2005. Indeed, the new emphasis on global perspectives has fostered an appeal to the universalist pursuits of anthropology, as opposed to history’s emphasis on the specific and the unique. Comparative history (in comparison to anthropology) presents too many caveats.⁴² But many ancient historians no longer recognize the difference between history and anthropology. *Comparanda* from other times and cultures can be seamlessly inserted into discussions of Antiquity as if they are primary evidence and not examples by analogy. Anthropological evidence *and theory* are often uncritically assumed to be a secure explanation of an historical *aporia* without regard for disputes about theory, methodology and interpretations within the field of anthropology itself. Of course, Keegan experimented with an anthropological approach to war in 1993, although he subsequently returned to his historical roots.⁴³ A recent revisionist treatment of Greek warfare, inspired by Garland’s *War in the Ancient World*, seeks to reconceptualize the period between Homer and Aristotle as an era of relative unity in practices. An anthropological, rather than an historical, viewpoint underlies many of the controversial arguments.⁴⁴

But a slightly different aspect of anthropology is also now in vogue: war as a product of culture. In general this is not the fashionable Marxist-inspired cultural anthropology, but instead hearkens back to the cultural approach of Vernant’s 1968 volume. Hanson elaborated his views of hoplite battle and Greek values from his *Western Way of War* in a 1995 book, which presented his theory connecting the conventions of Greek warfare with agricultural practices. His *Carnage and Culture* – from one perspective an update of Edward Creasy’s classic *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World* (1852) – expanded his flawed 1989 thesis about Western ‘decisive battle’ into a global perspective stretching from the Greeks to the present. Subsequently,

the tragic events of 9/11 catapulted the work onto the bestseller list.⁴⁵ A new impetus to the cultural approach, in fact, draws inspiration from the cultural aspects of the so-called 'war on terrorism'. In 2003 two volumes offered universalist perspectives on war and culture. Shannon French's *Code of the Warrior* treated warrior values and warrior codes in selected times and cultures from Homer to the present. John Lynn's *Battle* covered the same ground but with an interesting twist: Lynn exploited the cultural approach to offer a more historically conditioned alternative to the face-of-battle school, which by assuming a single timeless human nature promotes technological determinism. Although his chapter on Greeks did not break new ground, his demolition of Hanson's Western-way-of-war thesis was more successful.⁴⁶ Culture also drives another response to the face-of-battle school: J.E. Lendon's study of military antiquarianism – innovation as imitation of the past in Greek and Roman armies.⁴⁷ Here, other factors are discounted to render culture not a context but essentially a monocausal determinant. Although aware of face-of-battle foibles, Lendon accepts some aspects of Goldsworthy's fanciful reconstruction of Roman tactics as well as van Wees' recent controversial down-dating of the fully developed hoplite phalanx.

This discussion of current trends in ancient Greek military history has focused on schools of thought and so-called 'new approaches'. It has not included the influence of trends in literary theory and criticism on the interpretation of ancient historians: for example, finding flaws in Thucydides is currently fashionable, and Herodotus is now notable for discussions of 'the Other'. Work on ancient historiography has become increasingly literary. But this discussion has also largely ignored work of a traditional nature of which much of good quality has been produced. The next section of this Introduction will remedy this imbalance. Given the doctrinarism of some of the 'new approaches', the incredulity with which they have been received and propagated, and the smug sense of superiority in the innate quality of their 'newness', exposure of their foibles is long overdue. One finds less to fault in the original French *Annales* school than in their Anglophone imitators.⁴⁸

The theme of war and society need not, and should not, be a monopoly of *Annaliste* structuralism. The recent turn to the cultural context of war is refreshing – a relief from the socioeconomic obsession of the structuralists. Here, war can again be viewed against the totality of the society, culture and the *Zeitgeist* in which it occurs. Although the cultural approach is conceptually related to anthropology, it also recalls the efforts (however flawed) of Hans Delbrück's *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im rahmen der politischen Geschichte*.⁴⁹ Delbrück was the first historian to apply the principles of

historicism to military history and, wresting this study from the grasp of General Staff historians, retired officers and popularizers, he brought military history into the academy. His emphasis on topography, criticism of literary sources and *Sachkritik* (inherent military probability) remain essential methodological tools, even if he himself carried them to excess. Moreover, he examined war within its societal and cultural context: war in all its aspects as a product of its time. The new cultural approach owes a debt to Delbrück.

The Context: Scholarly Debate and Historical Problems

When Homer's rosy-fingered dawn cast its first light on the birth of the Western military tradition, the bard's twin icons of alternative military ethics, Achilles and Odysseus, were already flourishing. Achilles' warrior prowess dominates the *Iliad*, but Odysseus' stratagem of the Trojan Horse won the war. Homer became the basis of Greek education. The values of Homeric warriors in the *Iliad* shaped the minds of Greek combatants in the Classical hoplite phalanx, which began its development in the late eighth century. Philip II of Macedón's victory over Athens and Thebes at Chaeronea (338) represented (in general terms) the end of an era, as Philip's reforms and creation of the Macedonian phalanx exploited the tactical and strategic changes in the Greek conduct of war after the Persian Wars (490, 480–479). Homer could even be cited as the inspiration for the Macedonian phalanx.⁵⁰

For Homer, 'phalanx' was one of several vague terms for small groups of warriors; it was not the large formation of massed heavy infantry seen in Thucydides and Xenophon. In the *Iliad*, battle scenes emphasized duels of heroes as 'forefighters' (*promachoi*), often coming to battle in chariots but dismounting to fight and to display their martial excellence (*arete*) before their retinues, who also at times joined in the general melee. In Homer the spear is predominantly a missile weapon. The Classical hoplite phalanx, however, consisted of heavy infantry (hoplites) massed many ranks deep – eight, for unknown reasons, was the typical depth. A hoplite, a term first attested in the late sixth century and derived from *hopla* (the warrior's full set of equipment),⁵¹ carried, as his principal weapon, an eight-foot thrusting spear (*dory*); his chief defensive arm was a concave round shield (*aspis*) about three feet in diameter, made of wood with a bronze rim and sometimes a thin bronze sheet covering its face. This double-grip shield featured a central armband (*propax*) on its inner face for insertion of the forearm and a leather thong handgrip

(*antilabe*) on the inside right edge of the shield. The double grip evenly distributed the shield's weight (15–16 lbs), which could also be relieved by resting the shield on the left shoulder. In a sideways stance the *aspis* offered full protection to the warrior, but in charging an enemy or fighting from a frontal stance, the shield protected only the combatant's left side. A bronze cuirass, greaves and other armour for specific body parts might be added at the hoplite's discretion or according to his economic means, as before the fourth century individuals provided their own equipment. Armaments probably varied considerably, especially during the seventh and sixth centuries. By c.550 a leather or linen corslet often replaced the heavy bronze cuirass. The so-called Corinthian helmet covering the whole head and provided with a nose-guard and wide cheek pieces was the most common, but not the only type of headgear, and by the late fifth century – perhaps because it impaired the warrior's vision – the Corinthian helmet gave way to a conical felt or metal cap (*pilos*), covering only the top of the head.⁵²

The changes in Greek battle between Homer and Thucydides, however, present a host of problems directly connected to the political, social, economic and cultural development of Greek civilization over four centuries. Who fights, how, when and why are not exclusively military questions. The Classical hoplite phalanx represented the community in arms. Military glory, the exclusive privilege of a well-born few in Homer, somehow passed to a broader segment of the population, which had acquired not only the opportunity to join the wellborn in achieving glory, but had also gained the economic capacity to afford the requisite equipment. Could such an extension of the warrior function within Greek society occur without constitutional and political changes in a community? The phalanx was also a geographical paradox. Mountainous Greece developed a style of warfare best suited for level plains, as this formation's success depended on maintenance of its files in a solid front – a difficult task in broken terrain. The phalanx lacked manoeuvrability, and no Greek polis before the fifth century had the financial means and bureaucratic substructure to wage long and distant wars or to man permanent border defences. Neither battlefield generalship nor a sense of strategy is much in evidence among Greeks before 500. Rather, a set of unwritten rules, called the 'laws of the Greeks' in Thucydides, seemed to have regulated relations between Greek poleis, and battles appear to have had ritualized aspects – some religious in origin, others not. When and why did such unwritten rules originate?

Archaic Warfare 750–500 BC

Such questions come into sharper focus with the essays comprising Part I of this volume. After the collapse of Mycenaean civilization in the twelfth century, the Greeks entered a 'Dark Age'. Palaces, with their centralized bureaucracies and economies, disappeared, and urban centres declined with a general loss of wealth and population throughout Greece. Even the art of writing was forgotten. Around 750 Greece began to re-emerge with an explosion of activity: an increase in population and wealth; the invention of the Greek alphabet; the creation of larger political communities usually centred on an urban complex; distant trade; and the establishment of overseas colonies. Traditionally, Homer belongs to this flurry of developments after 750, as does first evidence of hoplite equipment (c.725). Thus began the so-called Archaic period, which would run until c.500, when the Persian Wars initiated the Classical period, traditionally terminated by the death of Alexander the Great in 323.

Politically, the Archaic period witnessed both extensive constitutional developments within poleis and their territorial expansion. A tripartite division of a political community between an executive, a council of elders and an assembly of free adult males, evident already in Homer, experienced shifts of power between the three components – a process that varied from polis to polis. Monarchs, never absolute in Greece, disappeared, either devolving into a magistrate with religious functions (for example, the *archon basileus* at Athens) or retaining some military authority with limited political power, as at Sparta, where the peculiarity of dual kings from different dynasties persisted. Throughout much of the Archaic period, power lay in the hands of wealthy aristocrats who controlled the councils. The emergence of a middle class brought its inclusion into the power structure in both the councils and the assemblies. Property qualifications for full citizenship or access to specific high magistracies characterized many Greek constitutional systems. From the late seventh through the sixth centuries – the so-called 'age of tyrants' – particularly prosperous poleis (for example, Corinth, Sicyon, Megara and Athens) often fell under the control of a single aristocrat, although the term 'tyrant' in this period denoted only a ruler's acquisition of power through irregular means. Sparta's escape from this constitutional phenomenon allowed her to pose as a liberator of other poleis from tyrants. The overthrow of a tyrant could lead to an oligarchy (rule by a wealthy few) or, as at Athens, set a polis on the road to democracy (full political participation by all citizens), although, in either case, members of the old aristocratic families continued to assume key positions of leadership.

Aristotle linked constitutional modifications with changes in military organization.⁵³ After the fall of monarchies, he posited a

period of oligarchy in an age of cavalry, since only the wealthy could afford to keep horses. The emergence of heavy infantry (that is, hoplites) as the chief arm of the battlefield corresponded to the extension of full political rights to a middle class capable of equipping themselves. In Aristotle's view, light infantry and navies coincided with democracies, in which the least wealthy had the franchise. Aristotle's age of aristocratic cavalry, which would fall at an early phase of the Archaic period, remains extremely problematic. But if the evolution of the hoplite phalanx cannot be divorced from the political development of the polis, tying the phalanx to specific constitutional reforms and identifying the hoplites as a class (or classes) within a polis (for example, the Yokemen/Zeugitai of Solon's classification of Athenian citizens in the early sixth century) provides fuel for debate.

A Greek political community or polis, conventionally translated as 'city-state', consisted of not only an urban centre (*asty*), but also agricultural and grazing land (*chora*). The bulk of a polis' population was rural. Small farmers competed with the large landholdings of aristocratic families. Citizens of a polis believed that they shared a common ancestry from a particular god or hero and were united in devotion to religious cults and festivals peculiar to their polis. The precise process of the creation of a polis in the Archaic period is most obscure. A state (polis) had to achieve dominance over the individual household (*oikos*) of the aristocrat and the clans and phratries, to which aristocratic families belonged. The union (*synoecism*) of villages into the larger unit of the polis represented another part of the process, and poleis who experienced tyranny probably also saw an effort to centralize power in the urban centre at the expense of the aristocratic families of the countryside. Athens' expansion to incorporate the whole of Attica continued into the late sixth century. Nor was such expansion always peaceful. Athens acquired the island of Salamis (c.600) after hostilities with Megara, which had probably taken it from Aegina. Sparta, which dominated Laconia in the Peloponnese, doubled its territory to the west by the conquest of Messenia in the mid-seventh century. Border disputes (for example, Athens and Boeotia, Sparta and Argos) – some never resolved and a cause of war – characterized the Archaic period. Acquisition of territory was one thing, but conquest and destruction of another polis generally did not belong to the aims of Archaic warfare on the Greek mainland.

A paucity of sources complicates evaluation of the Archaic period. Herodotus' coverage is episodic within his larger theme of East-West conflict leading to the Persian Wars. Thucydides' focus on the greatest war in Greek history provides only cursory clues to Archaic events. Likewise, Aristotle views the Archaic period within the context of the

unstable domestic and international politics of the fourth century. Indeed many fourth-century sources (for example, Plato, Xenophon, Isocrates, Ephorus and Aristotle) espoused an intellectual movement called Panhellenism, which deplored the horrors of the inter-polis warfare of their day, saw barbarians (that is, Persians) as the true object of Greek hostilities and, looking back over the traumatic divide of the Peloponnesian War (431–404), idealized the Archaic period as a time of ‘civilized’ warfare. Roman-era sources, such as Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch and others, preserve fragments of many sources now lost (for example, Ephorus, Theopompus and Callisthenes), but must be used with caution. Contemporary sources for armies of the Archaic period amount to archaeological data (especially vase paintings depicting warriors and their equipment), some epigraphical material (public documents chiselled on stone are not yet frequent) and the work of lyric poets (often extant only in fragments), of which Tyrtaeus (fl. 650), a contemporary of the Spartan conquest of Messenia, has particular worth. And, of course, there is Homer.

Homer, a staple of literary critics, has also attracted historians. As long recognized, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* only purport to describe a Late Bronze Age past, for Homer understood neither the society of Mycenaean palaces nor Mycenaean warfare, although heirlooms of the Late Bronze Age world occur in the epics. But the poet himself invites question marks. Long debated is whether the same poet authored both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Does Homer represent the Greek alphabet’s revolution in writing technique and the mind that shaped two literary masterpieces or a stitcher of tales (rhapsode) – a compiler of orally transmitted stories? If ‘Homer’ dates to the end of the eighth century, is that also the date of the present text of the *Iliad*? Illustrations of events in the Trojan War only begin to occur in Greek art around 700, and no references in art or in the work of other poets to specific events in the *Iliad* appear until the late sixth century. Down-dating the *Iliad* to the seventh or even the sixth century, as some now advocate, not only removes Homer’s uniqueness as the *first* witness of Greek society and warfare after the Dark Age, but also introduces the possibility that the text is even more a multi-layered conglomerate from different eras than previously thought. If Homer really is so ‘late’, why did he ignore hoplite equipment and the Classical phalanx?

In 1947 Helen Lorimer assembled a still valuable collection of archaeological data on the origins of the phalanx in Greek warfare.⁵⁴ Subsequently, views prevailed that the phalanx, absent in Homer, suddenly appeared in the mid-seventh century, as attested in fragments of Tyrtaeus and the battle scenes on the Chigi vase (c.640); the use of the hoplite shield and phalanx were thought synonymous, as the fully armoured hoplite could only function within the context of

a phalanx and the peculiar double-grip shield offered no protection for retreat in the fluid combat of Homeric warriors, who would refuse or accept battle at their whim, or in the open style of combat seen in Geometric art. Close combat replaced long-range fighting. Furthermore, the occurrence of hoplite equipment anywhere in the Mediterranean world was assumed to indicate use of the phalanx. Belief in a 'hoplite revolution' spread, as the phalanx seemed to suggest that the polis was functioning and that a middling class (a term recently coined to avoid the modern connotations of 'middle class') of hoplites had arisen. Anthony Snodgrass, however, undercut such views in 1965: just as hoplite armour developed piecemeal over an extended period, so too did the phalanx evolve over time, with its mature form long post-dating invention of the *aspis*. The phalanx resulted from a process of transition; it was not a sudden event. Likewise, John Salmon questioned any connection between creation of the phalanx and a political role of hoplites in the rise of tyrants at Corinth, Sicyon and Megara in the seventh century.⁵⁵

Opposition to a 'hoplite revolution' also came from another quarter. Joachim Latacz argued there could be no such 'revolution' because a proto-phalanx – a two-rank formation, of which the *promachoi* formed the first – could already be seen in Homeric battles. Homer's emphasis on the heroic displays of the *promachoi* obscured the fact that combat between mass armies not only occurred, but moreover *determined* the engagements. Although Latacz denied the Spartan use of the hoplite shield in Tyrtaeus, he believed that no difference could be discerned between the style of warfare in the *Iliad* and what Tyrtaeus described. Indeed, contrary to a view that posited the phalanx as a formation created to suit the hoplite shield, the opposite was true: the phalanx stimulated the invention of the *aspis*. Despite a trenchant review,⁵⁶ Latacz's book won followers, and some of these carried the view of organized mass armies at Troy even further.⁵⁷ Others saw new perspectives for understanding the rise of the polis and sought to historicize Homeric society and warfare into an early Archaic reality: Finley's identification of Homeric society with the Greek Dark Age⁵⁸ must be rejected, for Homer represented not multi-layered material from different eras but an accurate portrayal of eighth-century Greek society. The new view of mass, 'egalitarian' combat on the plains of Troy in the *Iliad* now permitted rash speculations about the social and political state of Greece.⁵⁹

But the leader in historicizing Homer has become Hans van Wees, following Latacz in some respects but also striking out on his own paths. For van Wees, Homeric battle, a fluid affair of both individual and mass combat featuring long-distance as well as close combat and even occasional bunching into a mass formation, presents a consistent

picture that is confirmed by the style of battle of pre-state tribes in New Guinea. Although less assertive about organized units/formations than Latacz, van Wees sees no difference between Homeric warfare and that described by Tyrtaeus. He would date Homeric warfare precisely to 700–640, believes that he can spot the *aspis* in the *Iliad* and even takes the curious use of chariots in Homeric battle as accurate. Indeed, he argues that a mature Classical phalanx developed only in the first half of the fifth century; until that point, open formations of mixed heavy and light infantry (slingers, archers and the like) and even cavalry continued to be the norm.⁶⁰

Of course, much depends on accepting van Wees' anthropological bent in assessing Greek warfare and his firm belief that vase paintings accurately reproduce contemporary reality, as opposed to scenes from epic modernizing warriors with hoplite equipment, or likewise van Wees' own interpretations of what vase paintings show. Since artists of the fifth and fourth centuries declined to depict the phalanx despite having the technical ability to do so, arguing the phalanx's absence in earlier art seems less impressive. Literary critics have also reacted vigorously to such extreme historicizing of an epic poem. Van Wees' method of analysing Homeric battles has been attacked and his view of consistency in Homeric battle descriptions stoutly rebutted.⁶¹

In 1993 Anthony Snodgrass, reacting to the widespread enthusiasm for Latacz's view of Homeric battle, returned to the theme of Homer, hoplites and the phalanx. Although he conceded a role for non-nobles in Homeric battles, his essay, "The "Hoplite Reform" Revisited" (Chapter 1) dissects in detail efforts to find anything resembling the Classical phalanx in the *Iliad's* battle scenes. Snodgrass reasserts his 1965 view on the long process of developing the phalanx and saps more than a little wind from the sails of Latacz's proto-phalanx, thus bringing the ship of his enthusiasts closer to the shore of permissible interpretation. The essay offers a brief sampling of the intense debates cursorily summarized here.

Around 700 the Euboean cities of Chalcis and Eretria waged war over the Lelantine plain, a most obscure affair in extant sources, but a conflict that Thucydides could cite as the greatest of the Archaic period, involving nearly all Greek cities of that time. Moreover, the two cities negotiated a treaty to establish definite rules of engagement: missiles would be prohibited.⁶² This agreement, one of the most widely cited events of Greek history, seems to coincide with the view that Archaic poleis of the Greek mainland observed a set of definite rules and limited strategic goals in warfare against each other.

Rules for combat were not new. In the *Iliad* the duel (*monomachia*) between Menelaus and Paris to decide the Trojan War shows the existence of a well-established procedure for such contests. It involved

an oath between the parties, sacrifice and representatives of both sides marking off a prescribed space for battle.⁶³ Border wars between poleis could also feature similar ‘duels of champions’ – either an individual pair or groups of limited number (say, 300). In all probability, the ritualized procedures for formal battles of rival phalanges developed from the rules for *monomachia*. As late as 420 Argos’ proposal for a 50-year treaty with Sparta featured a clause stipulating that in the future their border dispute be resolved by battle, preceded by a formal challenge and with pursuit of the defeated stopping at their mutual border.⁶⁴ Furthermore, a prohibition of missiles corresponds to a supposed Greek prejudice against archery, which characterized the hoplite ethos in the fifth century, when all means except face-to-face close combat were considered shameful.

Nevertheless, missile weapons were not proscribed in a *monomachia*. Nor is the Greek attitude to archery so negative as often believed. A prohibition of missiles c.700 cannot be connected with the emergence of the hoplite phalanx, which scarcely existed in any form at that point, and about a half-century later Tyrtaeus reveals light-armed missile-throwers in combat behind and between heavily-armoured infantry. Indeed, the prohibition of a specific weapon in warfare has no parallel before the late nineteenth century, except for the Second Lateran Council’s ban, in 1139, on the use of bows and crossbows against Christians (although they were permitted against heretics and infidels). Likewise, an inscribed public document is unlikely for Eretria c.700: no other inscribed inter-polis treaties are known at so early a date, and the first public documents at Eretria preserved on stone date nearly two centuries later. A solution to the curiosity of this alleged treaty is offered in my essay, ‘Ephorus and the Prohibition of Missiles’ (Chapter 2), where it is demonstrated that the treaty, known only from much later sources – Polybius and Strabo – is an invention of the fourth-century historian Ephorus. Greeks of the fourth century and later often invented traditions and forged documents (some even inscribed) to create Archaic precedents for contemporary claims and political agendas. Ephorus espoused the Panhellenist movement in his history and glorified the ‘chivalrous’ warfare of the Archaic period. Ephorus’ attribution of a prohibition of missiles to the Lelantine War may actually be a protest against the recent introduction of the catapult, which threatened to change the agonistic character of Greek warfare. The case of the prohibition of missiles illustrates just how wary we must be about events of the Archaic period known only from much later sources.

So, too, with Sparta. By the fifth century Sparta reputedly had the best army in Greece. Its phalanx, manned by essentially professional citizen-soldiers who from early youth spent their whole lives in

military training, excelled all others in combat ferocity and manoeuvre. Spartans preferred death to surrender and boasted that the army relieved their city of a need for walls. This extreme civic militarism combined with a simple lifestyle, purportedly devoid of luxury and wealth, created the so-called 'Spartan mirage'.

Generalities and legends abound, but reliable specifics are few. Apart from scattered material in Herodotus, Thucydides and lyric poets such as Tyrtaeus and Alemán, detailed overviews of Spartan society begin with Xenophon's *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* (360s?). In the early second century AD, Plutarch's massive *Life of Lycurgus*, the legendary founder of the Spartan lifestyle and institutions, represents an avalanche of accumulated traditions and fantasies. The apparent stability and orderliness of Spartan society made it an object of veneration for political thinkers, especially after Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War and the downfall of its radical democracy. Xenophon's *Constitution* reflected this trend, and Plato's *Republic* drew inspiration from a Spartan model. In the Hellenistic era (323–31) composing a 'Spartan Constitution' became a favourite exercise of Peripatetic, Stoic and Cynic philosophers. Spartans of the Roman Imperial era exploited their reputation: the city became a tourist attraction.⁶⁵

Sparta's peculiarities stemmed from its decision in the early sixth century to cut itself off from the outside world and to preserve what became an antiquated form of society. Full citizens at Sparta (Spartiates) numbered only 9000. The final conquest of Messenia in the second half of the seventh century, however, not only doubled the territory of the Peloponnese under direct Spartan control, but created a class of state-owned slaves, the helots, who vastly outnumbered their Spartiate masters. Fear of a helot revolt guided Sparta's domestic and foreign policy. A constitutional crisis in the late seventh century, perhaps connected with the fruits of the Messenian conquest, is obscure, but by the mid-sixth century a board of five annually elected ephors (overseers) checked the power of Sparta's dual monarchs and held responsibility for foreign affairs as well as for some domestic concerns. Sparta avoided the rule of tyrants and helped oust tyrants in other Peloponnesian cities as well as at Athens, but in the long term distant military campaigns were avoided. By the end of the sixth century, Sparta had surrounded herself with a network of allies, the Peloponnesian League, obligated to follow Spartan directives in foreign policy and supply manpower in war. Domestically, a rigorous educational system, the *agoge*, trained Spartiate youth, divided into age-classes in warrior skills and endurance, until they were admitted into the common messes (*syssitid*) of adult males. Military training continued in adult life at the expense of the agricultural labour carried

out by the helots. Spartan isolationism precluded its production of coinage, invented at the end of the seventh century: hence Sparta's lack of liquid capital and the preservation of a form of barter economy.⁶⁶

The Spartan army is no less obscure than other aspects of Spartan society. A long antiquated view of the phalanx as a Dorian creation has no factual basis,⁶⁷ nor does a Spartan adoption of the phalanx after its defeat at Hysiae (c.669) by the phalanx of Pheidon of Argos. The association of the most common type of helmet with Corinth and the *aspis* with Argos could point to an origin of hoplite equipment in the north-eastern Peloponnese or merely indicate sites of frequent manufacture of such items. A connection between the phalanx and the Spartan conquest of Messenia is likewise unclear, although the denial of Spartan use of the hoplite shield in Tyrtaeus' poetry is surely too extreme. Tyrtaeus represents a stage when concepts of fighting for the common good of the polis had evolved and standing one's ground rather than the arbitrary flight typified by Homeric warriors was encouraged.

If a definite date for Sparta's adoption of the phalanx is elusive,⁶⁸ the organization of the Spartan army also defies certainty. Tyrtaeus mentions the three Doric tribes, which as large units of political association are also conceivably units of military organization, but at a later date the Spartan army was composed of five *lochoi* (divisions) which could correspond to the five *obai* (villages) incorporated into the polis of Sparta. Thucydides disputes aspects of Herodotus' details about the Spartan army, and the organization of the army in Xenophon's *Constitution* does not agree with Thucydides' account of the army at the Battle of Mantinea (418). Should various reforms of the Spartan army be posited? Evidence for sound solutions to these very thorny problems is lacking.⁶⁹ It is clear, however, that drill and professionalism permitted the Spartans to break up the phalanx into independently manoeuvrable sub-units.⁷⁰ Many fourth-century mercenary forces adopted Spartan organization, which became a model for subdivisions of the Macedonian/Hellenistic phalanx.

The flaws in Spartan society and its isolationism, however, could not be overcome. From the Persian Wars onwards, Spartan commanders (for example, Pausanias, Lysander) experienced the wider world and liked it. External wealth with its corruptive tendencies began to seep into Sparta. The image of the superior Spartan hoplite cracked in 425, when 120 Spartiates surrendered at Sphacteria to an Athenian amphibious force comprising largely light infantry, but it was irreparably broken after Epaminondas defeated the Spartans at Leuctra (371). The subsequent liberation of Messenia finally toppled Sparta from the ranks of major Greek powers. But

Sparta was also hampered by a shortage of manpower. Units of perioeci, the free non-citizen residents of Laconia, served as hoplites (although brigaded separately from Spartiates) at Plataea (479) and bolstered Spartan forces in the Peloponnesian War. Even helots could be freed and sent off for service outside the Peloponnese.⁷¹ A shortage of Spartiates to man the army, whether the product of demographic trends or the symptom of a socioeconomic problem of some failing to qualify for membership in the *syssitia*, became a real concern from the late fifth century onwards.

Sparta's military reputation demands that a volume on Classical Greek armies feature at least one essay on Antiquity's most renowned militaristic state. Yet suitable essays meeting this series' requirements are not abundant, and hard facts about the Spartan army were elusive even to Thucydides and other historians. The current fad for anthropology and comparative studies renders a now almost forgotten essay on the Spartan and Zulu military systems apropos.⁷² William Scott Ferguson (1875–1954), a fixture at Harvard for nearly a half century (1908–45) and best known as an epigrapher, was no stranger to the study of imperialism.⁷³ His essay, 'The Zulus and the Spartans: A Comparison of their Military Systems' (Chapter 3), draws striking parallels between the practices of the Zulus of southern Africa at the height of their power under the famous Shaka (r. 1816–28) and the regimented society of Classical Sparta, although Ferguson wisely refrains from going beyond the analogy of *ex similibus similia*. If the progress of scholarship on Sparta has long antiquated some of Ferguson's quaint views, the Zulu-Spartan comparisons bring into sharp relief the primitivism of Spartan practices, which even Greeks thought bizarre. From another perspective, the Zulus provide a modern illustration of the social and political changes attendant on the modification of military organization and styles of warfare. Although the Zulus did not develop a phalanx, their conversion from individual warriors with throwing spears to an ordered, disciplined linear formation with thrusting spears parallels Archaic Greek military development. Nor should the Zulus be taken as an ethnological curiosity, for Shaka astutely used terrorism as a military and domestic policy and, despite his disciplined army, preferred terror and the deceitfulness of Odysseus to direct confrontation in battle.⁷⁴

The final two essays in Part I offer contrasting overviews of the Greek warrior code as it had developed by the end of the Archaic and the beginning of the Classical periods. From the traditional perspective Greeks viewed war as an *agon*, a contest or competition with general rules, which limited its ferocity to a single clash of phalanges on a battlefield, the defined space of a plain. Wars were formally declared and hostilities announced to the opponent. A

display of superiority in a single brutally bloody collision sufficed. Seeking unfair advantage through deception or surprise attack was shameful. Possession of the battlefield after the contest constituted victory, as the defeated were not pursued for mass annihilation and the dispatch of a herald to request retrieval of the dead constituted a formal concession of defeat. Nor was the capture or destruction of the vanquished polis a strategic objective. The system perfectly accommodated both the phalanx of a citizen-militia and a state lacking the bureaucratic underpinnings and the financial resources for lengthy, distant campaigns. Equally, the system reflected the acknowledgment of a common Greek heritage: Panhellenic religious sites were inviolate, and truces temporally halted hostilities for the observance of Panhellenic games. Member cities (most of the major powers of mainland Greece) of the amphictyony (religious league) that administered Delphi with its oracle of Apollo took an oath not to destroy another member polis or even to cut it off from running water (probably a reference to siege), although this oath is known only from a fourth-century source.⁷⁵ Such ‘gentlemanly’ warfare recalls in some respects that of eighteenth-century Europe, when war was ‘the sport of kings’, even if eighteenth-century conflicts were by no means bloodless. Indeed, the age of tyrants with its marital liaisons between ruling dynasties and cultural connections between the courts further invites this comparison. Thucydides’ references to the common laws of the Greeks and Plato’s Panhellenist and idealized version of this Greek warrior code⁷⁶ demonstrate that unwritten rules for conflicts between members of a Greek in-group existed and were not the invention of fourth-century Panhellenists or later sources.

W. Robert Connor’s ‘Early Greek Land Warfare as Symbolic Expression’ (Chapter 4) surveys the components of the Greek warrior code up to the time of the Persian Wars from a cultural perspective and suggests that the procedures of Greek warfare on a grand scale parallel the Greek rituals of the religious sacrifice. In contrast, Peter Krentz’s ‘Fighting by the Rules: The Invention of the Hoplite Agon’ (Chapter 5) strongly argues that the rules of agonistic warfare date only to the middle of the fifth century. Krentz, endorsing the hypothesis of van Wees, asserts that the style of Homeric warfare (that is, no close-order phalanx) prevailed until the mid-fifth century. Thus, for Krentz, major changes in the whole style of hoplite battle and Greek warfare in general must be situated in the period between the end of the Persian Wars (478) and the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (431), an era not particularly well known from contemporary literary sources (the gap between the coverage of Herodotus and Thucydides).

If Connor can be faulted for anthropologically primitivizing Archaic

warfare, and particularly the Athenian army before its reform by Cleisthenes (c.508) when the foundations of Athenian democracy were laid,⁷⁷ Krentz's study likewise cannot escape critique. The basis for his attack is unfortunately a rather superficial discussion of the Greek laws of war.⁷⁸ One wonders whether Krentz's emphasis on the first attested instance of a practice, given the paucity of the sources, is not really arguing from silence; little attention is paid not only to the broader social and cultural aspects of the Greek warrior code, but also to Greek perceptions of themselves as an in-group. Like van Wees, Krentz has no problem in drawing parallels from different time periods to assert identical practices, and his view of Athens (a naval power) as a leader in development of the phalanx can elicit numerous objections. Nevertheless, these essays by Connor and Krentz provide rich fodder for debate.

Religious, Social, Economic and Legal Aspects

Part II of this volume moves from political and technical military issues of a specific era to broader diachronic themes. Religion permeated every facet of Greek life – public as well as private. The local calendars of poleis revolved around periodic sacrifices and festivals. Homer's canonization of the 12 Olympian deities obscures that religion was primarily local: a god or goddess with a particular epithet may be the patron of one polis, but could still be worshipped with other epithets elsewhere. Each polis had its own locally peculiar cults. In the *Iliad* the gods determine winners and losers in battle. Throughout Greek history stories circulated about epiphanies of gods during battle, which encouraged winners or explained defeats. The gods had to be consulted before beginning a war or initiating battle. A specialist in interpreting the entrails of sacrificial victims, the *mantis*, accompanied Greek armies. Omens could deter battle or strategic movements as well as devastate or increase morale. Spartans performed special rites at the border when leaving their own territory for war. Even as the opposing forces charged at each other, a sacrifice took place in the no man's land between the two armies. At least a tenth of all booty from war was owed to the gods, whose temple precincts displayed trophies of captured armour.⁷⁹ Greeks had their own notion of 'holy war' (*hieros polemos*) in defence of religious sites. At least three concerning Delphi are on record, of which two are historical.⁸⁰

Modern attitudes of scepticism and cynicism about the role of religion in ancient warfare are misplaced, as there is a prevailing tendency to view war itself and strategic decisions as rationally calculated for motives of profit, power and advantage, thus forgetting the tremendous influence that such intangibles as honour and glory, as well as religion, have always played in military history. Lasting fame and a glorious death in battle represented the epitome of the hoplite ideal. Readers of Thucydides, an historian strongly influenced by Sophistic thought and sceptical of religion, might think that Greek warfare had become completely rationalized by the end of the fifth century, but Sophistic thought, despite its importance for intellectual history, affected only a limited few and not the mass of the Greek population at Athens or elsewhere. The degree of rationalization of Greek warfare, however, might be better gauged by the attitude of the extremely pious Xenophon in the next century, who, besides having an attitude of respect for the gods, understood that the gods also help those who help themselves. In 'Religious Scruples in Ancient Warfare' (Chapter 6) M.D. Goodman and A.J. Holladay reassert the role of

religion in Greek warfare and its effect on strategic decisions and operations (especially those of the Spartans).

Although the gods had their role in Greek warfare, the lot of fighting and dying still fell to mortals. The emergence of the polis transformed the motive for military service from the well-born's display of personal prowess to justify their privileged role in society to the pursuit of the community's public good. If the polis increased the military participation ratio, the phalanx evolved within the context of an aristocratic ethos based on the values of Homeric warriors. The right to fight, die and win glory was a privilege preserved for those with a full-citizen's rights and the ability to furnish themselves with the requisite equipment. Even so, the phalanx is often seen as democracy in action – a collection of equals in a formation of interchangeable parts. Called to service on the spur of the moment, the community in arms performed its single bloody deed and dispersed. But laws to punish absence from service (*astrateia*) and desertion in battle (*lipotaxia*) indicate that not every citizen would heed the call to duty, nor stand steadfast in his station in the phalanx, a formation dependent on cohesion and continuity of ranks and files.⁸¹ Apart from issues of command and leadership (see Chapter 11), did hoplite service in the phalanx require training? Could thousands of citizens suddenly assemble, find a place in the phalanx and perform brilliantly in battle? Is Pericles' well-known contrast between constant military training at Sparta and none at Athens really to be taken at face value? These and other issues are addressed in Ronald T. Ridley's 'The Hoplite as Citizen: Athenian Military Institutions in their Social Context' (Chapter 7).

Education remained a family affair, and a father teaching his sons the basic skills of the hoplite can be imagined. Unit drill of a polis' phalanx is not on record before the Hellenistic period, and Athens did not establish a formal institution, the *ephebeia*, for training its youth (18–20 years old) for military service until 335. Yet, as Ridley notes, exercising at the palaestra and gymnasia might have involved more than commonly thought. Athletic skills often drew inspiration from military training. Indeed, in the fifth century the gymnasia attracted the itinerant instructors of military arts (*hoplomachoi*), who (for a fee) taught advanced weapons skills (*hoplomachia*) as well as 'generalship', which they defined as tactics. But the *hoplomachoi*'s services were available only to a wealthy few.⁸² Dancing, especially in the choruses at festivals, is also suggestive, as the similarities between group dancing and drill are obvious. Greeks practised many dances with military themes – the pyrrhic is most often noted, but the not all dances called pyrrhic were the same.⁸³ The choral dancing and athletic contests at religious festivals present another intersection of

war and religion.

Both gods and men could profit from war. If Plato and Aristotle, writing in the fourth century, saw gain as a prime motive for war, their view scarcely does justice to the limited means available to Greek poleis for the conduct of major operations before 500.⁸⁴ Hoplites provided their own equipment and their own victuals. Military pay at Athens, for example, was instituted only c.460, and part of that compensation had to pay for food. Logistical support hardly existed: Greek armies on distant campaigns had to live off the land or depend on the local population or private contractors to supply markets for buying food.⁸⁵ Building and manning ships (approximately 200 men per trireme) represented a liturgy imposed on the wealthiest citizens. Access to sources of bullion (for example, the silver mines at Attic Laureum or gold mines in Thrace) changed the financial equations, as did the creation of an empire (for example, Athens 478–404) through tribute income. Coalition warfare permitted allied cities to pool resources. Sparta initially balked at Corinth's insistence on going to war with Athens in 431 because of a lack of liquid capital to finance operations. Mainland Greek poleis of the fourth century struggled to find the means to pay mercenaries and fund navies. Given the rather limited taxation of Greek citizens, the wars of Greek poleis had to finance themselves. Enrichment in war through booty, slaves and the sacking of cities generally belonged to overseas conflicts or on the periphery of the Greek mainland or represented an anomaly, as in the ferocity of the Peloponnesian War. Many at Athens saw the great Sicilian expedition of 416 as a source of present and future income.⁸⁶

In a predominantly rural economy the degree of destruction of agricultural capacity also entered the balance sheet of Greek warfare. The view long prevailed that mountainous Greece developed a style of war emphasizing a phalangical slugfest on an open plain because farmers had to defend their farms and the city's annual harvest. Victor Hanson, however, questioned the capability of hoplite armies to inflict serious and long-term damage on many crops: olive trees and vines resist destruction; trampling or cutting wheat fields was very labour-intensive; and only a short climatological window of opportunity existed for effective burning. Hence the damage to Attic agriculture from repeated Spartan invasions during the Peloponnesian War may not have been as extensive as often imagined and – from a broader perspective – hoplite battle was not a matter of a defender's fear of economic loss, but rather one of honour and the psychological need to protect his property from invaders.⁸⁷ James A. Thorne, undeterred by Hanson's defence of his views against snipers, reasserts the case for serious damage to Attic agriculture in his 'Warfare and Agriculture:

The Economic Impact of Devastation in Classical Greece' (Chapter 8).

In assessing this debate on agricultural destruction two points might be considered. First, many of the traditional rules of Greek warfare were repeatedly broken or ignored in the Peloponnesian War. Although the Spartans refused to destroy the city of Athens in 404 despite the urging of some allies to do so, the surrender and destruction of a Greek city by Greeks could now be an option. Economic warfare through attack or threat of attack on a city's agricultural capacity became a strategy in the fourth century. Poleis sought to defend their territory through border fortifications and theoretical discussions in the new genre of military theory (for example, Xenophon's *The Cavalry Commander* and Aeneas Tacticus' *Strategica*) suggested various means of defending against invasions through evacuations and the use of cavalry and light infantry.⁸⁸ To what extent do we see the debate on agricultural destruction through fourth-century or even Hellenistic eyes?

Second, given the ritualistic aspects of hoplite warfare and the limits on intra-Greek conflicts before the fifth century, did an invader seriously intend agricultural destruction? The only real parallel antedating the repeated Spartan invasions of Attica in the Peloponnesian War occurred in the Lydians' 12-year struggle with Miletus in the late seventh century.⁸⁹ The Lydians ceremoniously invaded to the tune of pipes and other musical instruments when the Milesian crops were ripe, but damaged only crops and left houses untouched, as Miletus had access to the sea and the Lydians wanted the Milesians to continue sowing their crops every year. On one occasion at least fire was the method of destruction. Of course, Lydians were not Greeks, and any application of the rules of hoplite warfare to this conflict at this early date or even Milesian use of the phalanx can only be a matter of conjecture.

Rules are featured again in the final two essays of Part II, which address laws of war and international law.⁹⁰ Modern scepticism about the existence of laws of war or international law in Antiquity, often the view of legally trained scholars who wish (ahistorically) to impose modern standards on an earlier era, should not be an issue. International law before the late nineteenth century evolved from unwritten customs and practices generally observed among an in-group of (European) peer states, and much the same can be said of laws of war. States (and armies) tend to observe such rules to the extent that they believe it is in their interest to do so. The powerful could (and always have) thumbed their noses at such rules, and their application in clashes between different civilizations and cultures encourage ambiguities and double standards. Indeed, the extension of international law to include the whole of humanity is really a

post-1945 phenomenon. Enforcement of international law is an eternal problem. As unwritten rules and customs for intercourse between units of pre-state societies are known and the major states of the Late Bronze Age in the Near East also observed a system of international rules, there is little reason to doubt such among the Greeks.

The common laws of the Greeks mentioned in Thucydides and other fifth-century sources represent standards of interstate behaviour that had evolved over the centuries. Evident already in Homer are the sacrosanctity of heralds and the rules for a *monomachia* (mentioned earlier). Religious scruples, guaranteed by an oath, formed the basis of enforcement, for the gods were the ultimate arbiters of right. Hence the significance of the oath in ancient treaties, which in Greek take their name, *spondai*, from the libations poured to the gods when an oath was taken. As in later periods of history, public opinion within the in-group of peer states also had a role, as Greek poleis jealously guarded their status and honour (*time*) within the group. Jacqueline de Romilly's discussion of the common laws of the Greeks and how the Greeks ignored and broke them in the Peloponnesian War remains a fundamental discussion.⁹¹

Apart from the overarching Panhellenic bonds of common language, customs and religious shrines, complex networks integrated some poleis but not others. Entangling alliances contributed to the Peloponnesian War, but marital ties between aristocratic families, claims of kinship, treaties of friendship (*philia*) and commercial agreements (*symbola*) also created bonds. As the rights of a citizen of one polis did not extend beyond the borders of his own city, a citizen of one city might serve as a *proxenos* for the citizens or interests of another city, essentially acting as a modern consulate.⁹² Furthermore, Greek practice included the possibility of arbitration, and clauses requiring arbitration of future disputes between poleis could be included in treaties. However, major powers (not unlike modern states) generally rejected arbitration, which depends on the existence of a trustworthy and mutually acceptable neutral to act as judge. Sparta rejected Athens' offers to have their disputes arbitrated before the start of the Peloponnesian War.⁹³ Although Plato uses language suggesting a Hobbesian natural state of war in his much-cited declaration of a state of perpetual war among Greeks,⁹⁴ the context is an extreme premise set up as a straw man for refutation. Even so, reluctance on the part of bickering poleis to fight each other cannot be claimed. Athens scarcely experienced more than a few years of peace in the fifth and fourth centuries. Indeed, Greek peace treaties tended to specify the length of time of their validity. Although the expiration of a treaty did not mean an immediate resumption of active hostilities, the stipulated duration probably reflected an acute awareness of the

mercurial character of Greek inter-polis relations.⁹⁵

Greeks discerned two types of war: internal or civil war (*stasis*) and external war (*polemos*). Less discussed and nowhere explicitly defined is a different type of *polemos* – that without herald (*akeryktos*) and/or without truce (*spondos*). Clearly this was a type of war without normal conventional restraints that neither Greeks nor modern commentators have wanted to emphasize. Plato uses *akeryktos polemos* for his supposed permanent state of war and Thucydides uses a form of *akeryktos* negatively to emphasize the extreme break in relations between the two belligerents at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.⁹⁶ In a brief essay, ‘AKHPYKTOΣ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΣ (Herodotus, v. 81)’ (Chapter 9), J.L. Myres has collected the references and suggests an expanded meaning of the phrase in the fifth and fourth centuries.⁹⁷

In the fifth century *akeryktos* could mean ‘unannounced’ – that is, a war not formally announced by the dispatch of a herald by one belligerent to another. Of course, an unannounced war was not one played by the rules. Furthermore, it should not be assumed that Greek colonial ventures after the late eighth century in Thrace, the Chersonese or Sicily and southern Italy, where Greeks encountered non-Greeks, involved war waged according to the same set of rules governing the in-group conflicts of Greek mainland poleis, and certainly the Persian Wars awakened Greeks to the might of a barbarian power that did not play by Greek rules. The often ferocious conflicts in Sicily and southern Italy against Carthaginians, local tribes or even other Greek cities seem more unrestricted in methods and aims than those known on the Greek mainland between established peers. Likewise in the East, Persians felt no obligation to observe Greek rules. The Persian Tissaphernes’ arrest and the Great King’s subsequent execution in Babylon of five Greek mercenary commanders (401) seized during a truce for negotiations – an act that Xenophon so righteously described as treachery – may in fact reflect a Persian attitude that conventional norms of international conduct were not owed to mercenaries in the service of a rebel (Cyrus II). The Greek mercenaries, now under Xenophon’s command, responded with a decree of a *polemos akeryktos* against the Persians – namely, war to the death without rules and accepted conventions of conduct. Greek mercenaries in the middle of Mesopotamia at the end of the fifth century did not invent this concept, which Herodotus applies to the Athenian-Aeginitan conflict of a century earlier. By the later fourth century, *aspondos* (‘without truce’) could be added to the phrase, now clearly indicating a relentless war with only limited restraints on conduct. In sum, a deterioration of Greek rules began with the Persian Wars and the intrusion of Persia, an outsider to the Greek system of rules between peers. Athens’ rise to a the status of a super-polis,

enriched by a maritime empire in the fifth century, further accelerated a disregard of conventions, of which observance reached a nadir in the Peloponnesian War. *Polemos akeryktos/aspondos* as a third category of Greek warfare can explain many of the cases of the supposed irregularities in conduct, which some scholars (for example, Krentz, van Wees and Dayton) wish to use as evidence against the existence of an agonistic warrior code.

Another aspect of Greek interstate relations involved borders and neutrality. Not all Greek wars were waged by contiguous states. How was polis A going to attack polis D without passing through the territory of polis B or even polis C? The parallel of the so-called Schlieffen Plan of the 1890s immediately comes to mind: how was Germany to outflank the French defences in the north without violating the territory of neutral Holland and thus provoking Great Britain? If, as Thucydides claimed,⁹⁸ border wars were the norm in the Archaic period, such was not the case in the wider world of Greek operations in the fifth and fourth centuries. The borders between the *chorai* of individual poleis, when these were not formed by natural obstacles, were not always clearly marked. Greeks, especially before the fourth century, had no concept of a linear and continuous defence of a border. When distant campaigns began to become frequent after the Persian Wars in the period of Athenian expansion, basic strategic thinking about how to reach a theatre of operations had to occur. Often the geography of Greece denied planners multiple choices. What were the options of a non-belligerent when suddenly faced with the possibility of an army at its doorstep seeking passage to attack a neighbour on its far border? Like many aspects of international law, the theoretical ideal and the practice did not always coincide. Derek J. Mosley examines these issues in his 'Crossing Greek Frontiers under Arms' (Chapter 10).⁹⁹

Classical Hoplite Battle

Battles fought by rules and wars with limited aims did not require generalship or strategic thinking. But the shock of the Persian Wars and Athens' conversion of an alliance against Persia into a maritime empire brought changes. Perhaps for the first time (since the Lelantine War?) Greeks of the mainland in 480–479 had to combine forces in an often internally contentious coalition and seriously consider the defence of geographical bottlenecks (Tempe, Thermopylae, the Isthmus of Corinth) against a Persian invader intent on conquest and destruction. This was no longer war as *agon*. It is debatable whether Greek freedom really triumphed over Oriental despotism, as modern commentators mimicking Herodotus (and Athenian propaganda) like

to assert, or whether the Persians in fact beat themselves, as Thucydides believed.¹⁰⁰ In the Greek tradition the 'lesson' of the Persian Wars envisioned a simplistic memory of the events: a numerically inferior army of well-organized, heavily armoured hoplites, skilled with thrusting spears, defeated poorly organized, massed hordes of unarmoured Persians primarily armed with bows. In hindsight the superiority of the hoplites made Persian defeat inevitable, although the Persians had defeated Greeks in Asia Minor in the sixth century and Persian forces in 480–479 probably included hoplites among their Greek allies. Indeed, by the early fourth century the Persian King of Kings realized that indirect control of the Greeks through money, diplomacy and intrigues could be more effective than conquest.¹⁰¹

Nevertheless, Athens' counter-offensive against Persia, her excuse for empire, featured distant expeditions of considerable size. Cimon's double victory by land and sea over the Persians at the Eurymedon River (466?) involved an Athenian fleet of perhaps 300 triremes and an unknown number of hoplites, and Athens' bid to conquer Egypt by exploiting a revolt against Persia (459?) possibly massed 200 vessels. Athens' introduction of state pay c.460 for hoplites in service, symbolic of the new radical democracy taking hold under Pericles' leadership, also corresponded to a real need to provide for troops on lengthy distant campaigns. Simultaneously, Athens' refortification (478–476) after the Persian destruction of its walls and the construction by 457 of the Long Walls tying the city to the naval base at Piraeus about four miles away represented Pericles' implementation of Themistocles' strategic vision of an Athens tied to its navy and maritime empire and thus invulnerable to attacks by land. The physical structures underlying the so-called Periclean strategy of the Peloponnesian War were built well before the clash of Titans began in 431. Strategic planning at the state level was being born. Athenian aggrandizement already exceeded traditional rules, and the disease was contagious: c. 460 Argos capitalized on the fact that Sparta was distracted by a major helot revolt (464–459) to destroy Mycenae and regain undisputed control of the Argive plain.

In the course of the long fifth century, war became a *techne* (skill, craft). Thucydides repeatedly contrasted the *techne* involved in the development of naval forces and the sophisticated manoeuvres and ramming techniques of triremes – skills developed at Athens – with their general absence at Sparta.¹⁰² Naval warfare was not for beginners. But war as a whole was becoming more technical and professional. The perpetually trained Spartan army was hardly a collection of amateur militiamen. At Athens the young aristocrats, who paid Sophists to teach them the arts of rhetoric in order to gain

political prominence in the Athenian assembly and election to high office through oratory, likewise paid *hoplomachoi* to teach them military skills. By the time of the Persian Wars the phalanx had reached its mature form, and cavalry and light infantry, except in colonial warfare and in the Greek west of Sicily and southern Italy, had been reduced to a marginal role in battle. But just as naval commanders required multiple skills to direct amphibious operations associated with the creation and maintenance of a maritime empire, likewise did the skills demanded of generals increase in parallel with the reappearance, on the Greek mainland, of armies of combined arms that became increasingly important during the Peloponnesian War and into the fourth century.¹⁰³ Xenophon repeatedly emphasized that generalship (*strategia*) was about much more than tactics (*tactica*). The duties and responsibilities of the general evolved *pari passu* not only with the development of the phalanx, but also with the increasingly complex character of Greek warfare. The opening essay of Part III, 'The General as Hoplite' (Chapter 11) traces the evolution of the general (*strategos*) from the leader of a warrior band in Homer through the general as a fellow hoplite to the role of the general as a battle manager. Leadership from the front remained essential, and hoplites (including the general), raised on a diet of Homeric heroes, sought glory for themselves and their polis. But the new circumstances of combined arms (cavalry and light infantry besides hoplites), the variety of operations and terrain, and the development of the concept of a tactical reserve created new demands on the commander.¹⁰⁴

As Greek warfare became more complex, it also became more cerebral. The traditional clash of rival phalanges of peer states on a open plain following an accepted code of conduct required no thinking and represented a contest of strength alone. But in the fifth century rules began to be broken or ignored. The ethos of Achilles, a trial of strength in open, face-to-face combat that had characterized Greek agonal warfare, now found itself strongly supplemented by the ethos of Odysseus, representing trickery, deceit and indirect means. Stratagem, a term symbolizing the Odysseus ethos, has always been the recourse of the weak against the strong and, if properly used, can produce miraculous results often with less or no bloodshed. Greeks were no exception to this universal aspect of the ethics of military conduct – the tension between force (*bid*) and trickery (*dolos*), a frequent motif in Greek literature. The presence of anti-deceit clauses in Greek treaties from an early date and the relaxed rules in a *polemos akeryktos/aspondos* between Greeks or in wars against non-Greeks demonstrate not only that trickery was not a new Greek idea in the fifth century, but also that the circumstances in which it was used must also be considered. Stratagems in Greek warfare and diplomacy

before the fifth century (to the extent that such can be verified as historical) do not prove the absence of a Greek warrior code.¹⁰⁵ A traditional neglect of reconnaissance and field intelligence reveals the faith Greeks placed in the observance of their rules of honourable conduct.¹⁰⁶ Nor can generals always be classified as users or avoiders of stratagems, although some became famous as *rusé* commanders (for example, Themistocles, Lysander and Iphicrates). The use of stratagem depended on the strategic and tactical situation.

Losers, when the victims of stratagem, always cry ‘foul’: the enemy cheated. Such sentiments reflect indignation at violation of an expected code of conduct, since stratagems (as opposed to perfidy, the breach of good faith) have never been illegal in the Western tradition of international law and laws of war.¹⁰⁷ Certainly the forthrightness of the Achilles ethos has always received preference and a certain moral and ethical ambiguity surrounds the use of stratagems, although for Greeks (and Romans) the vocabulary of stratagem was not limited to such terms as ‘trickery’, ‘deceit’ and ‘fraud’. ‘Wisdom’ and ‘skill’ were among the most frequent synonyms of stratagem, a concept related to the Archaic Greek notion of cunning intelligence (*metis*).¹⁰⁸ David Whitehead’s *ἸΚΛΟΠΗ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥ*: “Theft” in Ancient Greek Warfare’ (Chapter 12) explores the ambiguity of stratagem and the use of a word for thievery to denote it. Greek attitudes about what constitutes ‘fair play’ hardly coincide with modern views.¹⁰⁹ Thucydides, always an advocate of intelligence in war and politics, strongly approved of stratagems, as did the pious Xenophon. Indeed, stratagems became one of the standard motifs of Western military theory from its inception and, by the Hellenistic period, collections of examples of stratagems became a subgenre.¹¹⁰

Whether a general employed the ethos of Achilles or Odysseus in battle, reconstructing what happened in the fray and assessing the causes of victory and defeat for the opposing armies has always been a difficult task of exact historiography and interpretation. Marathon (490) and Leuctra (371) have become the two most discussed battles in Classical Greek history: the latter because Epaminondas’ defeat of the Spartan army seemed to usher in a new tactical era, and the former because Herodotus offers the first detailed account of any Greek battle and invites attempts at reconstruction. But Herodotus’ seemingly clear and straightforward account breaks down upon analysis. Matching his account with the topography of the Marathon plain remains a problem. Herodotus also inserts anachronisms about the command structure of the Athenian army: Callimachus the polemarch was in command, not Miltiades, whose legend overshadows the battle. Cutting through the layers of the tradition of legend and propaganda is no easy task, as Athenians used Marathon

and the sacrifices of their city and territory in the Persian Wars generally to justify the Athenian Empire. Nor are the tidbits of information supplied by other (and later) sources readily reconcilable with Herodotus' account. In fact, the strategic context of the battle and Persian intentions are not as clear as often supposed. In Herodotus' account the absence of Persian cavalry, the main arm of the Persian army, is most curious if the events of 490 were a serious attempt to conquer Athens, as opposed to an episode of gunboat diplomacy. Nor is it often asked to what extent the Greeks (and modern scholars) viewed Marathon from the perspective of the Persian invasion of 480–479.¹¹¹

Norman Whatley's 'On the Possibility of Reconstructing Marathon and Other Ancient Battles' (Chapter 13), uses Marathon as a paradigm for theoretical and methodological notes of caution on reconstructing ancient battles. Originally presented at Oxford in 1920 as a critique of the method of Hans Delbrück, whose critical reassessment of Herodotus' account of Marathon had created a furor among Classicists (intent on defending Herodotus' credibility), the essay circulated privately before its publication in 1964. If Whatley anticipated some of Keegan's face-of-battle critiques of traditional battle historiography, such as the imprecise knowledge of what happens in battle or the error of viewing a battlefield as a chessboard, he generally reaffirms Delbrück's emphasis on studying the total picture of an army within its society. For Whatley, the results of topographical studies and *Sachkritik* can only yield negative results – in other words, they reveal only where a battle could not have been fought or what was not done. Topographers can be overly credulous: environment also changes over time, and the site of a battlefield, even if the general location is known, can still be unclear. Despite certainty about the location of Plataea, the topography of the battle (479) remains an enigma. Whatley's too facile rejection of any principles of war, however, is often too glibly accepted by novices to military studies. Again, if Delbrück's faith in such principles was definitely too extreme (for example, citing Clausewitz to explain military behaviour in Thucydides), modern differences of opinion on the number or ranking of principles of war does not prove the absence of basic concepts for what works and what does not. More significantly, Whatley offers a beneficial antidote to the current excesses of *Sachkritik* by face-of-battle enthusiasts.

Reconstructing a specific battle is one thing, but defining the nature of hoplite combat between rival phalanges is another. Basic assumptions about what a phalanx is and its development have been questioned: was the phalanx an open formation to permit room for the individual skills of the hoplite or a close formation emphasizing

collective action? When did the phalanx reach its mature form? Did the mixture of hoplites and light infantry seen in Tyrtaeus persist until the Persian Wars and beyond? As Snodgrass and others have shown, the presence of hoplite equipment can no longer be taken as proof of a phalanx, as the hoplite, a somewhat more flexible fighter than often previously supposed, was not restricted to service in a phalanx (for example, hoplites served as marines in the navy) and the mature phalanx reflected a period of development. Nor can it be assumed that the phalanx was created simultaneously everywhere in the Greek world. In the plains of Thessaly and to some extent in Boeotia, cavalry remained the chief arm, although Boeotian Thebes had a formidable phalanx in the fifth century. Cavalry also prevailed for a long time in Macedonia, whose kings began using the hoplite phalanx only in the late fifth or early fourth century. The Aetolians and Acarnanians, excellent javelin men and slingers, in the rugged mountain lands of northwestern Greece, an area devoid of the polis as an institution, had no need of a heavy infantry phalanx. Also, little evidence exists for the fully developed phalanx in Greek Asia Minor, where Greek poleis lay under Persian control from the mid-sixth century. Sicily, too, offers a different scenario. Here, the tradition of colonial warfare (with few or no restrictive rules) featuring Greek cities (originally colonies) against natives encouraged greater use of cavalry and light infantry in addition to hoplites. The frequent rule of tyrants in major Sicilian cities permitted a concentration of resources for military purposes like that of Dionysius I (405–367) both for their own aggrandizement and in response to a threat from Carthage. A sizeable all-arms army already existed at the beginning of the fifth century at Syracuse, as evidenced by the fact that in 480 the tyrant Gelon could offer to send the mainland Greeks a force of 20,000 hoplites, 2000 cavalry, 2000 archers, 2000 slingers and 2000 *hamippoi* (light infantry used in close support of cavalry) against the Persian invasion.¹¹² Cavalry, however, remained the chief arm at Syracuse. At the time of the Athenian Sicilian expedition (415–413), a democratic Syracuse had to learn the arts of the phalanx.

Combined use of hoplites, light infantry (javelin men, archers, slingers), and cavalry are also evident in the colonial conflicts of the northern Aegean areas of the Chalcidice and Thrace in the sixth and fifth centuries. The exotic nature of such combinations of warriors, featuring Thracian peltasts and Scythian archers beside hoplites, fascinated Attic pottery painters in the period 540–480. Indeed, combined arms must have characterized many of the Athenian amphibious operations of the mid-fifth century and were already a feature of conflict in the northern Aegean at the start of the Peloponnesian War. Combined arms, however, did not indicate the

integration of light and heavy infantry in the same formation. Rather than an innovation of the Peloponnesian War, the 'new' significance of light infantry and cavalry in the conflict of 431–404 represents an intrusion of the unrestricted style of warfare prevailing on the periphery of the Greek world into the more limited agonal warfare of the Greek centre, where the preferred style of battle had been limited to the clash of rival phalanges.¹¹³

If the use of light infantry and cavalry does not alter the traditional view of the phalanx as a close formation of heavy infantry, some would argue from other, albeit largely episodic, evidence that the phalanx was really an open formation of files of hoplites spaced perhaps at three-foot, rather than one-and-a-half-foot intervals. At issue are the references to *othismos* (pushing). After the initial clash of phalanges the fierce fighting is often said to have resulted in a shoving match between the two sides, until a gap appeared in one phalanx leading to its penetration by the opposing side and the formation's dissolution. Thereafter a different phase of battle began, in which hoplites fought individually before the remnants of the defeated army escaped the battlefield. But are such references to pushing to be taken literally or metaphorically? Did hoplites really push each other? Did the added depth in a phalanx provide additional thrust for pushing? If British scholars in particular put too much effort into trying to interpret a hoplite battle as a rugby match, the opponents of *othismos* would turn the very concept of a phalanx on its head by positing the phalanx as an open formation. Robert D. Luginbill's '*Othismos: The Importance of the Mass-Shove in Hoplite Warfare*' (Chapter 14) summarizes the debate and argues for the traditional view, although the debate is far from over.¹¹⁴

The face-of-battle model for discussing battles has focused attention on the aftermath of the bloody contests. The collection of the dead and the treatment of the wounded, prisoners of war, and burial or commemoration of the war dead now attract attention.¹¹⁵ Prisoners taken in formal pitched battles are rarely mentioned in the sources, but their fate lay at the whim of their captors. Immobile wounded opponents were probably dispatched on the spot, unless personal or familial ties or political or financial gain motivated saving them. By Hellenic convention (agonal rules), hoplites who surrendered were not to be killed and could be ransomed. Stripping the enemy dead of armour, weapons and any other possessions – a Homeric practice continued in the Classical period – represented not only the taking of the spoils of victory, but also a major transfer of capital and a source of war memorials. Yet, mutilation of the enemy dead, common in Homer, is another topic avoided in the sources. In theory, Greeks refrained from mutilation in Greek versus Greek battles, but

Xenophon's Greek mercenaries in their *polemos akeryktos* against the Persians felt no such restraints.¹¹⁶ Lawrence A. Tritle examines the complex issues surrounding the mutilation of the dead in his 'Hector's Body: Mutilation of the Dead in Ancient Greece and Vietnam' (Chapter 15). Even among highly civilized Greeks the niceties of rules probably often succumbed to the savage fury of the heat of battle.

In a well-known passage¹¹⁷ the Persian general Mardonius explains the character of Greek warfare to Xerxes I on the eve of his invasion of Greece. He ridicules the Greek concept of hoplite battle: a head-on clash in an open plain, devoid of tactical or strategic manoeuvring and resulting in the utter annihilation of the defeated. His satirical exaggeration of casualties, of course, confuses the disintegration of a formation with the complete slaughter of its men. Despite some ritualistic aspects, hoplite battle was gruesome and ferocious. The greatest casualties, however, as the ancients already knew (a view later canonized by Ardant du Picq), came in the collapse of the defeated phalanx and in pursuit rather than in the toe-to-toe slugfest of opposing lines in the battle's initial phase. To the extent that we have accurate casualty figures, Peter Krentz has collected and analysed the numbers for Greek versus Greek battles between 479 and 371 in his 'Casualties in Hoplite Battles' (Chapter 16). Krentz finds a 5 per cent loss for winners and 14 per cent for losers, thus yielding a ratio of 1:2.9, but his figures concern only the dead. The wounded who died later are not included.¹¹⁸ Krentz's figures present infinite room for speculation on the long-term demographic effects of warfare, but it seems that, especially for a small polis, repeated losses could lead to the eventual extinction of a city.¹¹⁹

The Peloponnesian War: 431–404 BC

In the late spring of 431 King Archidamus II of Sparta led an invading army of the Peloponnesian League into Attica. Neither Athens nor Sparta really wanted this war at this time, but neither would back away from it. Like the assassination of an Austrian archduke at Sarajevo in late June 1914 that kindled the First World War, petty grievances brought rival coalitions into conflict through a system of entangling alliances, and smouldering resentments, suspicions and fear (Thucydides' 'truest pretext' for the war) fuelled a conflagration that would burn for 27 years, engulfing the entire Greek world from Sicily to the Black Sea and costing thousands of lives and untold amounts of treasure. The clash of the Athenian Empire and its allies with Sparta's Peloponnesian League and its confederates provided a context for various localized conflicts with no real strategic bearing on the larger war. Democratic-oligarchic strife within cities added tinder

to the flames, as rival parties solicited outside support from the major belligerents. Race also entered the mix, as Dorian Greeks in Sicily fended off the Ionian (Athenian) invaders with Spartan (Dorian) support (415–413). All the while, Persia, a strategic giant (although not free of its own internal difficulties), patiently watched the victors of 480–479 butcher each other for nearly a generation, before tipping the scale in Sparta's favour through financial aid. The passions unleashed spawned a degree of ferocity and brutality hitherto foreign to Greek warfare. Atrocities, not solely the handiwork of the barbarian mercenaries who now supplemented the mainland forces, laid bare the darkness of the human soul to the clinically inspired Thucydides, who watched it all unfold and probed its causes.¹²⁰ War had become a matter of money and intelligence, not glory – a technical profession in a game that amateurs played at their own risk. Little wonder that fourth-century writers looked back over the great chasm of this war and shook their heads.¹²¹ The Peloponnesian War encompassed a world war, a series of local small wars and civil wars.

But did the Peloponnesian War constitute a 'military revolution'? The Persian invasion of 480–479 shocked the mainland Greek powers into thinking strategically and acting collectively. The Athenian Empire, a conversion of the Delian League (454) originally formed in 478 to conduct a counter-offensive against Persia, had elevated Athens in material resources and power beyond the level of the traditional polis. Nearly 50 years of imperial administration and imperialist adventures throughout the eastern Mediterranean had produced a large, highly skilled navy and hoplites experienced in traditional land combat as well as amphibious operations. The abandonment of traditional rules of agonal warfare and the professionalization of armed forces, increasingly evident in the Peloponnesian War, were not unprecedented innovations of the 431–404 conflict: varied battlefield terrains and the less restrictive modes of colonial conflicts, where combined arms were the norm, had imposed their style on the major belligerents. The view of the Peloponnesian War as a 'military revolution' should be approached from a broader perspective of long-term trends.¹²²

The clash of Athens and Sparta became the classic strategic paradigm of sea power versus land power. Pericles refused to give the Spartans their desired confrontation of hoplite armies in a decisive battle and abandoned the *chora* of Attica to Spartan depredations, which failed to provoke the intended effect of forcing the Athenians to fight. Secure behind their fortifications, invulnerable to primitive Spartan siegecraft and with unhindered access to foodstuffs imported by sea, controlled by their superior naval forces, the Athenians hoped to frustrate the Spartans into seeking peace. Indeed, the Spartans seem

to have been mired for years in the traditional unimaginative hoplite strategy of making incursions into Athenian agricultural land in order to provoke battle, until Brasidas' adventurous campaign of 424–422 in Thrace and the Chalcidice (not an official part of Spartan strategy) began to hit Athens where it hurt – its allies and subject cities in those areas and its access to ship-building timber and the Thracian gold mines. From one perspective the war dragged on and played itself out in peripheral areas, because both sides avoided direct confrontation on the element in which the other held superiority. The belligerents seemed to play the game in a way that aimed to avoid losing the war, but not to win it. Only when Sparta gained a navy with Persian help and Lysander supplied creative leadership in the aftermath of an Athenian expansionist disaster (Sicily, 415–413) did the war find its end. Hans Delbrück later used Periclean strategy as the basis for his dichotomy of a strategy of attrition (*Ermattungsstrategie*) and a strategy of annihilation (*Niederwerfungsstrategie*).¹²³

But was it all really so simple? The first three essays of Part IV examine different aspects of Periclean and Spartan strategy. I.G. Spence, who like Thorne (Chapter 8) takes issue with Victor Hanson's denial of effective agricultural destruction, argues in 'Perikles and the Defence of Attika during the Peloponnesian War' (Chapter 17) that the Athenian defence of its *chora* was active and fairly effective until Sparta created a permanent base in Attica at Decelea in 413. Pericles developed a concept of mobile defence exploiting Athenian cavalry to complement his refusal to engage in hoplite battle and to limit the effectiveness of Spartan ravagers.¹²⁴ But he also combined this tactic with amphibious raids on the Peloponnese and invasions of the Megarid. By 425 Athens had established sites (for example, Cythera and Pylos) as permanent bases for raiding around the Peloponnese and encouraging helot unrest. It remains an enigma of the Peloponnesian War that Athens did not do more to strike the Spartans' Achilles' heel – the servile helot population.¹²⁵

The Spartan establishment, in 413, of a permanent base at Decelea for raiding Attica represented a practice called *epiteichismos*. H.D. Westlake's 'The Progress of Epiteichismos' (Chapter 18) catalogues examples for the fifth and fourth centuries and traces this phenomenon to a usage of civil war exploited by exiles and political dissidents and now applied in inter-polis warfare.¹²⁶ *Epiteichismos* reflected the primitive state of Greek siegecraft in the fifth century. Hitherto Greeks had not been in the business of besieging and destroying each other's cities. In fact, destruction of a Greek city by other Greeks was considered a barbarian act. Thucydides' claim¹²⁷ that the Athenians were experts in siegecraft at the time of the great helot revolt against Sparta (464–459) finds little confirmation

elsewhere.

The arts of Greek siegecraft paled in comparison to the sophistication found already in the eighth and seventh centuries among the Assyrians – a Near Eastern tradition preserved by the Persians and also the Carthaginians (Phoenician descendants). Heavily armoured hoplites were not really suitable for assaulting city walls, and the death of Lysander in 395 before the walls of Haliartus was considered inglorious – the fate of a socially inferior light infantryman. As Greeks began to learn, sieges were technical operations requiring the skills of common craftsmen, and light infantry were more effective than hoplites – proof of the increasing professionalization and specialization of warfare. Sieges were also terribly expensive. Athens' siege of Potidaea (432–430), a Corinthian colony and one of the sparks igniting the Peloponnesian War, became an immediate significant drain on the Athenian treasury. If, by the fifth century, most Greek cities had walls (before the fourth century often mudbrick rather than expensive stone), the means at hand to conduct a siege were limited. The simple battering ram, first attested for Greeks at Pericles' siege of Samos (440–439), had some utility against mudbrick but less against stone. Direct assaults were generally only effective against walls in poor repair. Greeks frequently had little choice but to surround a city (often including circumvallation) and attempt to starve it into surrender, although few Greek states had the financial means to keep large besieging forces in the field over long periods.¹²⁸ The cheapest and most efficient means of capturing a city was through treachery, exploiting the political instability within it.¹²⁹

In contrast to the numerous discussions of Athenian and Periclean strategy, Spartan strategy has been assumed to follow Thucydides' emphasis on annual invasions of Attica.¹³⁰ But opinions about foreign policy could differ at Sparta as they did in other Greek cities, and King Archidamus II, who led the first two invasions of Attica, was hardly a firebrand in support of the war and seems to have conducted his campaigns with some hesitancy.¹³¹ Thomas Kelly radically departs from a face-value acceptance of the Thucydidean view of Spartan strategy in 'Thucydides and Spartan Strategy in the Archidamian War' (Chapter 19). As it applies to any historian, the evidence presented must be compared to the interpretation placed upon it. For Kelly, the Spartans attempted to pursue a much more active naval policy than Thucydides chose to emphasize and the invasions of Attica were, on occasion, a diversion from the real Spartan effort. Indeed, Spartans were not such landlubbers as generally assumed. They had besieged (with the Corinthians) the tyrant Polycrates at Samos c.525, supplied some ships for the fleet at Salamis in 480, and their king Pausanias, the victor at Plataea, had been the initial commander-in-chief of the

Greek naval counter-offensive against the Persians in 478.¹³²

Like Pericles, the Spartan general Brasidas was one of the few leaders in this war that Thucydides obviously admired, and he seems to have made a point of tracing Brasidas' career in a way he did not do for others. His 424–422 campaign in Thrace and the Chalcidice cost Athens the permanent loss of the important site of Amphipolis on the border between Macedonia and Thrace and, in the traditional Spartan guise as a liberator from tyrants, he succeeded in inducing the defection of several key cities. Brasidas seemed to add a spark of genius to an otherwise unremarkable Spartan performance in the war. His attack on Athenian allies, Athens' 'centre of gravity' (in Clausewitzian terms), contributed to the Peace of Nicias (421), which marked the end of the first stage of the war, although it remains speculation what further damage he might have done to Athens had he avoided an untimely death during the defeat of the Athenian attempt under Cleon to retake Amphipolis in 422. Graham Wylie, in 'Brasidas – Great Commander or Whiz-Kid?' (Chapter 20), offers a critical assessment of Brasidas' generalship and finds his performance less impressive than Thucydides wants his readers to believe.¹³³ Nevertheless, the citizens of Amphipolis accorded Brasidas heroic honours. He represents – with Lysander, Alcibiades, Phormio and Demosthenes – one of the few military bright spots of this miserable war and anticipates the charismatic military leader, which would become more typical in the fourth century.¹³⁴

The Age of Xenophon and Epaminondas: 400–362 BC

In April 404 the Long Walls tying Athens to the port of Piraeus, the symbol of empire and naval power, tumbled to the ground as the Peloponnesian War ended with Athens' surrender to Lysander and the Spartan allies. Incredible Athenian resilience, however, brought about the reconstruction of the Long Walls (with Persian subsidies) in the period 395–393 and, later (377–357), even the formation of a Second Athenian League in the Aegean, but Athens' days as a superpower were over. The mantle of Greek hegemony passed to Sparta (404–371), ill-capable of managing overseas possessions and soon embroiled in conflicts with, first, the Persian satraps of Asia Minor and then with its former allies, Thebes and Corinth, supported by the resurgent Athens. Eventually Artaxerxes II of Persia imposed the so-called King's Peace on the Greek powers (387/386). Fifteen years later, Sparta, too, fell from the ranks of superpowers. After Thebes demolished a Spartan army at Leuctra, Epaminondas' invasion of the Peloponnese (370–369)

liberated Messenia from nearly four centuries of Spartan control. The emergence, in 370, of a new federal state, the Arcadian League, essentially reduced Spartan territory to Laconia. Theban ambitions after Leuctra looked not only south to the Peloponnese but also north to Thessaly, where the assassination of the tyrant Jason of Pherae in 370 left a power vacuum. An attempt to reassert Theban hegemony in the Peloponnese in 362 against the allied forces of Sparta, Mantinea and Athens yielded an indecisive Theban victory at Mantinea, but cost Epaminondas his life. The Theban bid for hegemony in Greece had lasted less than a decade. Epaminondas' death in 362, followed by that of King Agesilaus of Sparta in 359/358, removed the two dominant political and military figures of the first half of the fourth century.¹³⁵ By the 350s Philip II had begun to consolidate his power and to enlarge the Macedonian kingdom into a major player on the international scene. The journey of Greek political history to Chaeroneia, Macedonian dominance and the Hellenistic era had begun.¹³⁶

The tortuous political, diplomatic, and military manoeuvrings between 404 and 362 provided a context for a continuation, if not an acceleration, of the military trends of the fifth century, so prominent in the Peloponnesian War. In addition to the old mainland theatres of operations in the Peloponnese and Boeotia, new theatres significant in the conflict of 431–404 continued to attract attention: namely, north-western Greece, the Aegean islands and the Greek coastal cities of Asia Minor, and especially the northern Aegean, where Athens sought to reassert its old influence among poleis desirous of retaining their new autonomy and contended with wily kings in Macedonia and Thrace. Sicily, faced with Carthaginian invasions and political turmoil in its cities, returned (to some extent) to its separatist status.

Tactically, all major poleis now viewed cavalry as a necessary component of their military forces and light infantry (peltasts), both Thracian mercenaries and native Greeks, continued to increase in importance. The destruction of a Spartan hoplite *mora* at Corinth by Athenian peltasts in 390, although often cited as symbolic of the obsolescence of the hoplite, actually demonstrated not peltast superiority in isolation, but the value of peltast skirmishers operating from a hoplite base. Iphicrates, the most notable Athenian general of the early fourth century, gained fame as a commander of peltasts. His reforms of peltast equipment and practice, although the specifics are unclear and contested, are taken by some as a stage in the development of the later Macedonian phalangite by Philip II.¹³⁷ Furthermore, the increased use of mercenaries in the Peloponnesian War did not diminish after 404. For a variety of reasons mercenaries, both hoplites and peltasts, were available in abundance and were

looking for work. The degree of military specialization had reached the stage that even generals were for hire. The availability of such condottieri suggests that a split between the military and political functions of generals had occurred, although, in the case of Athens, this view is disputed.¹³⁸ Yet, at Syracuse, Dionysius I (r. 405–367) revived the post of tyrant and assembled, in the face of a Carthaginian threat, the resources to create a true ‘war machine’, including significant improvements in siegecraft. Similarly, the tyrant Jason of Pherae (r. 379–379) in Thessaly, combining the tradition of excellent Thessalian cavalry with mercenaries, anticipated Philip II of Macedón as a ‘giant of the North’.¹³⁹

In the midst of all these developments stands Xenophon (c.430-after 355). This student of Socrates, Athenian exile, mercenary commander, friend of Agesilaus, historian and military theorist became one of the most prolific writers of the fourth century.¹⁴⁰ His *Anabasis*, a memoir of his mercenary service in the Near East between 404 and 399 (the first extant example of military memoirs), not only preserved many valuable details of army life and tactics, but also served a Panhellenist purpose in exposing the vulnerability of the Persian Empire to potential Greek conquest.¹⁴¹ His pro-Spartan sympathies, evident in his encomium *Agesilaus* and his *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians*, also permeate his *Hellenica*, a continuation of Thucydides’ work, covering the years 411–362.

If Thucydides the political scientist had attempted to use the Peloponnesian War to teach ‘lessons’ to politicians and generals, Xenophon carried this idea one step further. The trends of specialization and professionalization in military affairs had turned war into a *techné* (craft, technical skill). The works of Xenophon and Aeneas Tacticus (fl. 360) represent the first examples of Western military theory, in which armies and the conduct of war became the subject of inquiry in their own right, divorced from the context of history although not devoid of historical exempla as evidence. This new literary genre exploited the form of the technical handbook (forerunner of the modern ‘how to do it’ text) and the encyclopedia, originally, a compendium of *technai* (an example being the work of Hippias of Elis) – both types of literature having been invented by the fifth-century Sophists. Aeneas’ *Strategica* was a military encyclopedia, of which only the segment on defence of a city is extant.¹⁴² Xenophon’s theoretical discussions, scattered in *On Horsemanship*, *Memorabilia*, *On Revenues* and *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians*, find more concentrated presentation in *The Cavalry Commander* and the *Cyropaedia*, the most widely read prose work in Antiquity. The *Cyropaedia* on the education and reign of Cyrus the Great of Persia, the first Western novel and one of the earliest examples of the ‘mirror

of princes' genre, also functions as a military encyclopedia, presenting discussions of generalship, military training and organization, logistics and medical services, camps and tactics. The fictitious account of the great battle between Cyrus and the Lydian Croesus at Thymbrara actually presents a hypothetical scenario of the competing column versus line versions of the fourth-century phalanx seen in the dense phalanx of Thebans against the more linear Spartans. Neal Wood, in 'Xenophon's Theory of Leadership' (Chapter 21), demonstrates the military basis of much of Xenophon's thought and how Xenophon's emphasis on the general as a manager reflects the new responsibilities of a commander in the fourth century. Xenophon stressed the creative and cerebral aspects of generalship, believed that stratagems were a major function of the general's art and (centuries before Ardant du Picq) preached the virtues of 'willing obedience'.¹⁴³

Xenophon's mercenary service reflected his time. Even Agesilaus, a Spartan king, did service overseas in Egypt, although it could be argued that he was an 'ally' and not a mercenary. Indeed, the Greek terms for mercenary, *epikouros* (ally), *misthophoros* (wage-earner) and *xenos* (stranger), permit an ambiguity of interpretation. In the Greek tradition military service, before the fourth century, was a citizen's obligation to his city and a socioeconomic distinction: those who could equip themselves with hoplite armour had the privilege of winning glory for themselves and their city. Nor did the introduction of military pay in the fifth century alter this equation, as the pay sufficed essentially only for sustenance, not personal profit. Fighting for a state that was not one's own and for a wage – a payment that would distastefully lower an aristocrat to the level of the lowly born – represented a break with the Greek tradition of civic military service. Mercenary bands also mixed Greeks of social classes from different cities and could also include non-Greeks. Status at home did not necessarily guarantee status abroad.¹⁴⁴

Mercenary service, however, had its own long tradition. From at least the seventh century Greek hoplites fought in Egypt and elsewhere in the Near East. Indeed, the rationale for the invention of coinage in the late seventh century may be connected with mercenaries in that it was a portable means of wealth that could be used as payment. The Achaemenid Persians particularly prized Greek hoplites: the service was lucrative and even Greek *hoplomachoi* could find work with the Persians.¹⁴⁵ Tyrants on the Greek mainland in the Archaic period often had mercenaries as bodyguards. Although in the Peloponnesian War the demand for mercenaries seemed to be chiefly for barbarian light infantry (peltasts), the steady supply of hoplites from mountainous and impoverished Arcadia in the central Peloponnese should not be ignored.¹⁴⁶

Motives for mercenary service varied. The internal turmoil of Greek poleis generated exiles. Inhabitants of regions with poor farmland might find military service abroad more appealing, especially as by the fifth century the lower class began to view war as personally profitable – in terms of plunder as well as pay. More recently, scholars have emphasized personal networks of friendship (*xenid*) as a means of recruiting mercenaries. Whatever the reasons, however, the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War saw many looking for work as mercenaries, even if orators such as Isocrates did exaggerate their numbers. Dislocations caused by the Peloponnesian War and subsequent fourth-century conflicts might also have been a factor. States in the fourth century were eager to hire mercenaries to bolster their citizen forces or even to replace them, and they remained a significant part of Greek armies well into the Hellenistic period and affected tactical aims. As fighters for pay and loot, mercenaries were motivated by the portable wealth they carried with them rather than any political cause – hence in Hellenistic battles the emphasis on the capture of the opponent's baggage train as a tactical aim. The military, political and social phenomenon that these extra-state mercenary forces represented is examined in Matthew Trundle's 'Identity and Community among Greek Mercenaries in the Classical World, 700–322 BCE' (Chapter 22).

If mercenaries represented the new professionalization and specialization of warfare, other aspects of these trends occurred at opposite ends of the Greek world. At Syracuse the tyrant Dionysius I responded to the Carthaginian threat by assembling the resources to create a vast war machine, including attention to 'research and development'. The western Greek world of Sicily and southern Italy had often been at the 'cutting edge' of Greek ideas. Many of the pre-Socratic thinkers and Sophists had their origins in these western areas. The need to respond to the Carthaginians, who shared the Near Eastern tradition of advanced siegecraft, prompted the Syracusan development of real siege machines and the invention of artillery.¹⁴⁷ Athenian and Spartan contacts with Dionysius may have brought non-torsion artillery to the Greek mainland by 370 or the early 360s. But the real birth of the later sophisticated Hellenistic siegecraft occurred in Sicily. Indeed, to the itinerant mercenaries, generals and *hoplomachoi* seeking work we can also add the *mechanopoioi*, specialists in the design and construction of siege machines.¹⁴⁸

When the Persian pretender Cyrus II, in whose army Xenophon and the Ten Thousand Greek mercenaries served, faced the army of his brother Artaxerxes II at Cunaxa north of Babylon in 401, another innovation destined to recur in the Hellenistic period made its initial appearance in Greek sources.¹⁴⁹ Scythed chariots, usually four-horse

chariots armed with 4.5-foot scythes attached to the axles, incited fear in opposing forces but, like elephants, they functioned more as a psychological weapon than a tool of tactical efficiency. Xenophon attributes their invention to Cyrus the Great,¹⁵⁰ and they continued to be used sporadically up to Pharnaces of Pontus' battle with Julius Caesar at Zela (47). The anonymous late-fourth-century AD author of the *De rebus bellicis* even revives them for Roman use. Alexander K. Nefiodkin tackles the problematic origin of this novel weapon in 'On the Origin of Scythed Chariots' (Chapter 23). According to Nefiodkin, an Indian origin for the chariots can be discounted; rather, they date to the reign of Artaxerxes I (465–424) and resulted from Persian preparations for another war with the Greeks that was cut short by the assassination of Xerxes I. Scythed chariots were conceived as a means to break up the Greek phalanx and mow down hoplites.

Xenophon concluded his *Hellenica* with the Battle of Mantinea in 362. He is the last historian, whose work is extant in more than fragments, to record contemporary events until Polybius in the second century. Hence, from the perspective of sources, there is some justification for a view, popular among some German scholars, that the Classical period should end and the Hellenistic period begin around c.360, rather than marking the division with the death of Alexander the Great in 323, as is traditional in Anglophone scholarship. The source problem extends to Epaminondas, the last great general of the first half of the fourth century, who met his end at Mantinea. Xenophon the Athenian with pro-Spartan sympathies had little interest in Epaminondas and, most regrettably, Plutarch's biography of the Theban general has not survived. Epaminondas' blaze of glory between his defeat of Sparta at Leuctra (371) and Mantinea has led to speculation that he was a major military innovator. His increase in the depth of the phalanx could be seen as a precursor of the Macedonian phalanx of Philip and Alexander and his supposed use of the oblique order of attack from the left (regardless of this view's historical accuracy) may have inspired the oblique order of Frederick the Great. Victor Hanson takes aim at Epaminondas the military reformer in 'Epameinondas, the Battle of Leuktra (371 B.C.) and the "Revolution" in Greek Battle Tactics' (Chapter 24) and ably explodes the myth of Epaminondas' innovations.

Leuctra, however, along with Marathon, are the two most controversial battles of Classical Greek history. Precisely how Epaminondas configured and used his massive left wing remains much debated and the sources permit various interpretations.¹⁵¹ Epaminondas' brilliance as a general should not be limited to his preference for attack on the left or his added depth to the phalanx. Rather, Epaminondas seems to have been a master of combining the

hoplite phalanx with the use of cavalry and light infantry, planning his battles and exploiting the stratagem of tactical surprise.¹⁵² Epaminondas only partially consolidated the changes in Greek warfare that began with the Persian Wars. The armies of the Hellenistic period would begin with Philip II and Alexander.

1 *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 84 (1964) 131 = 313 *infra*. Cf. (in 2004) Ernst Badian ('Xenophon the Athenian', in C. Tuplin, ed., *Xenophon and his World*, *Historia Einzelschriften* 172 (Stuttgart 2004) 33) on the difficulty of saying something new about Xenophon: 'It is difficult to write about Xenophon's life and work after H.R. Breitenbach's splendid study in *RE*. Much that one may think one has discovered has either been anticipated or refuted in advance. However, as a recent bibliography makes clear, this has not deterred the usual scholarly profusion.'

2 M.-C. Amouretti and F. Ruzé, *Les sociétés grecques et la guerre à la Vépoque classique* (Paris 1999); A. Bernand, *Guerre et violence dans le Grèce antique* (Paris 1999); P. Brulé and J. Oulhen, eds, *La guerre en Grèce à l'époque classique* (Rennes 1999); P. Brun, ed., *Questions d'Histoire: Guerre et sociétés dans les mondes grecs 490–322* (Paris 1999); J.-N. Corvisier, *Guerre et société dans les mondes grecs (490–322 av. J.C.)* (Paris 1999); *Guerres et sociétés dans les mondes grecs à l'époque classique: colloque de la SOPHAU*, Dijon, 26–28 March 1999 (= *Pallas* no. 51 [Lyon 1999]); G. Miroux and F. Vannier, *Guerre et société dans le monde grec* (Paris 1999); C. Mosse, *Guerres et sociétés dans les mondes grecs* (Paris 1999); F. Prost, ed., *Armées et sociétés de la Grèce classique. Aspects sociaux et politiques de la guerre aux Ve et IVe av. J.-C.* (Paris 1999); M.-C. Amouretti, F. Ruzé, J. Christien and P. Sineux, eds, *Le regard des Grecs sur la guerre: mythes et réalités* (Paris 2000); N. Bernard, *À l'épreuve de la guerre. Guerre et société dans le monde grec Ve et IVe siècles avant notre ère* (Paris 2000); M.-H. Delavaud-Roux, *Guerres et sociétés: mondes grecs* (Neuilly 2000); D. Gondicas and J. Boeldieu-Trevet, *Guerres et sociétés dans les mondes grecs* (Paris 2000); F. Rebuffat, *Guerre et société dans le monde grec (490–322 av. J.-C.)* (Paris 2000).

3 J. Rich and G. Shipley, eds, *War and Society in the Greek World* (New York/London 1993); CD. Hamilton and P. Krentz, eds, *Polis and P olemos: Essays on Politics, War, and History in Ancient Greece in Honor of Donald Kagan* (Claremont, CA 1997); K. Raafaub and N. Rosenstein, eds, *War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds: Asia, the Mediterranean, Europe, and Mesoamerica* (Cambridge, MA 1999); H. van Wees, ed., *War and Violence in Ancient Greece* (London 2000).

4 W.K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*, 5 vols (Berkeley/Los Angeles, CA, 1971–91); hereafter *G SAW*. Cf. my review of the fifth volume: 'The Greeks at War', *Classical Journal* 88 (1993) 410–18 at 410–14. Note also I. Spence, ed., *Historical Dictionary of Ancient Greek Warfare*, *Historical Dictionaries of War, Revolution, and Civil Unrest*, 16 (Lanham, MD 2002); G. Brizzi, *Il guerriero, Voplita, il legionario* (Bologna 2002) = *Le Guerrier de l'antiquité classique* (Monaco 2004); J.D. Montagu, *Battles of the Greek and Roman Worlds* (London 2000). For the general reader see M. Debidour, *Les Grecs et la guerre: V-IV siècles: de la guerre rituelle à guerre totale* (Monaco 2002); P. Connolly, *Greece and Rome at War*, 2nd edn (London 1998); A. Santosuosso, *Soldiers, Citizens, and the Symbols of War* (Boulder 1997); J.K. Anderson, 'Wars and Military Science: Greece', in M. Grant and R. Kitzinger, eds, *Civilization of the Ancient Mediterranean: Greece and Rome* (New York 1989) I, 679–701; J.H. Hackett, ed., *A History of War in the Ancient World* (London 1989); M. Sage, *Warfare in Ancient Greece: A Sourcebook* (New York/London 1986); P. Ducrey, *Guerre et guerriers dans le Grèce antique* (Paris

1985) = *Warfare in Classical Greece*, tr. J. Lloyd (New York 1986); A. Ferrill, *The Origins of War from the Stone Age to Alexander the Great* (London 1985; rev. edn, Boulder CO 1997); R. Humble, *Warfare in the Ancient World* (London 1980); J. Warry, *Warfare in the Classical World* (New York 1980); and J. Harmand, *La guerre antique de Sumer à Rome* (Paris 1973). Nicholas Sekunda has produced a number of worthwhile lavishly illustrated volumes in the Osprey series on ancient and modern armies: with Angus McBride, *The Ancient Greeks, Armies of Classical Greece 5th and 4th Centuries B.C.* (London 1986), with Simon Chew, *The Persian Army 560–330 B.C.* (London 1992), with Richard Hook, *The Spartans* (London, 1998), and with Adam Hook, *Greek Hoplite 480–323 BC* (Oxford 2000).

5 See John Keegan's report on the reactions of Classicists who saw preliminary chapters of V.D. Hanson's *The Western Way of War*, n. 30 *infra*, x–xi.

6 See J.W. Chambers II, 'The New Military History: Myth and Reality', *Journal of Military History* 55 (1991) 395–406 with additional bibliography; P. Paret, 'The New Military History', *Parameters* 21 (1991) 10–18. For an assessment of current trends in military historiography, see J. Black, *Rethinking Military History* (London/New York 2004).

7 G. Duby, *Le dimanche de Bouvines* (Paris 1973) = *The Legend of Bouvines: War, Religion, and Culture in the Middle Ages*, tr. C. Tihanyi (Berkeley/Los Angeles, CA 1990), *Guerriers et paysans. VIIe–XIIe siècle* (Paris 1973); *La société chevaleresque* (Paris 1979) = *The Chivalrous Society*, tr. C. Postan (Berkeley/Los Angeles, CA 1980); P. Contamine, *La guerre au moyen âge* (Paris 1980) = *War in the Middle Ages*, tr. Michael Jones (Oxford 1984).

8 A. Corvisier, *L'armée française de la fin du XVIIe siècle au ministère de Choiseul: Le soldat* (Paris 1964) 2 vols; *Armées et sociétés en Europe de 1494 à 1789* (Paris 1976) = *Armies and Societies in Europe 1494–1789*, tr. A.T. Siddall (Bloomington, IN 1979).

9 For example, 'Mercénariat et histoire grecque', 'Remarques sur la poliorcétique grecque', 'Le partage des profits de la guerre dans les traits d'alliance antiques', 'Les otages barbares au début de l'Empire', all conveniently collected posthumously in *Études d'histoire ancienne* (Paris 1967).

10 For example, L. Gernet, *Recherches sur la développement de la pensée juridique et morale en Grèce* (Paris 1917) and the posthumously published J.-P. Vernant, ed., *Anthropologie de la Grèce antique* (Paris 1968) = *The Anthropology of Ancient Greece* (Baltimore, MD 1981); H. Jeanmaire, *Couroi et courètes* (Lille 1939).

11 For example, *Aspects de la fonction guerrière chez les Indo-Européens* (Paris 1956); *Heur et Malheur du guerrier. Aspects mythiques de la fonction guerrière chez Indo-Européens* (Paris 1969) = *The Destiny of the Warrior*, tr. A. Hildebeitel (Chicago 1970).

12 A. Brelich, *Guerre, agoni e culti nella Grecia arcaica*, *Antiquitas* 1.7 (Bonn 1961).

13 J.-P. Vernant, ed., *Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne* (Paris 1968; repr. 1985, 1999). On this work's influence see R. Lonis, 'La guerre en Grèce. Quinze années de recherche: 1968–1983', *Revue des études grecques* 98 (1985) 321–79; cf. P. Ducrey, 'Aspects de l'histoire de la guerre en Grèce ancienne, 1945–1996', in P. Brulé and J. Oulhen, eds, *Esclavage, guerre, économie en Grèce ancienne. Hommages à Yvon Garlan* (Rennes 1997) 123–38.

14 *Les ruses de l'intelligence: la mètis des Grecs* (Paris 1974) = *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society*, tr. J. Lloyd (Atlantic Heights, NJ 1978).

15 For example, R.B. Ferguson and L.E. Farragher, eds, *The Anthropology of*

War: A Bibliography, Occasional Papers of the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, vol. 1 (New York 1988); J. Haas, ed., *The Anthropology of War* (Cambridge 1990); J. Guilaine and J. Zammit, *Le Sentier de la guerre: Visages de la violence préhistorique* (Paris 2001) = *The Origins of War: Violence in Prehistory*, tr. M. Hersey (Oxford 2004); K. Otterbein, *How War Began* (College Station, TX 2004).

¹⁶ *War in the Ancient World*, tr. J. Lloyd (London 1975); cf. his 'Éléments de polémologie marxiste', *Mélanges helléniques offerts à Georges Daux* (Paris 1974) 139–45. Dayton's attempt (n. 63 *infra*: 23–24) to discredit the views of the Vernant school, because some of them strongly opposed the Algerian War (1954–62), is hardly convincing.

¹⁷ M.I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus* (New York 1954; rev. edn, New York 1965); 'Sparta', in Vernant (*supra* n. 13) 143–60 = 'Sparta and Spartan Society', in B.D. Shaw and R.P. Sailer, eds, *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece* (London 1981) 24–80 = 'Sparta', in M.I. Finley, *The Use and Abuse of History*, 2nd edn (London 1986) 161–78; *The Ancient Economy*, Sather Classical Lectures 43 (Berkeley/Los Angeles, CA 1973).

¹⁸ *Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300–362 B.C.* (London 1979; 2nd edn, London 2002) *ma Agesilaus and the Crisis of Sparta* (Baltimore, MD 1987).

¹⁹ F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, tr. Siân Reynolds (London/New York 1972) = *la Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, 2nd edn (Paris 1966). For a critique of transhumance see E. Dench, *From Barbarians to New Men* (Oxford 1995) 112–18; critique of Mediterranean unity: D. Timpe, 'Der Mythos vom Mittelmeerraum: Über die Grenzen der alten Welt', *Chiron* 34 (2004) 3–23.

²⁰ M.I. Finley, *Ancient History: Evidence and Models* (New York 1985) 47–66, 67–87 ('War and Empire').

²¹ Alastar Jackson, 'War and Raids for Booty in the World of Odysseus', in Rich and Shipley (*supra* n. 3) 64–76; Shipley, 'Introduction' in Rich and Shipley, 1–24. See my review of this book in *Journal of Military History* 60 (1996) 763–66.

²² See Bernard (*supra* n. 2) and van Wees (*supra* n. 3). Cf. M. Berent, 'Anthropology and the Classics: War, Violence, and the Stateless Polis', *Classical Quarterly* 50 (2000) 257–89: apparently a summary of the author's Cambridge D.Phil. thesis (directed by Paul Cartledge) on connections between the rise of the polis and the origins of the phalanx – a highly speculative piece with more anthropological theory than evidence.

²³ R. Brian Ferguson, 'A Paradigm for the Study of War and Society', and V.D. Hanson and B. Strauss, 'Epilogue', in Raaflaub and Rosenstein (*supra* n. 3) 389–437, 439–53. See also my brief review of this book in *The Historian* 63 (2001) 893–95. While this volume was in press, another anthology edited by Raaflaub has appeared: *War and Peace in the Ancient World* (Oxford 2006).

²⁴ I. Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York 1974). For the trends see B.G. Trigger, *A History of Archaeological Thought* (Cambridge 1989); J. Bintliff, ed., *The Annales School and Archaeology* (New York 1991); and A. Bernard Knapp, 'Archaeology and Annales: Time, Space, and Change', in *idem*, ed., *Archaeology, Annales, and Ethnology* (Cambridge 1992) 1–21. Cf. T.C. Patterson, *Marx's Ghost: Conversations with Archaeologists* (Oxford/New York 2003). There is even now a 'companion' to this view of archaeology: L. Meskell and R. Preucel, eds, *A Companion to Social Archaeology* (Oxford 2004).

²⁵ Influences of the new archaeology on Roman military history are briefly

assessed in E.L. Wheeler, 'Methodological Limits and the Mirage of Roman Strategy, Part I', *Journal of Military History* 57 (1991) 13–17. The absurdities, to which the new theoretical bent of archaeology can lead, are well illustrated in S. James, 'Writing the Legions: The Development and Future of Roman Military Studies in Britain', *Archaeological Journal* 159 (2002) 1–58, a paper conveniently ignoring published criticisms of the so-called 'new approaches', although myopia of the scholarly literature is typical of such propagandists. James's new agenda would trivialize and theorize archaeology of the Roman army into scholarly irrelevancy.

26 I do not understand a recent work's attack on Keegan and his face-of-battle approach for its failure to account for victory and defeat. Such was not Keegan's intention. See K. Kagan, *The Eye of Command* (Ann Arbor 2006); cf. *The Face of Battle* (New York 1976) 74–77. Kagan (3) pretends that no one has questioned the face-of-battle approach, but see xx–xxxiii *infra*.

27 For example, *Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command* (New York 1947; repr. Norman, OK 2000).

28 Cf. Anne Curry, ed., *Agincourt 1415: Sir Thomas Erpingham and the Triumph of his English Archers* (Stroud 2000); *idem*, *The Battle of Agincourt: Sources and Interpretations* (Rochester, NY 2000); and *Agincourt: A New History* (Stroud 2005); T. Sutherland, 'The Battle of Agincourt: An Alternative Location?', *Journal of Conflict Archaeology* 1 (2005) 245–63.

29 For example, S.W. Serman and J.-P. Bertraud, 'Vie et psychologie des combattants et gens de guerre, questions de methods et de documentation compris l'iconographie, armée française de terre, officiers, sous-officiers et soldats, 1635–1945', in Gen. F. Gambiez, ed., *Mémoires et communications de la Commission française d'histoire militaire* (Paris 1970) [*non vidi*]; A. Corvisier, 'Le moral des combattants, panique et enthousiasme: Malplaquet, 11 Septembre 1709', *Revue historique des armées* 4.3 (1977) 7–32. On Folard see J. Chagniot, *le Chevalier de Folard: la stratégie de l'incertitude* (Monaco 1997).

30 V.D. Hanson, *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Ancient Greece* (New York 1989). A second edition (Berkeley/Los Angeles, CA 2000) includes a bibliographical supplement of work since 1987 with brief commentaries asserting that no one has ever proven him wrong about anything. *Caveat lectori*

31 *The Wars of the Ancient Greeh* (London 1999).

32 The 'decisive battle' thesis underlies Hanson's post 9/11 bestseller, *Carnage and Culture* (New York 2001) and is accepted by Doyne Dawson, *The Origins of Western Warfare* (Boulder 1996). I pointed out the weakness of this thesis long ago in a review of *Western Way of War*. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 21 (1990) 122–25; see also my 'Ruses and Stratagems', in T.N. Dupuy, ed., *International Military and Defense Encyclopedia* (Washington 1993) vol. V, 2330–34. John Lynn has attacked the thesis in more detail: see n. 46 *infra*, 12–25.

33 V.D. Hanson, ed., *Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience* (London/New York 1991; repr. 2002). See also 'The General as Hoplite', Chapter 11, this volume, 239–88.

34 A.B. Lloyd, ed., *Battle in Antiquity* (London 1996).

35 A rare German imitation of the face-of-battle approach, A. Konecny, 'Katekopsen ten moran Iphikrates. Das Gefecht bei Lechaion im Frühsommer 390 v. Chr.', *Chiron* 31 (2001) 79–127, offers a useful and perceptive study of the topography of the battle, before marching in lockstep to the beat of the face-of-battle drummer. Neither Santosuosso (*supra* n. 4) nor R.E. Gaebel, *Cavalry Operations in the Ancient Greek World* (Norman, OK 2002) question face-of-battle

tenets.

36 A.K. Goldsworthy, *The Roman Army at War 100 BC–AD 200* (Oxford 1996); see my review, 'Battles and Frontiers', *Journal of Roman Archaeology* 11 (1998) 644–51 at 644–50. Goldsworthy contributed the Roman volume to Keegan's *Cassell History of Warfare* series: *Roman Warfare* (London 2000).

37 'Some Words on *War and Peace*', in Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace: The Maude Translation, Background and Sources, Essays in Criticism*, ed. G. Gibian (New York 1966) 1368–71.

38 See R. MacMullen, 'The Legion as Society', *Historia* 33 (1984) 440–56, an attempt, inspired by the face-of-battle phenomenon, to apply 'buddy theory' to the legion. The paper has generated a mini-genre of other 'legion as society' papers in the same vein.

39 On Marshall see R.J. Spiller, 'S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire', *Royal United Service Institute Journal* 133.4 (1988) 63–71; cf. K.C. Jordan, 'Right for the Wrong Reasons: S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire in Korea', *Journal of Military History* 66 (2002) 135–62, who fails to address Spiller's arguments. On Ardant du Picq and the critique of face-of-battle studies offered here, see my 'Firepower: Missile Weapons and the 'Face of Battle'', in E. Dabrowa, ed., *Roman Military Studies*, Electrum 5 (Cracow 2001) 169–84, a preliminary discussion to a more detailed study in progress.

40 See J. Carmen, 'Beyond the Western Way of War: Ancient Battlefields in Comparative Perspective', in J. Carmen and A. Harding, eds, *Ancient Warfare: Archaeological Perspectives* (Phoenix Mill, 1999) 37–55: a remarkable blend of superficial knowledge in a comparativist context with blind belief in the Keegan-Hanson school and a total lack of proper historical methodology. But cf. the more rigorous and useful P.W.M. Freeman and A. Pollard, eds, *Fields of Conflict: Progress and Prospect in Battlefield Archaeology*, British Archaeological Reports, International Series 958 (Oxford 2001); and J. Schofield, *Combat Archaeology: Material Culture and Modern Conflict* (London 2005). The initial issue of *Journal of Conflict Archaeology* (2005) has now been reissued as an anthology: T. Pollard and I. Banks, eds, *Past Tense: Studies in the Archaeology of Conflict* (Leiden 2006).

41 H. von Stietencron and J. Rüpke, eds, *Töten im Krieg*, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für historische Anthropologie e.V 6 (Munich 1995). A non-anthropological Italian volume on a similar theme appeared five years earlier: M. Sordi, ed., '*Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori*'. *La morte in combattimento nell'antichità*, Contributi dell'Istituto di storia antica 16 (Milan 1990).

42 A new German volume, B. Meißner, O. Schmitt and M. Sommer, eds, *Krieg-Gesellschaft-Institutionen. Beiträge zu einer vergleichenden Kriegsgeschichte* (Berlin 2005), seeks to revive ancient military history in the German academy from a comparative perspective, although the editors renounce attention to battles (inadequate sources) and take the French and Anglophone theme of war and society as their point of departure (without espousing *Annaliste* tenets). The volume is most disappointing: see my review in *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 2006.07.55 (<http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/bmcr/2006/2006-07-55.html>).

43 *A History of Warfare* (London 1993/New York 1994). A colleague once referred to this work as 'potted anthropology'. Keegan's work is not devoid of criticism among modern military historians: see, for example, John Ferris, review of P. Addison and A. Calder, eds, *Time to Kill: The Soldier's Experience in War in the West, 1939–1943*, in *Journal of Military History* 62 (1968) 424, who complains about face-of-battle enthusiasts creating a personality cult around Keegan; see also C. Bassford, 'John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: A

Polemic', *War and History* 1 (1994) 319–36.

44 H. van Wees, *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities* (London 2004); cf. my review in *Journal of Military History* 69 (2005) 1192–94.

45 V.D. Hanson, *The Other Greeks: The Family Farm and the Agrarian Roots of Western Civilization* (New York 1995; 2nd edn, Berkeley/Los Angeles, CA 1999); cf. *supra* n. 32. A paperback edition of *Carnage and Culture* (New York 2002) includes an 'Afterward' of the author's musings on post 9/11 developments.

46 S.E. French, *The Code of the Warrior: Exploring Warrior Values Past and Present* (Lanham, MD 2003); J.A. Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture* (Boulder 2003). Lynn's views are summarized with a repetition of his attack on Hanson in 'Discourse, Reality, and the Culture of Combat', *International History Review* 27 (2005) 475–80. This issue of *IHR* is devoted to the cultural approach and also features A.M. Eckstein's 'Bellicosity and Anarchy: Soldiers, Warriors, and Combat in Antiquity, 481–97', which espouses the cultural approach mainly from Polybius and Roman evidence and with only the lightest rap on the knuckles to the face-of-battle school. One might also note the curious, slim tome of H. Sidebottom, *Ancient War: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford 2004), which in attacking Hanson's notion of a 'Western way of war' posits this concept as an ideology (rather than objective reality) and subject to frequent re-invention. Sidebottom's facile relativism and rehearsals of the known temper in advance any enthusiasm for his forthcoming cultural history of Greek and Roman battle.

47 *Soldiers & Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity* (New Haven, CT 2005); cf. my review in *American Journal of Philology* 127 (2006) 305–309.

48 An old witticism in academic circles of continental Europe is apropos: what happens to an idea when it dies in France? It goes to heaven in Britain and America.

49 Third edition (Berlin 1920) = H.J. Delbrück, *History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History*, tr. W.J. Renfroe, 4 vols (Westport, CT 1975–85). See IV x–xi, where Delbrück characterizes his work as world history and cultural history.

50 Diodorus Siculus 16.3.2, probably borrowed from Diodorus' source, Ephorus.

51 See J.F. Lazenby and D. Whitehead, 'The Myth of the Hoplite's Hoplon', *Classical Quarterly* 46 (1996) 27–33.

52 On the development of Greek armour see, besides general works in *supra* n. 4, A. Snodgrass, *Early Greek Arms and Armour* (Edinburgh 1964) *ma Arms and Armour of the Greeks* (Ithaca, NY 1967); J.K. Anderson, 'Hoplite Weapons and Offensive Arms', in Hanson, *Hoplites* (*supra* n. 33) 15–37; E. Jarva, *Archaïologia on Archaic Greek Body Armour*, *Studia Archaeologica Septentrionalia* 3 (Rovaniemi 1995).

53 See, for example, *Politics* 4.3.2–3, 13.7–10.

54 H.L. Lorimer, 'The Hoplite Phalanx', *Annual of the British School at Athens* 42 (1947) 76–138; cf. G. Ahlberg, *Fighting on Land and Sea in Greek Geometric Art* (Stockholm 1971), although this study is largely limited to material from Attica.

55 A. Snodgrass, 'Hoplite Reform and History', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 85 (1965) 110–22; cf. R.H. Storch, 'The Archaic Greek "Phalanx", 750–650 B.C.', *Ancient History Bulletin* 12 (1998) 1–7. P. Cartledge in his 'Hoplites and Heroes: Sparta's Contribution to the Technique of Ancient Warfare', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 97 (1977) 11–27 defends the phalanx's 'sudden appearance'; see also J. Salmon, 'Political Hoplites?', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 97 (1977) 84–101.

56 J. Latacz, *Kampfparänese, Kampfdarstellung und Kampfwirklichkeit in der Ilias, bei Kallinos und Tyrtaios*, *Zetemata* 66 (Munich 1977); cf. R. Leimbach's review in *Gnomon* 52 (1980) 418–25.

57 Pritchett, *GS AW IV* 7–44; Hanson, *Other Greeks* (*supra* n. 45) 222–38, *Wars* (*supra* n. 31) 34–45, and 'Hoplite Technology in Phalanx Battle', in *Hoplites* (*supra* n. 33) 63–84: Latacz's idea of the priority of the phalanx to the aspis is bolstered by arguments from technological determinism.

58 See *supra* n. 17.

59 I. Morris, *Burial and Ancient Society: the Rise of the Greek City-State* (Cambridge 1987) 196–201; K. Raaflaub, 'Soldiers, Citizens and the Evolution of the Early Greek Polis', in L.G. Mitchell and P.J. Rhodes, eds, *The Development of the Polis in Archaic Greece* (London 1997) 49–59 and 'Archaic and Classical Greece', in Raaflaub and Rosenstein (*supra* n. 3) 132–40; see also P. Cartledge, 'La nascita degli opliti e l'organizzazione militare', in S. Settis, ed., *I Greci II. 1* (Torino 1996) 681–92.

60 H. van Wees, 'The Homeric Way of War: The *Iliad* and the Hoplite Phalanx (I-II)', *Greece & Rome* 41 (1994) 1–18, 131–55, largely recycled as 'The Development of the Hoplite Phalanx: Iconography and Reality in the Seventh Century', in van Wees, *War and Violence* (*supra* n. 3) 125–66; idem, *Status Warriors: Violence and Society in Homer and History* (Amsterdam 1993), where he originally set out many of the ideas now reproduced in his *Greek Warfare* (*supra* n. 44); cf. his 'Homeric Warfare', in I. Morris and B. Powell, eds, *A New Companion to Homer* (Leiden 1997) 668–93 and his Homeric face-of-battle: 'Heroes, Knights and Nutters', in Lloyd (*supra* n. 34) 1–86. For Sidebottom (*supra* n. 46: 52), revisionist views of a 'hoplite revolution' are motivated by a rejection in the 1970s and 1980s of social-determinist and Marxist theories of historical change. But Sidebottom is blind to the Marxist and crypto-Marxist assumptions behind the 'primitivizing' of many (but not all) anthropologically-inspired revisionists.

61 See V.M. Udwin, *Between Two Armies: The Place of the Duel in Epic Culture* (Leiden 1999); O. Hellmann, *Die Schlachtszene der Bias. Das Bild des Dichters vom Kampf in der Heroenzeit*, *Hermes Einzelschrift* 83 (Stuttgart 2000); on the lack of artistic representation of the phalanx see J. Bazant, 'War, Poetry and Athenian Vases', *Listy filologické* 106 (1983) 203–209; L. Hannestad, 'War and Greek Art', in T. Bekker-Nielsen and L. Hannestad, eds, *War as a Cultural and Social Force: Essays on Warfare in Antiquity* (Copenhagen 2001) 110–19.

62 Thucydides 1.15.3; cf. Herodotus 5.99.1. In general on the Lelantine War see V. Parker, *Untersuchungen zum Lelantischen Kriege und verwandten Problemen der frühgriechischen Geschichte*, *Historia Einzelschriften* 109 (Stuttgart 1997), although the book is weak on problems concerning the origin of the phalanx and my essay (Chapter 2, this volume) escaped notice.

63 *Iliad* 3.74–461; cf. 7.55–311 (Hector versus Ajax). Strabo's credibility as an expert (seven centuries later) on the Lelantine War and the historicity of the Chalcis-Eretria treaty are now defended by J.C. Dayton, *The Athletes of War: An Evaluation of the Agonistic Element in Greek Warfare* (Toronto 2006) 31–44, 48, 50, 147–49, 169, who has a different (and unconvincing) view of Homeric duels and *monomachia*.

64 Thucydides 5.41.2.

65 On the Spartan mirage see F. Oilier, *Le mirage spartiate* (Paris 1933–43) 2 vols; E.N. Tigerstedt, *The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity* (Stockholm/Uppsala 1965–74) 2 vols; E. Rawson, *The Spartan Tradition in European Thought* (Oxford 1969), although this work omits military aspects of Sparta's veneration in

later ages. Translations and commentaries on Xenophon's *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* abound: for example, J.M. Moore, *Aristotle and Xenophon on Democracy and Oligarchy* (Berkeley/Los Angeles, CA 1975); G. Proietti, *Xenophon's Sparta*, *Mnemosyne* Supplement 98 (Leiden 1987); M. Lipka, *Xenophon's Spartan Constitution*, *Texte und Kommentare* 24 (Berlin 2002).

66 On Sparta in general see W.G. Forrest, *A History of Sparta, 950–192 B.C.* (London 1968) and the works of Cartledge (*supra* n. 18); P. Poralla, *A Prosopography of Lacedaemonians*, 2nd edn, ed. A.S. Bradford (Chicago 1985); on the Spartan educational system see N.M. Kennell, *The Gymnasium of Virtue: Education & Culture in Ancient Sparta* (Chapel Hill 1995); and J. Ducat, *Spartan Education. Youth and Society in the Classical Period* (Swansea 2006); on the Peloponnesian League see J.L. Lendon, 'Thucydides and the "Constitution" of the Peloponnesian League', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 35 (1994) 159–77. Note also J. Ducat, 'La société Spartiate et la guerre', in Prost (*supra* n. 2) 35–50. C. Bearzot and F. Landucci, eds, *Contro le 'leggi immutabili'. Gli Spartiani fra tradizione e innovazione* (Milan 2004).

67 Spartans spoke the Dorian dialect of Greek. The Greek tradition explained the presence of a Dorian dialect through a supposed invasion of Dorians after the Trojan War. Parallels to some Spartan customs on Crete, for example, could be explained by common Dorian ancestors.

68 M. Trundle, 'The Spartan Revolution: Hoplite Warfare in the Late Archaic Period', *War & Society* 19 (2001) 1–17, would date a Spartan phalanx to the early sixth century.

69 The only modern monograph on the Spartan army is J.F. Lazenby, *The Spartan Army* (Warminster 1985), a noble effort to tackle innumerable problems. For other views see A. Toynbee, *Some Problems in Greek History* (Oxford 1969) 365–404; J.K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley/Los Angeles, CA 1970), esp. 225–51; Cartledge, Agesilaus (*supra* n. 18) 427–31; H.W. Singor, 'Admission to the Syssitia in Fifth-Century Sparta', in S. Hodkinson and A. Powell, eds, *Sparta: New Perspectives* (London 1999) 67–89 and 'The Spartan Army at Mantinea and its Organisation in the Fifth Century B.C.', in W. Jongman and M. Kleijwegt, eds, *After the Past: Essays in honour of H W Pleket* (Leiden 2002) 235–84; and van Wees (*supra* n. 44) 245–48. Hot off the press is S. Hodkinson and A. Powell, eds, *Sparta and War* (Swansea 2006).

70 Cf. Xenophon, *Constitution* 11.4–10.

71 An effort to fill the Spartan hoplite ranks at Plataea with helots is misguided: see P. Hunt, 'Helots at the Battle of Plataea', *Historia* 46 (1997) 129–44 and *War and Ideology in Greek Historians* (Cambridge 1998) 33–38; see also the rebuttal of L. Burckhardt, review of Hunt (1998) in *Klio* 83 (2001) 236–37.

72 Ferguson's paper is missing in the bibliographical note to Hanson's chapter on Zulus in *Carnage and Culture* (*supra* n. 45) 481–82, although he notes Spartan and Zulu parallels.

73 *Greek Imperialism* (Boston, MA 1913).

74 See E.V. Walter, *Terror and Resistance: A Study of Political Violence* (New York 1969) 123–43.

75 On the amphictyonic oath contrast P. Sánchez, 'Le serment amphictionique (Aeschin. *Legat.* (2) 115: un faux du IV^e siècle?', *Historia* 46 (1997) 158–71 with F. Lefevre, 'Delphes et la guerre au IV^e s. av. J.-C.', in Prost (*supra* n. 2) 179–93. Note also Dayton's inconclusive discussion: *supra* n. 63: 122–27. Cf. n. 80 *infra* on the historicity of the so-called First Sacred War.

76 Plato, *Republic* 5.469c-71b.

77 Cf. H.W. Singor, 'The Military Side of the Peisistratean Tyranny', in H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, ed., *Peisistratos and the Tyranny: A Reappraisal of the Evidence* (Amsterdam 2000) 107–29.

78 J. Ober, 'The Rules of War in Classical Greece', in M. Howard, G.J. Andreaopoulos and M.R. Schulman, eds, *The Laws of War: Constraints in Warfare in the Western World* (New Haven, CT 1994) 12–26, 227–30 = *idem*, *The Athenian Revolution: Essays on Ancient Greek Democracy and Political Theory* (Princeton, NJ 1996) 53–71. Dayton's book (*supra* n. 63), inspired by Krentz, seeks to portray Greek agonal warfare as a fabrication of modern scholarship and denies that Greek or Roman warfare had 'rules' of any sort. Dayton seems not to understand, *inter alia*, that war is a normative phenomenon. His views contrast sharply with those of Lendon (*supra* n.47), for whom competition is a prime mover as a motivating and historical force.

79 On the connections of war and religion see H. Popp, 'Die Einwirkung von Vorzeichen, Opfern und Festen auf die Kriegführung der Griechen im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.', dissertation (Erlangen 1957), a seminal work; note also Pritchett, *GSAWill: Religion* and R. Lonis, *Guerre et religion en Grèce à époque classique*, *Annales Littéraires de l'Université de Besançon* 238 (Paris 1979). Battle sacrifices are treated in detail in M.H. Jameson, 'Sacrifice before Battle', in Hanson, *Hoplites* (*supra* n. 33) 197–27 and R. Parker, 'Sacrifice before Battle', in van Wees, *War and Violence* (*supra* n. 3) 299–314. Papers addressing various religious aspects of Greek warfare are also included in the anthologies noted at *supra* nn. 2–3.

80 The so-called First Sacred War of c.590, not attested before the fourth century, has been argued to be a fiction: see N. Robertson, 'The Myth of the First Sacred War', *Classical Quarterly* 28 (1978) 38–79; *contra* see G.A. Lehmann, 'Der "erste Heilige Krieg" – Eine Fiction?', *Historia* 29 (1980) 242–46.

81 See T. Schwertfeger, 'Die Schild des Archilochus', *Chiron* 12 (1982) 253–80; D. Hamel, 'Coming to Terms with *lipotaxia*', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 39 (1998) 361–45. Recent monographs on the hoplite as citizen include: L. Burckhardt, *Bürger und Soldaten: Aspekte der politischen und militärischen Rolle athenischer Bürger im Kriegswesen des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.*, *Historia Einzelschriften* 101 (Stuttgart 1996); J. Franz, *Krieger, Bauern, Bürger: Untersuchungen zu den Hoplitzen der archaischen und klassischen Zeit* (Frankfurt am Main 2002); note also F. Prost, 'Les combattants de Marathon: idéologie et société hoplitiques à Athènes au V s.', in Prost (*supra* n. 2) 69–88; C. Meier, 'Il molo della guerra nell'Atene classica, in Sordi' (*supra* n. 41) 69–94 = 'Die Rolle des Krieges im klassischen Athens', *Historische Zeitschrift* 251 (1990) 356–605. For a sense of recent attacks (for example, by van Wees) on Aristotle's concept of the middling class hoplite (a view particularly prized by V.D. Hanson) and the relationship of the Solonian class system at Athens to hoplite service, see V. Gabrielsen, 'The Impact of Armed Forces on Government and Politics in Archaic and Classical Greek Poleis: A Response to Hans van Wees', in A. Chaniotis and P. Ducrey, eds, *Army and Power in the Ancient World*, *Heidelberger althistorische Beiträge und epigraphische Studien* 37 (Stuttgart 2002) 83–98. On women in Greek warfare, primarily throwers of roof tiles, see W.D. Berry, 'Roof Tiles and Urban Violence in the Ancient World', *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies* 37 (1996) 55–74; cf. P. Loman, 'No Woman No War: Women's Participation in Ancient Greek Warfare', *Greece & Rome* 51 (2004) 34–54.

82 On unit drill see P. Roesch, *Études Béotiennes* (Paris 1982) 306–309, 347–49; on *hoplomachoi* see E.L. Wheeler, 'The *Hoplomachoi* and Vegetius' Spartan

Drillmasters', *Chiron* 13 (1983) 1–20.

⁸³ On dancing as military training see E.L. Wheeler, *Hoplomachia* and Greek Dances in Arms', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 23 (1982) 223–33. On the pyrrhic see M.-H. Delavaud-Roux, *Les danses armées en Grèce antique* (Aix-en-Provence 1993); P. Ceccarrelli, *La Pirrica nel Vantichità greco romana* (Pisa 1998). On dancing and drill see W.H. McNeill, *Keeping Together in Time: Dance and Drill in Human History* (Cambridge, MA 1995); H. Kleinschmidt, 'The Military and Dancing', *Ethnologia Europea* 25 (1995) 157–76 and 'Using the Gun: Manual Drill and the Proliferation of Portable Firearms', *Journal of Military History* 63 (1999) 601–30, esp. 618–22. Hoplite training is also discussed by L. Rawling, 'Alternative Agonies: Hoplite Martial and Combat Experiences beyond the Phalanx', in van Wees, *War and Violence* (*supra* n. 3) 233–59, although much here can be disputed: *inter alia* his apparent equation of *hoplomachia* and *monomachia*. Nor is *hoplomachia* a dance, as Hanson asserts: *Other Greeks* (*supra* n. 45) 305.

⁸⁴ The profit motive in Plato and Aristotle gives free rein to Marxist interpretations: see Y. Garlan, *Guerre et économie en Grèce ancienne* (Paris 1989), a useful collection of his papers; cf. under the inspiration of Garlan, van Wees, *Greek Warfare* (*supra* n. 44) 19–33, who concedes with reluctance a role for honour.

⁸⁵ Pritchett collects the evidence at GSAW 130–52.

⁸⁶ Thucydides 6.24.3. The acta of two French conferences explore various economic issues: see A. Chastagnol et al., *Armées et fiscalité dans le monde antique* (Paris 1977) and J. Andreau, P. Briant and R. Descat, eds, *Économie antique: La guerre dans les économies antiques*, *Entretiens d'Archéologie et d'Histoire* 5 (Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges 2000); see also P. Brun, *Eisphora-synthesis-stratitotika: recherches sur les finances militaires d'Athènes au IV^e siècle av. J.-C.* (Paris 1983) and 'Guerre et finances; état de question', *Pallas* 51 (1999) 223–40; V. Gabrielsen, *Financing the Athenian Fleet* (Baltimore, MD 1994); Pritchett, GSAW V 68–504; R. Thomsen, *Eisphora. A Study of Direct Taxation in Ancient Athens* (Copenhagen 1994).

⁸⁷ V.D. Hanson, *War and Agriculture in Classical Greece* (Pisa 1983); a second edition (Berkeley/Los Angeles, CA 1998) includes (201–51) Hanson's replies to critics; cf. *supra* n. 30.

⁸⁸ On the new fourth-century strategy of border forts and attempting to protect a city's *chora*, see Y. Garlan, *Recherches de poliorcétique grecque* (Paris 191 A), esp. 66–86; J. Ober, *Fortress Attica: Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier 404–322 B.C.*, *Mnemosyne Supplement* 84 (Leiden 1985), who would turn the Attic frontier into something resembling a Roman *limes*', cf. M.H. Munn, *The Defense of Attica: The Dema Wall and the Boiotian War of 378–375 B.C.* (Berkeley/Los Angeles, CA 1993) with a rebuttal of Ober's thesis at 15–25. On Aeneas Tacticus see the commentaries of M. Bettalli in Enea Tattico, *La Difesa di un Città Assediata (Poliorcetica)* (Pisa 1990) and D. Whitehead in *Aineias the Tactician, How to Survive under Siege*, 2nd edn (London 2001) and the edition with Alphonse Dain's valuable introduction, in A. Dain and A.M. Bon, *Énée le Tacticien, Poliorcétique* (Paris 1967).

⁸⁹ *Herodotus* 1.17–22.

⁹⁰ For useful surveys see C. Phillipson, *The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome* (London 1911) 2 vols; V. Martin, *La vie internationale dans la Grèce des cités* (Paris 1940); E. Bickerman, 'Remarques sur le droit des gens dans la Grèce classique', *Revue internationale des droits de l'antiquité*, 4 (1950) 99–127; R. Lonis, *Les usages de la guerre entre grecs et barbares* (Paris 1969) and 'La valeur du serment dans les accords internationaux en Grèce classique', *Dialogues d'histoire ancienne* 6 (1980) 267–80; D. Mosley, *Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient*

Greece, *Historia Einzelschriften* 22 (Wiesbaden 1973); F. Adcock and D. Mosley, *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* (London 1975); V. Ilari, *Guerra e diritto nel mondo antico*, Parte I: *Guerra e diritto nel mondo greco-ellenistico fino al III secolo* (Milan 1980); P. Karavites, *Capitulations and Greek Interstate Relations*, *Hypomnemata* 71 (Göttingen 1982) esp. 13–26; E. Baltrusch, *Symmachie und Spondai: Untersuchungen zum griechischen Völkerrecht der archaischen und klassischen Zeit* (8–5. Jahrhundert v. Chr.) (Berlin 1994); G.A. Sheets, ‘Conceptualizing International Law in Thucydides’, *American Journal of Philology* 115 (1994) 51–73; L. Piccirilli, *L’invenzione della diplomazia nella Grecia antica* (Rome 2002); D.J. Bederman, *International Law in Antiquity* (Cambridge 2001). The acta of a 1993 Strasbourg conference contains a number of useful papers, E. Frézouls and A. Jacquemin, eds, *Les relations internationales* (Paris 1995): V.A. Troncoso, ‘Ultimatum et déclaration de guerre dans le Grèce classique’, 211–95; F.J. Fernandez Nieto, ‘Tregua sagrada, diplomacia y política durante la guerra del Peloponense’, 161–88; D. Whitehead, ‘The Ten-Day Truce (Thucydides 5.26.2, etc.)’, 189–210; cf. M. Arnush, ‘Ten-Day Armistices in Thucydides’, *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 33 (1992) 329–53.

91 ‘Guerre et paix entre cités’, in Vernant (*supra* n. 13) 207–20. On the function of the oath in ancient treaties and the frequent insertion of an anti-deceit clause to deter circumvention of the oath, see E.L. Wheeler, ‘Sophistic Interpretations and Greek Treaties’, *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 25 (1984) 253–74.

92 On *philia* see G. Panessa, *Philiai. L’amicizia nelle relazioni interstatali dei Greci dalle origini alla fine della guerra del Peloponneso* (Pisa 1999). On *proxenoi* see A. Gerolymatos, *Espionage and Treason: A Study of the Proxenia in Political and Military Intelligence Gathering in Classical Greece* (Amsterdam 1986); M. Moggi, ‘I proxenoi e la guerra nel V secolo A.C.’, in Frézouls and Jacquemin (*supra* n. 90) 143–60. On kinship (both real and imagined) in diplomacy see CP. Jones, *Kinship Diplomacy in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, MA 1999).

93 Recent work on arbitration includes L. Piccirilli, *Gli arbitrati interstatali greci* (Pisa 1973); S.L. Ager, ‘Why War? Some Views on International Arbitration in Ancient Greece’, *Echoes du Monde Classique* 12 (1993) 1–13; D. Roebuck, *Ancient Greek Arbitration* (Oxford 2001).

94 Laws 1.626a. For an assessment of some recent work on ancient international relations in terms of ‘primitivists’ versus ‘realists’, see J.E. Lendon, ‘Primitivism and Ancient Foreign Relations’, *Classical Journal* 97.4 (2002) 375–94, although the characterizations can be curious (for example, Ernst Badián as a ‘primitivist’).

95 Van Wees’ recent attempt (*supra* n. 44, 3–18) to refute the views of de Romilly (*supra* n. 90) and to reject the Realist positions of Thucydides is misguided. No one has ever asserted that peace treaties were the only type of relations between Greek poleis, but it is the peace treaty and not other types of relationship, formal or informal, that define a state of peace. Nor is any credence owed to Graham Shipley’s arguments (Rich and Shipley, *supra* n. 3, 3–6) that the absence of the word *polemos* in the title of ancient Greek historical works indicates the absence of a concept of using war for periodization. Can there be any doubt that Herodotus and Thucydides or mainland Greeks as a whole viewed wars as the defining events of the beginning and end of the fifth century? The logic of Shipley’s argument would also deny the significance of the Second World War to the generation born between 1920 and 1960.

96 Plato, Laws 1.626a; Thucydides 1.146; 2.1.

97 For additional references and discussion see Ilari (*supra* n. 90) 103–104,

⁹⁸ 1.15.2.

⁹⁹ Mosley offers a slightly expanded version of the same paper in ‘Crossing Greek Frontiers under Arms IF, in E. Olshausen and H. Sonnabend, eds, *Stuttgarter Kolloquium zur historischen Geographie des Altertums* 4 (1990) (= *Geographica Antiqua* 7 [Amsterdam 1994]) 175–87. On the Greek concept of border/frontier, see G. Daverio Rocchi, *Frontier a e confini nella Grecia antica* (Rome 1988); M. Sordi, ed., *Il confine nel mondo classico* (Milan 1987). The influence of Greek geography on strategy is surveyed in E.L. Wheeler, ‘Strategie’, in H. Sonnabend, ed., *Mensch und Landschaft in der Antike. Lexikon der Historischen Geographie* (Stuttgart 1999) 524–33. An attempt to argue the existence of a concept of neutrality in Classical Greece may be found in R.A. Bauslaugh, *The Concept of Neutrality in Classical Greece* (Berkeley/Los Angeles, CA 1991).

¹⁰⁰ For Greek criticism of Herodotus’ view of the Persian Wars see Thucydides 1.69.5, 7.33.5; Theopompus, in F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, Teil 2B (Leiden 1926) 569–70 (no. 115 fr. 153); Plutarch, *Mor alia* 862D; cf. 873F–74D; Dio Chrysostom, *Orations* 11.148–49. For a Persian perspective see A.T. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948) 248–61.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Polyaeus, *Strategica* 7.16.2.

¹⁰² On Greek navies and especially that of Athens see M. Amit, *Athens and the Sea: A Study in Athenian Sea-Power* (Brussels 1965); L. Casson, *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World* (Princeton, NJ 1971); B. Jordan, *The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period* (Berkeley/Los Angeles, CA 1975); J. Morrison and R. Williams, *Greek Oared Ships 900–322 B.C.* (Cambridge 1968); J. Morrison et al., *The Athenian Trireme*, 2nd edn (Cambridge 2000); M. Moggi, ‘La supériorité navale degli Atēniēsi e l’evoluzione tattica della “naumachia”: opliti e māriṇai a confronto’, *Civiltà classica e cristiana* 5 (1984) 239–69; J.F. Lazenby, ‘Naval Warfare in the Ancient World: Myth and Reality’, *International History Review* 9 (1987) 438–55; A. Holladay, ‘Further Thoughts on Trireme Tactics’, *Greece & Rome* 35 (1988) 149–51; H.T. Wallinga, ‘The Trireme and History’, *Mnemosyne* 43 (1990) 132–49; Gabrielsen (*supra* n. 86); B. Strauss, ‘Perspectives on the Death of Fifth-Century Athenian Seamen’, in van Wees (*supra* n. 3) 261–83, and ‘Democracy, Kimon and the Evolution of Athenian Naval Tactics in the Fifth Century BC, in P. Flensted-Jensen et al., eds, *Polis and Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History* (Copenhagen 2000) 315–26.

¹⁰³ On cavalry see G. Bugh, *The Horsemen of Athens* (Princeton, NJ 1988); I. Spence, *The Cavalry of Classical Greece: A Social and Military History* (Oxford 1993); L. Worley, *Hippeis: The Cavalry of Classical Greece* (Boulder, CO 1994); and Gaebel (*supra* n. 35). Sparta, for example, instituted a cavalry corps in 424; Athens developed a small regular cavalry force after the Persian Wars.

¹⁰⁴ On political aspects of the office of general see C. Fornara, *The Athenian Board of Generals from 501 to 404*, *Historia Einzelschrift* 16 (Wiesbaden 1971); Pritchett, *GSAW* 4–58; W. Lengauer, *Greek Commanders in the 5th and 4th Centuries B. C. Politics and Ideology: A Study of Militarism* (Warsaw 1979); D. Hamel, *Athenian Generals: Military Authority in the Classical Period* (Leiden 1998) and ‘Strategoī on the Bema: The Separation of Political and Military Authority in Fourth Century Athens’, *Ancient History Bulletin* 9 (1995) 25–39; P. Fröhlich, ‘Les magistrats de la guerre’, in Prost (*supra* n. 2) 108–36; on the general’s pre-battle speech, see the replies of M. Clark, ‘Did Thucydides Invent the Battle Exhortation?’, *Historia* 44 (1995) 375–76, C. Ehrhardt, ‘Speeches before Battle’, *Historia* 44 (1995) 120–21, and W.K. Pritchett, *Ancient Greek Battle Speeches and a*

Palfrey (Amsterdam 2002) to M. Hansen 'The Battle Exhortation in Ancient Historiography. Fact or Fiction?', *Historia* 42 (1993) 161–80. For a vitriolic response to my essay reproduced here as Chapter 11, see W.K. Pritchett, 'The General on the Battlefield', in *idem, Essays in Greek History* (Amsterdam 1994) 111–14, which Hanson (*Western Way of War*, 2nd edn, *supra* n. 30, 243) takes as accurate. Readers may decide for themselves whether Pritchett's *ad hominem* attacks, misunderstandings and misrepresentations of the arguments really prove anything. Hanson reasserts his view of the general in 'The Classical Greek Warrior and the Egalitarian Military Ethos', *Ancient World* 31.2 (2000) 111–26.

105 See P. Krentz, 'Deception in Archaic and Classical Greek Warfare', in van Wees (*supra* n. 3) 167–200, who does not verify and defend the historicity of examples from the Archaic period, which may be fabrications of the fourth century and later.

106 See Pritchett, *GSAWII* 156–89; F.S. Russell, *Information Gathering in Classical Greece* (Ann Arbor, MI 1999).

107 See Wheeler, 'Ruses and Stratagems' (*supra* n. 32) and 'The Modern Legality of Frontinus' Stratagems', *Militär-geschichtliche Mitteilungen* 44.1(1988) 7–29: 91 per cent of the ancient stratagems in Frontinus' collection are legal acts of war by modern standards.

108 See E.L. Wheeler, *Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery*, Mnemosyne Supplement 108 (Leiden 1988). On *metis* see Détienne and Vernant (*supra* n. 14).

109 The base meaning of the word family, to which *Hope* belongs, signifies the legally neutral 'acting secretly', so the crux is not quite so problematic as Whitehead imagines. Greek law distinguished *klope* (thievery) from *harpage* (robbery by force), a parallel to the oppositions of secret versus open means and trickery versus force that characterize the problem of stratagems in general. See Wheeler (*supra* n. 108) 32 and 109–110 on ancient attitudes towards stratagems.

110 On Thucydides' view of stratagems see E.L. Wheeler, 'Polla kena tou polemou: The History of a Greek Proverb', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 29 (1988) 153–84 at 161–65. On stratagem collections see my 'Introduction', in Polyaeus, *Stratagems of War*, ed. and tr. P. Krentz and E.L. Wheeler (Chicago 1994) I vi–xxiv and my review of M.T. Schettino, *Introduzione a Polieno*, in *Classical Review* 51 (2001) 36–38.

111 On Marathon and the Persian Wars see W.K. Pritchett, *Marathon*, University of California Publications in Classical Archaeology 4.2 (Berkeley/Los Angeles, CA 1960); C. Hignett, *Xerxes' Invasion of Greece* (Oxford 1963); N.G.L. Hammond, 'The Campaign and Battle of Marathon', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 88 (1968) 13–57; G. Shrimpton, 'The Persian Cavalry at Marathon', *Phoenix* 34 (1980) 20–37; J.A.G. van der Veer, 'The Battle of Marathon: A Topographical Survey', *Mnemosyne* 34 (1982) 290–321; J.M. Balcer, 'The Persian Wars against Greece: A Reassessment', *Historia* 38 (1989) 127–43; J.A.S. Evans, 'Herodotus and the Battle of Marathon', *Historia* 42 (1993) 279–307; J.F. Lazenby, *The Defense of Greece 490–479 BC* (Warminster 1993); J.P. Holoka, 'Marathon and the Myth of the Same-Day March', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 38 (1997) 329–53; N.A. Doenges, 'The Campaign and Battle of Marathon', *Historia* 47 (1998) 1–17; Prost (*supra* n. 81); N. Sekunda, *Marathon 490 B.C.: The First Persian Invasion* (Oxford 2002); B.S. Strauss, *The Battle of Salamis: The Naval Encounter That Saved Greece – and Western Civilization* (New York 2004); G. Cawkwell, *The Greek Wars. The Failure of Persia* (Oxford 2005); R.T. Wallinga, *Xerxes' Greek Adventure: The Naval Perspective*, Mnemosyne Supplement 265 (Leiden 2005). Of Greek commanders in

the Persian Wars only Themistocles has prompted recent monographic treatment: see F.J. Frost, *Plutarch's Themistocles: A Historical Commentary* (Princeton, NJ 1980); R.J. Lenardon, *The Sage of Themistocles* (London 1978); A.J. Podlecki, *The Life of Themistocles: A Critical Survey of the Literary and Archaeological Evidence* (Montreal 1975). The last worthwhile attempt at a biography of Miltiades was H. Berve, *Miltiades. Studien zur Geschichte des Mannes und seiner Zeit*, Hermes Einzelschriften 2 (Berlin 1937).

112 Herodotus 7.158.4.

113 On light infantry see J.G.P. Best, *Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare* (Groningen 1969); F. Lissrague, *L'Autre guerrier Archers, peltasts, cavaliers dans l'imagerie attique* (Paris/Rome 1990); Pritchett, *GSAWV* 1–67 (stone-throwers, slingers). I. Ivanchik, 'Who Were the "Scythian" Archers on Archaic Attic Vases?', in D. Braund, ed., *Scythians and Greeks* (2005) 100–13, raises the question whether the 'Scythian' archers in vase paintings were real Scythians or whether Scythian attire had become a 'uniform' for archers. By the fourth century 'peltast' was a conventional term for any light infantry regardless of the weapon employed.

114 For responses to Luginbill see P. Krentz, 'Continuing the *Othismos* on *Othismos*', *Ancient History Bulletin* 8 (1994) 45–49; A. Goldsworthy, 'The *Othismos*, Myths and Heresies: The Nature of Hoplite Battle', *War and History* 4 (1997) 1–16; van Wees (*supra* n. 3) 127–31. Defenders of *othismos* include G. Hutchinson, *Xenophon and the Art of Command* (London 2000) 27, 169 and E.L. Wheeler, 'Land Combat', in *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare* (Cambridge 2007) in press.

115 P. Vaughn, 'The Identification and Retrieval of the Hoplite Battle-Dead', in Hanson, *Hoplite?*, (*supra* n. 33) 38–62; O. Jacob, 'La cité grecque et les blessés de guerre', in *Mélanges Gustave Glotz* (Paris 1932) II 461–81; M. Majno, *The Healing Hand: Man and Wound in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, MA 1975); S. Geroulanos and R. Bridler, *Trama. Wund-Entstehung und Wund-Pflege im antiken Griechenland* (Mainz 1994); R.H. Sternberg, 'The Transport of Sick and Wounded Soldiers in Classical Greece', *Phoenix* 53 (1999) 191–205; CF. Salazar, *The Treatment of War Wounds in Graeco-Roman Antiquity, Studies in Ancient Medicine* 21 (Leiden 2000); On POWs see P. Ducrey, *Le traitement de prisonniers de guerre dans la Grèce antique* (Paris 1968; 2nd edn, Paris 1999); A. Panagopoulos, *Captives and Hostages in the Peloponnesian War*, 2nd edn (Amsterdam 1989); A. Bielman, *Retour à liberté. Libération et sauvetage de prisonniers en Grèce ancienne* (Athens 1994). On ransom see Pritchett, *GSAWV* 245–97; D. Whitehead, 'Hoion to mnas lutrousthai', in Brulé and Oulhen (*supra* n. 13) 139–46. On burials see Pritchett, *GSAWV* 94–259; N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City*, tr. A. Sheridan (Cambridge, MA 1986).

116 Xenophon, *Anabasis* 3.4.5.

117 Herodotus 7.9b. 1–2.

118 Cf. P. Brulé, 'La mortalité de guerre in Grèce classique: l'exemple d'Athènes de 490 à 322', in Prost (*supra* n. 2) 51–68.

119 See V.D. Hanson, 'Hoplite Obliteration: The Case of the Town of Thespieae', in Carmen and Harding (*supra* n. 40) 203–17.

120 Study of the war is inseparable from analysis of its chief historian Thucydides, best read in English in the translation of Richard Crawley (1840–93), available in various editions but now most accessible in a revised form in R.B. Strassler, ed., *The Landmark Thucydides* (New York 1996). For students of political power the seventeenth-century translation of Thomas Hobbes can also be

interesting: *Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War: The Complete Hobbes Translation*, ed. D. Grene (Chicago 1959) or *Hobbes 'Thucydides'*, ed. R. Schlatter (New Brunswick, NJ 1975). An indispensable companion is A.W. Gomme, A. Andrewes and K. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 5 vols (Oxford 1945–70), now supplemented by S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides*, 2 vols (Oxford 1990–96). Worthwhile studies include A. Bauer, 'Ansichten des Thukydides über Kriegführung', *Philologus* 50 (1891) 401–29; F. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythist or icus* (London 1907); E. Schwartz, *Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides* (Bonn 1919); J.H. Finley, *Thucydides* (Cambridge, MA 1942); R. Syme, 'Thucydides', *Proceedings of the British Academy* 48 (1962) 39–56; G. Cawkwell, *Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War* (London/New York 1997); R.D. Luginbill, *Thucydides on War and National Character* (Boulder, CO 1999); but the premier modern scholar of Thucydides is unquestionably Jacqueline de Romilly, *Thucydide et l'impérialisme athénien* (Paris 1947) = *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism*, tr. P. Thody (Oxford 1963); *Histoire et raison chez Thucydide* (Paris 1956); and *L'invention de histoire politique chez Thucydide* (Paris 2005).

121 Basic studies of the war include B.W. Henderson, *The Great War between Athens and Sparta* (London 1927); G. Grundy, *Thucydides and the History of his Age* (Oxford 1948); R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1971); G.E.M. Ste Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, NY 1972); E. Badián, *From Plataea to Potidaea* (Baltimore 1993); J. Lazenby, *The Peloponnesian War: A Military History* (London 2004); D. Kagan's four-volume study, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (New York 1969), *The Archidamian War* (Ithaca, NY 1974), *The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition* (Ithaca, NY 1981), and *The Fall of the Athenian Empire* (New York 1987), is now summarized for popular consumption as *The Peloponnesian War* (New York 2003). Victor Hanson applies the face-of-battle approach to the conflict in *A War like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War* (New York 2005) with emphasis on the war's costs and atrocities; cf. my review in *Journal of Military History* 70 (2006) 816–18.

122 For a need to stress continuities in Greek warfare and incremental changes rather than sudden dramatic innovations (revolution) in the Peloponnesian War see Wheeler (*supra* n. 114); see also the rejection of the Peloponnesian War as a military revolution in Lonis (*supra* n. 79) 17–21, 283–94, 318.

123 The idea was first systematically expounded in his *Die Strategie des Perikles erläutert durch die Strategie Friedrichs des Großen* (Berlin 1890).

124 Spence refutes Ober's view that Pericles' mobile defence was planned from the beginning: see J. Ober, 'Thucydides, Pericles, and the Strategy of Defense', in J.W. Eadie and J. Ober, eds, *The Craft of the Ancient Historian: Essays in Honour of Chester G Starr* (New York 1985) 171–89.

125 On Athenian raiding see H.D. Westlake, 'Seaborne Raids in Periclean Strategy', *Classical Quarterly* 39 (1945) 75–84.

126 On *epiteichismos* see also M.H. Munn, 'Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaign and the Theban Stockade of 378–77 B.C.', *Classical Antiquity* 6 (1987) 106–38.

127 1.102.2.

128 On Greek siegecraft and fortifications see EE. Winter, *Greek Fortifications* (Toronto 1971); A. Wokalek, *Griechische Stadtfestungen: Studien zur Geschichte der frühgriechischen Befestigungsanlagen* (Bonn 1973); Garlan (*supra* n. 88); E. Will, 'Le territoire, la ville et la poliorcétique grecque', *Revue historique* 253 (1975) 297–318; A.W. Lawrence, *Greek Aims in Fortification* (Oxford 1979); J.P. Adam, *L'architecture militaire grecque* (Paris 1982). P. Leriche and H. Tréziny, eds, *La fortification dans l'histoire du monde grec* (Paris 1982) includes, *inter alia*, A.

Snodgrass, 'The Historical Significance of Fortification in Archaic Greece', 125–31 and P. Ducrey, 'Les fortifications grecques: rôle, fonction, efficacité', 133–42; see also H. Lauter, *Attische Festungen: Beiträge zum Festungswesen und zum Siedlungsstruktur von 5. bis zum 3. Jh. v. Chr.* (Marburg 1989); S.M. Rusch, 'Poliorcetic Assault in the Peloponnesian War', dissertation (University of Pennsylvania 1997); W.K. Pritchett, 'Akarnanian Walls and Scaling-Ladders', in *idem*, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography VIII* (Amsterdam 1992) 115–43; D. Campbell, *Ancient Siege Warfare. Persians, Greeks, Carthaginians and Romans* (Oxford 2005). On ancient sieges in general see P.B. Kern, *Ancient Siege Warfare* (Bloomington, IN 1999) with my review in *Technology and Culture* 41 (2000) 834–35.

¹²⁹ See Luis A. Losada, *The Fifth Column in the Peloponnesian War*, Mnemosyne Supplement 21 (Leiden 1972); cf. R. Lonis, 'Poliorcétique et stasis dans la première moitié du IV^e siècle av. J.-C.', in P. Carlier, ed., *Le IV^e siècle av. J.-C.: Approches historiographiques* (Nancy 1996) 241–57.

¹³⁰ Nearly all recent discussions follow P.A. Brunt, 'Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War', *Phoenix* 19 (1965) 255–80.

¹³¹ Cf. G. Cawkwell, 'Thucydides' Judgment of Periclean Strategy', *Yale Classical Studies* 24 (1976) 53–69.

¹³² For naval aspects of Sparta see Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia* (*supra* n. 18) 142–43.

¹³³ Cf. J. Boëdieu-Trevet, 'Brasidas: la naissance de l'art du commandement', in Brulé and Oulhen (*supra* n. 13) 147–58; E. Badián, 'The Road to Acanthus', in R. Mellor and L. Tritle, eds, *Text & Tradition: Studies in Greek History & Historiography in Honor of Mortimer Chambers* (Claremont, CA 1999) 3–35.

¹³⁴ For studies of the generals of the Peloponnesian War see K.-W. Welwei, 'Das Problem des "Präventivkrieges" im politischen Denken des Perikles und des Alkibiades', *Gymnasium* 79 (1972) 289–305; H. Bengtson, *Zu strategischen Konzeptionen des Alkibiades, Sitzungsberichte, Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse* 1979.4 (Munich 1979); W.M. Ellis, *Alcibiades* (London 1989); J. Roisman, *The General Demosthenes and his Use of Military Surprise*, *Historia Einzelschriften* 78 (Stuttgart 1993): critical of Demosthenes; Jean-François Bommelaer, *Lysander de Sparte: histoire et traditions* (Paris 1981); J. Hale, 'General Phormio's Art of War: A Greek Commentary on a Chinese Classic', in Hamilton and Krentz (*supra* n. 3) 85–103. Studies of Pericles abound, but for basic views see P.A. Stadter, *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles* (Chapel Hill, NC 1989).

¹³⁵ On Agesilaus see Cartledge (*supra* n. 18) and, more briefly, C. Hamilton, *Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony* (Ithaca, NY 1991) with my review in *American Journal of Philology* 114 (1993) 456–59. The standard study of Thebes is J. Buckler, *The Theban Hegemony 371–362 B.C.* (Cambridge, MA 1980).

¹³⁶ On Greek international politics in the 350s and Philip II see J. Buckler, *Philip II and the Sacred War*, Mnemosyne Supplement 109 (Leiden 1989); note also J.R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (Ithaca, NY 1976); and G. Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* (London 1978). For Macedonian institutions see M.B. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*, *Meletemata* 22, 2 vols (Athens 1996). For the possible influence of Epaminondas on Philip II see N.G.L. Hammond, 'What Philip May Have Learned as a Hostage in Thebes', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 38 (1997) 355–72. The King's Peace of 387/386 established a so-called 'common peace' (*koine eirene*), asserting the autonomy of all Greek poleis, but the idea hardly halted Greek conflicts. The concept, studied by T.T.B.

Ryder, *Koine Eirene* (London/New York 1965) and M. Jehne, *Koine Eirene. Untersuchungen zu den Befriedungs- und Stabilisierungsbemühungen in der griechischen Poliswelt des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.*, Hermes Einzelschriften 63 (Stuttgart 1993), forms a plank in Bauslaugh's thesis (*supra* n. 99) for a concept of Greek neutrality, but Bauslaugh takes the concept of *koine eirene* more seriously than did fourth-century Greeks.

137 For the Battle of Corinth see Konecny (*supra* n. 35). For peltasts see Best (*supra* n. 113); G. Griffith, 'Peltasts and the Origins of the Macedonian Phalanx', in H. Dell, ed., *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of Charles F. Edson* (Thessaloniki 1981) 161–67. For Iphicrates see Pritchett, *GSAW* II 62–72; E. Bianco, 'Iphicrate, rhetor kai strategos', *Miscellanea Graeca et Romana* 21 (1997) 179–201. A supposed revolution in the use of cavalry from Agesilaus' campaigns in Asia Minor is posited by P. Rahe in 'The Military Situation in Western Asia on the Eve of Cunaxa', *American Journal of Philology* 101 (1980) 79–96.

138 On the careers of these condottieri see Pritchett, *GSAW* II 59–116. The civilian control of generals is studied by Pritchett, *GSAW* II 4–58; Lengauer (*supra* n. 104); Burckhardt (*supra* n. 81); Hamel (*supra* n. 104).

139 On these charismatic figures see B. Craven, *Dionysius I: War-Lord of Sicily* (New Haven, CT 1990); S. Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae*, *Electrum* 3 (Cracow 1999).

140 The best biography in English remains J.K. Anderson, *Xenophon* (London 1974); see also H.R. Breitenbach, 'Historiographische Anschauungsformen Xenophons', dissertation (Basel 1950) and 'Xenophon (6): Xenophon von Athens', in A. Pauly, G. Wissow and W. Kroll, *Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft* IXA (Stuttgart 1967) 1567–928, 1981–2052, 2502; E. Delebecque, *Essai sur la vie de Xenophon* (Paris 1957); W.E. Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian: The Problem of the Individual and the Polis* (Albany, NY 1977); J. Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of His Times* (London 1996); Badián (*supra* n. 1) 33–53.

141 For a useful collection of papers on various aspects of the *Anabasis* see P. Briant, ed., *Dans les pas des Dix-Mille: Peuples et pays au Proche-Orient vues par un Grec* (Toulouse 1995); note also O. Lendle, *Kommentar zu Xenophons Anabasis* (Bucher 1–7) (Darmstadt 1995); G.B. Nussbaum, *The Ten Thousand: A Study of Social Organization and Action in Xenophon's Anabasis* (Leiden 1967); L. Iapichino, 'I Diecimila di Senofone: tecniche di combattimento, equipaggiamento militare e approvvigionamento degli strumenti di guerra', *Revista Storica dell'Antichità* 29 (1999) 91–105; J.W.I. Lee, 'The Lochos in Xenophon's *Anabasis*', in Tuplin (*supra* n. 1) 289–317.

142 On the origins of Western military theory see A. Bauer, 'Die Anfänge der Kriegswissenschaft', *Zeitschrift für allgemeine Geschichte* 3 (1886) 1–12; O.L. Spaulding, *Pen and Sword in Greece and Rome* (Princeton, NJ 1937) – still the only survey of ancient military thought as a whole in English; Dain, in Dain and Bon (*supra* n. 88); E.L. Wheeler, 'The Origins of Military Theory in Ancient Greece and China', *International Commission of Military History, Acta* 5, Bucarest 1980 (Bucharest 1981) 74–79, 'The *Hoplomachos*' (*supra* n. 82), and 'Polla kena tou polemou' (*supra* n. 110), the only modern study of the phenomenon of panic in ancient armies. There is little new in J. Vela Tejada, 'Warfare, History and Literature in the Archaic and Classical Periods: The Development of Greek Military Treatises', *Historia* 53 (2004) 129–46.

143 On *militaria* in Xenophon see especially Anderson (*supra* n. 69) and on Xenophon's view of the general see Hutchinson (*supra* n. 114); The *Cyropaedia* is now more accessible in a new English translation: *Xenophon, The Education of Cyrus*, tr. W. Ambler (Ithaca, NY 2001). While this volume was in press, two

further papers of note have appeared in *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 126 (2006): J.E. Lendon attempts to reconstruct a Xenophonic view of international relations: 'Xenophon and the Alternative to Realist Foreign Policy: *Cyropaedia* 3.1.14–31', 82–98; Paul Christesen argues that Cyrus the Great's reform of Persian cavalry represents Xenophon's cryptic program for reform of the Spartan army after Leuctra: 'Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and Military Reform in Sparta', 47–65.

144 Basic studies of Greek mercenaries include: H.W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* (Oxford 1933); Aymard, 'Mercénariat et histoire grecque' (*supra* n. 9) 487–98; G.B. Nussbaum, *The Ten Thousand: A Study of Social Organization and Action in Xenophon's Anabasis* (Leiden 1967); J. Roy, 'The Mercenaries of Cyrus', *Historia* 16 (1967) 292–323; H. Miller, 'The Practical and Economic Background to the Greek Mercenary Explosion', *Greece & Rome* 31 (1984) 155–60; L.R. Marinovic, *Le mercénariat grec au Ve siècle avant notre ère et la crise de la polis*, tr. Y. Garlan (Paris 1988); J.A. Krasilnikoff, 'Aegean Mercenaries in the Fourth to Second Centuries BC: A Study in Payment, Plunder and Logistics of Ancient Greek Armies', *Classica et Mediaevalia* 43 (1992) 23–36 and 'The Regular Payment of Aegean Mercenaries in the Classical Period', *Classica et Mediaevalia* 44 (1993) 77–95; M. Trundle, *Greek Mercenaries from the Late Archaic Period to Alexander* (London/New York 2004). For a debate on whether mercenaries provided their own equipment, see D. Whitehead, 'Who Equipped Mercenary Troops in Classical Greece?', *Historia* 40 (1991) 105–11; P. McKechnie, 'Greek Mercenary Troops and Their Equipment', *Historia* 43 (1994) 297–305.

145 On mercenaries in the Archaic period see: M. Bettali, *I mercenari nel mondo greco I: Dalle origini all'fine del V sec. a.C.* (Florence 1995); B. Lavelle, 'Epikouros and epikouroi in Early Greek Literature and History', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 38 (1997) 229–62; P. Kaplan, 'The Social Status of the Mercenary in Archaic Greece', in V.B. Gorman and E.W. Robinson, eds, *Oikistes: Studies in Constitutions, Colonies, and Military Power in the Ancient World Offered in Honor of A.J. Graham*, Mnemosyne Supplement 234 (Leiden 2002) 229–43. On Persian service see G. Seibt, *Griechische Söldner im Achaimenidenreich* (Bonn 1976); J. Hofstetter, *Die Griechen in Persien. Prosopographie der Griechen im persischen Reich vor Alexander*, Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran, Ergänzungsband 5 (Berlin 1978).

146 Cf. J. Roy, 'Arcadian Nationalism as Seen in Xenophon's *Anabasis*', *Mnemosyne* 25 (1972) 129–36.

147 See E.W. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery: Historical Development* (Oxford 1969); D. Campbell, *Greek and Roman Artillery 399 BC–AD 363* (Oxford 2003) and *Greek and Roman Siege Machinery 399 BC–AD 363* (Oxford 2003); T. Krischer, 'Die Rolle der Magna Graecia in der Geschichte der Mechanik', *Antike und Abendland* 41 (1995) 60–71; also note the works of Garlan, Campbell and Kern *supra* n. 128. Marsden's views of the invention of artillery at Syracuse under Dionysius I are now under attack: see P. Kingsley, 'Artillery and Prophecy: Sicily in the Reign of Dionysius I', *Prometheus* 21 (1995) 15–23; Hans Michael Schellenberg, 'Diodor von Sizilien 14,42,1 und die Erfindung der Artillerie im Mittelmeerraum', *Frankfurter elektronische Rundschau zur Altertumskunde* 3 (2006) 14–23 (<http://www.fera-journal.eu>).

148 Cf. E.W. Marsden, 'Macedonian Military Machinery and Its Designers under Philip and Alexander', in *Ancient Macedonia II* (Thessaloniki 1977) 211–23.

149 On Cunaxa see J.M. Bigwood, 'The Ancient Accounts of the Battle of Cunaxa', *American Journal of Philology* 104 (1983) 340–57; C. Ehrhardt, 'Two Notes on Xenophon, *Anabasis*', *Ancient History Bulletin* 8 (1994) 1–4.

¹⁵⁰ *Cyropaedia* 6.1.29–30.

¹⁵¹ The most recent detailed treatment of Leuctra is by Hutchinson (*supra* n. 114) 163–74.

¹⁵² For this view of Epaminondas' generalship see Wheeler (*supra* n. 114).

Part I
Archaic Warfare: 750–500 BC

[1] The “Hoplite Reform” Revisited

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It is a rare feat for an author, writing within one field of study, to bring about a complete revision of the accepted doctrine in a quite different field. Yet that is what Joachim Latacz achieved with the publication, in 1977, of his *Kampfparänese, Kampfdarstellung und Kampfvirklichkeit in der Uta, bei Kallinos und Tyrtaios*¹. Whatever its impact has been within Homeric philological scholarship, it can hardly match the transformation of thought which the book has brought about in early Greek military and social history. To some extent, that transformation only began to take effect from 1985, when W.K. Pritchett gave prominence to Latacz’ conclusions, and upheld the most important of them, in volume iv of his *The Greek State at War*²; but the ground had been prepared by a series of favourable reviews of Latacz’ work, with only one clearly dissenting voice ³ among the philological experts. Since 1985, the view has become widespread among historians that Latacz’ findings require a complete reappraisal of a critical episode in early Greek history, the transition to hoplite warfare: I single out, as especially influential, the views of Ian Morris ⁴, Victor Hanson ⁵ and Kurt Raaflaub⁶.

I will attempt to summarise, even if in too simplified a form, the main relevant conclusions that Latacz reached:

1) Mass armies, and not heroic champions, are the decisive element in Homeric battle, and the importance of their rôle is absolutely integral to the battle-descriptions;

2) These mass forces mainly play their part in two ways, and at two junctures: they partake in mass long-range exchange of missiles, before the *promachoi* engage in those exploits to which the narrative gives such prominence; and they join battle thereafter in mass hand-to-hand combat and close-order formation;

3) This latter phase, which decides the outcome of each major engagement, differs in no significant way from the warfare of the phalanx known from post-Homeric sources;

4) This Homeric phalanx-warfare is no mere literary conceit, but a consistent portrayal of what may well have been the contemporary historical reality;

5) As a consequence of 3) and 4) above, the whole conception of a dramatic change in Greek warfare in the period after Homer – the

‘hoplite reform’ or ‘hoplite revolution’ – must be abandoned.

In thus simplifying the arguments, I have omitted some important and interesting elements in Latacz’ case, such as his closely-argued interpretations of the frequent Homeric terms *phalanges*, *suches* and *promachoi* 7; but important as they are, I do not think that the main line of argument, as outlined above, actually *depends* on them for its validity. I therefore wish to set them aside here.

Let me begin my discussion, and indeed shorten it, by stating at once that I accept what I have called conclusion no. 1; indeed, like others, I see it as a striking new insight into the understanding of the battles in the *Iliad*. So much for those who thought in the 1960’s, as I did, that future enlightenment on early Greek warfare must come from archaeology, since the parameters of the interpretation of the literary evidence were substantially fixed and immovable. We have learned that, however much the poet may choose to emphasize the prowess of his heroes, and even to present his theme as being the anger of just one of them, he has still accepted that the setting of his poem is a long war between two large armies, and acknowledges some of the implications of this in a realistic if intermittent way. Expressed in such words, this may not sound like a spectacular advance; yet the repercussions in historical scholarship suggest that such it is.

These repercussions, however, in large part result from the subsequent conclusions that I have numbered 2), 3), 4) and 5); and here, along with an apparently small number of other critics 8,1 begin to dissent. Let us concentrate our attention on n° 2, which relates to the phases of operation of the mass forces in the poetic narrative, since nos 3, 4 and 5 all to some degree presuppose its validity: only if there is consistent and regular depiction of phases of exclusive hand-to-hand combat in the *Iliad* can we use this literary depiction as a basis for historical conclusions.

Latacz holds that there is a common initial phase of *Massenwurfkampf*, mass long-range exchange of missile-fire, which can on its own be decisive, but usually is not, and so makes way for the familiar interlude of exploits by the *promachoi*. These are then in turn brought to an end by a more decisive phase of *Massennahkampf*, mass hand-to-hand engagement 9. Latacz freely acknowledges that the sequence is not invariable, but it is important to his argument that there should be this chronological separation of phases in the battle-narrative.

In truth, however, such a separation is highly debatable. It is probably Hans van Wees (n. 8 above) who has looked most closely at Latacz’ argument, and here I am borrowing and enlarging on some of his criticisms. To consider, first, the status of the phase of

Massenwurfkampf: there are four formulaic passages which describe this in generalised, closely parallel terms: viii 66–7 and xi 84–5, which are identical, and xv 318–9 and xvi 777–8, which share the same second line. In each case, the poet tells us that “As long as (so-and-so), so long were the missile flying from both sides, and men kept falling”. The temporal expressions in the first line vary, but the picture is in each case one of a protracted period of missile-fire from both sides. The words hint at the inevitable sequel, that this picture will change and that one of the two sides will get the advantage. But at what stage in each engagement do these passages occur?

The answers are hardly what Latacz’ analysis requires: the passages are *not* always situated in a phase of unmixed missile-fire, nor are they located at the outset of the engagement. At viii 66, for example, we have heard only six lines previously that the two converging armies have clashed “with an impact of shields... their bossed shields collided together” (62–3). So it seems that the *Massennahkampf* has begun, just before the formulaic phrase encapsulating the *Massenwurfkampf*. At xi 84, similarly, we have heard almost as shortly before that the Trojans and Achaeans “fell upon each other... it was level pegging... they rushed in like wolves” (70–73) – not quite so explicit, but suggestive of much the same thing. If we move to xvi 777, the formulaic passage is set in the context of the struggle over the corpse of Kebriones: around him, the ground is “bristling with javelins and arrows” (772–3). In this particular case, Latacz goes so far as to estimate the distance between the two armies as “some 40 metres”¹⁰. But there is something wrong here. Only a few lines before (762–3), we have learned that Hector has hold of Kebriones’ head and Patroclus of his feet. So these two enemies at least are at close quarters; and they are not alone. The other Trojans and Greeks have come together in a mighty clash (764), and rocks are crashing against the shields of “those fighting over him” (sc. Kebriones) (775). Once again, a *Massennahkampf* or something like it is under way.

With the remaining passage, xv 318–9, there is a quite different problem, of a kind that will reappear later. This time, it does seem that the setting is one of pure missile-fighting: the difficulty is that one side in the exchange, the Achaean, consists of a small group of picked men who have been chosen for an explicit task, to cover the retreat of the main body of the army to the ships. Yet we hear in some detail of javelins finding their target, and the formulaic phrase “and men kept falling” once again applies to both sides. To his credit, Latacz admits that here the repeated passage has been inappropriately inserted, as a set piece, through a failure of composition.¹¹ Just so: but this surely means that here, at any rate, the passage forms the weakest evidence for a regular literary, let alone a regular historical practice. These

formulaic passages form the heart of the case for the integrity and the temporal priority of the *Massenwurfkampf*. Yet they show such a close juxtaposition of missile-and hand-to-hand engagement that, *prima facie*, the most reasonable inference is that which Hans van Wees has drawn 12: that the poet is saying that, *at one and the same time and place*, a large number of warriors were exchanging missiles while others were fighting it out hand to hand. But let us suspend final judgment until we have considered the *Massennahkampf* passages.

Latacz lists some 23 episodes of mass hand-to-hand engagement in the *Iliad* 13. But once again, we find ‘contamination’ in their near vicinity. Take the very first general clash in the poem, which begins at iv 446: the two armies come to grips and “shield clashed on shield”, in exactly the formula that we encountered in viii 60–63 (page 50 above). Yet almost at once, from line 457 on, we are in the throes of missile-fighting between individuals: twice in the later course of this engagement (iv 542 and v 167) the poet makes the general observation that there was “a hail of missiles”. This turns out to be typical. In Book viii, as we have already seen, a classic *Massennahkampf* description at lines 60–63 turns into a *Massenwurfkampf* at lines 66–7. At xi 90, a diagnostic phrase of hand-to-hand battle, the ‘breaking of the *phalanges*’, is merely a brief glimpse between the missile-combat that comes before (xi 84–5, above, page 50) and the mixed rout of infantry and chariots that follows when the Trojans give way; by line 163, it is from “the flying missiles” that Zeus rescues Hector.

With Books xii to xvi, we enter the great battle around the beached Achaean ships; and here occurs a series of passages which constitute the most impressive evidence for the ‘Homeric phalanx’ of Latacz, since they combine a reference to mass in-fighting with a mention of a tightly-packed formation – a formation which Latacz compares, and indeed identifies, with the *synaspismos* of the Classical phalanx 14. These two features, the *Massennahkampf* and the *synaspismos*, do not correlate very closely. Outside these Books, many of the mass engagements omit any mention of a tightly-packed formation; and conversely, many of the episodes of *synaspismos* take place in special, localised circumstances. Thus, at iv 532–3; it is only a small group of Thracians who form a close formation around their fallen leader Peiros; while at xi 592–4 the wounded Eurypylos is similarly protected by his companions, with their shields sloping back against their shoulders and their spears outstretched. When Patroclus is killed, the formation of his companions round his body is even more explicitly described, with a ‘hedging’ of shields (xvii 266–7; cf. 354–5). The size of force which can form around a single fallen man is not to be compared with a phalanx in the open field.

Much the same is true of the first occurrence within the battle at the ships (xiii 128–35): a group of the ‘best’ Achaeans, ‘hand-picked’, confront the Trojans with another ‘hedge’ of spears and shields. This is portrayed as a small task-force, specially mustered by Poseidon, not as a regular mass formation. Another passage which is given prominence in Latacz’ account is the massing of the Myrmidons at xvi 211–17. When Achilles harangues them, they respond by bunching together as closely as stones in a wall. But these are men who are nowhere near action. Before they reach the enemy, they must cover a distance (line 258), and indeed emerge from among the beached ships (267). The famous simile of the swarm of wasps (259–65) is intended to describe an order of march, not an order of battle.

In the middle and later part of Book xiii, more convincing examples appear: massed forces are in action, they are continuously at close quarters, and the compactness of their formations is several times explicitly mentioned. At xiii 339–43 occurs a passage which, while making only scant reference to formations, clearly describes a mass engagement on both sides, and places unusual stress on the bronze armour: the cuirasses are, uniquely, “newly-burnished”, the shields “gleaming”, the spears “grasped”, not thrown. At 487–8, there is once again a grouping of “companions” around Idomeneus, in response to his exhortation, with a repetition of the shield-drill found in xi 592–4 (above, page 52). At 800–01, the Trojan forces advance *en masse*, rank upon rank and “glittering with bronze”.

In these engagements, if anywhere in the *Iliad*, both the tactics and the equipment of hoplite warfare seem to invite recognition. But we have continually to remind ourselves where all this is taking place. At the end of Book xii, Hector had smashed down the gate in the Achaean rampart and the Trojans had swarmed inside. The fighting is now among the sterns of the beached ships, which some of the Achaeans will presently use as a fighting-platform. A certain confusion has sometimes been detected hereabouts: the reference to the *phalanges* of the Achaeans at xiii 806 seems inappropriate for the topographical situation. To state the position more broadly: no army which is hurled back on to the beaches in headlong retreat, as happens to the Achaeans at xii 470–1 (and again at xv 304–5), and is forced to make a stand with its back to the sea, has either the time or the freedom to adopt a formal battle-array like the phalanx. Its use of close-order formation is not a matter of choice, but of desperate necessity. As for the Trojans, it is equally impossible for them to attack their enemies in such circumstances without adopting a correspondingly dense formation.

Two provisional conclusions emerge from this discussion of what I have called conclusion n° 2’ in Latacz’ argument. First, in the battles

set in the open field, the narrative does not maintain a regular separation of phases of *Massenwurfkampf* and *Massennahkampf*. On the contrary, each is allowed to contaminate the other with, at times, as rapid an alternation between the two as is possible within the tempo of Homer's narrative. Secondly, when (as in Book xiii) there is a sustained account of a pure hand-to-hand engagement, it is in special circumstances which have nothing in common with a pitched battle in the open field, between two well-prepared adversaries. The significance of all this is that the integrity of a pure *Massennahkampf* in Homer, as a style of combat on a normal battlefield, seems unsustainable. Instead, we find the recurrent use of looser formations: formations in which there is room for individuals not only to hurl missiles, but to dodge them; which allow extreme freedom of movement to individuals across/ the battlefield; and which – an important observation that I owe to Hans van Wees – allow repeated rally and re-formation after a phase of retreat or flight. This last feature makes possible the apparently endless ebb and flow of battle with which we are so familiar in the *Iliad*. It is also something of which the later hoplite phalanx was notoriously incapable.

We should not forget that chariots are also a regular element in Homeric battle. For Latacz' interpretation they pose a special problem, on top of the difficulties that they present to the rest of us. He postpones treatment of them until the second half of his penultimate chapter 15, and his explanation of their use in the *Iliad* has attracted some criticism. For him, the chariot serves mainly as a transport vehicle, though it has also an important rôle in the context of pursuit and flight; during the main engagement, however, he believes that chariots are normally stationed behind the confronted armies. This case seems difficult to sustain. Quite apart from the promptitude with which chariots become available when their owners need them, there are a number of occasions where chariots are shown to be in the thick of the fighting, in the front line, at a time when the outcome of the battle is still in the balance. For an example, we need look no further than the opening engagement of the *Iliad* (iv 446 ff.). The Achaeans appear to be gaining the advantage, and at iv 507 Apollo rallies the Trojans. First to respond is Peiros with his Thracians, with a sequel that we have already noted (532–3, above, p. 52); but next, at the very beginning of the following book, the two sons of Dares charge at Diomedes in their chariot, though with equal lack of success (v IIS). This is in the midst of a mass engagement, which only swings decisively in favour of the Achaeans at v 37.

The case for 'Homeric phalanx warfare' thus seems vulnerable from every side. If even its literary existence is highly debatable, then the grounds for believing in its resemblance to later tactics, in its probable

historical origin and in the consequent rejection of any post-Homeric ‘hoplite reform’ – what I have termed conclusions 3), 4) and 5) in Latacz’ argument – are, to say the least, very much weakened. Yet there is a further line of defence. I have based my own arguments throughout on a hypothesis which Latacz himself shares, along with perhaps a slight majority of other commentators. This is, that the battle-scenes of the *Iliad* are based on a coherent, if not always absolutely clear vision of a form of warfare; and that the poet is, apart from the occasional lapse, faithful to that vision. I have been arguing that, on this hypothesis, the systematic use of a pitched battle formation like the later phalanx, with tactics like those of the later *synaspismos*, has no part in this form of warfare.

But what if the hypothesis is itself unsound? Some commentators would argue that to reproduce faithfully such a vision would be at best irrelevant, at worst inimical to the poet’s artistic purpose. Rather, the poet would draw on different and possibly incompatible modes of combat, known to him from whatever source, and weave them into a composite picture according to the dictates of a literary narrative. On the point at issue here, the significant question might then be, not whether the poet uses the ‘Homeric phalanx tactics’ in a consistent and intelligible way, but whether he shows any awareness at all of their existence. It could be argued, on this view, that any reference at all to the use of massed troops in close-order formation for hand-to-hand fighting, especially with associated mention of bronze defensive armour, betrays a familiarity with the concept of the later hoplite phalanx. The ‘threshold of proof will be very much lower than it has been in the argument as conducted up to this point.

This line of reasoning poses an obvious threat, not only to Latacz’ case but to my counter-arguments as well. I have no devastating rejoinder to it, still less a way of proving it invalid. I merely argue that, even on this more sceptical (or perhaps more sensitive) reading of the *Iliad*, the case for a ‘proto-phalanx’ is still not made: much less does it follow that “The general impression created by the poem is one of hoplites fighting in mass formation”¹⁶. Four essential elements of a hoplite phalanx were, first its use as a formation for pitched battle in an open field; secondly its density; thirdly its function as the main fighting force of an army; and finally its employment of (preferably uniform) bronze defensive armour. Never once, as far as I can discover, does the poet of the *Iliad* represent all four of these elements together. The most important missing element is usually the first, the use in pitched battle. The fact that one or two, and occasionally all three, of the other elements are found in some passages is an important discovery which we owe largely to Latacz’ work. Yet it is certain that, for centuries and even millennia before Homer, armies in

certain regions of the ancient world had had occasion to adopt the tactics of mass, close-order formation, and had at times also made use of bronze armour. Sometimes the circumstances of battle, the natural topography, or the technology of potential enemies invited or dictated such a response. At other times, these tactics were varied with looser formations, with more mobile operations, and with recourse to the help of specialised arms such as archers, cavalry or charioteers – just as happens in the battles of the *Iliad*.

But the measured claches of hoplite phalanxes, which we know from the fifth century and which we believe we can detect in the seventh, imply something more. What were these further developments? What, in other words, remains of the case for a ‘hoplite reform’? Pritchett sums up his own answer very succinctly, with the words “a technical progress in arms”¹⁷. That is an element which is most certainly present and, in attempting to put forward a positive alternative to the views of Latacz and Pritchett, I shall attend to it first. But I hope also to make clear that it is not the whole story.

The battle-scenes on Attic Late Geometric pottery have a natural place in this argument. They are used to good effect by Latacz in his closing pages 18: he finds valuable support for his conclusion about the potential historicity of the Homeric mass-battles (n° 4 above, page 48) in the fact that Gudrun Ahlberg had independently reached parallel conclusions about the Geometric paintings 19. The apparently ‘mixed’ tactics which they show, in her view, represent a natural sequence from long-range to close-in fighting; the repeated scenes of single combat are likewise seen as an ‘abbreviation’ for mass hand-to-hand engagements. The resemblances to Latacz’ own interpretation of the battles in the *Iliad* are indeed close, but the interpretation of these scenes is so controversial, even among those who know them best, that it is wisest not to press the arguments beyond general parallelisms.

It is on this level of general parallels, however, that I should like to draw attention to a feature which can be observed without involving much interpretation. This is, that Geometric depictions of warriors regularly occur, often on the same vase, in two clearly separated contexts. There are action scenes, usually military or funerary, and there are ‘parade scenes’, often below but sometimes above, in which files of warriors follow each other uneventfully round the vase 20. In the early phases of the pictorial style, there is a compatibility between the equipment and the style of drawing, as between the figures on the two separate zones, which allows the viewer to assume that the same kind of people are participating in both kinds of activity: in one or two cases, the ‘action’ can even spill over into the ‘parade’. But in the latest scenes, those of ‘Late Geometric IIB’, this is no longer so clearly

the case. A group of late amphorae, from more than one different workshop, show a funerary or chariot scene above, and a file of warriors with twin spears, helmets and round shields below [21](#). Their equipment is uniform and modest. Both in general and in detail, this recalls the *Iliad*'s distinction between the emphasized action of individuals and the implicit recognition of the rôle of the mass of the army. In both cases, the latter are foot-soldiers; the equipment of spears, helmets and shields recalls the normally specified arms of the *laoi* in the *Iliad*. Many of these are mentioned only at the moment of their death, and they are not usually credited with, for example, cuirasses or greaves.

Greater interest attaches to these group-portrayals on the vases once the painters begin to show pictorial blazons on the shields, as they occasionally do [22](#). If we are right in seeing a close connection between the pictorial blazon on the outer surface of the shield (implying that it could only be held one way up) and the two-handed arrangement of the Archaic and Classical *hoplon* on its inner side, which likewise could not be inverted, then we have here a proof that the hoplite shield was already known to Athenian painters in the years around 700 B.C. In the *Iliad*, by contrast, it is agreed that there is little if any sign of its presence; certainly its presence *as a norm* is entirely excluded by the recurrent shield-formulae. Hide appears as a standard material, for example, while wood is apparently unknown. With the hoplite shield, it was exactly the other way round.

If we accept the view that such a shield would *only* be used by warriors fighting in close formation, alongside others identically equipped, then we have here evidence of a dramatic change which, at least at Athens, had taken place by about 700 B.C., but which appears entirely to post-date the composition of the *Iliad*. This view commands wide support, and has now been reinforced by strong new arguments, based on the weight and concavity of the hoplite shield, by Victor Hanson's [23](#). Nor is there anything impossible about the swift sequence of change that it implies. Yet I am still inclined to doubt it, because of the clear iconographie evidence for the use of this shield in more varied types of fighting, and because of the still widely accepted interpretation [24](#) of the poetic evidence of Tyrtaeus, that the Spartan army in the mid-seventh century was still combining this equipment with a more open formation than the fully-developed phalanx. There is also the persistent portrayal, even later in this century, of formations of hoplites with twin spears, suggesting the survival of missile-combat as one of the functions of the early hoplite. This evidence led Latacz himself [25](#) to accept the reality of a long-drawn-out development, rather than a rapid introduction, of the phalanx of Classical type. On balance, I still find this broad, inductive evidence

more persuasive than the strict deductive logic of the argument from the handle-arrangement, weight and shape of the hoplite shield. We cannot after all be certain, from the time of the very first depiction of a pictorial blazon, that the shield had all the attributes of weight and material that it presently came to possess.

With the metal helmet, cuirass and greaves, it is utterly different. No one can seriously dispute that warriors of various kinds might find it advantageous to adopt these. The fact is that all three are indisputably present in the battle-scenes of the *Iliad*; and that, concordantly, all three are attested by actual dated finds from a date earlier than even the indirect evidence for the hoplite shield. The greave occurs, both in a Cretan tomb and in an isolated dedication at Olympia, well before 700 B.C. and perhaps around 750²⁶. The helmet and cuirass are most famously attested in the Panoply Tomb at Argos, of perhaps about 720²⁷, and there is at least inferential evidence that each had passed through a phase of development before that. For the use of the cuirass, there is the corroborative evidence of the Attic Late Geometric amphora in Buffalo²⁸, which shows one worn by an armed horseman. This evidence may be circumstantial, but is surely a more persuasive hint of the purpose of the Argive warrior's cuirass than the suggestion once mooted, that the dead man had been a sea-captain: not least, because it supplies a neat explanation of why the Argos tomb contained no shield, of hoplite or any other type.

On this account, we have the appearance, from well before the end of the eighth century, of a set of items of bronze defensive armour which are sporadically adopted by the exponents of the current forms of warfare. At the close of the century, there is added to these a form of shield designed for fighting on foot, in formations that gradually evolve into the true phalanx, in the form known from Classical times. But at the same period, the existing type of bronze helmet and greave are also modified, to a form that was equally suited to the tactics now evolving. The Corinthian helmet, heavy and vision-obscuring but immensely protective, was introduced and then, by the mid seventh century, modified so that it could be rested on the crown of the head and pulled down at the last moment before action. The greave acquired a new shape which enabled it simply to be slipped over the shin, again allowing for removal on the march and fitting just before action.

With these changes, the hoplite panoply was at last fully-formed. That hoplite tactics took a comparably long time to develop is *a priori* likely, since a substantial and by no means a natural or inevitable evolution lay between the adoption of heavy infantry in general, and the very specialised and somewhat artificial version of it that was the Greek hoplite phalanx²⁹. At all events, the actual dedications from

Olympia [30](#) confirm, in a quantitative way, that only from the middle of the seventh century did the panoply enjoy widespread popularity, just as the Corinthian vase-paintings more anecdotally suggest that only then did the tactics reach their finished form.

This then encompasses the “technical progress in arms” of which Pritchett writes, though I give the phrase a wider application than he. But what else was entailed by acceptance of the developed hoplite phalanx? I should like to end by singling out one factor which seems to me of the highest importance, although it has no direct connection with the actual battlefield; and which at the same time underlines the essential differences from the picture given in the *Iliad*. This is the matter of the *enrolment* of a hoplite army. For Archaic and Classical Sparta, we know a considerable amount about the *agoge*, whereby a self-selected hoplite class was prepared for an adulthood in arms. For general purposes, however, our knowledge of the Athenian system is more likely to be helpful, since here as in most Greek *poleis* eligibility for service as a hoplite was not automatically self-defining. A certain minimum property standard had to be applied, above which service was normally compulsory, so that some mechanism to prevent ‘draft-dodging’ had to be available; and below which it might be equally unfortunate, militarily, to go, since it would lead to an unevenly equipped army - an army, I cannot forbear to add, such as we seem to be presented with in the strange and often condemned passage in *Iliad* xiv 370–382 where at Poseidon’s behest three of the Achaean leaders set about re-distributing their troops’ armour by compulsory exchanges.

In Classical Athens, this enrolment process was devolved to the level of the ten Cleisthenic tribes, though there is evidence of changes over time [31](#). How is it likely to have been organised at the very earliest stage, in Athens and elsewhere? The natural answer would be on a local basis: someone in each community would be charged with the duty of mustering a given number of hoplites from their district. Ideally, this would require the existence both of a census and of a property register. Only thus could a count be made of those who were eligible and, equally important, a record kept *through time* to allow for new hoplites coming of age, and older ones dying, being killed in action, passing military age or falling on hard times economically. These mechanisms of later times sound improbably elaborate for the seventh century B.C., and we may prefer to imagine a cruder system in operation, such as the calling of an assembly of the biggest land-owners, with each being sent away to recruit one or more men similarly equipped. Yet even this mechanism would be hard to operate without maintaining a nominal roll, or at least a tally, of the original group – that is, without some kind of durable written records,

however simple. The question of training must also have arisen for some of the participants: it should not be strongly emphasized, any more than it was in antiquity, but there will always have been a minimum requirement.³²

The whole issue of the organisation of hoplites takes us ever further away from the world of the *Iliad*. Even when the rôle of the mass armies in Homer has been given its due recognition, there was still a long stride, or rather a whole series of shorter strides, to be taken before the developed hoplite phalanx arrived. On the one hand, the mixed tactics, the free and volatile formations, the sharp contrast between a chariot-driving hero and a Thersites, “counting for nothing in battle”; on the other, the streamlined uniformity of the hoplite phalanx, kept in step by the pipers so entirely absent from Homer, in which even the pretended descendants of that same hero would fight like anyone else, a uniformity dictated by peer-group pressure both within and between the separate *poleis*. I have always advocated the theory of a long and gradual evolution for the hoplite. I take the evidence of the *Iliad*, re-interpreted by Latacz’ findings, as prolonging that evolution at its upper end, not as truncating it or eliminating it altogether.

A.M. SNODGRASS

¹ *Zetemata* vol. 66 (Munich, 1977).

² (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1985).

³ That of R. LEIMBACH, *Gnomon* 52 (1980), 418–425.

⁴ I. MORRIS, *Burial and ancient society* (Cambridge, 1987), especially 196–200.

⁵ V.D. HANSON, in V.D. HANSON (ed.), *Hoplites: The Classical Greek battle experience* (London, 1991), 66–67, n. 11–12.

⁶ K. RAAFLAUB, Homer und die Geschichte des 8. Jh. s v. Chr., in J. LATACZ (ed.), *Zweihundert Jahre Homer-Forschung (Colloquium Rauricum 2, Stuttgart/Leipzig, 1991)*, especially 222–230.

⁷ LATACZ, *op. cit.* (above, v. 1), 45–49, 141–171.

⁸ Notably H. van WEES, “Kings in combat: battles and heroes in the *Iliad*”, *CQ* 38 (1988), 1–24; *idem*, *STATUS WARRIORS/ WAR, VIOLENCE AND SOCIETY IN HOMER AND HISTORY* (Amsterdam, 1992); and in a still unpublished paper that he was kind enough to show to me.

⁹ LATACZ, *op. cit.* (above v. 1), 116–212, especially 117–8.

¹⁰ LATACZ, *ibid.* 125 and n. 9.

¹¹ LATACZ, *ibid.* 124.

¹² See the works cited above, n. 8, especially *CQ* 38 (1988), 2–12.

¹³ LATACZ, *op. cit.* (above, n. 1), 178–212.

¹⁴ LATACZ, *ibid.* 55–67.

¹⁵ LATACZ, *ibid.* 215–223.

¹⁶ PRITCHETT, *op. cit.* (above, n. 2), 33.

17 PRITCHETT, *ibid.* 44.

18 LATACZ, *op. cit.* (above, n. 1), 238–241 and 245.

19 G. AHLBERG, *Fighting on land and sea in Greek Geometric art* (AIARS, vol. 16), (Stockholm, 1971), 53–54.

20 On these see G. AHLBERG, *Prothesis and ekphora in Greek Geometric art* (*Studies in Mediterranean Archaeology*, vol. 32), (Göteborg, 1971) especially 306,309 on the files of warriors.

21 Note especially the amphorae Athens, NM 894 (AHLBERG, *ibid.* (n. 20), 190, fig. 59); Berlin, 3203 (*ibid.* 183, fig. 58c); Hamburg, 1966–89 (*ibid.* n° 43, fig. 60c); Philadelphia, MS 5464 (*ibid.* 183, fig. 58d).

22 On the amphorae Athens, Benaki Mus., 7675 (AHLBERG, *ibid.* 28, n° 46, fig. 46a); Athens, NM 14763 and Copenhagen, Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek 3187 (J.N. COLDSTREAM, *Greek Geometric Poyttery* (London, 1968), 55, nos 8 and 12); and on a sherd from Athens, Kerameikos, AA 1963,649, fig. 5.

23 V.D. HANSON, *op. cit.* (above, n. 5), 67–71.

24 As for example by J.K. ANDERSON, in HANSON (ed.) (above, n. 5), 15–17.

25 LATACZ, *op. cit.* (above, n. 1), 37–38.

26 See E. KUNZE, *Beinschienen* (*Olympische Forschungen*, vol. 21) (Berlin and New York, 1991), 4–6 and n. 15.

27 But E. KUNZE, *VIII Bericht über die Ausgrabungen in Olympia* (Berlin, 1967), 114, prefers a date no later than 740 B.C.

28 COLDSTREAM, *op. cit.* (above, n. 22), 59, n° 21a.

29 Compare the view of P.A. CARTLEDGE, ‘Hoplites and heroes’, *JHS* 97 (1977), 11–27, especially 18–24.

30 See A. SNODGRASS, *Archaic Greece* (London, 1980), 105–107.

31 See A. ANDREWES, ‘The hoplite *katalogos*’, in *Classical Contributions: Studies in honor of M.F. McGregor* (Locust Valley, NY, 1981), 1–3.

32 ANDERSON, *op. cit.* (above, n. 24), 28–31.

Ephorus and The Prohibition of Missiles

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In memoriam Fordyce W. Mitchel

The alleged treaty banning missile weapons in a war between archaic Chalcis and Eretria is one of the most frequently cited events in Greek history.¹ A formal agreement to prohibit a specific type of weapon stands unique in the history of ancient international relations and, if historical, would constitute the first example for arms limitation in history. Indeed before the second half of the nineteenth century, when the humanitarian trend to ameliorate the laws and practices of war began to gain the influence it still exercises, only the Second Lateran Council's ban in 1139 on the use of bows and crossbows against Christians (permitted against infidels and heretics) offers a parallel.² The very uniqueness of such a pact, especially viewed from a larger historical perspective, arouses suspicion about its historicity. Only Polybius³ and Strabo⁴ mention the agreement, both rather late sources for the Archaic period, although some find an indirect reference in Archilochus.⁵

Nevertheless, the treaty's historicity has been widely accepted.⁶ Strabo's apparent quotation of an inscription convinces some and Archilochus fr.3 West adds other supporters.⁷ The treaty supposedly suits the chivalry of agonistic warfare in the Archaic period: missiles were un-heroic and too deadly for either men or horses, not to mention the treaty's coincidence with the civilizing/humanitarian mission of the Amphictyonic League.⁸ Besides, Polybius believed in the pact's historicity, and missile weapons would be ineffective in the new style of warfare employing the hoplite phalanx.⁹ A limitation on means of battle also would conform to a religiously sanctioned ritualistic war to initiate youth into the adult warrior community.¹⁰

Yet dissenters and skeptics can also be found: some believe that later Eretrians contrived the tale of a ban on missiles and even inscribed a fictitious treaty as a patriotic gesture to boast of their connection with Archilochus.¹¹ Furthermore, the new hoplite style of warfare made such an agreement on missiles unnecessary, and Strabo could not have read an archaic inscription even if he saw one.¹²

Ephorus has long been posited as the common source of Polybius and Strabo,¹³ although the implications of Ephorus as *Urquelle* have not been appreciated. All arguments hitherto presented for and against

the historicity of the treaty can be shown fallacious. A ban on missiles does not fit either the archaeological context of archaic Eretria or the military context of the eighth and seventh centuries. Strabo did not see an inscribed treaty in Eretria, and he struggled to explain the meaning of the treaty found in his source. The key to understanding this alleged prohibition of missiles lies with Ephorus, the panhellenist propaganda he preached, and a contemporary military development of the fourth century.

I

Consideration of the Lelantine War, Archilochus fr.3 West, and Plb. 13.3.4 need not obscure focus on the real issues. Proper interpretation of the alleged ban on missile weapons does not depend upon solving the problems of the Lelantine War, if that is the proper term for the war between archaic Chalcis and Eretria, which Thucydides said divided all Greek powers into one camp or the other.¹⁴ Strabo is the earliest source to specify where the Lelantine plain is, although he states that the war's focus was Lelanton (without explicit reference to the plain), which could also indicate a city of that name.¹⁵ For whatever reason the war occurred, a scholarly consensus now exists for dating the war *ca* 700¹⁶ and some archaeological evidence, as I shall note below, could support this date.¹⁷ Some go so far as to reject any connection between the treaty banning missiles and the Lelantine War.¹⁸ Certainly this hypercritical view has some justification: Strabo's quotation of the inscription does not mention the Lelantine War, but the context of the inscription in Strabo is the Lelantine War. So Strabo (or his source) made this connection, whether or not the war was the inscription's original context. Finally, both Herodotus and Thucydides viewed the Lelantine War as a single event. Since the two earliest sources for the war stress this point, then only an uncritical methodology permits standing this evidence on its head, in the belief that all sources for the war are equally valid, and constructing from this confused and contradictory mass of material the theory of a ritualistically repeated war with limited means for the initiation of youth.¹⁹ For this paper's purposes a war between Chalcis and Eretria occurred *ca* 700. Strabo believed the war concerned Lelanton (either the plain or perhaps a city) and involved a treaty prohibiting missile weapons in the conflict.

The reference of Archilochus fr.3 West to fighting on a plain involving the lords of Euboea and his contrast of missile weapons with swords and spears lead some to a connection with the ban on missiles in Strabo 10.1.12 and the Lelantine War.²⁰ Jacoby's date of 680–640 for Archilochus, now *opinio communis*, places the soldier-poet at least a

generation after the Lelantine War, and Jacoby wisely noted that neither could the Lelantine War be used to date Archilochus nor Archilochus the Lelantine War.²¹ Furthermore, Archilochus' use of the future tense in fr.3 West indicates an approaching or even an hypothetical event, which cannot be the Lelantine War, and the "plain" in question need not be the Lelantine: the context of the fragment in Plutarch (*Thes.* 5.2–3) is a discussion of the Abantes in Homer (II. 2.542–44), so the plain could easily be the Trojan. Nor is Homer's stylized description of the Abantes necessarily an historical reference to the realities of Euboean warfare.²² Besides, Archilochus does not refer to a prohibition of missile weapons but only to their relative scarcity: οὐ τοι ρόλλ' ... οὐδὲ θαμειαί. Strabo had read Archilochus and no doubt could have cited him, if he really had relevant information.²³ Archilochus fr.3 West neither proves nor supports the historicity of a ban on missiles in the late eighth or seventh centuries.

Polybius' account of the alleged treaty (13.3.4: text in note 3 above) in comparison to Strabo's (10.1.12) is vague and practically useless, except for its role in leading scholars to posit a common source for the two accounts.²⁴ The assumption that one source about two centuries earlier than another should convey more accurate information about an archaic event proves false in this case. Polybius fixes the setting of the treaty neither chronologically nor geographically. He states only that "the ancients" made an agreement not to use unseen or missile weapons against each other and to let close combat decide the issue of battles.

Besides using a different word for missile weapons (discussed below), Polybius also adds "unseen" (ἀδήλοις), which Strabo lacks. The reason is clear. Polybius' glorification of ancient practices in 13.3 precedes his account in 13.4 of Philip V's deceitful intrigues against Rhodes in 204, which involved the duplicity and sabotage of Heracleides of Tarentum, Philip's "unseen" weapon. The passage actually belongs to a series of polemics against Philip scattered throughout Polybius' work. His praise of the Romans (13.3.7–8), paralleled with equal propagandists intent elsewhere, serves to blacken further the picture of Philip.²⁵ For Polybius an alleged treaty banning missile weapons provides an ancient exemplum useful for his anti-Macedonian/pro-Roman propaganda. His vague reference to the pact proves neither his own belief in the treaty nor its historicity. Specious "facts" make excellent propaganda. Furthermore, omission of specific details precludes use of the passage to confirm the account in Strabo. Only Polybius and Strabo, however, refer to this treaty and a common source is most probable.

II

If the Lelantine War, Archilochus, and even Polybius' parallel account offer nothing fruitful, what can be derived from Strabo, the most detailed source for the treaty? The whole of 10.1 is devoted to Euboea. After various geographical details and brief digressions on the early traditions about the island (10.1.1–9), Strabo (10.1.10) turns to Eretria, to which he says the *komē* Amarynthus located seven stades away belongs. He notes an “Old Eretria” razed by the Persians in 490 and the “new” Eretria founded on the same site. Eretria's might is attested by a stele in the temple of Artemis Amarynthia, upon which were inscribed details of a festal procession of 3000 hoplites, 600 cavalry, and 60 chariots, and by Eretria's rule at some unspecified date over Andros, Teos, Ceos, and other islands. Strabo can fix neither the age of Eretrian power nor the date of the inscription with more precision than *ποτέ*, and the statement about an Eretrian thalassocracy does not belong to the inscription.

In 10.1.11 Strabo mentions Chalcis and Eretria as the leading cities of Euboea, noting that their esteem included not only war but also peace, as seen in Aristotle's residence in Chalcis at his death and the school of Menedemus (*ca* 339-*ca* 265) at Eretria. The theme of peace and philosophers thus introduces the alleged treaty on the prohibition of missiles in 10.1.12.

Strabo states that Chalcis and Eretria generally maintained friendly relations, which did not cease in their dispute over Lelanton. Instead of waging a war with self-willed stubbornness dictating the hostilities, they agreed to a conflict limited by definite rules. Strabo contrasts a πόλεμος κατὰ αὐθάδειαν with an ἄγων.²⁶ Strabo adds that a stele in the Amarynthium illustrates the point, for it bore an inscription prohibiting missile weapons. The rest of 10.1.12 is a digression on missiles and hand-to-hand weapons,²⁷ which continues in 10.1.13 with special attention to Euboeans as close-combat fighters in Homer.

Comparison of Strabo's account with Polybius' reveals both similarities and differences. Polybius' attribution of the treaty to “the ancients,” lack of geographical identification, and his propagandistic addition of “unseen” weapons for application of the exemplum against Philip V have been noted. In both sources references to close combat immediately follow mention of the ban on missiles, a logical sequence permitting little argument about a common source, and the phrase ἐκ χειρός καὶ συστάδην is common to both, although in Strabo the order is reversed. The argument that verbal similarity indicates a common source is mitigated somewhat by Polybius' use of this phrase elsewhere.²⁸ Yet verbal similarity with the *Urquelle* is probably not to be expected in Polybius, who has quite obviously in 13.3.4 reworked

the source considerably for his own purposes.

More puzzling is the difference in words used for missile weapons: ἐκηβόλοις in Polybius and τηλεβόλοις in Strabo. Ἐκηβόλος, Apollo's epithet in Homer, appears in Hellenistic authors, such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Onasander, Plutarch, Aelianus Tacticus, and Arrian, in historical and military contexts for missile weapons. In contrast, τηλεβόλος is relatively rare and not attested in epic—first occurring in Pindar (*Pyth.* 3.49). An argument that τηλεβόλος is a more specific term signifying only arrows and slings but not throwing spears and javelins is refuted by Strabo: in 10.1.12 *akontistai* are listed as users of τηλεβόλοις, and in 4.4.3 the comparative degree of the adjective describes a Gallic javelin similar to the *grosphos* (*hasta velitaris*) of the Roman *velites*.²⁹ If, as I argue, Polybius has considerably revised his source for the treaty stylistically, and his ἐκηβόλοις for missiles conforms with usage in other Hellenistic authors, then Strabo should be credited not only with the more detailed account of the treaty but also with probably a more faithful reproduction of the *Urquelle*. This argument (although not one to be pressed too far) would suggest that Strabo's τηλεβόλοις indicates a source that does not antedate the fifth century, and therefore that the inscription (at least as quoted in Strabo) also cannot be earlier than that date.³⁰

It is likewise peculiar that according to Strabo Chalcis and Eretria agreed to wage their *agon* by several rules (συνέθεντο, ἐφ' οἷς συστήσονται τον αγῶνα), but he can cite only one clause from presumably many in the treaty to justify his case. Any inscribed public document would have included all stipulations of an agreement. Several avenues of escape from this difficulty lie open: first, the inscription of 10.1.12 could be identified with the processional inscription of 10.1.10, also from the Amarynthium and also reporting military details. But a treaty and the description of a religious procession are two very different kinds of documents. This solution does not explain Strabo's reporting only one clause of the treaty, even if two inscriptions on the same stele are posited. Besides, Strabo in no way connects the two inscriptions and many cult inscriptions from Amarynthus are known (see below).

Second, Polybius' rules of "the ancients" could be used to supplement Strabo's single clause: mandatory declaration of war, advanced notice of time and place of battle, i.e., battles by appointment only, and renunciation of stratagems.³¹ Polybius' extensive revision of his source for the treaty renders any attempt to supplement Strabo with Polybius highly questionable, and in Strabo's account any requirement of a declaration of war is superfluous: Chalcis and Eretria have already declared war; the problem concerns

only the rules of waging it. Finally, Strabo's mention of only one clause from the treaty could represent historical selection: he knew more clauses, but only chose to give one. As noted above, however, the quotation of the inscription contains no reference to the Lelantine War (see note 18 above). The connection between the war and the inscription as well as the assumption of a multi-clause treaty is merely the inference of Strabo (or his source) to explain the inscription. An inscription recording a treaty with a single known clause and associated with the Lelantine War begins to appear even more incredible.

III

Since literary sources fail to confirm the historicity of a ban on missiles, perhaps archaeological material can be more enlightening. Does a treaty prohibiting missiles fit the archaeological and military context of archaic Eretria? Two sites from Strabo 10.1.10–12 demand consideration—his Old Eretria said to have been razed by the Persians in 490, upon which a new Eretria was founded, and Amarynthus, the site of the sanctuary to Artemis, the patron goddess of Eretria, said to be seven stades from the city.

Among other geographical mistakes about Euboea, Strabo (10.1.10) errs in stating that Eretria was destroyed and that the Persians used their “netting” tactics in its capture. The town actually fell by betrayal; only the temples were destroyed, to which recent excavations now add damage to the city's West Gate.³² No literary text attests Persian destruction of the Amarynthium outside the city and the site of Amarynthus (discussed below) remains uncertain, although it would be quite peculiar if the Persians omitted destruction of the chief Eretrian sanctuary, given that their motive was revenge for Eretrian damage to Persian religious sites at Sardis. If the Persians destroyed the Amarynthium, the survival of a stele displaying an archaic treaty on missiles seems unlikely, but the opportunity for a later forgery of such a treaty appears inviting. Furthermore, the status of Eretria in the first half of the fifth century is practically unknown. Herodotus records Persian enslavement of the Eretrian population and its resettlement at Ardericca, 210 stades from Susa, but this can hardly mean the entire population: Eretria furnished seven ships to the Greek allied navy in 480 and 600 hoplites from Eretria and Styra served at Plataea the following year.³³

Strabo's picture of an Old Eretria replaced by a new city after 490 is entirely false—only one of his several misconceptions about Euboea.³⁴ Many scholars wish to identify Old Eretria with Amarynthus, a site whose name betrays a pre-Greek origin but whose

location is in doubt.³⁵ Wherever Amarynthus may be, its festival of Artemis Amarysia, well attested by Hellenistic inscriptions, became a pan-Euboean event.³⁶ The occurrence of pyrrhic dancing at the festival in Hellenistic times leads some to see a connection with the military procession described in the inscription of Strabo 10.1.10 and to posit both a military flavor for the festival passed down from archaic times and an obscure association with the treaty banning missiles: a periodically repeated and religiously sanctioned ritual for the initiation of youth.³⁷ In such cases continuity of practice is always easy to postulate and rather difficult to prove. First, as already noted, Strabo in no way associates the inscriptions of 10.1.10 and 10.1.12. Second, whatever its military connection in the fifth century and earlier, pyrrhic dancing in the Hellenistic period did not constitute military training nor have a military connection.³⁸ Third, Strabo gives no indication that the power of Eretria seen in the inscription dates to the Archaic period. To Strabo, writing under Augustus, the Eretrians' former power (τὴν δὲ δύνανται . . . ἣν ἔσχον ποτέ) (10.1.10), could indicate the period of Eretria's leadership in an anti-Athenian coalition 411–394/3 or merely Strabo's (or his source's) inference from the size of the procession in the Amarysia. The use of chariots in the procession does not dictate an archaic date for the inscription or Eretrian military conservatism on the battlefield. Chariots were a regular part of the Panatheneia and no one draws similar conclusions from these Athenian chariots.³⁹

Strabo's geographical errors about Euboea, his false belief in destruction of Eretria in 490, and his general chronological vagueness do not inspire confidence in his accuracy about a supposed archaic treaty banning missiles. Evidence for the Amarysia dates to the fourth century and the Hellenistic period, from which time the bulk of Eretrian inscriptions derive.⁴⁰ On the basis of probability alone an inscribed treaty, even if existing and not the product of a propagandist's imagination, would seem to fit the fourth century at earliest.

But the real question is whether archaeological material from archaic Eretria will support the historicity of a ban on missiles. Only Eretria comes into consideration, since archaic Chalcis most probably lies beneath the modern city of Chalcis and no major excavations in that area have yet been conducted.⁴¹

Eretria was a relatively new city to be engaged in a war with Chalcis *ca* 700. Its foundation can be dated *ca* 800–750 on the basis of ceramic evidence, burials, and some building activity.⁴² Although the city's original extent is disputed (the acropolis may not have been initially included), Eretria was remarkable for its size (at least one square kilometer), its wealth (gold diadems, numerous bronze

cauldrons), and its overseas contacts.⁴³ In fact the bulk of the city walls (or in another view an expansion of the city) and the West Gate belong to the seventh century—a troublesome problem for historians of the Lelantine War, although one excavator is willing to juggle the archaeological evidence to fit nearly any date for the war.⁴⁴

The earliest history of Eretria, however, can no longer be considered without reference to the British excavations of Xeropolis at modern Lefkandi. The ancient name of Xeropolis, located on the coast of the Lelantine plain halfway between Chalcis and Eretria, is unknown. The excavators suggest *Lelanton*.⁴⁵ The site experienced continuous occupation from the tenth century to *ca* 700 and has yielded numerous oriental imports of good quality, iron implements, and the presence of a foundry in the ninth century. *Ca* 825 a “disturbance” at Xeropolis occasioned the abandonment of some cemeteries and a general reduction of the inhabited area. Complete abandonment of the site came *ca* 700 possibly after a sack of the town. There is speculation that the decline of Xeropolis is connected with the rise of Eretria and that Xeropolis’ evacuation marks an incident in the Lelantine War.⁴⁶

A connection with the Lelantine War becomes even more intriguing from an additional item of evidence from Eretria. A group of six warrior cremations, dated 720–680 and distinct from the city’s major Geometric cemetery, was discovered just south of the West Gate within the city walls. Iron swords and spearheads occur in the grave goods. Tomb Six, the oldest and richest burial, perhaps that of a “prince,” forms the center of a semicircle around which the other cremation burials were arranged. In brief, the site became a heroon, surrounded by a peribole and including a triangular monument—its *sema*. Evidence of numerous sacrifices and offerings in the seventh century occur, although continuation of the cult after the sixth century cannot be substantiated.⁴⁷

Abandonment of Xeropolis *ca* 700 and warriors of 720–680 venerated as heroes at Eretria certainly coincide with a date of *ca* 700 derived from literary sources for the Lelantine War, although the lack of any archaeological evidence from Chalcis still casts a shadow over an identification of this apparent struggle between Xeropolis and Eretria with the great war of coalitions in Thucydides (1.15.3). Since the new city of Eretria was at war *ca* 700, can an inscribed treaty banning missiles have been part of this struggle? What is the epigraphical evidence from archaic Eretria?

As Forrest noted, inscriptions of the seventh century are few and Eretrian inscriptions are extremely rare. Jeffrey, who in 1961 accepted an archaic date for the inscriptions in Strabo 10.1.10 and 12, has difficulty finding parallel evidence. Her earliest Eretrian inscription

(no.22) does not come from Eretria: a potter's signature on an Early Protocorinthian aryballos of unknown provenance possibly from the second half of the seventh century. Her next earliest is a brief $\theta\epsilon\alpha$ painted on an amphora from the Eretrian necropolis and dated *ca* 600. The only archaic Eretrian inscriptions of any political substance, i.e., not ceramic or funerary inscriptions, are three legal texts of *ca* 550–525 on blocks rebuilt in the city gate.⁴⁸ The epigraphical poverty of Eretria supports rejection rather than confirmation of an inscribed stele banning missiles *ca* 700.

Plutarch, however, records a tale that Cleomachus of Pharsalus brought Thessalian cavalry to the aid of Chalcis in the Lelantine War. He died in battle and the Chalcidians erected a column (bearing an inscription?) to him in their agora. At first glance the story seems to offer Chalcidian support for an Eretrian inscribed stele of the Lelantine War. Yet column monuments do not appear before the sixth century.⁴⁹ If the earliest extant inscribed Greek treaties are taken into consideration, the earliest, the alliance of Elis and Heraea *ca* 550 (*ca* 500: Jeffrey), appears on a bronze tablet, and Bengtson's earliest treaty on stone is the Athenian decree on Erythrae after 465.⁵⁰ An inscribed Greek treaty on stone dating before the sixth century would be an anomaly in the present state of the evidence.⁵¹ Even Jeffrey after several flip-flops on the issue still believes in the historicity of Strabo's ban on missiles, but now (1976) dates it to the fifth century or later,⁵² although this concession to epigraphic reality removes the treaty from any meaningful contemporary context and invites an argument for forgery.

Much of the credibility of Strabo's ban on missiles derives from the assumed accuracy of the Homeric fame of the Euboeans, i.e., the Abantes, as experts in close combat, an appeal to which Strabo also resorts in attempting to explain the ban's meaning, and the archaic Chalcidians did have a reputation for the manufacture of swords.⁵³ In addition, *opinio communis* sees Greek warfare of the Dark Age and Geometric period as an era of combat predominantly between small groups of aristocrats relying on missile weapons and swords. The various components of the hoplite panoply began to appear in the late eighth and early seventh centuries, which began a transitional period of tactical experimentation eventually producing the hoplite phalanx of massed infantry about the middle of the seventh century or a little later.⁵⁴ Does a prohibition of missiles make sense in the military context of archaic Eretria?

Surprisingly, no one has noticed that the chief divinities of Eretria were archers: Artemis, Apollo, and even Heracles.⁵⁵ Although the mythological attributes of divinities in no way dictate the tactical practices of their worshipers, there is a certain contradiction in the

idea of setting up an inscription banning missiles in the sanctuary of Artemis. Indeed a Euboean tradition in missile weapons can be demonstrated to offset the Homeric association of Euboea with close combat.

With the exception of Crete the Dark Age saw the disappearance of archery on the Greek mainland: finds of arrowheads, frequent in the Mycenaean period, practically vanish until the eighth century; archery is common in the seventh.⁵⁶ Euboea may now be added to those few places where Dark Age archery was known. A hydria of Middle Protogeometric date (i.e., ca 900) showing archers was found at Xeropolis. Although a unique find and probably an import, the vase shows at least an Euboean awareness of archery, which finds subsequent confirmation.⁵⁷ About a half-century later in Late Protogeometric burials at Xeropolis one tomb contained ten arrowheads and an iron sword (Toumba Cemetery, Tomb 26) and another the possible remains of a composite bow (Palia Perivolia/East Cemeteries, T Pyre 1). Iron spearheads also occur in burials of this period.⁵⁸

It should also be noted that until the introduction of the closed massed formation of the phalanx, spears were generally missile rather than thrusting weapons. Just as in the heroic duels in the *Iliad*, spears were thrown before closing for sword combat. From about 900, multiple spearheads in burials became common—not an indication of wealth as in Mycenaean graves, but of the use of spears as javelins. In Geometric and Protocorinthian vases warriors often appear carrying two spears, at least one of which would be thrown and the other left for close combat.⁵⁹

Eretrian evidence conforms to this interpretation. A Late Geometric amphora of local manufacture dated ca 700 shows warriors carrying two spears and possibly a hoplite shield—the only evidence so far of hoplite equipment from the Archaic period at Eretria. The fragment of a crater from the Eretrian heroön depicts a warrior (apparently part of a file of warriors) also carrying two spears and a Dipylon shield. Furthermore, the warrior burials of the Eretrian heroön contained numerous swords and elongated spearheads—javelin heads, not thrusting spears.⁶⁰ Since Strabo's *τηλεβόλοις* denotes javelins as well as slings and arrows, as shown above (note 29), the archaeological evidence appears decisive: Eretrians ca 700 did not observe a ban on missiles and a treaty to this effect cannot have been part of the Lelantine War.

Several specific arguments for the treaty's historicity can now be readily dispatched. The notion cannot stand that a ban on missiles conforms to an archaic Greek code of chivalry in which archery was shunned as un-heroic and rules of *monomachia* permitted only close

combat (cf. note 8 above). Strabo's *τηλεβόλοις* includes both spears and arrows. Homeric heroes threw their spears, and the eighth and seventh centuries saw a revival of archery and an emphasis on missiles, to which Eretria *ca* 700 does not offer an exception. The cowardice of archers asserted in Homer, Euripides, and Dio Chrysostom, and echoed in Homeric scholia, need not represent the true Greek attitude toward the bow used with approval by both gods and heroes.⁶¹

Von Scala and Walbank wish to associate the ban on missiles with the practice of *monomachia*, a duel of champions, and cite a fragment of Ephorus in Strabo, relating that *monomachia* is an ἔθος τι παλαιόν τῶν Ἑλλήνων.⁶² Ephorus' fragment is an unfortunate selection of evidence, since both duelists use missile weapons: one a bow, the other a sling. Besides, the rules of *monomachia* did not prohibit missile weapons: Menelaus throws his spear in his duel with Paris; both Hector and Ajax throw spears in their duel; and Pausanias and Polyaeus tell essentially the same story as Ephorus of a *monomachia* involving missile weapons. Strabo (10.1.13) even claims it a regular practice in *monomachia* to throw spears before closing for sword play.⁶³

The ineffectiveness of missiles against the new tactics of the hoplite phalanx is an argument used both for and against the historicity of a ban on missiles (see note 9 above), and is equally invalid for both sides of the issue. A treaty of *ca* 700 would antedate the appearance of the phalanx by at least a half-century.⁶⁴ The revival of archery on the mainland coincides with the development of hoplite armor, as seen in the reappearance of greaves *ca* 675, if taken as anti-missile protection rather than a social distinction. Besides, hoplite armor scarcely comes into question for Eretria *ca* 700, where the only evidence for it is a possible hoplite shield in a vase painting.⁶⁵ Furthermore, a belief that missiles are ineffective against hoplites and other heavily armored infantry in mass formation ignores Demosthenes' misfortune in Aetolia, not to mention the Parthian victory at Carrhae.⁶⁶ A larger target is easier to hit (cf. Arr., *Tact.* 15.4).

The opposite side of the coin also fails to convince: Forrest's argument that a ban was unnecessary because missiles were obsolete is based on Lorimer's early date for the introduction of the phalanx. But Snodgrass has refuted Lorimer's view. Analogy with modern practice indicates that Forrest's argument (contrary to his intention) would actually advocate such a treaty's historicity: except for arms banned for humanitarian reasons, only ineffective weapons tend to be prohibited.⁶⁷

Still another argument for historicity of the pact connects the alleged treaty with the civilizing/ humanitarian mission of the Delphic

Amphictyony.⁶⁸ The argument rests upon the Amphictyonic oath, which attempts to limit warfare between Amphictyonic members by forbidding the destruction of a member city, its starvation, or its deprivation of running water by another member. For some the oath must date at least to the early sixth century because of its supposed connection with the First Sacred War of *ca* 590. Unfortunately, some see the oath (known only from sources of the fourth century) as a forgery, and the historicity of the First Sacred War, not mentioned in any source before Isocrates (14.31), is also under attack.⁶⁹ These controversies cannot be treated here, but tying the historicity of a ban on missiles *ca* 700 to an oath whose archaic date can only be argued rather than proved is to build a very shaky house of cards. Besides, even if the archaic date of the Amphictyonic oath is accepted, the treaty banning missiles would still antedate it by a century.

Finally, the question must be raised: *cui bono*? What purpose would a ban on missiles *ca* 700 serve? The arguments based on chivalry, humani-tarianism, and practical military concerns have all been shown fallacious.⁷⁰ If comparison is permitted between Strabo's alleged treaty and the only other prohibition of a specific weapon before the nineteenth century, a social answer appears at least possible. Many scholars think that the Second Lateran Council's prohibition in 1139 of the crossbow and other forms of archery was intended to limit warfare to the knightly class, i.e., an attempt to exclude mercenaries and other non-nobles.⁷¹ Murray makes a similar claim for Strabo's treaty, although without citing the Second Lateran Council's ban as parallel: the pact excluded arrows and stones of the lower classes. In this view only Eretrian and Chalcidian aristocrats would participate in the war.

The argument fails, however, for two reasons: first, Strabo's *têlebolois* includes spears; and second, archery in the early Archaic period was not the specialized skill of a lower class. The presence of iron swords and arrowheads side by side in Protogeometric tombs found at Lefkandi and Athens indicates that aristocrats, too, could be archers, and a mounted heavily armored archer appears on a "Chalcidian" vase.⁷² Indeed many common notions of what constituted the rules of the aristocratic warrior code in the Archaic period stand in need of some revision, as a recent study of *μψασπία* has shown.⁷³ A treaty banning missiles does not belong to events of the Lelantine War, nor does it fit the archaeological, epigraphical, and military context of archaic Eretria. The treaty's meaning and its proper context must be sought in Strabo or his source.

IV

Many believe that Strabo actually visited Eretria and reports the treaty banning missiles from autopsy. Forrest, a skeptic of the treaty, carries the view further: Strabo was not a good enough epigrapher to read a seventh-century inscription and what he saw was a later Eretrian forgery.⁷⁴ Despite Strabo's boasts of great journeys of discovery in imitation of Polybius and Poseidonius, the indications of autopsy in Strabo belong to his sources. In 10.1.12 Strabo does not say he saw the inscription himself, nor can it be proved that Strabo ever visited Eretria or Euboea. His own autopsy of the area might have corrected the errors of his sources.⁷⁵

Strabo not only knew the treaty on missiles exclusively from his source, but the structure of 10.1.11–13 suggests that he did not understand the meaning of the inscription. As noted above, references to peace and Chalcis and Eretria as seats of philosophers in 10.1.11 introduce discussion of the Lelantine War and the alleged treaty, but any connection between philosophers and the treaty is a chronological absurdity. Aristotle died at Chalcis in 322 and Mene-demus' Eretrian school flourished ca 300–273.⁷⁶ Immediately after mention of the treaty Strabo begins a muddled digression on close-combat vs missile weapons and the types of spears suitable for both. He even asserts that a sixteen-foot sarissa can be hurled. The effort to make sense of the treaty continues in 10.1.13 with commentary on Euboeans as close-combat fighters in Homer. Strabo's appeal to Homer, whom he considered the founder of geography, is not unusual, and his commentary probably owes much to Apollodorus of Athens' twelve-book study of the Catalogue of Ships.⁷⁷ In brief, Strabo's source presented him with a peculiar treaty banning missiles, which he did not know how to interpret. So he did his best to explain it by situating the treaty between anachronistic references to philosophers and an otherwise unnecessary digression on close vs distant combat.

Interpretation of the treaty thus is reduced to a common source for Strabo 10.1.12 and Polybius 13.3.4. Strabo's sources for Euboea include the geographers and Homeric commentators Apollodorus of Athens (b. ca 180), Artemidorus of Ephesus (fl. 100), and Demetrius of Scepsis (b. ca 214)⁷⁸; the local Euboean historians, Aristotle of Chalcis (probably 4th c.) and Arche-machus (3rd c. at latest)⁷⁹ and the major fourth-century figures, Aristotle and Ephorus. Scholars have further reduced the problem of a common source to Aristotle (or at least an Aristotelian *politeia*) or Ephorus, although some insist on Apollodorus as Strabo's *Zwischenquelle* for either Aristotle or Ephorus and some say Ephorus through Artemidorus.⁸⁰

Sure footing is rarely found in the slippery business of *Quellenforschung*, but the stronger case lies with Ephorus. Aly, who believes Strabo 10.1.12 preserves a genuine seventh-century

document, champions Aristotle. He assumes, however, that the Aristotle of Strabo 10.1.3, 8 can only be the philosopher without even mentioning Aristotle of Chalcis, and from this assumption he derives his whole argument for Aristotle as Strabo's *Urquelle* for Euboean geography through Apollodorus. Eleven references to Strabo in Rose's collection of Aristotelian fragments supposedly bolsters the case, as does schol. *ad* II. 2.543 on the Abantes (ἦν δέ παρ' αὐτοῖς αἰσχρόν τό τοξεύειν), which he connects both with Strabo's ban on missiles and with the Homeric commentary of Apollodorus. Polybius' defense of Aristotle's account of the foundation of Locri against the slanders of Timaeus allegedly proves that Polybius would not have used Ephorus in 13.3.4.⁸¹ To Aly's arguments may be added Aristotle's authorship of an Eretrian *Politeia*, and Aristotle's view of a pacifistic Lycurgus at Sparta could be used to argue at least a favorable *Tendenz* to a ban on missiles.⁸²

Yet Aly's arguments have glaring weaknesses—one assumption leading to another. The Aristotle of Strabo 10.1.3, 8 need not be the philosopher, and even if it is, that would not prove Aristotle the source for Strabo 10.1.12. In comparison to Strabo as a minor source for Aristotle's fragments, Strabo is a major source for Ephorus' fragments. Likewise, the conjectured assignment of schol. *ad* II. 2.543 to Apollodorus proves nothing and even presents difficulties: first, Ephorus was a major source for Apollodorus, and Strabo in 10.2 extensively uses Ephorus through Apollodorus; second, if the association of Apollodorus with the scholion is accepted, Strabo can be charged with imprecise language: he has obviously changed a specific word for archery (*toxueîn*) to a general term for any missile (*têlebolois*).⁸³ Finally, Polybius' defense of Aristotle in Book XII does not prove that he did not consult Ephorus for Book XIII. Polybius also defends Ephorus against Timaeus in Book XII, which is the only part of Polybius' work where Aristotle is cited at length, and Polybius shows no familiarity with the *Politics* and several other major Aristotelian works.⁸⁴

Ephorus is indeed the more likely candidate. Both Polybius and Strabo sing his praises, and Strabo even couples Ephorus and Polybius on occasion. Some argue that Strabo used Ephorus directly as well as indirectly. Furthermore, Ephorus is known to have cited inscriptions.⁸⁵

Recognition of Ephorus as the *Urquelle* of Strabo and Polybius (whether Strabo's use occurred through Apollodorus or Artemidorus does not affect the argument) does not mean acceptance of all of the arguments of von Scala and Walbank. As noted above, the attempt to find verbal similarity between Polybius and Strabo is inconclusive. Certainly Ephorus was interested in the ancient customs of the Greeks, particularly as they concerned amelioration of warfare between

Greeks, but the rules of *monomachia* in no way excluded missile weapons. Therefore von Scala's acceptance of the emendation of Plut, fr.84 to arrive at a direct reference to *monomachia* in the context of the Lelantine War is based on a false assumption.⁸⁶

Fixing the context of Ephorus' treatment of an Eretrian-Chalcidian treaty banning missiles is not easy given the fragmentary survival of Ephorus' work, and assignment of the treaty to a specific book would be meaningless conjecture. Retention of the manuscript reading of ναυμαχοῦντα in Plut, fr.84, however, a reference to the death of King Amphidamas of Chalcis in a naval battle during the Lelantine War, suggests at least a plausible argument. Hesiod participated in games at Chalcis sponsored by Amphidamas, which Plutarch (from Ephorus?) says were funerary and occurred during the Lelantine War.⁸⁷ The historicity of Plutarch's report is of no concern here.⁸⁸ Ephorus from Aeolic Cyme was well aware that Hesiod's father was a native of the same city, and he even claimed Homer as Cymeian. Ephorus as Plutarch's source is a distinct possibility.⁸⁹

The reference to a naval battle in Plut, fr.84 may also be of significance. Polybius notes that Ephorus' ability to treat naval battles offset his deficiencies as a military historian. Ephorus had some interest in Eretria's naval power and quotes an inscription from Torone on the loss of an Eretrian fleet in 411.⁹⁰ Strabo's reference (10.1.10) to Eretrian control over several Cycladic islands, implying naval power, comes immediately after the inscription on the festal procession. Citing inscriptions and discussing naval power would well indicate Ephorus.⁹¹ Furthermore, if the Eretrian inscription of Strabo 10.1.10 belongs to Ephorus, then the inscription of Strabo 10.1.12 in all likelihood is also his. A fourth-century inscription on the festival of Artemis Amarysia encounters no epigraphical, archaeological, and historical objections. Citing a real inscription would increase the credibility of a forgery.

Another piece of evidence should also be considered. Eusebius' *Chronicon* preserves a fragment of Diodorus (7.11) giving a list of thalassocracies in the Aegean between the Trojan War and Xerxes' invasion of Greece. An Eretrian thalassocracy, said to have lasted fifteen years, appears under the year 506. Diodorus' immediate source was Castor of Rhodes, writing in the first half of the first century, but Castor used Apollodorus of Athens, who in turn most probably drew from Ephorus. Apollodorus and Ephorus are explicitly cited for the date of Homer.⁹² Although Diodorus' seventh book exists only in fragments and placement of those fragments is, at least to some extent, based on an editor's imagination, it is nevertheless interesting that the list of thalassocracies in 7.11 is followed by an Ephorus fragment (7.12.3) and most probably preceded by one: 7.10 on the

tyrant Malaćus at Cyme must certainly be from Ephorus.⁹³

The accuracy of 506 as the date of an Eretrian thalassocracy matters not. It would appear that Ephorus discussed Eretrian sea power, not surprising for a city which was an early leader in Greek colonization, and if Plut. *Mor.* 153F and fr.84 derive from Ephorus, he also treated the Lelantine War. Indeed if Plut. *Mor.* 760E-61A on Cleomachus of Thessaly and the monument erected to him in Chalcis for his aid in the Lelantine War is also from Ephorus, it would offer a parallel to the inscribed stele of Strabo 10.1.12.⁹⁴ But this argument should not be pressed.

V

A treaty between Chalcis and Eretria, of which only one clause is known— that banning missiles, first occurs in Ephorus and was associated with the Lelantine War. Such a treaty does not fit the archaeological, epigraphical, and military context of Eretria *ca* 700. Did an inscribed stele purporting to be an archaic treaty really exist in fourth-century Eretria, or is it Ephorus' invention? What was the motive for the forgery?

The forgery of archaic documents by later Greeks is a fact and includes the inscription of such documents on stone, although some scholars will always argue for authenticity. As examples may be cited the inscribed romance of the foundation of Magnesia on the Maeander from Thessalian Magnesia, the oath of Cyrene, and the much debated Themistocles decree.⁹⁵ Forrest argues that Strabo's treaty was a forgery set up by later Eretrians, ignorant of the change in tactics produced by the phalanx, to explain the contrast of missiles and close combat in Archilochus fr.3 West. Donlan rejects Forrest's argument, although agreeing that the inscription cannot date to the seventh century. In his view two rationalistic explanations are possible: first, the inscription gave details on reorganization of the Eretrian army, in which hoplites replaced slingers and archers; second, the inscription was a casualty list or epitaph, specifying close combat and omission of missiles. Bakhuizen believes the inscription a chronicle of Eretrian history, which mentioned the Lelantine War and also Archilochus. This chronicler, a later historian, or perhaps even Strabo distorted the original information into a treaty banning missiles.⁹⁶

None of these explanations are convincing and all three scholars omit consideration of Plb. 13.3.4. The inscription, if it really existed, cannot be traced back earlier than Ephorus, who could invent a treaty banning missiles in the Lelantine War from Archilochus fr.3 West just as easily as some ingenious Eretrian. Persian destruction of Eretrian temples in 490 surely indicates that any archaic stele from a sanctuary

did not survive. That Ephorus garbled a legitimate inscription into a ban on missiles is not likely given his explicit quotation of such documents (e.g., *FGrH* 70 F 122, 199). There can never be certainty about whether Eretrians erected a forged inscription or Ephorus invented one. Any argument about a forgery must address not only the problem of the document itself but also the motive for the forgery. Although local Eretrian patriotism desiring to establish a firm link with famous lines from Archilochus cannot be totally discounted, Ephorus had a better and more contemporary motive for forgery.

Ephorus, the student of Isocrates or at least a sympathizer with Isocratean views, has not fared well as a reliable historian in modern eyes.⁹⁷ Even in antiquity he received mixed reviews: Josephus rated him among the most accurate historians; Strabo knew Ephorus made mistakes, but still considered him better than others. Seneca was less generous: Ephorus had little credibility—often he was deceived and often he was the deceiver.⁹⁸ Ephorus' citation of inscriptions implies travel and autopsy, but apart from his journey from Cyme to Athens nothing is known of his travels, if indeed he made any. Polybius, who in Book XII often defends Ephorus against Timaeus, upbraids them both for a lack of autopsy and topographical study. Ephorus had not visited the battlefield of Leuctra. Even a “cut-and-paste” artist like Diodorus recognized that Ephorus had never been to Egypt.⁹⁹ A visit of Ephorus to Eretria cannot be proved, although given the scanty evidence on Ephorus' life this silence of the sources does not mean much. The connection of Ephorus with a ban on missiles lies with Ephorus the panhellenist, not the Ephorus the peripatetic.

The movement of panhellenism emerged in the late fifth and fourth centuries as a response to the numerous wars and political turmoil within the Greek world. Isocrates and his followers became its chief (though not only) proponents. The panhellenists preached to restore observance of the common laws of the Greeks, to limit and to ameliorate warfare between Greeks, and to direct hostilities against the common barbarian enemy Persia. In the Isocratean school panhellenist propaganda included glorification of the Greek past and even distortions of that past. Plato, a non-Isocratean panhellenist, proposed a new code of warfare in his *Republic* to try to insure that Greeks would wage only limited war between their cities and to prohibit acts engendering lasting resentment, such as enslavement of Greeks or hindering their burial. War between Greeks should only be a *stasis* with *polemos* reserved for barbarians.¹⁰⁰

Ephorus' panhellenism is not in dispute.¹⁰¹ His *Histories* treated the κοινὰ πράξεις of Greeks and barbarians from the return of the Heracleidae to his own time—the first universal history in Polybius' view.¹⁰² He emphasized the common laws of the Greeks and

posited a civilizing mission of the Delphic Oracle to guide Greek behavior. His equation of the common laws of the Greeks with the common laws of all men echoes Isocrates. Yet his panhellenism could induce invention: Ephorus created the myth of joint strategic planning between Persia and Carthage for the simultaneous invasions of Greece and Sicily in 480.¹⁰³

Of more significance for Ephorus' treatment of a treaty banning missiles is his concern for limitations on warfare. As noted above, he was interested in the chivalry seen in the old Greek custom of *monomachia*. His common laws of the Greeks included sparing the lives of prisoners of war and permitting only trophies of wood for victories over other Greeks, so that both such trophies and memories of these misfortunes would eventually be forgotten.¹⁰⁴ Strabo's treaty on missiles is in close accord with this aspect of Ephorus' thought. Chalcis and Eretria in the Lelantine War offered an example of how Greek states should manage an armed conflict. Once determined on war, they made an agreement to wage the struggle by definite rules and limited means. It would be a regulated contest, an *agon*, rather than a *polemos* in which each side acted as it saw fit (*kata authadeiari*).

But why a ban on missiles? Apart from the literary theme that missiles were cowardly and un-heroic, can this concern be associated with a fourth-century military development, of which Ephorus particularly disapproved? From the Peloponnesian War on light infantry, often mercenaries and especially Thracian peltasts, had become prominent in Greek warfare. The skirmishing tactics of such troops who refused to close for hand-to-hand combat, could be seen as unmanly conduct and were particularly troublesome to heavily armed hoplites.¹⁰⁵ But Strabo's *têlebolois* is a most obscure word, if Ephorus' objection is to mercenaries or peltasts. Catapults offer a better explanation.

Engineers of Dionysius I of Syracuse invented the non-torsion catapult in 399. Use of the weapon reached mainland Greece by 368 or 367 and Philip II's engineers developed torsion artillery in the period 353–341. Artillery made its first major impact on mainland Greek siegecraft in 340, Philip II's capture of Perinthus. Ephorus was writing his *Histories*, presumably at Athens, 360–330, and the siege of Perinthus marked the last event he described. Non-torsion artillery, however, might have been in Athenian hands since 371/0. In 340 Phocion expelled a pro-Macedonian faction from Eretria and transferred to Athens the Macedonian torsion artillery found there.¹⁰⁶

Ephorus was no doubt aware of the new weapon and bringing the first torsion artillery to Athens from Eretria might have been suggestive. The real significance of the catapult, however, is the effect that this new and no doubt terrifying weapon would have had upon a

panhellenist urging limitations on warfare. For the first time in Greek warfare a man could be killed by a machine and not a warrior's prowess. Ephorus' reaction to the catapult probably resembled that of King Archidamus III of Sparta, when he first saw a demonstration of the new device in 368 or 367: ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἀπόλωλεν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή.¹⁰⁷ Archidamus' exclamation invites comparison with the reaction of another advocate of chivalry to the new artillery of a much later age. Don Quixote moans:

Blessed were the times which lacked the dreadful fury of those diabolical engines, the artillery, whose inventor I firmly believe is now receiving the reward for his devilish invention in hell; an invention which allows a base and cowardly hand to take the life of a brave knight, in such a way that, without his knowing how or why, when his valiant heart is fullest of furious courage, there comes some random shot— discharged perhaps by a man who fled in terror from the flash the accursed machine made in firing—and puts an end in a moment to the consciousness of one who deserved to enjoy life for many an age. And when I think of that, I am tempted to say that it grieves me to the heart to have adopted this profession of knight errantry in such a detestable age as we now live in. For although no danger frightens me, still it causes me misgivings to think that powder and lead may deprive me of the chance of winning fame and renown by the strength of my arm and the edge of my sword, over all the known earth.¹⁰⁸

If the introduction of artillery was seen as the end of military *arete*, the hallmark of the Homeric warrior code, then no doubt a proponent of limited warfare like Ephorus, who idealized the chivalrous agonal warfare of a distant past, would have disdained and feared a new ultimate weapon like the catapult. The obscure Lelantine War and Archilochus fr.3 West offered Ephorus the opportunity to create an exemplum of how war should be waged by definite rules and restraints, and to protest use of a new terrifying missile weapon, which in the hands of Phocian mercenaries and Philip II cast a foreboding shadow over the future of traditional Greek politics and values. Persian destruction of the archaic sanctuaries at Eretria in 490 facilitated Ephorus' pretense to cite such a treaty, of which the existence could no longer be verified.

A treaty banning missiles transferred to an archaic context to offer an ancient exemplum for imitation fits admirably the political, military, and intellectual context of the fourth century, but not at all that of archaic Eretria. Strabo knew Ephorus' treaty only through a *Zwischenquelle*, who seems to have sharply edited and trimmed Ephorus' text.¹⁰⁹ Strabo clearly did not understand the treaty's meaning, but did his best to explain what might be considered the first protest against missiles in history.¹¹⁰

¹ The following abbreviations appear in the footnotes: Aly = Wolfgang Aly,

Strabon von Amasia, *Antiquitas* 1.5 (Bonn 1957); Bakhuizen = S. C. Bakhuizen, *Chalcis-in-Euboea, Iron and Chalcidians Abroad*, *Chalcidian Studies* III (Leiden 1976); Coldstream = J. N. Coldstream, *Geometric Greece* (New York 1977); Donlan = Walter Donlan, "Archilochus, Strabo and the Lelantine War," *TAPA* 101 (1970) 131–42; *Eretria* - Paul Auberson/Claude Bérard/Clemens Krause et al., *Eretria, Fouilles et Recherches*, I–VI (Bern 1968–78); Forrest = W. G. Forrest, "Colonization and the Rise of Delphi," *Historia* 6(1957) 160–75; Greenhalgh = P. A. L. Greenhalgh, *Early Greek Warfare, Horsemen and Chariots in the Homeric and Archaic Ages* (Cambridge 1973); Jeffrey I = L. H. Jeffrey, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* (Oxford 1961), Jeffrey II = *Archaic Greece: the City-States. 700–500 B.C.* (New York 1976); *Lefkandi* - M. R. Popham/ L. H. Sackett/P. G. Themelis, ed., *Lefkandi, I: the Iron Age*, BSA Supp. 11 (Oxford 1980); Murray = Oswyn Murray, *Early Greece* (Atlantic Heights 1980); Podlecki I = A. J. Podlecki, "Three Greek Soldier-Poets: Archilochus, Alcaeus, Solon," *CW* 63 (1969) 73–81, Podlecki II = *The Early Greek Poets and Their Times* (Vancouver 1984); Pritchett, *G SAW* = W. Kendrick Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*, I–IV (Berkeley 1971–85); Snodgrass, *EGAW* - A. M. Snodgrass, *Early Greek Armour and Weapons* (Edinburgh 1964), Snodgrass, *A AG – Arms and Armour of the Greeks* (Ithaca 1967), Snodgrass, *AG – Archaic Greece: the Age of Experiment* (London 1980); von Scala I = Rudolf von Scala, *Die Studien des Polybios* (Stuttgart 1890), von Scala II = *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* (Leipzig 1898); Walbank, *HCP* = F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, I–III (Oxford 1957–79). With a few obvious exceptions, all dates are B.C.

2 Second Lateran Council, Canon 29 = *Decretales Gregori IX* 5.15 (Emil Friedberg, ed., *Corpus Iuris Canonis*[Graz 1955] II): "Artem autem illam mortiferam et [Deo] odibilem ballis-tariorum et sagittariorum adversus Christianos et catholicos exerceri de cetero sub anathemate prohibemus." Cf. Frederick H. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge 1975) 156–58; James Turner Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War* (Princeton 1981) 128–29; Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford 1984) 71–72, 274–75. On the modern humanitarian trend see Geoffrey Best, *Humanity in Warfare* (New York 1980).

3

P1b. 13.3.2–4: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι πολὺ τι τοῦ τοιοῦτου μέρους ἐκτὸς ἦσαν· τοσοῦτο γὰρ ἀπῆλλοτριῶντο τοῦ κακομηχανεῖν περὶ τοὺς φίλους χάριν τοῦ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ συναυξεῖν τὰς σφετέρας δυναστείας, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τοὺς πολεμίους ὃ ἤρουντο δι' ἀπάτης νικᾶν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες (οὐδὲν) οὔτε λαμπρὸν οὐδὲ μὴν βέβαιον εἶναι τὸν κατορ. θωμμάτων, ἐὰν μὴ τις ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς μαχόμενος 4 ἡτήτησεν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τοὺς ἀντιταττομένους, διὸ καὶ συνετίθεντο πρὸς σφᾶς μὴτ' ἀδῆλοις βέλεσι μὴθ' ἐκηβόλοις χρῆσασθαι κατ' ἀλλήλων, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἐκ χειρὸς καὶ συστάδην γινόμενὴν μάχην ἀληθινὴν ὑπελάμβανον εἶναι κρίσιν πραγμάτων.

4

Strabo 10. I. 12: Τὸ μὲν οὖν πλεόν ὠμολόγουν ἀλλήλαις αἱ πόλεις αὗται, περὶ δὲ Ἀηλάντου διενεχθεῖσαι οὐδ' οὕτω τελέως ἐπαύσαντο, ὥστε τῷ πολέμῳ κατὰ αὐθάδειαν δρᾶν ἕκαστα, ἀλλὰ συνέθεντο, ἐφ' οἷς συστήσονται τὸν ἀγῶνα. Δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ Ἀμαρυνθείῳ στηλήτῃς, φράζουσα μὴ χρῆσθαι τηλεβόλοις. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἐθῶν καὶ τῶν ὀπλισμῶν οὐθὲν οὗτ' ἐστὶν οὗτ' ἦν ἔθος· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν τηλεβόλοις χρῶνται, καθάπερ οἱ τοξῶται καὶ οἱ σφενδονῆται καὶ ἀκοντισταί, οἱ δ' ἀγχεμάχοις, καθάπερ οἱ ξίφει καὶ δόρατι τῷ ὀρεκτῷ χρώμενοι· διττὴ γάρ ἡ τῶν δόρατων χρῆσις, ἡ μὲν ἐκ χειρὸς, ἡ δ' ὡς παλτοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ κοντὸς ὁμοιότερας τὰς χρεῖας ἀποδίδωσι· καὶ γὰρ συστάδην καὶ κοντοβολούντων, ὅπερ καὶ ἡ σάρισσα δύναται καὶ ὁ ὑσός.

5 Archilochus fr.3 West = Plut. *Thes.* 5.2–3:

οἱ δ' Ἀργεῖοι τὰς ἐκείαντες ἀντίστοιχὰς τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον . . . ὄντες πολεμικοὶ καὶ ἀγχιμαχοὶ καὶ μάλιστα δὴ πάντων εἰς χεῖρας ὠθεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις μεμαθηκότες. ὥς μαρτυρεῖ καὶ Ἀρχιλόχος ἐν τούτοις· οὗτοι πόλλ' ἐπὶ τόξῳ τανύσσεται, οὐδὲ θαμναὶ σφενδύειν, εὐτ' ἂν δὴ μᾶλλον Ἀρης συνάγῃ ἐν πεδίοις· ξιφῶν δὲ πολυστονονέσσεται ἔργον· ταύτης γὰρ κείνοι δάμονές εἰσι μάχης 5 δεσπόται Εὐβοίης Δουρικλυτοί.

6 E.g., von Scala I, 308 n. I and II, 16–17 (Nr. 19); H. L. Lorimer, “The Hoplite Phalanx,” *BSA* 42 (1947) 118; J. A. O. Larsen, review of A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, I in CP 44 (1949) 258–59; Johannes Volkmann, “Die Waffentechnik in ihrem Einfluss auf das soziale Leben der Antike,” in Leopold von Wiese, ed., *Die Entwicklung der Kriegswaffe und ihr Zusammenhang mit der Sozialordnung* (Cologne 1953) 71; John Boardman, “Early Euboean Pottery and History,” *BSA* 52 (1957) 24, 29; Aly 354–60; Jeffrey I, 82 and 11, 46, 65–66 but cf. 70 n.4; Angelo Brelich, *Guerre, agoni e culti nella Grecia arcaica*, *Antiquitas* 1.7 (Bonn 1961) 9–21; Snodgrass, *EGAW*, 180; Walbank, *HCP* 11, 416; J. K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley 1970) 1–2; Krause, *Eretria* IV, 21 with n. 10; Greenhalgh 91–92; Pritchett, *GSAW* II, 173, 251–52, IV, 16 n.52; Yvon Garion, *War in the Ancient World*, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York 1975) 29, 128; Virgilio Ilari, *Guerra e diritto nel mondo antica*, Parte Prima, Università di Roma, Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto di Diritto Romano e dei Diritti del' Oriente Mediterraneo 56 (Milan 1980) 53; Murray 78; Peter Karavites, *Capitula-Hons and Greek Interstate Relations*, *Hypomnemata* 71 (Göttingen 1982) 23; Anne Pippin Burnett, *Three Archaic Poets: Archilochus, Alcaeus, Sappho* (Cambridge, Mass. 1983) 40 n.21.

7 Inscription: Lorimer, Aly, Jeffrey I, Greenhalgh, Burnett; Archilochus: Jeffrey II, Murray. For this note and nn. 8–10 below specific citations appear in note 6 above.

8 Chivalry: Walbank and sources cited in Brelich (above, note 6) 16 and in Donlan 133 n.5; too deadly: Greenhalgh, Jeffrey II cf. Brelich, Anderson; Amphictyonic League: Walbank, Pritchett.

9 Polybius: Snodgrass; ineffectiveness: Anderson cf. Forrest 163.

10 Brelich, Garlón.

11 Forrest 163–64; Bakhuizen 35. *Contra*, Donlan 140.

12 Unnecessary: Forrest 163; Donlan 140; Strabo as epigrapher: Forrest 163; other skeptics: Podlecki I, 75 and II, 45–46; Hermann Bengston, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums*, II2 (Munich 1962) Nr. 102.

13 Von Scala in note 6 above; Walbank, *HCP* 11, 416; Josef Forderer, *Ephoros und Strabon* (Diss. Tübingen 1913) 41, 43.

14 Thuc. 1.15.3 cf. Hdt. 5.99.1; Bakhuizen 34–36.

15 Strabo 10.1.9 and 12 cf. Plut., *Mor.* 153F, fr.84 = schol. *ad Hes.*, *Erga* 654–62; Popham, *Lefcandi* I, 425–26. Whatever the historical accuracy of the term “Lelantine War,” I shall use it for the sake of convenience as a conventional term.

16 Forrest 160–65; Jeffrey II, 65–67; Murray 76–78; Bérard, *Eretria* III, 68 with n.27; Krause, *Eretria* IV, 20–21 with n.58; Coldstream 200; Karavites (above, note 6) 23 with n.8; Donlan 135 n.8. These references include citation of earlier literature. Pritchett has recently exploited a new fragment of Tyrtaeus (*POxy.* 3316) as a basis for the rehabilitation of Pausanias' accuracy on the Messenian wars. If an isolated reference to Argives in the new fragment is indeed a confirmation of Argive support of Messenia in the wars (and this “if is considerable), the degree of Greek sophistication in coalition warfare in the Archaic period should be upgraded in scholarly views, and Thucydides' assertion

in 1.15.3 about major coalitions in the Lelantine War gains plausibility. See W. Kendrick Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, V, CPCS 31 (Berkeley 1985) 1–68. Pritchett curiously omits reference to Lionel Pearson, “The Pseudo-History of Messenia and its Authors,” *Historia* 11 (1962) 397–426.

17 Theognis 891–94 refers to destruction of Cerinthus in extreme northeastern Euboea and of the Lelantine plain (two geographically distant areas) in conjunction with a curse on the Cypselids. This enigmatic passage, which mentions neither Chalcis nor Eretria, could be used to argue continuation of the dispute over the Lelantine plain at a later date, although Burn rejects these lines as historically “useless.” Figueria would date this conflict after 600, arguing from literary references to various alliances associated with the Lelantine War and not from Euboean archaeological evidence. See A. R. Burn, “The So-Called Trade-Leagues’ in Early Greek History and the Lelantine War,” *JHS* 49 (1929) 34; Thomas J. Figueira/Gregory Nagy, ed., *Theognis of Megara: Poetry and the Polis* (Baltimore 1985) 288–91 cf. 123–24, 271.

18 Snodgrass, *EGAW*, 180; Bérard, *Eretria* III, 69 n.48.

19 Hdt. 5.99.1; Thuc. 1.15.3; Brelich (above, note 6) 9–21; Garlón (above, note 6) 29, 128. Cf. A. Andrewes, review of Brelich, *JHS* 82 (1962) 192–93.

20 Text in note 5 above; Jeffrey II, 65; Murray 78; Donlan 131–33, 135–36; Greenhalgh 92.

21 Felix Jacoby, “The Date of Archilochus,” *CQ* 35 (1941) 97–109; Burnett (above, note 6) 26; Podlecki II, 31–32, 46. Donlan believes that Archilochus was concerned with or at least knew of an actual or potential conflict between Chalcis and Eretria: 135–36.

22 Forrest 163–64; Burnett (above, note 6) 40; Podlecki II, 45; Greenhalgh 91. *Contra*, Donlan 136 n. I; Murray 78, who thinks that Archilochus’ future tense somehow indicates a remembrance on an earlier generation.

23 Donlan 132, 133 n.2, 134.

24 Polybius’ account is ignored by Forrest 163–64; Bakhuizen 35; and others.

25 For Heracleides’ activities see F. W. Walbank, *Philip V of Macedón* (Cambridge 1940) 108–111. Cf. the gloss on Plb. 13.3–4 in Schweighauser’s edition (1789): “facile intelligitur de dolo illo agi, quo in subornando adversus Rhodios Heracleide usus Philippus est.” Polybius’ polemics: e.g., 5.11–12.4, 110.1–9; 18.3, 33.6; Roman propaganda: Liv. 42.47.4–9 with Walbank, *HCP* III, 299 on the Polybian origin of the passage.

26 Cf. Dion. Hal., *Ant. Rom.* 9.17.4 for *authadeia* as the “arbitrariness” of L. Aemilius Mamercus’ treaty with Veii (traditionally, 478: *MRR* I, 25–26), made without consulting the Senate about the terms.

27 Some earlier editors viewed this digression as an interpolation, although its authenticity is accepted in the latest edition of Strabo, Book X by François Lasserre (Budé: Paris 1971).

28 Von Scala I, 308 n.I; Walbank, *HCP* 11, 416.

29 *LSJ* s.vv. ἐκήβόλος, τηλεβόλος; Arr., *Tact.* 15.1; *grosphos*: Plb. 6.22.1, 4; Bérard, *Eretria* III, 69 n.48; Lasserre (above, note 27) 120 (n.3 *ad p.*29).

30 We cannot, of course, argue either that Pindar invented the word or that it occurred before him on this evidence.

31 Ilari (above, note 6) 53. On battles by appointment see Pritchett, *G SAW* II, 147–55 cf. 173–76; A. M. Eckstein, “Perils of Poetry: the Roman ‘Poetic Tradition’ on the Outbreak of the First Punic War,” *A JA H* 5 (1980) 175–78, 188 n. 19, who

erroneously equates challenges to battle with battles by appointment. I hope to treat such battles in a Roman context elsewhere.

³² Hdt. 6.101.2–3 cf. 6.119.2–4; netting: Hdt. 6.31.2; Lasserre (above, note 27) 119 n.8 cf. Steven W. Hirsch, “Cyrus’ Parable of the Fish: Sea Power in the Early Relations of Greece and Persia,” *CJ* 81 (1986) 222–29; Krause, *Eretria* IV, 49; Fritz Geyer, *Topographie und Geschichte der Insel Euböia*, Quellen und Forschungen zur alten Geschichte und Geographie 6 (Berlin 1903) 56–57.

³³ Hdt. 6.101.3, 119.2–4; 8.1.2, 46.2; 9.28.5; on Eretria, apparently prosperous, in the mid-fifth century see Russell Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 568–69.

³⁴ For other geographical errors in Strabo 10.1 see Geyer (above, note 32) 56–57; Popham, *Lefkandi* I, 426 n.3; Bakhuizen 82–84. In general on the archaeology of Eretria see Philippson, “Eretria 1,” *RE* 6 (1907) 422–25; T. W. Jacobsen, “Eretria,” *PECS* (1976) 315–17.

³⁵ Some place Amarynthus near modern Kato Batheia and Ano Batheia, five or six miles east of Eretria at the foot of Mt. Kotylaion, a mountain sacred to Artemis. Numerous Hellenistic inscriptions including dedications to Artemis, Apollo, and Leto and fragments of victor lists from festive games have been found there. Material as early as the sixth century also occurs. *IG* XII.9 139–86; Irene C. Ringwood, “Local Festivals of Euboea,” *AJA* 33 (1929) 386; William Wallace, “The Demes of Eretria,” *Hesperia* 16 (1947) 134; Boardman (above, note 6) 23; Geyer (above, note 32) 57. On the -nthos combination as a pre-Greek place name see Carl Blegan/J. B. Haley, “The Coming of the Greeks,” *AJA* 32 (1928) 141–54; Emily Vermeule, *Greece in the Bronze Age* (Chicago 1964) 60–64. In preference to this inland site, some place Amarynthus at Palaioacastri, a prehistoric coastal site. See Bakhuizen 78–79; Popham, *Lefkandi* I, 423, 426 note 4. Cf. Boardman (above, note 6) 24.

³⁶ Jessen, “Amarsysia,” *RE* 1 (1984) 1743; Denis Knoepfler, “Carystos et les Artemisia d’Amarynthos,” *BCH* 96 (1972) 283–301. Knoepfler promises a monograph on Amarynthus and inscriptions of the cult which has not appeared, unless this be his “La cité de Ménédème. Études et documents sur l’historié d’Érétria à la haute époque hellénistique” (Thèse Sorbonne 1984): *non vidi*.

³⁷ *IG* XII.9 236, 237, *IG* XII Suppl. 553 (a copy of XII.9 236); Liv. 35.38.3; Brelich (above, note 6) 18–20; Ringwood (above, note 35) 386–87. Cf. note 19 above.

³⁸ See Everett L. Wheeler, “*Hoplomachia* and Greek Dances in Arms,” *GRBS* 23 (1982) 223–33, esp. 233 with note 54. Cf. J. Delorme, *Gymnasium* (Paris 1960) 469–74 and S. C. Humphreys, “The Nothoi of Kynosarges,” *J HS* 94 (1974) 90–91.

³⁹ Archaic date of inscription in Strabo 10.1.10; Geyer (above, note 32) 63; Ringwood (above, note 35) 386; Snodgrass, *AAG* 71; Jeffrey I, 82; Coldstream 199 cites an abundance of Eretrian pottery on Andros to argue Eretrian control of the island in the late eighth and seventh centuries, but trade need not mean political control. 411–394/3; Bakhuizen 29. Panatheneia: L. Ziehen, “Panatheneia,” *RE* 18 (1949) 468 cf. Lorimer (above, note 6) 118. A thesis of Greenhalgh’s book is that chariots in Geometric vase painting do not indicate battlefield use, but are a heroizing substitution for cavalry.

⁴⁰ Cf. notes 35, 37 above. The numerous funerary stelai found in the West Gate area date predominantly to the fourth and third centuries: Christine Dunant, *Eretria* VI, 22, 26.

⁴¹ Bakhuizen’s book, in which he attempts to belittle archaic Eretria and to magnify the role of Chalcis, argues that Chalcis’ prominence occurred from an

early development of iron technology and exploitation of local iron resources. While his critical approach to the sources should be justly appreciated, his speculative arguments remain unproven, especially given the lack of archaeological support. See the reviews of M. M. Austin, *CR* 28 (1978) 377 and Denis Knoepfler, *M H* 32(1980) 190–91.

42 Auberson, *Eretria* I, 24, Bérard, *Eretria* VI, 94 with n.93; Boardman (above, note 6) 14; Popham, *Lefkandi* I, 424; Coldstream 88, 199.

43 Bérard, *Eretria* VI, 89–95; Coldstream 199.

44 Krause, *Eretria* IV, 20–21 cf. Bérard in note 43 above.

45 Popham, *Lefkandi* I, 424–26. Bakhuizen 8–13 argues that Xeropolis is Old Chalcis, i.e., a city called Euboea known only from a murky tradition and thought to have been submerged by a tidal wave (Strabo 10.1.9); Coldstream 90 argues for Strabo's Old Eretria.

46 Popham/Sackett, *Lefkandi* I, 365–66, 368–69, 424; Murray 75–76; Coldstream 200. Also see P. G. Themelis, “Die Nekropolen von Lefkandi-Nord auf Euboea,” *SB Vienna* 418 (1983) 145–60.

47 Bérard, *Eretria* III, *passim*, *Eretria* VI, 89–95, and “Le sceptre du prince,” *MH* 29 (1972) 218–27, where he argues that the bronze spearhead found in Tomb Six and possibly an heirloom in an age of iron indicates the royal power of the occupant; Popham/Sackett, *Lefkandi* I, 369; Murray 78; Coldstream 196–97, 350 and “Hero-cults in the Age of Homer,” *JHS* 96 (1976) 15.

48 Forrest 163; Jeffrey I, 82–86 cf. 71–81.

49 Plut. *Mor.* 760E–61B; Bakhuizen 35–36 with note 143 cf. his “Ο μέγας κίων, the Monument for Cleomachos at Chalcis-in-Euboea,” in *Festoen opgedragen aan A. N. Zadoks-Josephus Jitta*, *Scripta Archaeologica Groningana* 6 (Groningen/Bussum 1976) 43–47.

50 Bengtson, *Staatsvertr.* 2 Nr. 102 cf. Jeffrey 1, 219 nr.6, *Staatsvertr.* 2 Nr. 134 cf. Russell Meiggs/David Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford 1969) nr.40, who date it 453–52 and therefore later than the Athenian alliance with Egesta (nr. 37 = *Staatsvertr.* 2 Nr. 139), which they date 458–57, although others say 418–17. This is not the place to debate the problems of fifth-century epigraphy.

51 A sixth-century Spartan treaty with Tegea mentioned by Aristotle and generally regarded as historical was inscribed on a stele: Arist. fr.592 Rose = Plut., *Mor.* 292B; *Staatsvertr.* 2 Nr. 112; Felix Jacoby, *CQ* 38 (1944) 15–16; Paul Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia* (London 1979) 138–39.

52 Jeffrey II, 46, 65–66, 69 n.3, 70 n.4.

53 II. 2.542–44; Strabo 10.1.13; Chalcidian sword: references collected in Robert Renehan, “The Early Greek Poets: Some Interpretations,” *HSCP* (1983) 2.

54 The basic article remains A. N. Snodgrass, “Hoplite Reform and History,” *J HS* 85 (1965) 110–22 cf. his *A AG* 35–88, *EG AW* *passim*, and *AG* 104–106. John Salmon would push back the introduction of the phalanx to ca 675: “Political Hoplites?” *J HS* 97 (1977) 84–101. Also see Greenhalgh 70–74, 146 and *passim*. Snodgrass has recently been challenged by Pritchett (*GSAW* IV, 1–93), who discounts the significance of changes in Greek armor and argues continuity of the Greek phalanx from Homer on. Despite the poet's emphasis on heroic duels, Pritchett believes he has proved that battles of massed infantry organized in definite, disciplined units and forming phalanges fought on the plain of Troy. Pritchett curiously pretends that he is arguing with Lorimer (above, note 6) instead of Snodgrass, who had already refuted Lorimer on many points, and

Snodgrass' 1965 article is not mentioned. Needless to say, the argument does not convince. On the other hand, Pritchett has admirably collected the evidence for hoplite combat in the Classical period. His discussion of *othismos* (65–68, 71–73, 91–92) is more than adequate to refute the questionable attempt of Peter Krentz to argue that *othismos* is a myth and that the phalanx was an open and not a closed formation: "The Nature of Hoplite Battle," *CI Ant* 4 (1985) 50–61.

55 On the cult of Heracles at Eretria: *IG XII.9* 234; Ringwood (above, note 35) 388.

56 Snodgrass, *EGAW* 151–56, *AAG* 39, 47. Cf. Donlan 137 n.7 and G. Ahlberg, *Fighting on Land and Sea in Greek Geometric Art*, Acta Instituti Atheniensis Regni Sueciae, Series in 4°, 16 (Stockholm 1971) 53–54.

57 V. R. d'A. Desborough, *Lefkandi* I, 348, 357, II, Pl. 210c, Pl. 270d. Of course oral traditions about the Mycenaean period which eventually became part of the Homeric corpus probably perpetuated the memory of archery.

58 *Lefkandi*, I, 160–61, 175–76, 182–83, 192–93, 358–59, 361.

59 Snodgrass, *AAG* 38–39, 57, *EGAW* 138; Greenhalgh 41, 59, 63.

60 Amphora: Boardman (above, note 6) 29 and "Pottery from Euboea," *BSA* 47 (1952) 7 with Pl. Ill A; Greenhalgh 91, 92; Lilly Kahil, "Céramique géométrique et subgéométrique d'Érétrie/M/i/XtI (1968) 100 with Pl. 27.4; heroon: Bérard, *Eretria* III, 17 (Tomb 6—five javelin heads), 18 (Tomb 8—one javelin head), 19–20 (Tomb 9—three javelin heads).

61 II. 11.379–95; Eur. *H F* 157–64, 188–203; D. Chr. 58.1–4; schol. Ven. *ad* II. 2.543 and Eust. 282 (*ad* II. 2.543), cited by Pritchett, *GSAW* IV, 31 n.94. For an argument that the bow is not a cowardly weapon in Homer see André Arnaud, "Quelques aspects des rapports de ruse et de la guerre dans le monde grec du VIII^e au VI^e siècle" (Thèse de 3^e Cycle: Paris 1971) 26–27. A literary analysis of Euripides' debate on archery in Richard Hamilton, "Slings and Arrows: the Debate with Lycus in the *Heracles*," *TAPA* 115 (1985) 19–25. Eustathius 1030 (*ad* II. 15.540–43) defends an archer's shooting an enemy in the back.

62 Ephorus, *FGrH* 70 F 115 = Strabo 8.3.33; von Scala and Walbank in note 6 above. On *monomachia* see Wheeler (above, note 38) 224 with n.9 and Pritchett, *GSAW* IV, 15–21, who provides a catalogue of such duels. For Roman *monomachia* see S. P. Oakley, "Single Combat in the Roman Republic," *CQ* 35 (1985) 392–410. An alleged *monomachia* in the Lelantine War rests on emending the text of Plut, fr.84 from ναυμαχούντα to μονομαχούντα.

63 II. 3.355–56, 7.244–50; Paus. 5.4.2; Polyaeus 5.48 (= *Exc. Polyaei* 11.2); Strabo 10.1.13.

64 Snodgrass, *EGAW* 180.

65 On archery see note 56 above; Eretrian vase with shield: Boardman (above, note 60) cf. Coldstream 192 and Snodgrass, *AG* 108; greaves: Alcaeus Z 34 *PLF*; Snodgrass, *EGAW* 183, *AAG* 52–53. The function of greaves is not clear. Snodgrass is hardly convincing that greaves, worn in Mycenaean times but abandoned in the Dark Age, were revived because of epic references to them: *AG* 104. Delbrück, in discussing the phalanx of the earliest Roman army, suggests that in an age when each man bore the expense of arming himself, greaves were a social distinction emphasizing the wealth of the men who could afford them. The view has some merit, since in the early Imperial army only centurions, other officers, and members of elite units, e.g., urban cohorts, wore greaves. See Hans Delbrück, *The History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History*, trans. Walter J. Renfro, Jr., I (Westport 1975) 265; Paul Couissin, *Les armes romaines* (Paris 1926)

⁶⁶ Demosthenes: Thuc. 3.97–98; Carrahae: Plut. *Crass.* 23–29; Dio 40.14–24; Snodgrass, *EGAW* 156; Greenhalgh 91.

⁶⁷ Forrest 163 cf. note 54 above; Antonio Cassese, “Means of Warfare: the Traditional and the New Law of War,” in Antonio Cassese, ed., *The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict* (Naples 1979) I, 166–67 cf. 196–97.

⁶⁸ See note 8 above; J. A. O. Larsen, “Federation for Peace in Ancient Greece,” *CP* 39 (1944) 145–62; F. W. Walbank, “The Problem of Greek Nationality,” *Phoenix* 5 (1951) 53–54; Franz Kiechle, “Zur Humanität in der Kriegführung der griechischen Staaten,” *Historia* 7 (1958) 134–35.

⁶⁹ Amphictyonic oath: Aeschin. 2.115; *Staatsvertr.* 2 Nr. 104 cf. Louis Robert, *Études épigraphiques et philologiques* (Paris 1938) 314–15; Georges Daux, “Serments amphictyoniques et serment de Platées,” in *Studies Presented to David Moore Robinson* (St. Louis 1953) II, 779; Peter Siewert, *Die Eid von Plataiai*, *Vestigia* 16 (Munich 1972) 78–79 and passim; First Sacred War: N. Robertson, “The Myth of the First Sacred War,” *CQ2S* (1978) 38–73; G. A. Lehmann, “Der ‘erste Heilige Krieg—Eine Fiction?’” *Historia* 29 (1980) 242–46.

⁷⁰ For the sake of completeness Greenhalgh’s explanation of the treaty should be noted: the pact’s intent was protection of the aristocratic warriors’ horses. See Greenhalgh 92, 136–37. A treaty to protect horses but not men finds no parallel in the annals of chivalry. Surely if the treaty applied to horses, Polybius or Strabo would have specified such.

⁷¹ Russell (above, note 2) 156; Johnson (above, note 2) 128–29; Contamine (above, note 2) 71–72, 274–75; Paul Fournier, “La prohibition par le II^e Concile de Latran d’armes jugée trop meurtrières (1139),” *Revue Générale de Droit International Public* 33 (1916) 471–79. Cf. A. T. Hatto, “Archery and Chivalry: a Noble Prejudice,” *Modern Language Review* 35 (1940) 40–54. This view is not universal. One scholar finds a more immediate cause of the ban: only two years before the Lateran Council many pilgrims were injured at the siege of Praeneste by archers from the army of Lothar III, the (Holy) Roman Emperor. See Ernst-Dieter Hehl, *Kirche und Krieg im 12. Jahrhundert: Studien zu kanonischem Recht und politischer Wirklichkeit*, *Monographien zur Geschichte des Mittelalters* 19 (Stuttgart 1980) 45–48.

⁷² Murray 78; H. W. and E. Catling, *Lefkandi* I, 256–57; Greenhalgh 139–41 with fig. 76.

⁷³ See Thomas Schwertfeger, “Der Shield des Archilochos,” *Chiron* 12 (1982) 253–80.

⁷⁴ Boardman (above, note 6) 29; Greenhalgh 91; Ilari (above, note 6) 53 n.34; Podlecki II, 45; Forrest 163. Burnett (above, note 6) apparently thinks that a stone bearing the inscription is extant and was published by Forrest in 1957: 40 n.21.

⁷⁵ Strabo 2.5.11; E. Honigmann, *RE*, Reihe 2, 4A (1931) 81–85; Lasserre (above, note 27) 14; Strabo’s errors: note 34 above.

⁷⁶ On Menedemus see D. L. 2.125–44 (numerous errors); K. von Fritz, “Menedemos 9,” *RE* 15 (1931) 788–94; Lasserre (above, note 27) 28 n.5 cf. Knoepfler’s thesis (above, note 36).

⁷⁷ Strabo and Homer: Honigmann (above, note 75) 144–47; 10.1.13 = Apollodorus: E. Schwartz, *RE* 1 (1894) 2867–68; Lasserre (above, note 27) 10.

⁷⁸ Apollodorus: Schwartz (above, note 77) 2856–86, esp. 2868; *FGrH* 244 F 201–204 (use in Strabo 10.2); Lasserre (above, note 27) 10; Artemidorus: Berger, *RE* 2 (1895) 1329–30; R. Stiehle, “Der Geograph Arternidoros von Ephesus,”

Philologus 11 (1856) 193–244; Lasserre (above, note 27) 8, 120 n.2; Demetrius: Schwartz, *RE* 4 (1901) 2807–13; Lasserre (above, note 27) 8, 11.

⁷⁹ Aristotle: *FGrH* 423 with comm.: Jacoby states (without argument) that the Aristotle cited in Strabo 10.1.3, 8 must be the Stagirite; Archemachus: *FGrH* 424 F 9 = Strabo 10.3.6. In this fragment Archemachus has the Curetés of Chalcis fighting for the Lelantine plain but without reference to a ban on missiles. The story is an *aition* to explain the name “Curetés” from their peculiar haircut: see Bakhuizen 34–35 cf. 22; Aly 354–55.

⁸⁰ Aristotle: Aly 354–60; Ephorus through Apollodorus: von Scala and Walbank in note 6 above; Ephorus through Artemidorus: Lasserre (above, note 27) 8, 120 n.2; Aristotle or Ephorus through Apollodorus: Bakhuizen 35.

⁸¹ Aly 347–60; Plb 12.5–8.

⁸² Heracl. Lemb., *Exc. Polit.* 40 Dilts = Arist. fr.611.40 Rose; cf. 10 Dilts, 611.10 Rose, Arist. *Pol.* 5. 1306a 31–32; Everett L. Wheeler, “The *Hoplomachoi* and Vegetius’ Spartan Drillmasters,” *Chiron* 13 (1983) 16 with nn.81–82.

⁸³ Ephorus in Strabo: *FGrH* 70, passim; Ephorus in Apollodorus: Schwartz (above, note 76) 2870–71; *FGrH* 244 F 201–204 (use in Strabo 10.2).

⁸⁴ Plb. 12.28.8–12 and passim; F. W. Walbank, *Polybius* (Berkeley 1972) 32 n.3.

⁸⁵ Praises: e.g., Plb. 5.33.2, 6.45.1, 9.1.4, 12.28.10; Strabo 9.3.11, 10.3.2–5; *FGrH* 70, passim; Polybius and Ephorus: Strabo 1.1.1, 8.1.1; direct use: Honigmann (above, note 75) 141–42; Fordeker (above, note 13) 45–50; inscriptions: *FGrH* 70 F 122, 199.

⁸⁶ See note 62 above and von Scala 11, Nr. 19.

⁸⁷ Hes., *Erga* 654–55; Plut., *Mor.* 153F, fr.84. Aly, 359–60, argues that Plutarch’s source is an Aristotelian *Politeia* of the Chalcidians, but the fragments of this work indicate the Chalcidians of the Chalcidice: Heracl. Lemb. *Exc. Polit.* 62–63 Dilts.

⁸⁸ Historical: Jeffrey II, 65; rejected: K. J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* IV (Oxford 1970) 216; Bakhuizen 34.

⁸⁹ Hes. *Erga* 635–36; Ephorus *FGrH* 70 F 1, 101–102. On the role of Ephorus’ Cymeian patriotism in his work see Deborah Hobson Samuel, “Cyme and the Veracity of Ephorus,” *TAPA* 99 (1968) 375–88.

⁹⁰ Plb. 12.25¹ = *FGrH* 70 T 20, F 199 = Diod. 13.41.1–3.

⁹¹ Von Scala I, 308 n.1.

⁹² *FGrH* 70 F 102: “in Latina Historia haec ad verbum scripta repperimus Agrippa apud Latinos régnante Homērus poeta in Graecia claruit, ut testantur Apollodorus grammaticus et Euforbus historicus; ante urbem Romam conditam ann. CXXIV et, ut ait Cornelius Nepos, ante olympiadem primam ann. C. Castor: *FGrH* 250; Wolfgang Aly, “Kastor als Quelle Diodors im 7. Buch,” *RhM* 66 (1911) 584–606; Kubitschek, *RE* 10 (1919) 2350–51.

⁹³ Diod. 7.12.3 cf. Strabo 10.4.16–20 = Ephorus *FGrH* 70 F 149; Schwartz, “Diodorus,” *RE* 5 (1905) 678.

⁹⁴ Plutarch *Mor.* 761 A–B, balances the account of 760F–61A with a different version from an Aristotle, who could be either the philosopher or Aristotle of Chalcis.

⁹⁵ See Forrest 163 with n.5, 166 with n.9. Cf. Meiggs/Lewis (above, note 50) nos.5, 23.

⁹⁶ Forrest 163–64; Donlan 140; Bakhuizen 35.

97 E. Schwartz, "Ephorus," *RE* 6 (1909) 1–16; E. A. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus* (Cambridge 1935) 1–16. Schwartz denies and Barber defends a close relationship between Ephorus and Isocrates. For an attempted rehabilitation of Ephorus' reputation as an historian see Guido Schepens, "Historiographical Problems in Ephorus," in *Historiographia Antiqua: Commentationes Lovanienses in honorem W. Peremans septuagenarii editae* (Louvain 1977) 95–118, esp. 98–99, 114 n.98, and 115 n.99 on older literature. Cf. (against Ephorus' accuracy) H. D. Westlake, "Agesilaus in Diodorus," *GRBS* 27 (1986) 263–77. A new book-length study of Ephorus would be welcome.

98 *FGrH* 70 T 14a = Jos., c. *AP*. 1.67, F 122 = Strabo 10.3.5, T 14b = Sen., *QNat.* 7.16.2: "Ephorus vero non religiosissimae fidei: saepe decipitur, saepe decipit." Ephorus also had a reputation for plagiarism: Porphyry in Euseb. *Prep. Evang.* 10.3.2, 12 cf. E. Stemmlinger, *Das Plagiat in der griechischen Literatur* (Leipzig 1912) 47–48.

99 *Plb.* 12.25e-g; *Diod.* 1.37.4, 39.7, 13; Schepens (above, note 97) 105 n.61.

100 For a survey of panhellenism and bibliography see Gerhard Dobesch, *Der "Philippos" des Isokrates* (Vienna 1968) 3–28 with n.52; common laws of the Greeks: Demetrius Wogastli, *Die Normen des altgriechischen Völkerrechts* (Diss. Freiburg 1895); Ilari (above, note 6) 357–68; idealization and invention of Greek history: Franz Hampl, "Römische Politik in republikanischer Zeit und das Problem des 'Sittenverfalls,'" *HZ* 188 (1959) 149–52; limitations on warfare: *Pl. Rep.* 5.469b-71b cf. *Menex.* 242d; Kiechle (above, note 68) 143–49; Had (above, note 6) 143–50, 192–201.

101 Barber (above, note 97) 79–83; L. Canfora, "Eforo contro Tuciddide (su Cimone e Pausania)," *Sileno* 3 (1977) 211–14. Schepens (above, note 97) accepts Ephorus' panhellenism and his pro-Athenian bias, but argues that Ephorus' work was apolitical: 116 and *passim*.

102 *FGrH* 70 T 7 (= *Plb.* 5.33.2), 8, 11.

103 *FGrH* 70 F 31 = Strabo 9.3.11; *Diod.* 13.23.4 cf. *Isoc.* 18.27–28; *Diod.* 13.20–32 = Ephorus: Schwartz (above, note 93) 681; Walbank, *HCP* I, 264; H. W. Parke/D. E. W. Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle* (Oxford 1966) I, 378; 480: *FGrH* 70 F 186 cf. *Diod.* 11.1.4–5, 20.1; Barber (above, note 97) 27; Klaus Meister, "Das persisch-karthagische Bündnis von 481 v. Chr.," *Historia* 19 (1970) 607–12.

104 *FGrH* 70 F 115; *Diod.* 13.23.4, 24.5–6, 26.2.

105 *Missiles* = cowardice: see note 61 above; peltasts: J. G. P. Best, *Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare* (Groningen 1969).

106 E. W. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery: Historical Development* (Oxford 1969) 48–67; Barber (above, note 97) 12–13.

107 *Plut. Mor.* 191E = 219A; Marsden (above, note 106) 65.

108 Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, *The Adventures of Don Quixote*, trans. J. M. Cohen (Penguin: Harmondsworth 1950) 344–45 (Pt. 1, Ch. 38).

109 Lasserre (above, note 27) believes that repetition of both the word *συστάδην* and the idea of close combat at the end of 10.1.12 and the beginning of 10.1.13 indicates Strabo's switch from Artemidorus in 10.1.12 to Apollodorus in 10.1.13: 29 n.4.

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The Zulus and The Spartans: A Comparison of Their Military Systems

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There exists a wide-spread tendency to refer accidental resemblances between the institutions of different peoples to community of descent. The ancients were prone to consider all the circumcised peoples with whom they were acquainted, for example the Colchians and the Jews, as descendants of the Egyptians; and Christian missionaries, better versed in the Bible than in anthropology, have been found predisposed to regard the circumcised Bantus of Central and South Africa as being in some mysterious fashion derived from the lost tribes of Israel.¹ Using other institutions as criteria of relationship, certain late Greek writers avowed that the Jews and the Gymnosophists of India were kinsmen of the Spartans.

To avoid any misunderstanding, I hasten to state at the outset of this paper that in bringing the Zulus into juxtaposition with the Spartans I am not seeking to establish any racial or political connection between the two peoples. What is common to them is the purpose in their public organization: both alike made war, and preparation for war, the primary aims of their association. The object of their wars was, to be sure, as different as were the economic efforts of the two peoples. The Zulu government, when it fought for material advantage, sought cattle; the Spartan government sought, in such cases, an extension of territory. The problem of the Zulus was identical with that of the Spartans in that each concerned, in the first instance, the defense of their lives; but in the second instance what they defended was different: the Spartan defended his territory, the Zulu his herds. "The Kafirs were men", said a Kafir orator, "and they loved their cattle — their wives and their children lived upon milk — they fought for their property".² But beyond this the Zulu fought for something besides property; he fought for the glory of his people, or rather for that of his kings, and from a sheer love of fighting; and therein he agreed with the Spartan, and both, it may be, with all peoples of whom war is the national industry.

There is, of course, a great difference in the culture of the two nations. The difference, however, is essentially one of the culture-level of the Hellenes and the Bantus, the two races to which they belonged. The former were a comparatively civilized people when the Spartans reared their military state among them, and the establishment of the

disciplinary régime of the Spartans involved, in fact, a degeneration to the level of the ideals and accomplishments of the common soldier. The Bantus, on the contrary, were savages, practising polygamy, living in thatched huts floored with cow-dung and ants' hill clay, eating raw flesh and constrained in their actions by primitive taboos, when the Zulus among them attained to a life of the 'strengste Kultur' — organized, disciplined, and completely subject to authority.

It is my intention in this paper to describe the Zulu military institutions at their apogee under Chaka (Tshaka) and Dingaan; to trace their origin and development;³ and finally, by way of summary, to compare them with those of the Spartans.

Chaka maintained a standing army of from 12,000 to 15,000 warriors.⁴ Each regiment was stationed in a military kraal, or *ekanda*. The regiment contained from 600 to 800 or 1,000 men;⁵ that at Dingaan's capital, Umkunginglove (Umgungindhlovu), for example, was about 900 strong. This regiment differed from others in that it was largely made up of "chiefs of smaller towns bearing the appellation of *indoona* or *umnumzana* (head of a village)"; and "it is evidently with a political view of state surveillance", writes Gardiner, "that the most influential of these are formed into this description of bodyguard,⁶ and that all in rotation are obliged to appear and reside for some time in the capital, where they become not only hostages for the good conduct of those dependent upon them, but are thereby prevented from plotting any scheme for the subversion of the existing government". Whereas this regiment may have consisted of veterans alone, and whereas we know that there were others constituted entirely of young warriors, it appears that the typical Zulu regiment of the active army was made up of the two classes in conjunction.⁷ The young warriors, moreover, were of two kinds:⁸ those who, like the veterans, wore the characteristic Zulu headring,⁹ and the "boys", as those who lacked it were named in contradistinction to the "men" who had it. In addition there were associated with each regiment children who had not yet entered the army.

The veterans were distinguished from the young warriors by the color of their shields. The former had white shields with black spots down the centre; the shields of the latter were black.¹⁰ The way in which the regiments were recruited will indicate most clearly how the classes came to be thus related to one another within the regiments. The following is the story as it was told to Bishop Colenso by two Zulu soldiers:¹¹ "The boys when they think themselves big enough to enlist — say from sixteen to eighteen years old¹² — collect at the military kraals, each going to that to which his father belongs, and there they stay, milking the cows into their mouths, This is a sign that they wish to be enlisted, and when the *izinnceku* (king's officers) of the military

kraals see that a good many of such boys have collected,¹³ one of them reports the fact to the king, who then gives permission for the boys to be brought before him. There is no penalty for those who do not join, although, of course, they are not thought much of.¹⁴ Such men [as do not enlist] may marry whenever they please, and they put on the head-ring by permission of the head man of their kraal. ... If, however, a man has once enlisted, and at some future time fails to appear when his regiment is called together for any purpose, it will then be inquired, ‘What has become of him?’ And if he cannot give a good reason for his absence he may perhaps be killed by his regiment, but not by the king. A man who has enlisted also may not marry until the king gives leave to his regiment.

“Well, the king gives the order to collect the boys to the officer who has reported them, who delivers it to the indunas of the different military kraals. The boys are then collected at the different military kraals, and on the appointed day messengers are sent to the king to say they are now coming. Thereupon the king has cattle killed for them, so that when they arrive they find the meat ready. The king then gives them a name, and appoints a head-ringed man as induna over them, and either makes them into a separate regiment and orders them to build for themselves a new military kraal, or incorporates them with one of the regiments already formed, when they share the existing kraal”.¹⁵ In the former case a black-shielded regiment would naturally result; in the latter, a mixed regiment, when the regiment with which they were incorporated was a regiment of veterans, since it is unthinkable that the raw recruits were at once given the insignia of the veterans.¹⁶ It is true that it was in the reign of Cetshwayo, some fifty years after the death of Chaka, that the above description of the Zulu system of recruiting was given. None the less, it holds for the earlier time also;¹⁷ and precisely the same system existed among the Matebele, who can have derived it only from Moselekatze, who took it with him when he fled from Zululand in Chaka’s time. The children taken by Moselekatze in his raids, says one writer,¹⁸ “grew up in the service of their captors, or of those to whom they sell them within the tribe. They herd cattle in time of peace; they carry the impedimenta of the soldier when he goes to war. At home they practise fighting and running with boys of their own age; in the field they are familiarized with deeds of blood. Their physical frame thus becomes more fully developed than if they had grown up in their own unwarlike and ill-fed tribes. I have seen children of Bushmen among the Matebele whose personal appearance formed a perfect contrast to their ill-favoured relatives in the desert. As the captive boys grow older, they become impatient of the restraints of their position, and laying their heads together, all living in a certain town march off in a body to the

chief's quarters and present their petition to Moselekatze: 'We are men, O King; we are no longer boys; give us cattle to herd and to defend'. If the chief approves of their petition, he drives out a few cows as their herd, and gives these boys in charge of an experienced soldier, with some assistants, who, in the new town or barracks which they erect, proceed to train them as Matebele soldiers. This is called to *'bota'*.¹⁹ It is in this way that the Matebele army is supplied with men.

"The new military town or regiment is called by the same name as the one in which they lived as captive boys. When they go to war now it is as a company of that regiment.²⁰ But they are no longer baggage-carriers; they bear their own weapons now like their former masters. Should they succeed in killing and in taking captive, they at once occupy the position of their former owners, and on a second war have their boy to carry their food and water. Should they not succeed in killing man, woman, or little child, their position is still one of dishonour. They are not men.... The Matebele soldier-town has nothing domestic about it; it is not a town, but barracks. The voice of the infant, the song of the mother, are almost unknown there. Only after some signal service does the chief bestow, as a great reward to the soldier, a captive girl to be his wife".

The method of recruiting among the Zulus being as above described, it is clear that the number of regiments and ekandas varied at different times. Thus on one occasion Isaacs²¹ notes that Chaka had collected twelve regiments with white shields and seventeen regiments with black, all warriors with wounds. These, the King claimed, were but half of his soldiers.²² For Dingaan's reign we have a list of twenty-six regiments.²³ Dingaan, says Gardiner,²⁴ had from "fourteen to sixteen large ekandas, and several of a smaller size". Two lists for Panda's (Mpande's) time, one for ca. 1854 and the other for ca. 1872,²⁵ contain each the names of fourteen regiments, the "boys" in the first list being the veterans or the superannuated in the second. On occasion (1841), however, Panda could assemble twenty-five regiments at his capital, the appearance of regiments with "red, blue (?), yellow, white and red, and white and black shields" disclosing the presence of the third class, or reserves,²⁶ of which we shall come to speak in a moment. At the battle of Ulundi (1879), in Cetshwayo's (Cetywayo's) reign, there were present, according to a Zulu prisoner,²⁷ thirteen,, or perhaps fourteen, regiments.²⁸ These figures tell their own story. The maximum of Zulu military power and the most complete concentration of the male population in the ekandas occurred during Chaka's reign. New regiments were then being formed yearly of boys, both home grown and captured in war; and very few old regiments were being relegated, on marriage, into the reserves. The constant wars, being uniformly successful, brought in many more recruits than

they cost in casualties. Under Dingaan the situation changed. The opportunities for profitable boy, girl, and cattle raids were much reduced. Hence new regiments could be enrolled only when the native crop of young men sufficed. The king was tempted by the desire of saving his cattle to allow his regiments to marry, and, therewith, to pass over into the reserves which he did not have to feed. The economic situation went from bad to worse after the accession of Panda; and in the years following 1850²⁹ the Zulu youth, being left both unfed and unweaned by the king, took up the military career in smaller numbers. Moreover, attracted by the hope that a more vigorous government would bring back the good old days, the young men flocked to the kraals of the king's sons, Cetshwayo and Umbulazi — to “live under the tiger's tail” in place of “under the tiger's head”, as it was called. The result was the war in which Umbulazi was killed, and the settlement according to which Panda was to be thenceforth the “head” of the nation and Cetshwayo the “feet”. This change of government could not, however, alter the economic conditions, and all that Panda could do thereafter, as before, was to enroll a new regiment every third or fourth year;³⁰ with the result that, reserves included, the Zulu army consisted thenceforth of only thirteen or fourteen regiments. These regiments seem to have been distinguished from one another — at least in the case of the young warriors — by the nature of the headdress worn.³¹

On a general mobilization the regiments were formed into three army corps.³² In each army corps³³ there were regiments of veterans and of young warriors, and, in addition, regiments of a third class of soldiers which we must consider next.

“The middle warriors”, says Isaacs, “or those that have wives, form distinct regiments, and are called ‘inferiors’”. They were distinguished by having red shields. It may be that their name was Umkundas, or more correctly, *Amagundane*, which means “mice”, and is a term of contempt.³⁴ They constituted the reserves and were apparently, at least under Dingaan, as numerous as the veterans and young warriors combined. An attempt to determine their relation to the regulars brings up the question of the relation of the civil kraals and their inhabitants to the military kraals — a question which, curiously enough, is left unanswered by both our primary and our secondary authorities. Yet it must be answered before we can comprehend the Zulu military system,

Commonly, it appears, an ekanda was surrounded by a cluster of civil villages. In the old Zululand, where Nobamba, Duguza, and Umkunginglove lay, there was, however, a number of ekandas disproportionate to the civil population.³⁵ During Chaka's reign Nobamba seems to have been the only ekanda which was at the same

time a civil village.³⁶ It had thus a permanent population. The king always lived in an ekanda: Ghaka preferred Nobamba or Duguza, Dingaan Umkunginglove or Congella. Hence there were troops assembled all the year round at those ekandas in which, the king lived for a year continuously, since naturally neither Chaka nor Dingaan could dispense altogether with a military force at his immediate disposal.³⁷ The regiments “are obliged”, says Gardiner,³⁸ “to assemble (each in its own ekanda) during half the year,³⁹ principally for the practice of dancing, which is considered as a military exercise”. “And also for some weeks, now”, writes Champion on March 6, 1837,⁴⁰ “the soldiers, that is the majority of the people, have been absent at their headquarters to learn new dances.... The king has his own favorite regiment at this time under his training at Umkunginglove”. During the rest of the year — when they were not absent on a military expedition — the regulars were dispersed among the civil villages. There, however, at least during Chaka’s reign, they formed a group by themselves. “From their youth”, writes Isaacs,⁴¹ the warriors were “excluded from all intercourse with the common people”, and “passed their days in celibacy”. Their career is easy to trace.

When they were infants, and unable to do much more than toddle,⁴² the bigger lads who had already begun to serve with the regiment “molested and beat” the little boys wherever they found them until they also nearly all “joined these young tyrants”.⁴³ Once they had indicated their intention of becoming soldiers they became the recruiting sergeants in turn. They watched the king’s cattle, milked the cows, and carried baggage, while the regiment was in the ekanda. While at home they consorted, doubtless, with one another, and fagged their juniors. At puberty, or somewhat later, they were enrolled among the young warriors. Either then, or later when they had distinguished themselves in battle, they had their heads shaved at the king’s orders and were required by the king to assume the “men’s” crown-ring.⁴⁴ As young warriors they spent months of every year in the ekanda, practising war dances, and other months on the long weary marches that led across the wilderness to the country of enemies or subjects who had cattle. Many of them were, of course, killed, or died of hunger or thirst on these expeditions. Many of them were executed by the king’s orders as cowards or conspirators. But those who survived drove on each return cow after cow into their cattle kraals — their share of the spoils of war. Every year, in December, they went up to the king’s ekanda for the Feast of First Fruits, when a great round of dancing culminated in a review of all the soldiers — “a trial of skill”, in which one regiment was pitted against, another.⁴⁵ Thus five, or ten, or twenty years passed.⁴⁶ They had long since become veterans, and had taken part in turns at the

capital in the king's bodyguard. White shields with black spots down the centre have been given out to them from the royal arsenals instead of the black shields which they had borne as young warriors. They have not been allowed to marry. While in quarters in the civil villages they may have had sexual intercourse practically at pleasure with the unmarried girls and with wives who were nursing children; but they may not have had children of their own. A soldier must be a bachelor. He must not be enervated by matrimony and softened by family ties. At last came the time when as a reward for distinguished service in war rendered by the individual soldier or by his whole regiment, "the Great Elephant", as Chaka was called, announced at the Feast of First Fruits⁴⁷ that a soldier, or his whole regiment, as the case might be, was to marry. The brides might be designated at the same time, and to disobey was to die.⁴⁸ Or perhaps it was simply the advance of years which, while unfitting him for soldiering, won him permission to marry.⁴⁹ "You are like an old woman now", said Chaka to a warrior who had dislocated his thigh, "I must find a husband for you".⁵⁰ Thenceforth there were no more gatherings in the ekanda for him. His Ufe was now lived in his own kraal with the women and little children,⁵¹ He took as many wives as he could afford and begot a numerous progeny, if the misfortune of sterility — a frequent concomitant of polygamy — did not befall him.⁵² In that case some young warrior would probably do the begetting for him. For he was now one of the class of inferiors, or "mice". He was, of course, Hable for military service, but not in the first fine. Still, at least under Chaka, the call to arms came with great frequency. Then he donned his military costume like the active soldiers; put on his head the characteristic head-gear of his regiment of reserves — "a turban of otter skins", perhaps, "at the upper edge of which were two bits of hide resembling horns" — threw over his shoulder a tippet of cow-tails, fastened white cow-tails around his arms and legs, and hung from his girdle his thick petticoat of skins of monkeys and genets, "made to resemble the tails of those animals". Thus accoutred and with a red or red spotted shield in his left hand, his stout assegai in his right, and his knobbed stick in his belt, he set off for the place of rendezvous. "All day long on one hand and the other", writes Champion,⁵³ "are the warriors directing their course towards the capital. They follow each other in Indian file with their large oval black and white shields, held at their left side, their bodies adorned with ox-tails, and their head covered with feathers.... Those who at other times have frequented our houses, and seemed very mild, when arrayed with the large otter band over their forehead, the *isihlohlo*, or bunch of feathers, on their head, and the strip of ox-skin covering their chest, and their hands full of the instruments of death, appear

like savage Indians. All seem to be in haste today. They pass our house, but none loiter as usual. They seldom even stop to say a *sakubona*, A boy who is at work for us, and is a soldier, can scarce contain himself, as he sees his fellows on the move. He says he must go. Thus are the young trained to delight in destruction. It is the spirit of the nation. The lame, the sick, the women and children only are left”.

The activities of the ordinary villages were not notably different from those of Bantu or Kafir kraals in general, except that they were all subject to the imperious call of military duty, and were under the watchful eye and irresistible authority of the king and his indunas. The characteristic thing in the life of the Zulus was the régime of the ekandas, which, for that very reason, perhaps, has been particularly described by those traders and missionaries who were its only European eye witnesses. To the activities of the ekandas we accordingly turn.

Under the date of December 31, 1837, Champion writes:⁵⁴ “The people are now all going up to the capital to celebrate the yearly dance at the eating of green corn”. On March 6 he writes further:⁵⁵ “For some weeks now the soldiers, that is the majority of the people, have been absent at their headquarters to learn new dances.... The king has his own favourite regiment at this time under his training at Umgunghlovu”—a passage I have already had occasion to cite. On April 4, he reports⁵⁶ having visited the capital and witnessed the dancing there, in which 1,000 participated; and finally on May 4 he notes:⁵⁷ “The people are returning from their two months’ dancing, having concluded it by a trial of skill, one regiment with another”. Then on June 8 he enters in his journal the description of the gathering of the clans for war.⁵⁸ There was thus a general mustering of all the warriors for the Feast of First Fruits in December. This lasted for about a week.⁵⁹ The regiments were then sent to their ekandas where they trained for two or three months, concentrating again in the capital for a grand review and competition. Then came a month’s furlough; then war. It was accordingly the rainy season, I e., summer, and specifically, in 1837 at least, the four months of it that followed the maturity of the green corn (January, February, March and April) that the soldiers spent in the ekandas. The fine, dry, cool season, from June to September,⁶⁰ on the other hand, was the time for campaigning.⁶¹

The general plan of an ordinary ekanda is clear. The round huts of the soldiers — each sufficient for five people, according to Gardiner,⁶² for twenty men, according to Retief⁶³— lay between two concentric brush fences, while in the center was an open circle into which the cattle might be driven in times of danger. Dingaan’s chief ekanda

(Umkunglōve), which was upwards of a mile in diameter and contained over 1,000 huts,⁶⁴ had a large unfenced common in the center, round the edges of which were placed several fenced cattle pens. Over against the main entrance, at the far end of the common (as of the circle in the ordinary ekandas) lay the king's "palace" and the quarters of his women, called the *issigordlo*.⁶⁵ This common served as a court-house, dining-room, council-chamber, and dance and drill ground, and was shut off from the "palace" by a wall, over which the king could look when he stood on certain clay mounds provided for the purpose. The women's quarters "extended beyond the circle which formed the kraal, but were also strongly fenced in".⁶⁶ They had a private entrance from the rear.

The capital was, of course, under the direct government of the king, though a large measure of influence was possessed by the two great indunas of the realm, who presided each over the half of the ekanda in which his huts lay.⁶⁷ They were assisted by about twenty lesser indunas, who formed the heart of the king's *umpakati*. Elsewhere there was one induna in charge of each ekanda, and associated with him from one to nine other indunas, who, in turn, were "assisted by an inferior class, who have charge of the different sections, and attend principally to the distribution of the provisions and the shields".⁶⁸ We may conjecture with tolerable certainty that the minor indunas were the heads (umnumzana) of the civil villages or groups of civil villages from which the warriors of each ekanda were drawn. Possibly, however, Gardiner⁶⁹ was incorrectly informed as to their number; for Isaacs affirms that each ekanda had "four or more divisions, called *isscarbes*, each division having a minor chief, subject to a principal or *indoonah*", and Arbousset gives to every regiment four officers, a captain, lieutenant, and two second lieutenants.⁷⁰ In any case, and the fact is sufficiently remarkable, the heads of both the military and the civil villages were appointed by the two great indunas of the realm.⁷¹ They can hardly have acted as more than the mouthpieces for the king in this task.

It was before they enlisted that the Zulu children, by practising in the fields and fighting sham duels and battles among themselves, learned the use of the deadly national weapon, the short stabbing assegai.⁷² Hence the elements of individual fighting could be presumed to be possessed by all the soldiers when they assembled in the ekandas. The object of the military exercises practised there was proficiency in dancing war-dances; and, seemingly, the military exercises themselves consisted of nothing else. These we shall let eye-witnesses describe: "This morning [April 12, 1826]" writes Isaacs,⁷³ "three regiments of boys arrived to be reviewed. There appeared to be nearly 6,000, all having black shields.⁷⁴ The respective corps were

distinguished by the shape and ornament of their caps. One regiment had them in the shape of Malay hats, with a peak on the crown about six inches high, and a bunch of feathers at the top. Another wore a turban made of otter-skin, having a crane's feather or two on each side; and the third wore small bunches of feathers over the whole head, made fast by means of small ties. Thus accoutred and distinguished, they entered the gate, ran up the kraal, halted in front of the palace, and saluted the king. One boy stepped in front and made a long harangue. When the orator had concluded, the whole of his comrades first shouted, and then commenced running over the kraal, trying to excel each other in feats of agility and gesture, regardless of order, regularity, or discipline. After this exhibition, which lasted three hours, a regiment of men arrived with white shields, having on them one or two black spots in the center; they saluted Chaka, then retired to put away their shields and assembled again in one body to dance.

“They formed a half circle; the men in the centre and the boys in the two extremities. The king placed himself in the middle of the space within the circle, and about 1,500 girls stood opposite to the men three deep, in a straight line, and with great regularity. His majesty then commenced dancing, the warriors followed, and the girls kept time by singing, clapping their hands, and raising their bodies on their toes. The strange attitudes of the men exceeded anything I had seen before. The king was remarkable for his unequalled activity and the surprising muscular powers he exhibited. He was decorated with a profusion of green and yellow glass beads. The girls had their share of ornaments; in addition, too, they had each of them four brass bangles round their necks, which kept them in an erect posture, and rendered them as unmoveable as the neck of a statue. This ceremony was performed with considerable regularity, from the king giving, as it were, the time for every motion. Wherever he cast his eye, there was the greatest effort made; and nothing could exceed the exertion of the whole until sunset, when Chaka, accompanied by his girls, retired within the palace, and the warriors to their respective huts. Many, however, went first to the river and performed their evening ablutions “.

An idea of what the young warriors did during the three hours they were exhibiting their “feats of agility and gesture “, and of “the strange attitudes of the men” in the subsequent dance, may be had from Gardiner’s account.⁷⁵ After informing us that two regiments were concerned, and that they had formed two sides of a square, he thus proceeds: “The object was to assure their sovereign of the capacity and eagerness of each old warrior to emulate his former deeds; and, certainly, if actions could speak, they must have made a most

indelible impression upon his mind. Here was no speechifying, but out came a warrior with a bounce, brandishing his weapon and beating his shield, and covering as much ground in three strides as a tiger could spring,— stabbing, and parrying, and retreating, and again vaulting into the ranks, with so light a foot and so rigid a muscle, that the eye had scarcely time to follow the velocity of his movements. Another and another came out, each with a peculiar step and gesture; and while in the performance of these exploits, pointed at throughout his meteor course as well by the king as by his compatriots, who by the extension of their hands and their sticks towards the individual, accompanied by the prolonged sound of the letter Z, indicated their recognition of a warrior of known and tried courage”. A still more comprehensive description of these war-dances is given by Owen:⁷⁶ “The first act was a representation of the manner in which the Zulus commence a battle. The regiment divided into companies — each soldier having a stick in his hand; or, in lieu of a stick, the horn or some bone of a beast; for very few had their shields and no one his spear — with a sort of double-quick march, and performed various evolutions; exciting themselves to the supposed combat by some note of their voice, which could not be called a song, and by raising their sticks aloft in the air. Very soon, though it was not warm, the sweat ran down their bodies. On a sudden, they gave a whistle; and forming into one large company, they ran furiously, as if to charge down the open area of the town, whistling as they ran. Some who had shields, after this first essay, leaping aloft and kicking their shields, cried out, ‘We are as hard as stones; nothing shall hurt us.’ Presently the military divided into two parts; and each dancing round the area on opposite quarters, they at last came within twenty yards of each other, when they made a tremendous rush, as if engaging each other in close conflict.⁷⁷ The Zoolus do not throw their spears as other tribes do, but come to close quarters. After the sham fight had continued for some minutes, one party gave a particular sort of cry, which is usual after they have gained a victory. After this, they formed a large semicircle, in which they stood very thick and deep, their numbers beyond count; and began to sing and dance, the king himself sometimes setting the tune.”

The element on which the two essentials of the Zulu manual of arms — the mimic fighting by individual soldiers and the mimic attack by the entire regiment — were superimposed, was what in general terms may be called the South African folk-dance. To this, in fact, at the Zulu court, the charge served as a prelude, and it must not be forgotten that the mimicry of battle scenes was but a special manifestation of a love for dramatic imitation which also displayed itself in the mimicry of other actions of many sorts. In his folk-dances

the South African in the liveliest manner impersonated an almost endless variety of scenes — a gazelle pursued by a hunter, a man who has stumbled upon a place crawling with serpents, a leopard or a Hon springing, sitting on its haunches, switching its tail, showing its claws, or roaring.⁷⁸ Such folk-dances were reported from Natal as early as 1593,⁷⁹ and had, perhaps, their origin not among the Bantus, but among their predecessors, the Hottentots.⁸⁰ “The art”, writes Champion,⁸¹ “consists in making out an *igam* or song, and fitting to it the *imikuba* or motions of the arm and body corresponding. “ Once the men have taken up their position in a semi-circle, as described above by Isaacs, and the women have been drawn up “opposite to the men”, and the king has reached his place in the center, the dance begins. “Each man”, says Gardiner,⁸² “ is provided with a short stick, knobbed at the end, and it is by the direction he gives to this, the motion of his other hand, and the turns of his body, that the action and pathos of the song is [*sic*] indicated; the correspondence is often very beautiful, while the feet regulate the time, and impart that locomotive effect in which they so much delight; sometimes the feet are merely lifted, to descend with a stamp; sometimes a leaping stride is taken on either side; at others, a combination of both; but they have yet a more violent gesture: forming four deep, in open order, they make short runs to and fro, leaping, prancing, and crossing each other’s paths, brandishing their sticks, and raising such a cloud of dust by the vehemence and rapidity of the exercise, that to a bystander it has all the effect of the wildest battle scene of savage life, and which it is doubtless intended to imitate.⁸³ While all this is going on in the ring, the women in the centre are not idle spectators; they do not indeed move from their position, but, bending their bodies forwards to the clap of their hands, stamping with both feet together, and raising their voices to the highest pitch, they fill in their parts, and following out the chorus with such a degree of continued exertion, as would cause an European female to go upon crutches for the remainder of her life.”⁸⁴

When not engaged in military exercises, or in hunting — a favorite pursuit among the Zulus as among the Spartans — the warriors might accompany the king while inspecting his cattle — his regular forenoon task — or attend him while he dispensed his ferocious justice. At other times they might be required to go on parties to execute his orders ⁸⁵ — to slay the men, women and children of a condemned chief, for example, and fetch his cattle to the capital to be divided among themselves. For according to general Bantu law, the whole clan of a chieftain was guilty along with its head, and must perish with him — a savage tradition for which neither Ghaka nor Dingaan, it should be remembered, was responsible. If in the worst instances the guilt of the

kings matched the greed of the executioners, and if the former ruled their subjects as with rods of iron, and required of them almost superhuman obedience and exertions, it is but fair to add that they also rewarded them liberally, and accredited their system of government by its success.

Apparently the warriors had to provide their own uniforms and their own assegais,⁸⁶ but the shields were made by them in the ekandas from the hides of the king's cattle; they were kept by the mess-officers in the royal shield houses, and distributed by the king on the eve of the expeditions.⁸⁷ While in the ekandas the soldiers were maintained at the king's expense. They received but two meals a day — among males it was the prerogative of the king alone to grow stout — a breakfast, which consisted only of beer, and an evening meal of meat cooked in blood like the famous black broth of the Spartans.⁸⁸

The beer was levied on the civil villages in the midst of which the ekandas lay, and the grain from which it was made was either grown on the king's fields at the ekandas, or was taken in Heu of taxes for the support of the military establishment.⁸⁹ The main charge for the army, however, was the meat it consumed. This was provided from the king's herds, for the protection of which, in one sense, the ekandas were built and the military system devised. "Six, eight, and sometimes ten or twelve" cattle⁹⁰ were slaughtered daily at a single ekanda in Dingaan's time. "The evening meal", says Gardiner,⁹¹ "is the most characteristic, and which, from the situation of my hut near one of their *feeding places*?⁹² I had the most frequent opportunities of witnessing. Every regiment is divided into sections, and over each of them is an officer appointed, whose particular charge are the shields and the distribution of meat, of which he is the carver. The beer is always drunk in the area included within the inner fence, and often in the presence of the king; but, for the supper, every section 10 separately collected in some convenient spot in that quarter, within the fences. The meat is generally stewed in a large black earthen bowl, with a smaller one inverted, and cemented round the top ⁹³ to prevent the steam from escaping.... It is usually dark before their repasts are ready, when the meat is brought upon a mat about two feet square, and placed upon the ground, round which the whole party thickly crowd in a dense circle, often two or three deep. The carver then, with an assegai head upon a short stick, which constitutes his knife, apportions rations to every second or third man, who, in his turn, divides it with his collateral neighbours, by the joint effort of their teeth; the recipient being always privileged to the first bite. So positive is the labour which is necessary before they can venture to swallow these tough morsels, that the operation is distinctly audible at a considerable distance; and when the whole is devoured (for the

word ‘eat’ is too mild an expression for the operation, which is over in a few minutes) the whole body becomes a convenient napkin, and is plentifully besmeared with the fat and grease which adhere to their hands and lips, while the most thrifty take this opportunity of reburnishing the brass which encircles their throat and arms.”

Such then were the main features of the Zulu military régime and *ekanda fife*. Its consequences for the physique and bearing of the people were profound. “Les Amazoulous”, writes Delegorgue,⁹⁴ “sont les hommes les mieux faits de toute la race cafre; leur taille, inférieure à celle des Anglais et surtout des boers, est égale, ce me semble, à celle des Français; mais elle offre plus de grâce dans l'ensemble des proportions; elle est svelte, élégante et solide; les muscles sont dessinés fortement, sans accuser de maigreur. On trouve chez eux le ferme uni au gracieux, la force jointe à l'agilité, partout de la souplesse, et jamais dans leur pose l'embarras du maintien”. Of the mental characteristics of the Zulu the same sympathetic reporter writes as follows:⁹⁵ “Doué d'un jugement parfaitement sain et d'une pénétration qui étonne, il n'admet qu'avec la plus grande réserve tout se qu'on lui dit concernant des choses à lui inconnues. Sont-elles vagues, ne tombent-elles pas sous le sens; il semble y adhérer par défaut d'opposition; mais plusieurs heures de discours ne rencontrent encore qu'un véritable sceptique. Le Zoulou a un brillant vernis d'urbanité; il est d'une politesse et d'une aisance de manières qui contrastent singulièrement avec la grossièreté et la pesanteur non-seulement de certains Cafres de l'intérieur, mais encore des boers. Il a de lui-même une très-haute opinion, qu'il se laisse aller à témoigner quelquefois par une sorte de mépris pour tout ce qui est européen”

What, now, was the origin of this strange system? We have, I believe, to recognize first the fundamental Bantu institutions on which it was based — old institutions which were developed and put to new uses by the founders of the Zulu state; secondly, the innovations of Dingiswayo, king of the Umtetwas; and thirdly, the perfecting of the system under Chaka (1812/16–1828). The deterioration of the system began with Dingaan (1828–1840)⁹⁶: under Panda (1840–1872), who violated the Zulu law that a king should never live to grow old, it fell into decay,⁹⁷ only to be restored on a different economic basis by his enterprising son, Cetshwayo (1872–1879, 1883/4).⁹⁸

The two most important Bantu practices underlying the military system we have been considering are, I believe, the folk-dance and the puberty rites.

As has been seen already, the military exercises of the Zulus consisted of a charge *en masse*, which, by dividing and going to either side of a specified point, formed a semicircle; and a dance in this horse-shoe formation, with individual soldiers performing mimic

combats before the king in the centre. Now this semi-circle, used in the Zulu *guba* (or *imikuba*), or performance of war songs, the Zulu *gila*, or war dance, and the Zulu *mukhumbi* (or *umkumbi*), or battle line, was the invariable formation of the South African folk-dance.⁹⁹ By adapting to his needs the movements of the dance the Zulu drill-master, whoever he was, found a way of being thorough without being unpopular; for dancing seems to have been the black man's highest art; and it was at once sufficiently individual and concerted to serve, with modifications, both for the muscular development of the soldier and for the acquisition of the fine and company movements that he at the root of all military evolutions. The origin in dancing accounts for the *tempo* of Zulu drill; there was nothing *adagio* about it. Without their passion for dancing it is incredible that any tribe of savages would have submitted to the laborious training of the Zulus.

The Bantus generally signalized the attainment of puberty among both males and females by circumcision. The rite was accompanied in the case of girls with prolonged orgies calculated to stimulate sensuality¹⁰⁰ to the uttermost; in the case of the boys, it was accompanied with temporary seclusion in charge of a trainer. Thereafter they were men, ready for military service and for sexual life. If they possessed the requisite number of cattle, they might marry and acquire therewith someone to provide for their future sustenance. Otherwise, they might remain unmarried for years, being, however, permitted in the meantime to have free intercourse with the unmarried girls.¹⁰¹ Now, among the Bantus, within the brief period coveted by our knowledge, two remarkable military states have made their appearance — that of the Masai,¹⁰² on the plateau lying north and south of Mt. Kilimanjaro, and that of the Zulus, at the other end of the Bantu territory, north of Natal, in the district between the Tugela and the Pondolo rivers. The first placed between circumcision and marriage an interval of approximately twenty years,— a period of seclusion of monstrous length — during which the young men and young women lived together by themselves promiscuously (but without having children) in unwall'd warrior kraals. The girls, of course, went out of these “free-love” establishments while still young enough to become the wives of soldiers on their discharge; but all the while the males lived in the barracks, keeping their bodies fit by almost unceasing rounds of war-dancing, and maintaining their stock of cattle by military expeditions into lands far and near. Fierce and hardy, truculent and fiendishly cruel, they came and went swiftly and secretly, creating terror and desolation from Mombasa to the Equator. Their peers in the south deferred circumcision of the males — the prerequisite of marriage — so long that it was omitted altogether; whereupon the omission of marriage was the logical, though, of

course, impracticable, consequence.¹⁰³

The author of this innovation is frequently said to have been Chaka;¹⁰⁴ but the fact that he himself was uncircumcised, that he was begotten by an uncircumcised father, and that the Fengoos, whom he drove from Natal and scattered south and east among the neighboring tribes, were also uncircumcised,¹⁰⁵ leads us to conclude that the prohibition was earlier than Chaka's reign. And, in fact, H. F. Fynn, one of the first group of Europeans to travel in Zululand, who learned its language, and who interrogated Chaka about its past, tells us definitely¹⁰⁶ that it was Chaka's predecessor. Dingiswayo, who "ordered the rite to be deferred until he should have brought under his dominion all [Kafir nations] within his reach. Owing to this circumstance, circumcision fell into disuse among all the Eastern tribes, and the omission of the ceremony extended to all who acknowledged his authority. Among these was Senzagakona: the rite was postponed in his case"; hence the little short of miraculous birth of Chaka, for, as Isaacs, writing in 1836, says:¹⁰⁷ "the preposterous idea" is still prevalent among the eastern tribes that the uncircumcised are "not capable of propagating their species." What Dingiswayo accomplished, therefore, if indeed it was he and not some one of his predecessors who deferred the circumcision of the males,¹⁰⁸ i. e., marriage, was to get an ample stock of men without family ties and responsibilities with which to carry on his wars.

Of Dingiswayo Fynn says further:¹⁰⁹ "He assumed a despotic power hitherto unknown: he divided his followers into regiments, distinguishing each by name and by the colour of their shields. He introduced war dresses of a most imposing appearance to be worn by his chief men and warriors.... He declared war on all the neighbouring tribes, assigning as his reason ¹¹⁰ that he wished to do away with the incessant quarrels that occurred amongst the tribes, because no supreme head was over them to say who was right or who was wrong; a state of things that could not have been the design of Umvela, the first of the human race." On the other hand, it is claimed by some writers ¹¹¹ that it was Chaka who instituted the regiments, whereas earlier they had "charged in a mass, and without observing any orderly arrangement." This, however, is apparently incorrect; for Sir TheopTilus Shepstone, who carefully studied native traditions, agrees entirely with Fynn. Of Dingiswayo he says: "He learned [while in exile] the strength of standing armies, the value of discipline and training, as compared with the mobs, called armies, in his own country. He had heard of or seen bodies of civilized soldiers. He had ascertained that they were divided into regiments and companies, with regularly appointed officers, and he thought that all soldiers were bachelors.... He formed all the young men into regiments, with

commanders in due subordination to each other, and very soon he had a formidable regular force at his command".¹¹²

So much for Dingiswayo. The military innovations of Chaka, were apparently two: first, the unification, in a single system, of the warriors and their ekandas belonging to various tribes, which had submitted, indeed, to Dingiswayo and imitated his institution of a trained standing army, but which ceased to be autonomous states and existed as military units of a central power only under Chaka; second, the substitution of a single spear for the stock of darts hitherto used. These reforms we shall consider in turn.

Each tribe within the radius subdued by Dingiswayo may be supposed to have had at its head-kraal a small standing army when that monarch was captured and put to death. One of these tribes was that of the Zulus, over whom Chaka, an illegitimate son of Senzangakona, long an exile in Dingiswayo's army, had recently been set as king.¹¹³ As he emerged on the horizon of history, though his was already a name of terror from the Limpopo to the St. John's river,¹¹⁴ he was described by three of the little group of white men who discovered him. "Chaka", wrote Lieutenant King in 1825,¹¹⁵ "is about 38 years of age, upwards of six feet in height, and well proportioned; he is allowed to be the best pedestrian in the country; and, in fact, during his wonderful exercises on this day he exhibited the most astonishing activity." "On our arrival [in 1824]", writes Fynn,¹¹⁶ "we found him sitting under a tree, in the act of decorating himself. He was surrounded by about 200 people, a servant standing at his side, and holding a shield over him to keep the glare of the sun from him. Round his forehead he wore a turban of otter-skin [— in letting Fynn describe the king's equipment we get at the same time a detailed picture of the Zulu full-dress war costume —], with a feather of a crane erect in front, full two feet long. Earrings of dried sugar cane, carved round the edge, with white ends, and an inch in diameter, were let into the lobes of the ears, which had been cut to admit them. From shoulder to shoulder he wore bunches, three inches in length, of the skins of monkeys and genets, twisted like the tails of these animals, and hanging half down the body. Round the ring on the head¹¹⁷.... were a dozen bunches of the red feathers of the loorie, tastefully tied to thorns which were stuck in the hair. Round his arms were white ox-tails, cut down the middle so as to allow the hairs to hang about the arm, to the number of four for each. Round the waist a petticoat, resembling the Highland plaid,¹¹⁸ made of skins of monkeys and genets, and twisted as before described, having small tassels round the top, the petticoat reaching to the knees, below which were white ox-tails to fit round the legs so as to hang to the ankles. He had a white shield with a single black spot, and an assegai." "His

strength”, writes Isaacs,¹¹⁹ “appeared herculean; his disposition turbulent; his heart iron; his mind a warring element; and his ambition knew no bounds.”

Such was the new king of the Zulus who, about the time of the Battle of Waterloo, conquered their liege lords, the Umtetwas, as the Persians did the Medes) and incorporated them in a fashion in his own tribe. With his forces thus augmented he dealt similarly with his neighbours one after another. (Conquest and incorporation ‘ was his recipe for unifying Zululand — a merciless conquest, in which all but the boys and marriageable girls were put to death, an astonishingly non-chauvinistic form of incorporation, by which his new subjects were put on a complete equality with his old.¹²⁰ The object of his wars was first and foremost the subjugation of his immediate neighbours and the extirpation of the more remote;¹²¹ with the essential consequence that their cattle became his, their girls entered his issigordlo, their boys came to add to the population and number of his ekandas. The tribes nearest to the danger moved back out of reach of his arm and crowded and warred down their neighbours, so that the repercussion of his thrusts was felt as far north as Lakes Nyassa and Tanganyika, and as far south as Cape Town. Those that could not escape he plundered and harried unmercifully, so that eventually he surrounded his enlarged nation with a wide depopulated tract as a sort of protecting ring-wall. In this work the assegai was the first instrument, famine the decisive one. It is estimated that a million souls perished in his reign from either the one or the other. Once the cattle were carried off and the crops destroyed, bands of cannibals formed in the wilderness and continued the work of destruction. To crown the agony, two Zulus or Zuluized chieftains, who had offended Chaka, escaped, and set up independent powers on the Zulu model. Of these chiefs one, Moselekatze, crossed the Drakensberg,¹²² to found new Zululands to the north of the Vaal and to the north of the Limpopo rivers, successively. The other, called by Captain Owen Loonkundava or Soonkundava, and said by him to have been the uncle of Chaka or of Zeite,¹²³ fled northward to the regions of Delagoa Bay, there to repeat the destructive wars, if not, like Moselekatze, the incorporation-policy of their stern teacher. Zululand was a malignant cancer which propagated itself by division.

In this way Chaka built up the centralized ekanda system which we have described. And so thoroughly was his work done, so completely were the old tribes, torn up and recom-bined in this ruthless fashion,¹²⁴ displaced by new military units, that despite a moment of threatened dissolution at the accession of Dingaan,¹²⁵ despite the seditious intrigues of the Boers and British, and despite the withdrawal of its economic basis during the fifty years that followed

the murder of Retief, Sir Henry Bulwer was able to write three years after the exile of Cetshwayo,¹²⁶ “the system (of Chaka).... has taken deep root in the Zulu nation. It is part and parcel of the Zulu life; and its extinction would be the work of many years. The organization is there, the material is there, the machinery is there. And, as a timepiece which has been suffered to run down and lie in disuse is silent, but no sooner is the action of the mainspring restored than, complete in all parts of its mechanism, it begins again to tell the hours and moments of time, so is the wonderful mechanism of the Zulu military system; it needs only to be touched by the master hand of whoever is recognized by the Zulus as their chief, and straightway the whole machinery is put in motion. It needs but the word to be spoken, and forthwith, as in the fabled scene where Cadmus sows the dragon’s teeth’ the land brings forth a living harvest of armed men. They gather at the appointed places, the regiments are marshalled, the companies are told off, the vacant places are filled up, a nation stands in arms.”

The other great military innovation of Chaka belongs to the domain of tactics. This was the substitution of the lance for the dart, and, what is the important consequence, the introduction of hand to hand fighting. How this was done Fynn tells us:¹²⁷ “ He disapproved of the custom of throwing the assegai. To substitute a different mode of attack, Chaka assembled two divisions of his followers, who were ordered to supply themselves with a reed (javelin) each from the river bank, that he might be convinced of the effect which only one weapon would produce when used at close quarters. The two divisions thus armed were ordered to oppose each other, the one throwing the weapon, the other rushing on and stabbing their opponents. The result of this collision was momentary, and met with Chaka’s entire satisfaction, few having escaped being wounded, and several severely. Chaka then ordered six oxen to be slaughtered in his presence; and collecting the assegais of his followers, with the exception of one left to each, he ordered the shafts to be broken¹²⁸ and used in cooking the meat, of which the prime parts were given, hot, to those who had been conspicuous for courage; the inferior parts, after being soaked in cold water, were given to those who had been seen to shrink in the combat. Thus originated the use of the single spear by the eastern tribes.”

Thus originated at the same time the chance to use effectively mass formations in battle. Heretofore, the organizing of the men in regiments and companies and the training of them to execute orders and act in concert without confusion—the work, as we have seen, of Dingiswayo — had had its value in getting the men regularly to the point from which they were wont to throw their assegais (a distance of perhaps twenty yards),¹²⁹ but its full effect was secured only when

Chaka, by forcing the soldiers to close, added the moral and physical force of impact or shock. Moreover, the drill necessary to enable troops to reach the battlefield in good time and order was probably a much less severe discipline than that required to bring them to charge in face of a storm of assegais. Of course, like all Bantus, the Zulus had their war medicines which, if properly administered, deflected assegais from their course, or made “bullets flatten against the body”.¹³⁰ But Chaka believed, like the Prussians, that the fear of possible death on advancing could only be outweighed by the fear of certain death on flinching, and he forced his soldiers to strive to outdo each other by requiring that after every battle “cowards” should be executed.

Accordingly, it is not surprising that Chaka has been reputed the author of the entire Zulu military system. And, in fact, what service could the mock charge above described have rendered before it was customary for soldiers to fight hand to hand? Certainly, that part of the manual of arms which taught the springing forward from the fine, the stabbing and parrying, and the eventual retreat to the fine, based though it is on the imitative dances earlier practised, is intelligible only on the assumption that the weapon used was the short lance introduced by Chaka, and not the long throwing spear which had been regularly employed before his reform. The Zulu battle array, moreover, is commonly; and, I believe, correctly, attributed to Chaka.¹³¹ When mobilized, just prior to its departure on an expedition, the entire army was drawn up on parade in the form of a horseshoe, and it was the object of the Zulu general to reproduce this formation while engaging the enemy.¹³² The wings, in which the young warriors were posted, then pushed forward from the fine or “breast” — composed of veterans — in an encircling movement, the whole force advancing rapidly at the same time. Directly behind the “breast” a second fine was drawn up in the shape of a parallelogram or square, and its regiments could be brought into action as needed.¹³³ True, these tactics of enveloping at both ends while securing the center against the enemy’s breaking through at that point by stationing there a reserve of veterans, are not irreconcilable with the use of hurling darts. All they required for their execution was the organization of soldiers in regiments and companies. Hence, if by Zulu tradition they are incorrectly accredited to Chaka, they must be ascribed to Dingiswayo. They were certainly not hereditary from of old among the eastern tribes, since we know that before the Zulu invasion and conquest of the Delagoa Bay region the Bantu tribes there “were ignorant of the *niukhumbi*, viz., the armed circle of warriors which is at the base of the Zulu military system”.¹³⁴

The rigor of the whole régime — the rule that the warrior who

returned without his spear must die;¹³⁵ that after every battle the officers must designate for death “cowards” whether there were any or not;¹³⁶ that no provisions for the return march should be taken when an expedition started;¹³⁷ that troops who withdrew in face of an enemy forfeited their lives;¹³⁸ that old men who could not fight should be put out of the way;¹³⁹ that soldiers should endure the most acute pain, such as having their bare arms burned with a burning glass,¹⁴⁰ without flinching; that they must execute every order, were it even to catch a lion unarmed,¹⁴¹ to cross the Tugela in flood time,¹⁴² or to put to death their own sons or brothers,¹⁴³ without manifesting the slightest sign of hesitation — this atrocious code reveals the spirit of the masterful and relentless Chaka, rather than the comparatively gentle Dingiswayo.¹⁴⁴ We may leave undetermined which of the two has the responsibility for the peculiarly Zulu military salute, the bending almost double of the soldiers as they came opposite the king, and the marching in this crouching posture till they were well past “his majesty”.¹⁴⁵ On the war path they might go in single file, or, as when they were first seen by white reporters, in “large bodies..... marching in good military order”.¹⁴⁶ While at Panda’s capital in 1841 Delegorgue saw regiments charge with 100 men in front and 10 in depth and an army corps go through its evolutions with seven such regiments placed one behind the other.¹⁴⁷

Without discussing each engagement separately it is impossible to indicate how the Zulu tactics approved themselves in action and how closely the parade formation was adhered to in individual instances. There were of course no European eye-witnesses of the battles of Dingiswayo, and the victories of Chaka over most of the native tribes had been already gained before Farewell, Fynn, King, Isaacs, and their companions reached Port Natal in 1823 and 1824. The advent of firearms and of mounted troops naturally put the Zulu impis at a great disadvantage. Thereafter they had no chance of success when there was anything like equality of numbers on each side; and once within their “laagers” of wagons even small handfuls of Boers beat off the attacks of hundreds and thousands of Zulus. In these circumstances the most conspicuous successes of the blacks were gained when they had lured their foemen inside their circle by well-placed ambushades. At this business they were past masters. Obviously, their use of scouts and of decoy parties, and their practice of putting their forces into position during the darkness for an attack at dawn, if not at night itself, as well as their skill in using the advantages of terrain to cloak the advance of their wings, which brought the whites repeatedly into deadly perils were the arts of a warfare matured in the unchronicled campaigns waged before 1823. Indeed, the only notable modification of their fighting traceable to contact with the whites was their reversion

to the practice of throwing the assegai¹⁴⁸ when unable to reach their enemy over his barricade of wagons.

Very few of the battles fought by the Zulus against native armies are known to us in any detail. Among these few we may put the unsuccessful attack of Chaka's army on Sotschangana near Inhambane in 1828;¹⁴⁹ the defeat of Umbulazi by his brother, Cetshwayo at the Tugela in 1856;¹⁵⁰ the struggle between Moselekatze and the Bamangwato in 1862;¹⁵¹ and — the earliest of the group, which we describe in the words of an eyewitness, Fynn¹⁵² — the defeat of Sikunyana, king of the Endwandwe, by Chaka in 1824. The campaign began, from Fynn's point of view at least, with a quick march of sixty miles to Nobamba, "the general rendezvous of the forces." There they rested two days. Then after despatching¹⁵³ spies, the whole army advanced "in separate divisions and by different routes". It consisted of about 50,000 persons, including the boys who drove the cattle on which the army lived while on the way, and some women who carried beer, corn, and milk, and who returned when these supplies were exhausted. For two days they marched, and again they rested for two days, and they repeated the march and the rest during the following four days. Then, on being rejoined by the spies, they proceeded to a great forest near which the enemy was awaiting their arrival, and on the next morning joined battle. "Being a stranger to their mode of attack", continues Fynn, "I determined to ascend the mountain and be a spectator of passing events.... On the upper part [of an immense mountain] there was a rocky eminence, near the summit of which the enemy had collected all his forces, surrounding their cattle; and above them the women and children of the nation in a body. They were sitting down awaiting the attack. Chaka's forces marched slowly and with much caution, in regiments, each regiment divided into companies, till within twenty yards of the enemy, when they made a halt. Although Chaka's troops had taken up a position so near, the enemy seemed disinclined to move,¹⁵⁴ till Jacob ¹⁵⁵ had fired at them three times. The first and second shots seemed to make no impression on them, for they only hissed, and cried in reply: 'That is a dog'. At the third shot, both parties, with a tumultuous yell, clashed together, and continued stabbing each other for about three minutes, when both fell back a few paces. Seeing their losses about equal, both armies raised a cry, and this was followed by another rush, and they continued closely engaged about twice as long as in the first onset, when both parties again drew off.¹⁵⁶ But the enemy's loss had now been the more severe. This urged the Zulus to a final charge. The shrieks now became terrific. The remnant of the enemy's army sought shelter in an adjoining wood, out of which they were soon driven. Then began a slaughter of the women and children. They were all put

to death. The cattle, being taken by the different regiments, were driven to the kraal lately occupied by Sikunyana. The battle, from the commencement to the close; did not last more than an hour and a half. The numbers of the hostile tribe, including women and children, could not have been less than 40,000,¹⁵⁷ The number of cattle taken was estimated at 60,000. Early next morning Chaka arrived, and each regiment, previous to its inspection by him had picked out its ‘cowards’ and put them to death.”

This passage gives the best account we possess of a battle in Chaka’s time. Of the later fighting we have many narratives, two of which I quote in the footnotes.¹⁵⁸ From these and other reports it appears that the Zulu generals — either the king in person, or, more frequently, an induna especially appointed when the army was on the eve of departure, and who alone was entrusted with knowledge as to its destination ¹⁵⁹—gave much thought and care to the planning of their campaigns. How thoroughly they had assimilated the doctrine applied in the present war by the German General Staff, that a war must be waged, not against the armed forces of the enemy alone, but against his entire moral and material resources, is illustrated by the description given by Isaacs of the operations of a Zulu army at Port Natal: “The kraal had been burned for fuel; the cat had been speared and skinned; the ducks were scattered lifeless about the place. In fact, not a living creature could be found:—all was devastation, and destruction marked the course of the insatiable warriors, for even the growing corn was levelled in waste. One thousand of these savage wretches had been bivouacking here for two or three days, and had left painful demonstrations of their plundering propensities.”¹⁶⁰ It is not to Sparta that one has to go to find a parallel for such a warfare.

“Of the art of war”, says Aristotle in his *Politics*, “the art of hunting is a part”. If we may judge of the matter by the venery still practised in the lands once dominated by the Zulus, among these people the two were identical: the art of hunting was with them simply an application to another kind of animal of the art of war. The chief mobilizes his men as for a battle. On their arrival they rush in companies down his kraal, giving a frenzied exhibition of their swiftness of foot and their skill in stabbing with the assegais. Then they are drawn up in a circle and have the ‘hunt-medicines’ administered; after which, on the signal’s being given by the chief, they stab “the ground in front of them with their assagais, making a very loud hurricane of noise and fury, for they added to the sound of the quivering assagais a tremendous shouting of “Whir-r-r-r-r-r-r-h, whir-r-r-r-r-h!”¹⁶¹ Then each man takes the place assigned to him in a great circle thrown round miles of country, and advancing towards the center, drives the wild animals before him till finally they perish, impaled on the points

of his and his companions' assegais. The hunt, if successful, ends in the orgy of stabbing mimicked in the anticipatory demonstration. Put enemies instead of animals, and this description of a Zulu hunt, which we owe to an eye witness,¹⁶² becomes at once a description of a Zulu war.

In summary, we may say that the Zulu impis owed their irresistibility among the surrounding natives, and their successes over the whites, to the following characteristics:

- The merciless discipline maintained by Chaka.
- The high training of the men in physical endurance and in effecting mass movements.
- The use of the stabbing assegai and hand to hand fighting.
- The tactics of surrounding the enemy and thus destroying him utterly.
- The well organized system of espionage.
- Their reputation for invincibility and the terror which their pitiless massacres of the, entire population of the enemy inspired.

Chaka seemingly held his subjects in the hollow of his hand. The whites, he told them, they were 'not to consider their equals', but they should look on them and pay them " the respect due to kings." ¹⁶³ And so respectful were the Zulus for authority that as long as the missionaries and the traders enjoyed the king's favor they came and went among the ekandas and villages as they pleased. "Steal? No !" said a Zulu to Champion "if any man steals in the king's country he eats no more corn." ¹⁶⁴ The forefathers of the Europeans, explained Chaka on one occasion,¹⁶⁵ 'had bestowed on them many gifts by giving them all the knowledge of arts and manufactures, yet they had kept from them the greatest of gifts, a good black skin; for this did not necessitate the wearing of clothes to hide the white skin, which was not pleasant to the eye'. To his own subjects the king was a despot revelling in the wantonness of his power. Their lives were as nothing to him, and he killed them like flies. Their services were at all times entirely at his disposal, and they could do nothing for anybody except at his orders. Chaka refused to let any of them trade with the whites;¹⁶⁶ these should deal with himself alone. Yet, for all his absolutism, he had to take account of the desires of his people.¹⁶⁷ As a reward for their celibacy and their long periods of forced continence, he used to promise his soldiers, says Isaacs,¹⁶⁸ "that when they had made themselves masters of the earth on this side of the water, they should 'booser' [enjoy themselves] with their women and marry as many wives as they might think proper".. There are indications,

indeed, that even Chaka lived in fear of his indunas, if not of his soldiers. The pathetic eagerness with which he sought from the whites a medicine, of which Farewell had spoken, that would keep black hairs from turning white,¹⁶⁹ testifies to the strength of Zulu public opinion that a king with gray hair and wrinkles was a doomed king. He must give way to his successor. Hence both Chaka and Dingaan had no sons. "I am but a boy, I am too young to marry",¹⁷⁰ said Dingaan at forty. Chaka controlled his warriors and loved the wars on which he loosed them. Dingaan, on the other hand, would gladly have had peace. "But", writes Isaacs,¹⁷¹ "one of the great checks to the advancement of the Zoolu monarch in cultivating the sweets of peace and in encouraging commerce, are his warriors; a powerful body of savages trained up to war from their youth, and to indulge in all the rapacity to which their various predatory excursions naturally tend. These, under the command of chiefs, whose ferocity is almost unrestrainable, keep the monarch always in awe of their power, and goad him to the commission of deeds, which I feel persuaded he would not have executed but to keep them tranquil. As I have stated before, they consist of about 15,000 men, destined solely for war. They were not permitted to marry until Dingān, after the death of Chaka, abolished this law;¹⁷² they live entirely on plunder, and, such being the case, it is not a matter of astonishment that they are always elated with the thoughts of war. The king having changed the constitution of this force, gives them certainly an opportunity of acquiring subsistence without plunder, by the labour of their wives in cultivating their kraals; but they have been so habituated to plunder, that it has become a gratification rather than a toil; and what they gather by it gives them more satisfaction than that which they obtain by peaceful or honest means. Their insatiable thirst for the blood of their enemies is inherent, and as they are destined from their boyhood to wield the spear, 'it grows with their growth, and strengthens with their strength', making them, before their maturity, ferocious by profession, and savages from example. With such a body of people continually encircling the king, and urging him to pursue some warlike object, the Zoolu monarch has merely the shadow of power. He is called upon, indeed, to refuse or assent, but under circumstances so peculiarly awing, he usually assents; though, with Dingān, I believe this proceeds not from choice but from apprehension

In proceeding, now, to specify the points of similarity—in origin, institutions, and spirit — between the Zulu system and the Spartan, I shall assume that in the case of the latter the main facts are commonly known. Hence a tabular view will suffice.

1. The Homeric Greeks, like the Bantus generally, threw the spear. The Spartans created the Dorian phalanx by holding on to the spear

and using it in fighting at close quarters. Like the assegai it was wielded with one hand.

2. Simultaneously with the retention of the spear the unorganized line of duellists characteristic of the Homeric age gave way to the ordered array of men in an army, with tactical subdivisions acting under orders, and with officers, higher and lower, in due subordination.

3. In the training of the Spartan soldiers war dances — the famous Pyrrhic, for example — played an important rôle, and it may have been the case here, as among the Zulus, that dance formations underlay some of the military formations. Certainly of the imitative dances common among the Hellenes generally those which by a mimicry of fighting trained for efficiency in war were a specialty of Sparta,¹⁷³ whence they spread, in the sixth century B. C, simultaneously with the Dorian phalanx, to Athens, and to other places in Greece. Of the Pyrrhic dance Plato says in his *Laws*¹⁷⁴ that “it imitates the modes of avoiding blows and darts, by dropping or giving way, or springing aside; or rising up or falling down; also the opposite postures which, are those of action, as, for example, the imitation of archery and the hurling of javelins, and of all sorts of blows.” It was danced either by individuals or by companies, and the time, which was rapid, was given by a woman playing a flute or by men clapping their hands. It was regarded, Athenaeus tells us, as a *προηύμνησμα του πόλεμου*¹⁷⁵ The Spartan equivalent of the Zulu Feast of First Fruits was the far-famed Gymnopaedia — a fête at which naked youths in competition exhibited their skill in war-dances.

4. In both cases the peculiarities of the régime were developments or intensifications of pre-existent customs — in the one case Doric, and in the other Bantu. The indebtedness of Dingiswayo, “the Wanderer”, to the whites may be paralleled with the alleged borrowings of Lycurgus, the traveller, from abroad.

5. The segregation of the boys for military training began among the Spartans at the age of seven, that is to say, at about the same age as among the Zulus. The pens (ἵλαι) and herds (αγέλαο) must have corresponded pretty closely to the companies of boys formed at the ekandas. There was “fagging” in both systems; in both, the feeding of the boys was more or less hit or miss. Puberty was taken notice of in Sparta in that thereafter the youths had to sleep on reeds in the open air. The graduation of the soldiers into *Mellirenes* (18 to 20), *Irenes* (20 to 30), and “men” (30 to 60), had its Zulu equivalent. The group under the mess-officers in Zululand coincided in size and object with the *syssitia*; and between the Zulu beef stew and the Spartan black broth (αἰματζα) the likeness is almost uncanny. The Zulu warriors were forbidden to marry altogether though they might have mistresses

in the civil villages; the Spartans were permitted to marry at 20, but had to live in the barracks and visit their wives only at stolen moments. In both societies the conception of adultery was not that commonly held: in fact a form of polyandry characterized both. Men in Sparta as well as in Zululand were compelled to marry, but whereas “Lycurgus” made dowries illegal, Chaka made them nominal.

The Spartans admitted to their “pens” and “herds” only the sons of Spartans, a much less intensive military training being used for the males of subjected populations. The Zulus, as we have seen, opened their ekandas both to sons of Zulus and children of conquered enemies. The Ottomans in their great days reserved their standing army to boys taken in war or as tribute from the Giaours. There are indeed striking resemblances between the impis of Chaka and the Turkish Janissaries in training and mode of life as well as in recruitment— a few of which may be pointed out in a remark interpolated at this point.¹⁷⁶ The future Janissaries were picked and enrolled as boys of 8, 10, 12, 14, or 20 years. They were first put out in the service of the Anatolian feudal lords till they had learned the language, faith, laws and customs of their masters. Then, on their return to the capital, they were organized in “messes” of ten and put into a variety of employments calculated to develop strength of body and proficiency in some trade useful in war. Their next step was to be assigned as apprentices to the messes of the Janissaries, of which there were 165 each 100 strong. On becoming masters of their craft they were enrolled as full-fledged Janissaries. They were not allowed to marry or to have any form of family life; but, as among the Zulus, this was the point at which the system broke down first. Leave to marry was followed by the admission of the sons of Janissaries to the corps, and ultimately a standing army, detached from civil society and at the utter disposal of the Sultan, was converted into a privileged and unmanageable military caste, like the Zulu warriors in their later degenerate days.

6. In both the Spartan and the Zulu states war was esteemed the only worthy occupation of a man, and commerce was prohibited.

7. The Spartan said, “Return with your shield or on it”, the Zulu, “with your spear or die”. Each had to learn to endure pain without flinching. Wounds in the front were in both countries creditable; wounds in the back dishonorable. To retreat in face of an enemy was a Spartan prohibition as well as a Zulu. Chaka gave “cowards” a short shrift; Sparta was, perhaps, even more cruel. There, the “coward” lost citizen rights; he was ejected from his *syssitia*, excluded from all fêtes, and subjected to every indignity. He had, for example, to wear a cloak made of patchwork, have his hair cut on one side only, give place to all, even to the young. No one talked to him, no one gave him his

daughter in marriage or took his daughter to wife. No one gave him fire. And, like the childless, he had to go to the market-place in wintry cold, and sing songs at his own expense.

8. In Zululand the king was the state. He practically never died; he was put to death by his successor, who, under the circumstances, could not be expected to mourn for him. It was accordingly possible among the Zulus to pay respect to authority only when the king was wounded or his mother or grandmother, or some one of his dignitaries, died. Then, however, the mourning was unrestrained. Everybody had to assemble at the capital. The lack of a tear was a death warrant. Men showed their grief by clubbing to death those whose eyes were dry, or moist only with spittle; and in this way 7,000 persons are said to have perished when Nandi died. At such times all ordinary occupations were suspended. Sparta mourned the death of its kings with less ferocity, but none the less with extraordinary fervor. For ten days thereafter all business was suspended. Riders were despatched all over the land to carry the news, and Spartans, Perioecs, and Helots flocked to the city to attend the funeral. Thousands assembled in this way and made public lamentation. In every household at least one man and woman must put on mourning.

9. It was the boys in Zululand who let the hair grow, if not long, at least curly, while the men shaved their heads; the Spartan boys kept their hair cut short; the adults let it grow long and dressed it, at least before battle, even more carefully than the Zulu warriors cultivated their crown-ring. The Spartan boys went sandal-less, in Zululand the men were unshod. It was a Spartan who, on being asked why the girls went about scantily clothed, while the married women wore veils, answered, "Because the maidens have got to get husbands, the married women to keep theirs". "Questionnées", writes Delegorgue¹⁷⁷ of the Zulu girls, "sur la nullité de leur mode de se vêtir, ces jeunes filles répondent qu'une *intombu* (i. e., jeune fille) doit se montrer telle qu'elle est, afin de trouver un homme".

Other coincidences — for such they are: nothing more — subordinated, if to any law, to the principle "e simihbus simiha fiunt", the reader may establish for himself between the Zulus and the Spartans. Those noted warrant me, I believe, in bringing the two peoples into juxtaposition. They cannot blind us to the differences. The Zulu smeared his body with grease and polished it off with red ochre; the Spartan softened his skin with delicate oil and scraped his hard muscles with the strigil.

¹ This, for example, is the thesis maintained by M. Merker, *Die Masai*, Berlin, 1904.

² T. Pringle, *African Sketches*¹, London, 1834, p. 435 = *Ibid.*², London, 1840, p. 99.

3 The primary sources for the reigns of Dingiswayo and Chaka are few. They consist of some papers left by H F. Fynn; some evidence given by Fynn and others before a commission appointed in 1853 to 'inquire into the past and present state of the Kafirs in the District of Natal', and some letters written by F. G. Farewell. All this material is conveniently accessible in J. Bird, *Annals of Natal*, vol. 1, Petermaritzburg, 1888, where, too, are reprinted most of the best materials for the entire period dealt with in this paper. Further evidence is preserved, in the first volume of W. F. W. Owen, *Narrative of voyages to explore the shores of Africa, Arabia, and Madagascar*, 2 vols, London, 1833; in S Kay, *Travels and researches in Caffrana*, London, 1833; in R. Moffat, *Missionary labours and scenes in southern Africa*, London, 1842, and especially in chapter 16 of Arbousset, *Relation d'un voyage d'exploration au nord-est de la colonie du Cap de Bonne-espérance*, Paris, 1842. The most detailed account of Chaka is given by N. Isaacs, *Travels and adventures in eastern Africa*, 2 vols., London, 1836. This last work also covers the early years of Dingaan, and is a mine of curious and valuable information. For Dingaan the primary materials are more abundant. Next after Isaacs' work comes A. Gardiner, *Journey to the Zoolo Country*, London, 1836. Then follow the journals of the missionaries — those of the British F Owen and W. Hewetson in the *Church Missionary Record* for 1838, p. 245 sqq., and those of the Americans Champion, Grout, Adams, Venable, Lindley, and Wilson, in the *Missionary Herald* for 1837 and 1838. The other records of the later years of Dingaan — those filled with, his struggle with the Boers — are to be found in the *Annals of Natal*, §2. Some additional first-hand information covering chiefly the epoch of Dingaan and Panda may be found in the following books: A. Delegorgue, *Voyage dans l'Afrique Australe*, 2 vols., Paris, 1847; R. J. Mann, *Colony of Natal*, London, 1859; L Grout, *Zulu-land, or life among the Zulu-Kafirs*, Philadelphia, 1864; T, Shooter, *The Kafirs of Natal and the Zulu Country*, London, 1857; J. Mackenzie, *Ten years north of the Orange River*, Edinburgh, 1871, and W. Holden, *History of the Colony of Natal*, London, 1855. For the secondary books of most value, vide *infra*, n. 96.

We are by no means entirely dependent upon the reports of contemporaries for our knowledge of the military system of Chaka. Generally speaking, it is unsafe to assume that Zulu institutions known to exist in more recent times date from Chaka's day; but we are fortunately in a position frequently to distinguish the original from the secondary, as well as to add many details not directly reported. This we can do from the fact that Chaka's system was carried from Zululand into other districts in Chaka's own time by Moselekatze (Umsilikazi) and by Loonkundava or Mamkusa (or however the Zulu conqueror of the Thonga tribes may have been named). What is common to the Matebele or the Thonga and to the later Zulus may, accordingly, be inferred to have belonged to Chaka; since borrowing at a time subsequent to the separation is out of the question, at least in the case of the Matebele.

4 14,000 according to Farewell (ap. J. Bird, op. cit., p. 192), who puts the total population under Chaka at 50,000 souls and the number of soldiers assembled when Fynn and he arrived at his residence in 1824 at 8,000 to 9,000. Fynn, on the other hand, estimates the troops present on that occasion at 12,000

(Ibid., p. 76). He nowhere states the strength of the standing army, but computes Chaka's "effective warriors" at 50,000 (Ibid., p. 66), and reports that this number, including, however, the boys and women in the commissariat, took part along with himself in a great military expedition. Vide infra, p. 226. Isaacs, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 325, and Kay, op. cit., p. 403 (misquoted as 50,000 by Isaacs, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 328, and again by Shooter, op. cit., p. 338), put the number in constant readiness at 15,000. Gardiner agrees with them, as may be seen from the data given in the text. Grout, op. cit., p. 73, puts his active army at 12,000 to 15,000, and gives him still greater reserves. Arbousset, op. cit., p. 270, computes both at from 15,000 to 20,000 and the total population at 100,000 souls, Gardiner, op. cit., p. 92, states, but not as a matter of personal knowledge, that Dingaan could put 50,000 men in the field. Kay, op. cit., p. 403, doubles this total for Chaka and is followed by Isaacs, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 328; vol. 2, p. 325. Dingaan met the Boers at Blood River with 9,000 to 10,000 men in 36 "regiments", according to Bantjes (ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 448). Delegorgue (ap. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 241) computes the total army of the Zulus at the accession of Panda, in 1840, at 20,000 to 40,000 for foreign service, and 20,000 reserves. G. McC. Theal, History of South Africa, London, 1888, vol. 3, p. 297, concludes that Chaka had a highly disciplined army of 40,000 or 50,000 men. He could probably put twice as many men into the field as his successors. Vide infra, p. 202, sq.

5 Gardiner, op. cit., p. 92 sqq.; cf. Arbousset, op. cit., p. 272; Delegorgue, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 396, et passim.

6 Called *umpagati* by Gardiner. This word means, perhaps, "guards". See especially Fynn (ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 119), who claims that "every man and boy who is in the chief's circle is called an *umpakati*". Thus Hewetson writes (Church Mission. Rec, 1838, p. 276): "This morning we saw two large bodies of the Zoolu army coming down the hills. The black shields showed the regiment of boys, or those who are not suffered to shave their heads, not having distinguished themselves in battle; the others, with white shields, showed the Umkunginglove Regiment, or Body-guards". The body-guard acted, however, as a Council; hence *umpakati* also means "councillors" (Isaacs, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 173, n. 1, and F. Owen, Church Mission. Rec, 1838, p. 252).

7 Gardiner, op. cit., p. 92. It is possible, however, that Gardiner means no more than that there were veteran officers in the regiments of young warriors, and children tending cattle at every *ekanda*.

8 Called by Gardiner *isimporthlo* and *izinseezwa*. See also Shooter, op. cit., p. 338.

9 There is much difference of report as to the significance of the head-ring. Whether it signified puberty, service with credit in war, or matrimony, it was in any case given to his soldiers by the king. In the regular army, prior to Dingaan's indulgence *re* matrimony, it can hardly have signified anything but distinguished service.

10 Isaacs, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 181. It must be noted, however, that Gardiner (op. cit., p. 103 sqq.) flatly contradicts this view, and reports that each regiment, i. e., all the classes of each regiment, had shields of the same color. The color of the shields is thus the distinguishing mark of the regiment and not of the class. As Gardiner had lost his notes and was writing from memory, it is likely that he is in error. Naturally when a regiment consisted of veterans alone or of young warriors alone — a case which, however, he does not contemplate — the shields of a regiment were all of one color. So, too, in the case of the third class, the regiments undoubtedly had shields of the same color. These facts may explain why Fynn also (vide infra, p. 219) says that Dingiswayo distinguished the regiments by the color

of their shields.

11 Bishop Colenso [trans.], *Cetshwayo's Dutchman*, Cornelius Vigro, London, 1880, p. 189 sq.

12 Vide infra, p. 205, n. 42.

13 Fifteen or so boys, present at Umkunginglove, used to attend F. Owen's class in 1837 (Church Mission. Rec, 1838, p. 225 sq.). At dancing time the number swelled to 96 (Ibid., p. 280).

14 Vide infra, p. 205,

15 Thus on October 21, Owen writes (Church Mission. Rec, 1838, p. 228): Dingaan's "indunas were sitting at his feet; and a number of men were being arranged in classes, to be sent to reside at different villages".

16 For a regiment made up of old and young men see J. Y. Gibson, *The story of Zuluz*, London, 1911, p. 136. The officers of the young warriors had white shields (Arbousset, op. cit., p. 290).

17 Isaacs, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 173.

18 Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 327 sqq.

19 Whence among the Zulus the lads at the ekandas who had not yet scored in war were called *amabootu* (Gardiner, op. cit., p. 92).

20 It may be conjectured that in Zululand, too, in the days of Panda and Cetshwayo, the boys who congregated in their fathers' ekanda were enrolled as a company in the regiment stationed there. Under Chaka, when the soldiers in the ekandas were bachelors, and many of the children were captives, the method followed in distributing the recruits must have been, as among the Matebele, more arbitrary.

21 Isaacs, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 140, Arbousset, op. cit., p. 270, describes a trick by which the Zulu kings multiplied for the benefit of strangers the number of their soldiers.

22 The reserves were absent. Isaacs here allows 1,000 men to a regiment. If we give it 700 and accept Chaka's claim, his total force would be about 40)000.

23 Arbousset, op. cit., p. 285. This list was derived from a native named Rasebouai, who had served for four years in the "serail" of Dingaan. Thirteen of the twenty-six regiments included in it were made up, says Arbousset (op. cit., p. 287), of "soldats éprouvés" called *emétlopés*, "whites", and the others of *ementamos*, "blacks". The shields of the former were white "ou bien bigarrés"; those of the latter were black or red. In this list, accordingly, those who did not belong to the ekandas were included. Vide infra p. 204,

24 Gardiner, op. cit., p. 92.

25 Shooter, op. cit., p. 338; Gibson, op. cit., p. 110.

26 Delegorgue, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 400 sq.

27 C. Norris-Newman, *In Zululand with the British in 1879*, London, 1880, p. 320 sq. I have not been able to make out what the eight corps were to which the regiments are assigned in this list. One of them, however, Um-iambongwenga, is apparently a regiment of younger "men" in Shooter's list. I note that in four of the five lists there is a Duguza regiment. For an explanation of several of the names see Arbousset, op. cit., p. 292 sqq. Several names of Chaka's regiments are found in Bishop Colenso, *Zulu-English Dictionary*, passim.

28 It is worth noting perhaps, that there were thirteen regiments in Moselekatze's army in 1888; A. R. Colquhoun, *Matabelerland*, London, [1892], p. 37,

29 Mann, op. cit., p. 28 sqq.

30 See the dates of recruitment given by Gibson, op. cit., p. 110.

31 The crane's feather erect seems to have been reserved for the veterans; Arbousset, op. cit., p. 287. Isaacs (vide infra, p. 210) describes three groups of young warriors, each group having a different head-gear. In this case the group contained ca. 2000 men. Can it have been a single regiment? In the case noted by Fynn (vide infra, n. 33) the regiments had the normal strength of ca. 750 men. Only one of the four, however, consisted of young warriors. On another occasion, Fynn, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 90, alludes to the destruction of a regiment named "Dust", "raised only two months previously and numbering two thousand men". It seems to me likely that in Chaka's time the regiments of young men were larger than later. Still, it is not unthinkable that two or three regiments were occasionally combined to form a single large regiment and that, when this occurred, they adopted the same style of headdress.

32 Isaacs, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 181; cf. Fynn, ap. Ibid., p. 90; Grout, op. cit., p. 349; C. Celliers, ap. Bird, p. 239; cf. J. C. Voigt, Fifty years of the history of the Republic in South Africa, London, 1899, vol. 1, p. 299; Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 275. Zulu tactics apparently demanded the division of the army into three corps. Vide infra, p. 224.

33 Such an army corps (not at full strength, however) Fynn (ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 85) saw drill and march off against Zuedi in 1824. It consisted of four regiments totalling about 3,000 men. One of its regiments had white shields with black dots, another black shields — veterans and young warriors of the standing army, doubtless. According to Isaacs, two of the corps had names which connect them with Duguza and Ababulalayo — two of Chaka's royal ekandas. The third corps was called Umbalabale, (or more correctly, perhaps, *Imbalabale*, which means "having party-coloured shields")- Isaacs warns us against regarding this third corps as made up of the third class; each army corps had, he tells us, all three classes in it. Obviously two of the four regiments in the army corps which Fynn saw—»the second and the third in his enumeration: those carrying red-spotted and gray shields — were constituted of the third class, thus confirming Isaacs' report. Fynn also alludes to another army corps of 4,000 men, which had started against Zuedi earlier.

34 Isaacs, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 173,181, with Bird's notes; cf. G. Champion, ap. Ibid., p. 207, and Fynn as quoted above, n. 33. I have a suspicion however, that Isaacs meant to write in each case *Umfundas*, "inferiors."

35 Champion, Mission. Herald, 1838, p. 216.

36 Ibid., loc. cit.; Gardiner, op. cit., p. 143.

37 Cf., however, F. Owen (Church Mission. Rec, 1838, p. 223): "I asked him [Dinga'an] where all his people were, since the town {Umkunginglove} seemed nearly empty. He said that they were all dispersed to their own homes, in the out places or villages".

38 Gardiner, op. cit., p. 92.

39 Others make the time less — "a few months in the year" (Venable, Mission. Herald, 1838, p. 218), "two months' dancing" (Champion, op. cit., p. 214).

40 Champion, op. cit., p. 213.

41 Isaacs, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 297.

42 The baggage-boys with the great expedition of 1824 were, says Fynn, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 87, "few above" the age of twelve years and some not more than six". In the light of this statement what Colenso says (vide supra, p. 200) must be

corrected when applied to the Zulus of Chaka's time.

43 Isaacs, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 333; Bird, op. cit., p. 173.

44 These promotions were usually made at the Feast of First Fruits.

45 Champion, op. cit., p. 214.

46 Grout, op. cit., p. 163.

47 It is significant of the strength of Bantu traditions, and of the obstacles which Dingiswayo and Chaka had to overcome, that, despite the despotism under which they lived, the Zulus still exercised their ancient right of calling their kings, in the most intemperate language, to an annual accounting at this festival; Delegorgue, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 237,

48 Arbousset, op. cit., p. 291. The girls, too — at least under Panda and Cetshwayo — were formed into regiments; "that is to say, they just live at home and work for their fathers only; but all those of about the same age are called by one name, (those now growing up are the Umtiyane, 'Ensnarers'), and may not marry till the King gives leave"; Bishop Colenso, Cetshwayo's Dutchman, p. 192. For the famous ease where a regiment of girls rebelled against Cetshwayo's command to marry two regiments of old men, see Gibson, op. cit., p. 133. It seems to me not improbable that the organizing of the girls for matrimony — with the soldiers — was one of the devices by which Cetshwayo tried to make service in the standing army more attractive to the men. (Vide infra, p. 216). In any case there is no allusion to regiments of girls in the records of Chaka's or Dingaan's time.

49 Arbousset, op. cit., p. 271: "Au sortir du service, vers l'âge de quarante ans, ils se mettent à fabriquer des armes", etc. Chaka ordered that "the number of cattle given to the parents of the bride should be only nominal, or rather only so many as were necessary for the marriage feast". Fynn, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 114.

50 Isaacs, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 116. For the late marriage of the Zulus of Moselekatze see Mission. Herald, 1837, p. 189.

51 Two-thirds of the huts in the civil kraals were occupied by women; Gardiner, op. cit., p. 207.

52 The Zulu women — perhaps because the men spent so much of their lives in the ekandas and in war — were superior in looks to the ordinary Kafir women and were remarkably more prolific.

53 Champion, op. cit., p. 215.

54 Ibid., p. 211.

55 Ibid., p. 212.

56 Ibid., p. 214,

57 Ibid. p. 215.

58 Already cited, vide supra, p. 207.

59 F. Owen, Church Mission. Rec, 1838, p. 249; Delegorgue, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 394 sqq.; Bishop Colenso, op. cit., p. 191. The fête had apparently become much less elaborate by 1870.

60 For the climate of Natal see X C. Chase, The Cape of Good Hope and the eastern province of Algoa Bay, London, 1843, p. 21.

61 Gardiner, op. cit., p. 206; Isaacs, ap. Bad, op. cit., p. 178 sq. It is thus apparent that the regular troops could spend very few months of the normal year at the civil kraals.

62 Gardiner, op. cit., p. 206.

63 P. Retief, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 365; cf. Grout, op. cit., p. 79.

64 1,000 according to Champion (Mission. Herald, 1837, p. 178 sqq.); 1,100 according to Gardiner, op. cit., p. 206; 1,700 according to Retief, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 365; 2,000 according to Holden, op. cit., p. 84, whose sketch is schematic. According to Isaacs (op. cit., vol. 1, p. 73) Chaka's "imperial kraal" was over three miles in circumference, and "includes within its space about 1400 huts".

65 Chaka's contained 100 huts according to Isaacs, loc. cit. For a description and sketch of Dingaan's "palace" see Gardiner, op. cit., p. 201, and F. Owen, op. cit., p. 234. The latter writes: "It is very spacious, lofty, and exquisitely neat; the floor as bright as polished marble; a fireplace very tastily devised; and the roof formed of sticks closely compacted together. It is far superior to the common huts, but the door is as low as any. It is supported by twenty-one pillars, or posts, which are covered, from top to bottom, with beads of various colours." The Patagonian Martyr has entitled one of his highly remarkable poems "My Zulu Hut". In it he gives a very realistic account of an ordinary hut.

66 W. Wood, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 379. For this reason, perhaps, Champion, who gives a detailed description and drawing of this ekanda (Mission. Herald, 1837, p. 178 sqq.), makes it oval in shape; cf. F. Owen, Church Mission. Rec, 1839, p. 218. Wood reports that it contained four cattle pens. Champion puts seven in his sketch. There was an *issigordlo* in every ekanda. The chief *induna* or the *incosacase* (head woman) had it when the king was absent.

67 Wood, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 379. It is only under Dingaan that we can try really to gauge the weight of the influence of the two head *indunas*, the cautious *Umtlrella* and the haughty *Tambuza*. They had then to be considered, obviously; they gave the king advice, and we find him alleging their opposition as the motive for his inaction; but, when seemingly the king by a nod could have had them and everyone else put to death immediately, it is incredible that they should checkmate him when he had really set his mind on anything; cf. Delegorgue, op. cit., *yoh* 2, p. 230. It was their definition of their powers, not his, when they informed F. Owen (Church Mission. Bee, 1838, p. 231) "that the king could do nothing without them; for whatever the king might appoint, it would not stand without their consent".

68 Gardiner, op. cit., p. 92. As to these mess- and shield-officers we know only that they existed, and that they had charge of groups which we may estimate at from twenty to thirty men. What the relations were of these mess-groups to the companies into which the regiments were divided is obscure. The companies are, perhaps, identical with the *iss-carhes*. The mess-groups were, of course, smaller.

69 Gardiner, op. cit., p. 230.

70 Isaacs, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 230; Arbousset, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 285. It may also be noted that Wood, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 379, says that there were at *Umkungung* love "four huts erected on poles, which contained the arms of the troops". Each company had perhaps its own shield house.

71 Isaacs, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 296.

72 Bishop Colenso, op. cit., p. 191; cf. Mackenzie, *supra*, p. 201.

73 Isaacs, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 120.

74 In this case the color of the shield cannot have distinguished the regiment, since in that event the regiment must have had 6,000 young warriors.

75 Gardiner, op. cit., p. 64. This war dance was imposed upon the *Thongas* in the *Delagoa Bay* district by their Zulu conquerors, and is minutely described by H. J. Junod, *The life of a South African tribe*, London, 1913, vol. 1, p. 437 sq.

⁷⁶ F. Owen, op. cit., p. 235. Delegorgue, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 183 sqq.; 396 sqq., has also described these war dances at great length and with much vivacity.

⁷⁷ In Swaziland, according to D. Kidd, *The essential Kafir*, London, 1904, p. 303 sq., many Zulu practices are still maintained, and he gives a most vivid description of a sham fight which he witnessed. "The impression left on one's mind", he says, "was that of overwhelming, irresistible force sweeping over the veldt, and tramping out, every living thing on its surface."

⁷⁸ Delegorgue, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 186 sq. For mimic dancing see J. Campbell, *Travels in South Africa*, London, 1815, p. 261 sq.

⁷⁹ G. McC. Theal, *History and ethnography of South Africa before 1795*, London, 1907, vol. 1, p. 386.

⁸⁰ It is, however, noticeable that one element seen by Delegorgue, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 397 sq., among the Zulus seems to recur among the Masai (J. Thomson, *Through Masai-Land*, London, [1895], p. 66; 252): hence the dances may be Bantu; cf. Moffat, op. cit., p. 348 sqq.

⁸¹ Champion, *Mission. Herald*, 1838, p. 213.

⁸² Gardiner, op. cit., p. 57 sq.

⁸³ For this identical dance among the Matebele see Venable, *Mission, Herald*, 1837, p. 240, and Sir W. C. Harris, *Wild sports of Southern Africa*,⁴ London, 1844, p. 153 sqq., where the acknowledgements due to Gardiner have been forgotten.

⁸⁴ The place of these women in ekanda life was an important one. Under Chaka none of them, except at Nobamba — the old Zulu capital (Kay, op. cit., p. 406; Fynn, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 86) — were wives or mothers. Chaka, says Isaacs (op. cit, vol. 1, p. 327; cf. Fynn, ap. Êird, op. cit., p. 77; Champion, *Mission. Herald*, 1837, p. 180) "had no queen, although he had at each of his palaces from 300 to 500 girls [over 1,200 in all, according to Theal, *History of South Africa*, vol. 3, p. 297], who were denominated servants or sisters. If any of these became pregnant, they were immediately taken away, and some imaginary crime alleged for putting them to death. "On this subject see further Kay, op. cit., p. 405, and especially the story of Botekaze told by Arbousset, op. cit., p. 298 sqq. The gruesome tale of how the king seized hold of his own child, surreptitiously born, and dashed its brains out, is told by Gardiner (op. cit., p. 99) of Chaka and by Arbousset (op. cit., p. 308) of Dingaan. The reason for this atrocious custom will be seen later (vide infra, p. 230). The women in the ekandas belonged to three groups, the mothers, sisters, and servants of the king. The mothers, explains Gardiner (op. cit., p. 146), were the wives of Senzangakona, father of Chaka and Dingaan, and they and other women of high rank were "generally placed as pensioners, one or two together, in the different military towns, where they preside, and are particularly charged with the distribution of provisions". The Jew Isaacs (vol. 1, p. 234) is less nice than the Patagonian Martyr: "The duty of these stepmothers", he says, "is an important one, namely, to select young females for the imperial seraglios, to superintend them, and prevent any improper intercourse. They are made responsible for all under their charge; and, equally so, that all additions are pure virgins". Their task was no sinecure in view of the fact that the only restraint recognized by the girls was fear, and that single men in barracks are proverbially "no bloomin' plaster saints". On one occasion, Chaka, having learned in a dream that certain boys had polluted the purity of his women, had over 170 of both sexes cruelly put to death. Nandi, his own mother, who had charge of the women at the capital, was severely beaten for negligence (Isaacs, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 189 sqq.; Arbousset, op. cit., p. 299, says that Chaka had her put to death for harbouring Botekaze in her trouble). In such matters the merest

suspicion meant death. Hence, when the girls were seen approaching on the road, the Zulu men made a detour so as not to meet them (Isaacs, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 245); the arrival of one of them at a kraal was a signal for the male portion of the natives to decamp; to approach one of these young women, writes F. Owen, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 338, or “to pass her without special command is death.” When away from the issigordlo, her food was brought to her from the nearest ekanda, since “she was not allowed to have her food from any of the meaner villages.” The girls thus privileged and restricted were obviously the pampered and fattened-”sisters” or concubines of the king, who, however, were distinguished from the servants chiefly by his favor. Both alike were selected by the “mothers” (Arbousset, op. cit., p. 2 < f4): they might be the daughters of chiefs taken in lieu of tribute, or captives spared when all their relatives were slaughtered, or gifts from the king’s subjects. Their duties were fourfold; they ministered to the king’s pleasures, and intensified his aesthetic satisfaction and feeling of power. They were also indispensable in the dances, since by immemorial custom women had secured a place in these exercises which even Dingiswayo and Chaka did not venture to take from them. They constituted, furthermore, currency of a higher denomination than cattle, and their circulation was forced, not voluntary. When Dingaan wanted twenty or fifty or a hundred head of cattle he might require one of his officers to give them to him in exchange for one of his “sisters” (Gardiner, op. cit., p. 98 [misprinted in original as 89]). And finally the servants, if not the “sisters”, had to do ‘women’s work’ at the ekandas: they had to help in the making of the kraal fences and the huts (Gardiner, op. cit., p. 205; Isaacs, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 230); they had to keep the floors of the houses smoothly polished; they had to weed the king’s corn and *imphi* grounds (Gardiner, op. cit., p. 40); they had to accompany the warriors at the beginning of a military expedition, carrying food and drink for them; and above all, they had to fetch to the issigordlo from the nearby civil villages the beer which was given every morning to the warriors (F. Owen, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 336). “It is no unfrequent thing”, writes Gardiner (op. cit., p. 55), “to see a string of thirty or forty women [“beer-wagons”, as the servants are called “], Champion, op. cit., p. 181; cf. also F. Owen, Church Mission. Rec, 1838, p. 237] proceeding to the issigordlo with bowls of *outckualla* on their heads, singing as they go; these are delivered to servants appointed, and soon set before the assembled crowd, who, passing them from one to the other, empty then? on the spot”. For little scenes of seraglio life, see Champion, loc. cit; Gardiner, op. cit., p. 200 sq.; F. Owen, op. cit., p. 225, 232 sq.; Delegorgue, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 176.

⁸⁵ For a kind of *Krypleia* among the Zulus of Matebeleland see the story of “The chief’s knives” told by Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 325 sq.

⁸⁶ Bishop Colenso, op. cit., p. 191; Arbousset, op. cit., p. 271. There are several allusions to copper-smiths at the ekandas (Champion, op. cit., p. 180; Gardiner, op. cit., p. 105), but none, I think, to blacksmiths. The reason for this is that copper, being imported, belonged to the king, whereas iron, being a native product, was made into assegais, hoes, and axes at the civil villages. Hence articles of copper and brass could be obtained from the king alone, and were marks of high honor (Gardiner, op. cit., p. 94; Grout, op. cit., p. 107), whereas assegais might be procured anywhere; cf. Grout, op. cit., p. 113. The industrial basis of Zulu warfare was, accordingly, not a matter of grave concern to the government until the introduction of firearms.

⁸⁷ Champion, op. cit., p. 181; Gardiner, op. cit., p. 47, 120; Isaacs, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 329; Wood, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 379; Owen, Church Mission. Rec, 1838, p. 255.

88 There is some evidence (Champion, loc cit.) that the women in the ekandas had the common dish of sour milk used so extensively in the civil villages, but none that it was available for the men. Among the Masai a milk diet precluded the eating of meat at the same time (Thomson, op. cit., p. 251).

89 Delegorgue, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 238 sq.

90 Gardiner, op. cit., p. 51.

91 Ibid., p. 55, sq.

92 Cf. the Spartan *syssitia*. The section may be computed at from twenty to thirty men. For an equally vivid and realistic account of the Matebele *syssitia* see Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 322 sq.

93 With cow-dung among the Matebele, Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 321.

94 Delegorgue, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 216.

95 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 234.

96 In addition to the works cited above (p. 198 n, 3) the following books may be consulted for the story of Dingiswayo, Chaka, and Dingaan: J. Y. Gibson, *The story of the Zulus*,² London, 1911, p. 11 sqq.; G. McC. Theal, *History of South Africa*, vol. 3, p. 293 sqq.; vol. 4, p. 116 sqq.; J. C. Voigt, *Fifty years of the history of the Republic in South Africa*, London, 1899, vol. 1, p. 184 sqq.; D. Kidd, *The essential Kafir*, London, 1904, *passim*; A. Steedman, *Wanderings and adventures in the interior of southern Africa*, London, 1835, vol. 1, p. 269 sqq.; vol. 2, p. 238 sq.

97 See especially, Mann, op. cit., p. 28 sqq.

98 The most important alteration, due to the advance of the whites and the cessation of profitable wars, was that the king no longer fed his soldiers; they had to have their food brought to them at the ekandas. Hence there was a great falling off in the numbers in residence there, and they stayed a much shorter time. See especially Bishop Colenso, op. cit., p. 190 sqq.; Gibson, op. cit., p. 131; Mann, op. cit., p. 28; and *supra*, p. 203.

99 Junod, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 431 sqq.

100 Kidd, op. cit., p. 210; Theal, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 292; A. C. Hollis, *The Masai*, Oxford, 1905, p. xvi.

101 Junod, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 96 sqq.; Theal, loc. cit.; Kidd, op. cit., p. 228.

102 JBest described by Thomson, op. cit., p. 243 sqq.

103 Arbousset, op. cit., p. 279, affirms that the Zulu soldiers were circumcised when they were discharged. Despite the fact that he describes the rite then performed (according to his story) with the greatest circumstantiality, it seems incredible that the other authorities should all be wrong in making it omitted altogether. Cf. Delegorgue op. cit., vol. 2, p. 220.

104 Isaacs, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 306; Arbousset, op. cit., p. 279; Gardiner, op. cit., p. 95; Shooter, op. cit., p. 395; Theal, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 295.

105 Kay, op. cit., p. 406.

106 Fynn, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 64.

107 Isaacs, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 321.

108 That it was really Dingiswayo, and not someone earlier, who abolished circumcision is suggested by the fact that among the "Eastern tribes" south of Delagoa Bay, who, according to tradition, abandoned this rite at the time of the Zulu invasion (Junod, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 72), the custom existed as late as 1798 (W. White, *Journal of a voyage on the eastern coast of Africa*, London, 1800, p.

38 sqq.). The difficulty is that Chaka was born ca. 1787 and his uncircumcised father perhaps as early as 1760. Hence the custom should have been abolished as early as 1775, at which time Dingiswayo cannot possibly have been on the throne. It may have been, however, that kings' sons, before the general abolition of the practice, were left uncircumcised with the intent that, being technically boys, they might be debarred from conspiring to take their fathers' places. Naturally, in that event we cannot use the fact that Dingiswayo and Chaka were uncircumcised to date the abolition of the practice generally.

109 Fynn, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 63.

110 How could Fynn have known jthis?

111 Delegorgue, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 218; Kidd, op. cit., p. 302; Isaacs, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 170; Junod, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 72.

112 T. Shepstone, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 163. To an historian of Greece and Rome Dingiswayo looks not unlike a doublet of Chaka. There were, of course, no European witnesses of his actions. In regard to his wanderings the Zulus themselves can have known but little; and were it not for the story of the white man with a horse and a gun by whom he was accompanied on his return, we should do well, I think, not to estimate too highly his indebtedness to the military institutions of the Cape. Theal, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 294, is here rather cautious. Fynn, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 63, states it as an inference only that he got his idea of military reforms from the white men. Shepstone, ap. Ibid., p. 163, prefaces his statement by a non-committal "it seems". Isaacs apparently knew little about Dingiswayo. It should be noticed also that Voigt, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 185, citing as his authority—erroneously, I am inclined to think — W. C. Harris, reports that Chaka was inspired to make his conquests by the story of Napoleon told him by a shipwrecked white sailor. How quick Chaka was to turn to his own advantage a European institution of which he appreciated the usefulness, is illustrated by the story of the creation of sentinels (Shooter, op. cit., p. 278, following Isaacs).

113 The datéis uncertain. Shepstone, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 158, makes it 1812, and Theal and Voigt follow him; but his argument is far from conclusive. Delegorgue, vol. 2, p. 218, n. 1, assigns to him a reign of twelve years, thus fixing his accession in 1816. Gibson, op. cit., p. 13, suggests about 1818. If the white man who accompanied Dingis-wayo was Dr. Cowan (Chase, ap. Steedman, op. cit., Appendix to vol. 2, p. 174), we should have to date the accession of Dingiswayo a little after 1808, but there are very various versions of the fate of Dr. Cowan and his party. See Campbell, op. cit., p. 181, 197; Moffat, op. cit., p. 224.

114 W. F. W. Owen, Narrative of voyages, vol. 1, p. 71.

115 Ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 184.

116 Ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 77 sq.

117 This is described as follows by Gardiner, op. cit., p. 100: "Apiece of rush cut, and smoothed to the proper size and length, is closely twisted round with sinew, and formed into a circle by uniting the ends; with sinew it is then sewn to the roots of the hair, which in every other part, even within the circle, is entirely removed, and the ring thus closely fitted on the scalp, and blackened over with the black wax of a honeycomb, is completed."

118 See W. F. W. Owen, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 94.

119 Isaacs, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 322.

120 Grout, op. cit., p. 72, first noted, I think, the milder policy pursued by Chaka in dealing with immediate neighbors. Shooter, op. cit., p. 256, also mentions some gentler traits. Voigt, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 186, comes stoutly to his

defence. To those who came in contact with his handiwork — Farewell, Fynn, Isaacs, Arbousset, Shepstone — he was an unmitigated tyrant without a single redeeming feature,

121 The effects are most vividly described by Shepstone, *ap. Bird, op. cit.*, p. 157 sqq. The most detailed account of Chaka's wars I have been able to find is that given by Shooter, *op. cit.*, p. 249 sqq.

122 In 1817 according to Theal, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 314, agreeing with the American missionaries (*Mission. Herald*, 1837, p. 188). This is possible if Chaka came to the throne as early as 1812, but not otherwise, since Chaka's system must have been thoroughly established prior to Moselekatze's trek. There is, however, no clear evidence that he went off over the mountains so early. He was discovered in the Transvaal by Scoon and M'Luckie in 1829 (*Steed-man, op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 187; *Moffat, op. cit.*, p. 510). From the position he then held, and the fact that he "had already destroyed many powerful tribes" in Bechuanaland, we may infer with certainty that he had made his escape long before the death of Chaka on September 23, 1828. Hence Shooter (*op. cit.*, p. 306) and Grout (*op. cit.*, p. 230) are in error when they make him flee after the accession of Dingaan, Fynn, *ap. Bird, op. cit.*, p. 68, has reinforcements reach him from Zululand in 1826. It seems to me that Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 307, is right in dating his trek about 1820.

123 W.F.W. Owen, *Narrative of voyages*, vol. 1, p. 80, calls him Loon Kundava and, on p. 58, uncle of Chaka. I should have called the Soonkundava which appears in *Ibid.*, p. 142, a simple misprint were it not that in a report printed by G. McC. Theal in his *Records of South Eastern Africa*, Cape Colony, vol. 2, p. 470, from the pen of Captain Owen himself, and not of H. B. Robinson, the editor of the *Narrative*, the form Soongundava appears. Here, moreover, he is said to have been the uncle of Zeite. Can this be Zwide (*Bird, op. cit.*, p. 149), Switi (Shooter), or Zuedi, king of the Undwandwe in Chaka's time? In any case in 1822 it was "some years since" the Zulus had conquered the Thonga tribe. Its conqueror, according to Junod, vol. 1, *op. cit.*, p. 27, was named Manukosi (Mani-kusa), who ruled over it till his death in 1865, four years earlier than the death of Moselekatze himself. At one place Junod (*loc cit.*) dates Manukosi's conquest in ca. 1835, but later (*Ibid.*, p. 259; 423) he has Manukosi and the Zulus arrive among the Thonga at ca. 1820. Apparently Manukosi, like Chaka, had a forerunner.

124 Fynn, *ap. Bird, op. cit.*, p. 100. The description given by Moffat, *op. cit.*, p. 361, of the behavior of the Bechuanas after a victory leads me to believe that it was not the cruelty, but the success of Chaka that was his characteristic feature. *Vide supra*, p. 221, n. 120.

125 Fynn, writing at the accession of Dingaan, in 1828, expected the Zulus then to disintegrate into their constituent tribes (*Bird, op. cit.*, p. 100). It was then that Queto at the head of the Amakwabi crossed Natal to Pondo-land, and Umhlaka (Shooter, *op. cit.*, p. 305) or Mothlégé (Arbousset, *op. cit.*, p. 305) or whatever his name may have been, crossed the Drakensberg, each seceding from the Zulu state. Dr. Andrew Smith (*Bird, op. cit.*, p. 265) thought in 1834 that the days of Chaka's regime were then numbered.

126 Gibson, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

127 *Ap. Bird, op. cit.*, p. 66.

128 Isaacs, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 330, tells the story with a few variations. He notes, for example, the effect of the shields in rendering the reed javelins harmless when thrown, and has all the assegais destroyed and one new stout one substituted in each case.

129 Vide supra, p. 211; vide infra, p. 226, and J. Boshof, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 410. Certainly it was from this distance that the Zulu charge began.

130 Junod, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 439. Cf. Isaacs, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 199.

131 E. g., by Voigt, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 185.

132 See, e. g., how Chaka instructed his men now to destroy a kraal, Isaacs, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 190.

133 Vide infra, p. 227 sq., n. 158.

134 Junod, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 33.

135 Farewell, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 93.

136 Fynn, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 89; Isaacs, ap. Ibid., p. 181.

137 Isaacs, ap. Ibid., p. 179.

138 Fynn, ap. Ibid., p. 90

139 Isaacs, ap. Ibid., p. 170.

140 Gardiner, op. cit., p. 53.

141 Ibid., loc. cit.

142 Isaacs, vol. 1, p. 97.

143 Isaacs, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 172, 191.

144 Scott, Despatch no. 12, Enclosure 1, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 149; Shepstone, ap. Ibid., p. 163,

145 Gardiner, op. cit., p. 62 and illustration; frontispiece in Harris, op. cit.

146 W. F. W. Owen, Narrative, vol. 1, p. 95.

147 Delegorgue, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 396; 409.

148 Vide infra, p. 227, n. 158.

149 Fynn, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 95, 99; Isaacs, ap. Shooter, op. cit., p. 301.

150 J. Dunn, John Dunn, Cetywayo, and the three Generals. Edited by D. C. F. Moodie, Pietermaritzburg, 1886, p. 4 sqq.

151 Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 296 sqq.

152 Ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 86 sqq. There is also much valuable information regarding Zulu warfare, as practised by the tribes in the neighborhood of Delagoa Bay, in Junod, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 446 sqq. and Appendix vii. The date, however, is so late (1894/96, 1901) that the fighting witnessed by Junod was merely a burlesque of the real Zulu thing.

153 For Chaka's spy system see Isaacs, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 180; Gardiner, op. cit., p. 94.

154 They, too, used lances, not darts, obviously. It is surprising how quickly the military innovations of Dingiswayo and Chaka were taken up by the other eastern tribes.

155 A Zulu who had served as an interpreter with Captain Owen in 1822, and, on escaping, had regained his own people, where he subsequently played a very important rôle. He had obtained a gun from the whites.

156 A good illustration of how quickly even well-hardened men got out of breath when engaged in active spear or swordplay. The Roman method of relieving those in the front rank by those in the second took account of this fact.

157 Either the Zulus were enormously superior in numbers, or Fynn's figure, 50,000, is, as I suspect, too high; for there cannot have been more than 10,000 fighters in Sikunyana's tribe, and the probability is that there were far from that

many. I cannot refrain from pointing out that Fynn includes in this narrative much that he cannot have seen or heard from his point of vantage. On the other hand he does not make it clear by what means the Zulus cut off the retreat of the enemy. What he seems to be describing is the action of the “breast” of the Zulu army.

158 For good examples of how they lured on and surrounded their adversaries see, in addition to the passages given below, Woodys account Cap. Bird, op. cit., p. 385) of their defeat of BiggaFs party, and BosKof’s story of the disaster of Uys and Potgieter (ap. Ibid., p. 410 sqq.). The most remarkable narrative of the entire Zulu-Boer conflict, and a real epic, as it seems to me, told by one of its heroes, is the journal of Charl Colliers (ap. Ibid., p. 238 sqq). Voigt, op. cit., vols, 1 and 2, has taken particular pains to analyze and to illustrate with diagrams- the tactical movements of these battles. Cf. also H. H. Parr, Sketch of the Kafir and Zulu Wars, London, 1880, p. 112 sqq. The following account of the Uys-Potgieter affair is given by F. Owen (Gburch Mission. Rec, 1838, p. 273 sqq.; ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 357), his informant being “a Scotchman in their party”: “The despot’s army [i. e. Dingaan’s] was drawn up on some rocks; through, which there was a narrow pass, from which the Boers were to make their egress, before they could reach the royal residence. The rocks formed a half circle; on each quadrant sat a division of the Zoolu army,,guarding the pass. A third division remained at some distance, to fall on,the rear of the Boers as soon as they had entered the ground which the Zoolus had chosen for the fight. By this means they hoped to surround them, and prevent all opportunity of escape. Peter Uys divided his men into two principal parties, which were to commence with the two divisions of Zoolus who were arranged on the rocks. A smaller division, under Cobus Uys, was stationed by itself, with orders not to attack the third party of Zoolus unless they should happen to make the first onset. The division which Peter Uys commanded advanced and fired. The party of the enemy whom this division attacked were quickly put to the rout. Meanwhile, the other main division of the Boers met with a signal defeat. Having fired not more than sixteen shots, they fled. The Zoolus, returning from the pursuit, and being quickly joined by the other two divisions, now hemmed in the remaining Boers. [Here follows the piteous story of the death of Uys and his son.] The Boers, being surrounded by the enemy, who were vastly their superiors in numbers, continued the fight for about an hour and a half, keeping up a continued fire, dismounting, and advancing several paces till they were able to take a steady aim at their adversaries, and then retreating to their horses — which are trained to stand perfectly still in the midst of this noise and firing — mounting and loading. On the other hand, the Zooms were not able to come sufficiently near to take steady aim with their spears — which on this occasion they threw—before they were shot, Thus about 500 of them were killed, though some reckoned their loss at 1,000. At length, the Boers, unable to make their enemy retreat, were obliged to effect a retreat for themselves; which they accomplished by directing a fire simultaneously to one point of the ring; and having thus made a lane with their guns through the Zoolus, they rode over the dead bodies and escaped “Of the last fight in the campaign of 1838 against Dingaan, we have from Pretorius, the Boer commander, the following account (ap Bird, op. cit, p 235): “Two of Dingaan’s spies had fallen into our hands, and they used the opportunity to mislead us. They told us that after the battle on the Sunday [i. e. Blood River], the Zulus had never rallied. They were utterly disheartened, and could not be mustered again; but that countless cattle were in the ravines below. We believed them, and were led into an ambushade. Looking down from the heights, we saw countless objects moving in the low ground, which we mistook for cattle. These were Kafirs They used the stratagem of creeping on hands and feet through open spaces between the thickets, having their shields of ox-hide on their backs’ This at

a great distance, and from above, gave them the appearance of cattle. We moved down the heights, and had come near the Kafirs before the error was discovered. The alarm was given, and Landman and others ordered a retreat; but we found ourselves surrounded by thousands of Kafirs, and had to fight our way through them. We effected this without losing a man. But when we had regained the heights, a throng of Kafirs was still between us and our encampment, their object being to intercept us.”

159 Isaacs, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 180.

160 Isaacs, vol. 2, p. 242.

161 Cf. Junod, op. cit., p. 423 sqq.

162 Kidd, op. cit., p. 315 sqq.

163 Fynn, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 79; cf. Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 312; 320.

164 Champion, Mission. Herald, 1838, p. 210.

165 Fynn, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 80.

166 Isaacs, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 182; Smith, ap. Ibid., p. 262.

167 Fynn, ap. Ibid., p. 122.

168 Isaacs, vol. 1, p. 343; Arbousset, op. cit., p. 280.

169 Isaacs, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 232; cf. Shooter, op. cit., p. 280 sq.

170 Gardiner, op. cit., p. 99.

171 Isaacs, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 278,

172 See also Gardiner, op. cit., p. 143. This was the point at which, not unnaturally, the system of Dingiswayo and Chaka broke down first. Vide supra, p. 203.

173 L. Séehan, art. *Saltatio*, in Daremberg and Saglio, *Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines*.

174 Plato, *Opera*, ed. Stallbaum, Leipzig, 1821 sqq., *Leges*, VII, 815a.

175 Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae*, ed. Kaibel, Leipzig, 1887 sqq., XIV, 631a.

176 A. H. Lybyer, *The government of the Ottoman Empire in the time of Suleiman the Magnificent*, Harvard Historical Studies, vol. 18, Cambridge, 1913.

177 Delegorgue, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 227.

W.R. Connor

The Greeks had little love for wild Ares. His temples and statues were sparse. Athena always came out the victor in battles between the two of them. His hair filled with dirt as he fell to cover seven acres with his body. The artisans accepted him only in naked form; they denied him his helmet; his spear off to one side, abandoned on a chair, diagonally placed, no longer a symbol — more a bit of decoration.¹

These lines from Yannis Ritsos' "Expiation" stand in sharp contrast to the assessment of the role of war in ancient Greek society offered by leading ancient historians over the past few decades.² Beginning in the 1950s, and increasingly in the 1960s and 1970s, many classical scholars concluded that ancient Greece was a war culture: it derived its values from war, it accepted war as something inevitable and natural, its citizens went out to fight every spring with the same regularity that blood-red cyclamens brighten the Greek hillsides.³ Arnaldo Momigliano, speaking in 1954 at the second International Congress of Classical Studies, was one of the first to argue this view:

War was an ever present reality in Greek life; it was a focus for emotions, ethical values, social rules . . . War was the centre of Greek life. Yet the amount of attention that Greek political thinkers gave to causes of war is negligible in comparison to the attention they paid to constitutional changes . . . The reason, I suspect, is that the Greeks came to accept war as a natural fact like birth and death about which nothing could be done.⁴

The idea of controlling wars, like the idea of the emancipation of women and the idea of birth control, is part of the intellectual revolution of the XIX century and meant a break with the classical tradition of historiography about wars.⁵

In his Vanier lectures, published in 1972, Eric Havelock helped support this view by providing a more secure conceptual basis. He drew on the work of psychologists and social biologists and his own studies devoted to literacy. The title of the lectures reveals much of the approach — "War as a Way of Life in Classical Culture".⁶ Havelock owed much to studies of aggression and territoriality by Konrad Lorenz and others; the idea of "cultural programming" was especially important in his thinking. He applied that idea to Homer, Herodotus and Thucydides, whose texts he believed "yield up the secret of a joint partnership in a literary enterprise, one which proved decisive in

placing organised warfare at the heart of the European value system”.⁷ In Havelock’s view these authors not only exalted war, they legitimized it and encouraged its persistent prominence in European civilization.

Later Jacqueline de Romilly, Sir Kenneth Dover and others joined in emphasizing the universality of war among the Greeks.⁸ The late Sir Moses Finley also lent his support to this view — “War was a normal part of life . . . hardly a year went by without requiring a formal decision to fight, followed by a muster and the necessary preparations, and finally combat at some level”⁹ — and in recent years showed a disposition to carry the argument one stage further. Not only was war “normal”, it was unopposed: “No one in the city-state world, and certainly no social class, was opposed to war, conquest and empire”.¹⁰ Behind these comments a radical re-evaluation of Greek civilization was under way, and entering a wider intellectual discourse. In Hannah Arendt’s *On Revolution*, for example, we find a similar view of the Greeks: “Since for the Greeks political life by definition did not extend beyond *the polis*, the use of violence seemed to them beyond the need for justification in the realm of what we today call foreign affairs”.¹¹

These scholars and critics are the best of their generation; yet, as we shall see, they are wrong or seriously misleading in several major respects. They have, moreover, slipped into the old habit of treating the various periods of Greek civilization and the various forms of warfare as a unity. They have thereby encouraged the view that the Greeks were as monolithic in their acceptance of the inevitability of war as they were ferocious in its conduct. As a result diversities, tensions and perplexities that were extremely important to ancient Greek civilization are reduced to a cliché which has the Greeks tell:

. . . with such high zest
To children ardent for some desperate glory
The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est
Pro patria mori.¹²

This approach obscures much of the diversity of view to be found among various Greeks about war — their disagreements and dissensions, the diversity of practice and the inner division between a recognition of the inevitability of war if independence is to be maintained and horror at some of its consequences.

To explore the full complexity of the role of war in Greek society would be a lengthy task. Within the confines of this essay, however, it is possible to ask what was the role of land warfare among the Greeks in the sixth and early fifth centuries B.C. What was it like? How common was it? Above all, how did it function and relate to other aspects of their society? This is but a small part of a larger stoyi, but it

may help clarify some important questions about the Greeks.

First, was war really as endemic as we have been told? It certainly seems so as we read through the pages of Greek literature: the battles of the *Iliad*, the marching songs of Tyrtaeus, Aeschylus' tragedies "full of Ares",¹³ and above all the historians — Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius — for whom war defined the opportunity for historical writing. Surely war was an extremely important fact for that culture and its writers. But to gauge its frequency by its prominence in literature would be to commit the historiographical fallacy — mistaking literary representation for historical fact. That fallacy obscures two important differences in warfare among the Greeks: first, a difference over time; and secondly, a difference by type of state.

This is well illustrated by Frank Frost's recent study of Athenian warfare from the late seventh until the late sixth century B.C.¹⁴ Volunteer expeditions, freebooting, civil strife, the use of mercenary troops are all well attested in this period, but an official call-up of the citizens for a real war is hard to find. Frost concludes that his "catalogue of Athenian military ventures ... is surprisingly modest for a people who are supposed to be so fond of fighting" and that "no regular mobilization seems to have taken place".¹⁵ The average Athenian male of military age was not marching out to war every spring in the sixth century B.C. If he chose, he could probably have lived out his modest life expectancy without ever having joined in a battle.

His descendants in the next century, the era of Athenian hegemony, could not lead such a quiet life. The shift was a dramatic one, coinciding with the fall of the Pisistratid tyranny, the increasing threat from Persia and Cleisthenes' restructuring of civic institutions, many of which, recent scholarship has pointed out, were designed to make the city more effective militarily.¹⁶ The reorganization of Athens into ten tribes, for example, provided a more effective basis for Athens' military power. That new system enabled Athens to take the leadership against the Persians and eventually to dominate many Greek states. At this time Athens was developing a new sense of itself and of its place in the Greek world. Soon it took on a hegemonic role among the Greeks. As it did so, it naturally found itself drawn with increasing frequency into warfare.¹⁷ Thus Athens illustrates both the distinctions alluded to earlier in this discussion: the extent of warfare changes over time and by type of state — hegemonic ambitions were far from universal among the Greeks, but their occurrence regularly led to an increased frequency of war. The case of Athens provides, therefore, a warning against the generalization that the Greeks were constantly at war throughout their history. Even Athens was not always at war. Nor was Sparta, as Finley himself pointed out some

years ago, especially eager to engage in warfare.¹⁸ Often commercial states (for example, Corinth), festival centres (for example, Elis) or states with few hegemonic ambitions and relatively restrained neighbours (for example, Megara, Sicyon, Phlius and many of the islands) could enjoy protracted tranquillity.¹⁹

Some of what has now become orthodox doctrine about war among the Greeks needs, therefore, to be modified. Yet, although we need to be more cautious in assessing the frequency of war, its importance in ancient Greek civilization is not in dispute. A proper assessment of its role, however, depends on the recognition that historians cannot rely on what the ancient Greeks *said* about war, but must examine closely how war was conducted and how it related to other parts of civic life.²⁰ At the same time scholarly developments in other historical periods where stimulating work has been done on the connection between war and economic, social and cultural setting provide useful analogies and methods. A close examination of land warfare among the Greek city-states of the archaic and early classical periods shows that for the Greeks war was more than tactics, strategy and gore; it was linked to almost every aspect of their social organization and to their rich imaginative life. The significance of war in early Greek civilization, it can be seen, is not to be measured by its frequency but by its symbolic power.

But when we ask what a land war was like for the city-states of continental Greece during this period, it is surprising, after all the attention classicists have paid to military history, how hard it is to find a comprehensive description of a typical land campaign.²¹ The next section of this essay pieces together as vivid a picture as possible — in effect, as “thick” a description as possible — in order to clarify the symbolic and cultural role of warfare among the Greeks.²²

I

A provocation has taken place that a city regards as a *casus belli*. Whatever the ultimate roots of the dispute, each party often presents its action as justified self-defence or as a legitimate response to an act of hubris, that is, some overreaching that the other state thinks it can get away with. The ancient sources, although they are often from later periods, probably replicate the widespread Greek practice of playing down questions of political ideology, economics or long-range shifts in the balance of power among states. These issues are often masked as a dispute over some border land, as a response to an offence arising out of some ritual matter or as the obligation to be loyal to some friendly state.²³ Whenever possible war is presented as a matter of honour rather than of economic or strategic interest.²⁴

Before war is undertaken an oracle will probably be consulted, most likely at a major pan-Hellenic centre such as Delphi. The response of the oracle will be discussed in the city's assembly before a final vote on war is taken. After that a herald should be sent forward to the enemy to declare war. All subsequent intercourse between the states will require the presence of a herald.²⁵

Before an expedition can take place, however, two further measures are needed. First, sacrifices must be made, to the protecting divinities of the town of course, but also in some states to Eros or to virgins, such as the Hyakinthidai in Athens, famed in myth for their devotion to the city.²⁶ Secondly, a decision must be made about which citizens are to take part in the expedition.²⁷ In fifth-century Athens ten commanders, elected annually, one from each tribe, saw that a list of names was posted by the Eponymous Heroes, that is, by the monument with the statues of the ten mythological figures after whom the Athenian tribes were named.²⁸ Those whose names are listed know that they are to appear on a certain day, with equipment and their own provisions for food supply.²⁹

For the main body of troops the equipment is heavy armour, *hopla* — shield, breastplate, helmet, greaves, an eight-foot thrusting-spear, sword or dagger. These heavy-armed troops — the hoplites — take their name from that armour; the investment is considerable: these men are not necessarily aristocrats, but they are certainly not poor. Their weapons would require an expenditure equivalent to several months' wages at the rates for moderately skilled craftsmen.³⁰ Since rations are not supplied by a quartermaster corps, some food would be brought along and the rest purchased at special markets *en route*. A slave, and perhaps a mule, to help carry tent, bedroll and miscellaneous equipment would be very welcome.

The appointed time for departure is normally an early summer morning after the quarter moon, for the Greeks — the enlightened rational Greeks — waited until the moon and the omens were auspicious.³¹ After individual vows and farewells, the army moves out, and with it a large percentage of the population. Athens sent nine thousand hoplites against the Persians at Plataea, probably almost all its available land troops. Fifty years later, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the city could dispose thirteen thousand citizen hoplites of military age plus sixteen thousand older citizens and metics who could guard the walls and do garrison duty.³² Even smaller cities would find that with allies, cavalry and light-armed troops a fighting force of well over ten thousand could often be mustered. In addition, heralds, traders who aim to buy the booty and perhaps jugglers, dancers, singers, whores — anyone who thinks a profit could be turned by going along — each with gear and noise

form a great audience for the coming spectacle.³³ Sacrificial animals, especially goats, accompany them, with shepherds of course to keep them together. But the army itself need not be herded in very close order. There was a tacit understanding among Greek poleis that you did not ambush or otherwise try to surprise a hoplite force.³⁴ Non-Greeks, Greeks who were not organized in true poleis, poleis that were fighting with light-armed troops might try to gain an advantage in that way — but the heavy-armed troops of a self-respecting city would regard such a surprise attack as *apate*, deception, legitimate in some military situations but not in hoplite battles.³⁵

Indeed when they finally draw close to the other city some agreement, tacit or explicit, determines when and where the two forces will engage.³⁶ The reliance on heavy armour dictates a plain — good agricultural land, usually on the periphery of the invaded territory.³⁷ The attackers, after making suitable sacrifices at the border, might ravage the enemy's territory for some while if he hesitated to engage them, mocking and taunting at any opportunity.³⁸ But at last the two armies, ritually purified, armour polished, are grouped in tribal regiments, ready to fight. Each hoplite straps a circular shield on the left arm, and carries a thrusting-spear in his right hand.³⁹

The best fighters are stationed in the front and to the rear.⁴⁰ Behind the front rank, another and then another, regularly eight of them, in later times sometimes sixteen, even fifty. If we allow 6 feet per man and eight men deep, a phalanx of ten thousand men would reach approximately 7,500 feet in length — the full width of many small Greek plains.⁴¹ On the flanks, light-armed troops and cavalry are stationed to prevent encirclement and to move in for the kill when one of the two armies gives way. Just before, the engagement omens are taken;⁴² sacrificial animals are slaughtered in the sight of all.⁴³ Under other circumstances the sequel to such killing would normally be a sacrificial meal with its correlative the strengthening of communal ties among those bound together by the ritual and the fellowship of the meal.⁴⁴ But in war the immediate sequel is the shedding of more blood.⁴⁵

Each commander now gives a short speech of encouragement, and then most likely takes his place in the front ranks. Since there is now little room for manoeuvring or brilliant strategy, the commanders have no reason to stand aside from the fray. A trumpet sounds or someone from one army moves forward carrying a lighted torch and casts it into the ranks of the enemy.⁴⁶ The two armies are now moving forward, sometimes on the double.⁴⁷ This is the moment for the battle-cry, whose name, *alalai* or *alalalai*, gives an onomatopoeic hint of its chilling sound.⁴⁸

The pattern of the fighting itself has been much disputed in recent years, perhaps because the actual pattern varied from battle to battle or even from hour to hour.⁴⁹ Sometimes there seem to have been individual engagements, perhaps for an extended period of time. In these each soldier's dexterity and agility were crucial. But a characteristic feature of the hoplite battle is the *othismos*, the thrust, compelling the enemy to give ground, often by locking shield against shield and driving the opposing force backward.⁵⁰ Eventually one side gives way, turning, running, every man for himself. The break is called the *trope*, "the turning" — a physical turning, but also the transformation of collective anonymous combat into hand-to-hand fights with sword or dagger, scenes of supplication, armour thrown away, headlong flight to the hills or to some local shrine for safety, the closing-in of the light-armed troops and pursuit by the cavalry — deaths, more deaths.⁵¹ Anonymous, narrativeless combat is suddenly turned into a replica of the Homeric battle scenes.⁵²

Pursuit would not go very far, nor would the victorious army move rapidly to follow up on its advantage.⁵³ The battlefield remains the focus of attention, for much work is still to be done. The enemy dead must be stripped of their armour; the victor's dead gathered, identified and readied for burial.⁵⁴ The victorious commanders now garland themselves and their troops in celebration of the victory and in honour of the gods.⁵⁵ The troops construct a victory marker, called a *trophæion*, a word related to the term for the "turning" (*trope*). The *trophæion* should be located "at the spot where the battle had turned about: weapons looted from the enemy, armour, helmets, shields and spears are hung about an oak post ... the *trophæion* is an image of Zeus, the lord of victory".⁵⁶

When the defeated had regrouped they would send a herald asking for a truce to take up their dead. Under Greek custom the victor could not honourably refuse such a truce — called the *spoudaia* the pouring of libations.⁵⁷ But the request combined with the control of the battlefield is the definition of victory and the request for the bodies a sure mark of defeat.⁵⁸ This is true no matter what the strategic implications of the battle might be.

Before long the captives would be ransomed by friends or relatives; fixed amounts govern the ransom and a strong cultural norm, sometimes violated by the Greeks and sometimes misunderstood by modern scholars, discourages the enslavement of Greeks captured in a hoplite battle.⁵⁹ Enslavement could be expected in some other situations, but not in land battles waged by hoplites.⁶⁰

Next the spoils of battle must be divided. These may be substantial, given the vast wealth that moves with such an army. The taking of booty was perhaps the largest movement of capital in Greek civic

life.⁶¹ Figures easily reach into the hundreds of talents, and in later periods thousands are not uncommon.⁶² The allocation of this booty is understandably a major matter of concern. First, “the top of the pile”, the *akrothinia* is set aside as a tithe, a real tenth, for the gods — usually through a dedication at Delphi or another pan-Hellenic sanctuary where all could see it.⁶³ Here war and poetry intersect: some Simonides should be found to write a suitable epigram for the victory. The remaining bronze armour and the proceeds from the ransoming normally go to the city, perhaps with a specified share for the commanders.⁶⁴ In addition, of course, there are purses and small pieces of booty taken by individual soldiers.

As a result of a hoplite battle, in other words, wealth moves from the private into the public realm, often through public-work projects — temples, parks or fortifications.⁶⁵ Commemoration through these projects and through dedications is extremely important, perhaps even more so than following up on the strategic advantage, if any, of the battle. Greek commanders sometimes seem much more concerned with the proper commemoration of their victory than in anything Clausewitz would tell them to do. Apart from the anomalous seizure of Messenia by the Spartans, territorial acquisition, for example, appears primarily in the change of sovereignty over marginal border lands. Each state retains control over its main agricultural land. Nor do we often find in this period a victorious hoplite force attempting to change the form of government of a state whose hoplite army has been defeated — to substitute a democracy for an oligarchy, for example. The ideology of ancient Greek land warfare, the representation of war as a matter of honour, affects its conduct and results. Underlying the violence and destruction of war is a logic based not on the use of war as a means to certain ends but on its effectiveness as a way of self and civic representation.

The dramatic change at the moment of the *trope* — the shift from collective to individual fighting — reappears at the end of the battle through the censure of those who left the expedition at some point (*lipostratia*) and through awards to those who distinguished themselves in courage (*aristeia*).⁶⁶ There follows the return home with due festivity; some evidence indicates the existence of victory processions in early Greece, although nothing like the Roman triumph or the Byzantine ceremony of *adventus*.⁶⁷ Surely much festivity and revelry follow a victory — happy celebrations, but also a way of re-establishing the unity of the community.⁶⁸

That unity is demonstrated above all in the honouring of the war dead. By the late fifth century the Athenians cremated the dead on the battlefield in tribal pyres; the ashes of the fallen were then brought back to Athens, kept in tribal caskets for civic burial.⁶⁹ And at the end

of the campaigning season would be held a public funeral ceremony consisting of an oration in honour of the fallen, funeral games and a funeral feast for the relatives of the dead.⁷⁰ The final commemoration, however, is a memorial consisting of names, just names, name after name after name, arranged by tribe. Once again we have a movement from the private to the public realm. Naming for the Greeks, as for us, is a family matter; but in war the polis controls the names, not only in conscription, but in the award of honours at the end of the battle, in regulating what display a commander may make of his success and above all in the tribal monuments honouring the dead.⁷¹ These, unlike the battlefield *trophæion*, are intended to be permanent. As the impermanence of the trophy marks the transitoriness of human relationships, especially interstate ties of all sorts, the inscribed names of the dead mark the endurance that comes from the merging of the individual into the community.⁷²

II

The peculiarities of this pattern of warfare are evident to us, as they were to some critics in antiquity. Herodotus, for example, has Mardonius, the Persian commander, say:

And yet, I am told, these very Greeks are wont to wage wars against one another in the most foolish way, through sheer perversity and doltishness. For no sooner is war proclaimed than they search out the smoothest and fairest plain that is to be found in all the land, and there they assemble and fight; whence it comes to pass that even the conquerors depart with great loss: I say nothing of the conquered for they are destroyed altogether.⁷³

Herodotus has Mardonius give expression to a reaction that many Greeks of the fifth century are likely to have shared. Yet, as the historical Mardonius found out, the system was highly effective, especially against the Persians. Yet its military effectiveness did not prevent extensive codification and thorough ritualization. Both features demand comment.

First, codification. It is now widely recognized that systems of warfare are often encoded, in two senses of the word. Military conduct in many cultures is governed by elaborate codes or standards of behaviour; it can also be encoded in another and more interesting sense — as an encapsulation of social roles and values. Such codes may represent relationships within the society and sometimes help resolve conflicts and tensions between social groups or values. In early Greek land warfare the tensions between the possessors of heavy armour and other groups within the society, between individual and collective action, between glory and advantage, mercy and severity,

guile and openness, are all encoded within the system of land warfare.

The code was incorporated in a series of unwritten “laws of the Greeks”, widely recognized, although not universally followed, in antiquity.⁷⁴ Polybius calls attention to the code when he contrasts the warfare of his own era with that of earlier times. The Greeks of those days, he wrote:

would not even consent to get the better of their enemies by fraud, regarding no success as brilliant or secure unless they crushed the spirit of their adversaries in open battle. For this reason they entered into a convention among themselves to use against each other neither secret missiles nor those discharged from a distance, and considered that it was only a hand to hand battle at close quarters which was truly decisive. Hence they preceded war by a declaration, and when they intended to do battle gave notice of the fact and of the spot to which they would proceed and array their army. But at the present they say it is a sign of poor generalship to do anything openly in war.⁷⁵

Polybius may be mistaking the existence of a code for its effective operation. But even so, he points to a phenomenon of great interest in the study of early Greek history.⁷⁶ Three aspects are especially relevant to the present enquiry. First, the practical effects of such a code. There is some evidence that the code of warfare and its related practices occasionally diminished or eliminated some of the violence in warfare. When an oracle was consulted, it sometimes warned against the war or urged postponement—even for a full generation.⁷⁷ Omens taken before battle might encourage delay or even cause a temporary withdrawal of the enemy’s force. The resolution of conflicts by combat between one or more champions from each side was not an especially effective device, but its recurrent use points to another possible way of minimizing violence. More common, and perhaps more effective, was the supplication ritual and the conventions governing the ransoming of prisoners — a counterbalance to some of the fury and slaughter of the battle. We can begin to see why, then, the concern with supplication was so central in the literature of the archaic and classical periods of Greece. The destructive effects of ancient warfare were, as will shortly be seen, intense, but to some small degree the code may have served to prevent even greater violence.

A second and more significant aspect of its operation, however, was its validation of a social hierarchy. Excessive concentration on the practical effects of the code may obscure this important effect. The agreement to which Polybius called attention in the passage cited above prohibited the use of certain types of projectiles in an early Greek conflict, probably the Lelantine War.⁷⁸ The agreement has often been seen as a proto-Geneva Convention aimed at making warfare

more humane. This may indeed have been one of its effects, but a more immediate purpose may have been to minimize the role of the slingers and other light-armed troops and to ensure the central role of hoplites. Similar considerations may have been behind agreements to resolve issues by single combat or by a battle of champions, and the reluctance of hoplite armies to overthrow the governments of enemy cities in which the hoplite classes dominated.⁷⁹ The code, in other words, reflects a degree of interstate solidarity among hoplites.

Thirdly, the code of warfare is closely connected with pan-Hellenic values and with the major pan-Hellenic sanctuaries. The logic behind this development can readily be surmised. Such codes are most effectively promulgated when the warriors share across country lines some sense of class identity. For the Greeks that contact came primarily through visits to the pan-Hellenic sanctuaries. Thus it is not surprising to find pan-Hellenic motifs both at the beginning and at the end of a campaign — first through the consultation of Delphi, and later through dedications at this or another pan-Hellenic sanctuary. Nor is it surprising to find wars postponed or special truces for the observance of pan-Hellenic festivities. These three aspects of the code — its practical effects, its validation of social ranking and its connection to pan-Hellenic identity — all point to its centrality in early Greek culture.

The second characteristic of such land warfare is its elaborate ritualization. The term “ritualization” may require explanation: it does not imply that the violence of war was unreal or perfunctory. Xenophon’s description of a hoplite battlefield of the fourth century B.C. should dispel that notion even for an earlier period: “the earth stained with blood, friend and foe lying dead side by side, shields smashed to pieces, spears snapped in two, daggers bared of their sheaths, some on the ground, some embedded in the bodies, some yet gripped by the hand”.⁸⁰ Xenophon’s picture is confirmed by a recent study of the figures for battle casualties in such battles during the period 472–371 B.C. Peter Krentz estimates that on average the victorious side lost about 5 per cent of its force in a hoplite battle in this period; the losing side approximately 14 per cent.⁸¹ Picture the effects of such casualties on a cadre of twenty-year-olds after ten years of fighting one hoplite battle a year. By the time they reached thirty, fewer than forty of the original hundred would be alive. These figures should be taken seriously by those who think that most Greek cities were annually engaged in one or more hoplite battles. Given the high rate of mortality in antiquity from other causes, the hoplite class under such circumstances almost certainly could not reproduce itself.⁸² The figures are also a reminder that the code governing early Greek land warfare was far from eliminating its destructiveness.

Although the violence in such battles was real enough, its structure conformed to and conveyed cultural norms, and corresponded to other ritual acts of great importance to the culture. In that sense it was “ritualized”. Walter Burkert has provided a useful key to understanding this ritualization by observing that in Greek antiquity “war may almost appear like one great sacrificial action”.⁸³ This is not mere simile. Many of the elements in such warfare are correlatives of those in ritual sacrifice among the Greeks: the sequence of procession, violent blow, the spilling of blood, the burning of flesh and the pouring of libations that stands at the centre of the sacrificial ritual is paralleled by the sequence in the land battle: the march into battle, the blood spilled in the fighting, the funeral pyres and the truce (called the *spondaic* the “libations”). Furthermore the cry of the women at the moment of sacrifice, the *ololugmos*, has its echo in the soldiers’ battle-cry, the *alalagmos*.⁸⁴ The garlanding after the battle adapts to warfare another practice from sacrificial ritual.

The sacrificial pattern helps explain some of the structure of ancient land warfare: an abortive sacrifice before battle (sacrifice without the burning of the animal flesh and without a ceremonial meal) is replaced by another form of sacrifice in the battle itself. Once the battle is over, the sacrificial pattern is reasserted in the garlanding, libations and eventually in the funeral feast. The significance of this pattern is not to be found in the persistence of neolithic or earlier hunting rituals, as Burkert sometimes suggests, but in the usual outcome of sacrifice in the ancient world — community-building through a shared meal.⁸⁵ As often in ancient ritual the community divides, projects an image of itself that illuminates its inner relationships, and then converges in festivity and unity.⁸⁶ Yet there is a further aspect: the ambiguity of emotion at animal sacrifice — the division between exultation in the offering and delight in the meal on one side, and the horror of the deed on the other, so well brought out in Burkert’s *Homo Necans* — is the perfect expression of the ambiguity of Greek reactions to war.

These ritual elements helped make the Greek pattern of hoplite warfare a very powerful symbolic system. We can best understand this by looking more closely at the division and reunification of the community in such warfare. The polis is divided at first into two groups, each of which may become engaged in fighting before the campaign is over. The first group, largely military-age males and their logistical support, leaves the city in order to do battle. The second group, consisting of older men, women and children, remains at home but, if need be, will fight on the walls, from the roof-tops and from street to street to defend the city. The first group receives the greatest attention, both in antiquity and in modern times, but the second is

strategically no less important. It has, moreover, the prerogative of judging the conduct of the first group, praising and honouring valour, and condemning individuals or even whole expeditions for cowardice, as the Corinthians did when their expeditionary force returned claiming victory over the Athenians but without having set up a trophy in the Megrid.⁸⁷

Warfare, then, represents division within the community and a potential for inner as well as external strife. This is perhaps hinted at before the departure of the expedition by sacrifices to Eros or to legendary maidens who gave their lives to ensure the success of the community in war.⁸⁸ Such sacrifices, for example to the Hyakinthidai at Athens, mark, as Walter Burkert puts it, “the turning away from love to war”.⁸⁹ At the end of the campaign the community is reintegrated through festivities and celebrations, if victory has been achieved, or in any event, by the commemoration of the war dead.

The campaign, in other words, becomes a closed system. This is evident in several further respects: at an early stage there is the consultation of Delphi, at the end the dedication of spoils at this or some other pan-Hellenic shrine. In these dedications themes such as retaliation against hubris, the involvement of the gods, the importance of personal and civic honour that are prominent at the beginning of a campaign reappear, often given expression through verse on dedications or other monuments. They are prominent, for example, in the Athenian epigram on the occasion of their defeat of the Boeotians and Euboeans around 506 B.C.:

When Chalcis and Boeotia dared her might,
Athens subdued their pride in valorous fight;
Gave bonds for insult; and, the ransom paid,
From the full tenths these steeds for Pallas made.⁹⁰

The power of such a symbolic system derives in large part from its ability to provide a coherent way of looking at the world, of seeing and interpreting experience. In war, where grief and horror can so readily overwhelm human understanding, fragment communities and shatter individual personality and the willingness to contribute to civic goals, the coherence of such a ritualized system is consoling and compelling.

At the same time it may have wider implications. Although it is no more effective than the elaborate codification in minimizing the destructiveness of war, it too has important effects on society. The ritual elements provide a powerful way of representing the central place of the hoplite class within the polis and of strengthening the institutions whereby it governed. It has long been recognized, of course, that a Greek hoplite army is a stylized, selective representation

of the social and political system of the archaic and early classical polis.⁹¹ It shows the structure of the city — its social patterns, religion, age-ranking, etc. But it is also a very selective representation. In classical Athens, for example, special emphasis was placed on the importance of the Cleisthenic tribal system. The call-up notice is posted by the monument of the ten tribal heroes; the army fights by tribal divisions; normally ten commanders, one from each tribe, serve as its general staff; the bodies of the fallen are cremated in tribal pyres, their ashes mixed in tribal caskets, their names inscribed on tribal lists. Sometimes the funeral orations pronounced at the time of state burial use the example of the tribal heroes to commend the sacrifice of the soldiers who had fallen in the year's campaigns and thereby to hold up a model of the relationship between individual and state. For the tribal heroes were not mere names; they were examples of individual sacrifice for common good, and hence models for the new Athenian civic order that flourished through the involvement and contributions of a large portion of its citizens. This is well illustrated by passages in various funeral orations, including the encomium of the war dead of the Erechtheid tribe included in the funeral speech ascribed to Demosthenes:

those from the Erechtheid tribe knew that their eponym Erechtheus had let his daughters, who are called the Hyacinthidae, go to a conspicuous death in order to save his country. They felt it would be disgraceful if one who had descended from the immortals did everything possible for the freedom of the country, while they placed greater value on a mortal body than on undying glory.⁹²

The selectivity of the representation of civic order is evident throughout. The emphasis on bronze armour, for example, through its display in musters and parades, its use on trophies and the later practice of presenting suits of armour to the orphaned boys of those who had died in war, etc., validates the pre-eminence of the hoplite class. The massed use of such armour, moreover, defines this type of combat and the individual's role in it. Its use is also presented as a mark of the contrast between Greek and barbarian.⁹³ Owning such armour is required if one is to march out of the city as a hoplite; retaining the armour is essential if you are to return from war in honour. "With your shield or on it", said the Laconic mother — and if she did not mean it, the culture did.⁹⁴ The use of this type of armour determined the choice of the "smoothest and fairest place" for the battlefield; the stripping of this armour from the dead was a mark of victory, selling it was the principal way wealth was acquired in warfare, setting up the trophy involved transforming such armour into a sacred memorial. And the culmination of the campaign was the dedication of armour — especially shields — in the sanctuaries of the

gods. Ancient Greek land warfare revolves about bronze armour, just as it revolves about the hoplite class.⁹⁵ By attaching such significance to the armour its possessors are themselves given a central role in society and its survival. Light-armed troops and cavalry — not to mention the fleet and its “naval rabble”, the *nautikos ochlos* — however great their military potential, are made to seem quite peripheral.⁹⁶

The Attic war memorials sometimes provide a further indication of the relative social status of hoplites and of other groups of warriors. Some of these inscriptions list the fallen and then add, as if an afterthought, the names of the archers who had also given their lives in the campaigns of the year.⁹⁷ The pattern, however, is not the result of carelessness; it reflects the attitude that denied full civic status to the lowest economic class, the *thetes*, and that, even in Aristotle’s day, viewed citizenship as a function of service in the hoplite ranks.⁹⁸

Again, as was apparent in the discussion of the codification of warfare, the structure works across city lines, and tends to exclude certain patterns of warfare that might otherwise be expected. It helps explain, for example, why many Greek cities were slow to exploit the advantages of peltasts and other comparatively light-armed troops, and when at war with another Greek state avoided the obvious strategy of holding the mountain passes and waging wars of attrition.⁹⁹ Twentieth-century history amply establishes how effective these techniques can be in a Greek setting. If we understand that hoplite warfare was in large part a way of representing and validating social relationships within and between poleis, it becomes easy to recognize the problems this form of warfare would pose. For it would tend to devalue the status of the hoplite class. As modern guerrilla warfare shows, the successful application of such techniques entails the use of highly mobile troops, men the Greeks would call *psiloi*. And these — slingers, archers, javelin-hurlers — were traditionally drawn from those classes in society that could not afford the investment in heavy armour. To put them at the centre of a campaign, however effective it might prove tactically, would be to elevate their civic status at the expense of the hoplite classes, and risk eventual political repercussions.¹⁰⁰

A similar consideration may help clarify why for a long time no Greek state encouraged slave revolts or defections or tried to exploit the grievances of marginal groups denied full civic status, for example those who dwelt in outlying regions of certain poleis. Nor did Greek states in this period use the rhetoric of ideology or social revolution, AH these would be heard, loud and strong, in later decades, but not in our period.

For Athens a great change took place during the Peloponnesian

War, when a desperate strategic situation required every possible effort for survival. The armour of Athenian hoplites was modified for lightness and manoeuvrability, and increasing use was made of light-armed troops.¹⁰¹ The general Demosthenes seems to have made some especially significant innovations in the use of light-armed troops.¹⁰² Inevitably these innovations were controversial and thereby had political as well as military implications. They might be used to validate the claims of non-hoplite groups for even greater power in a society that some thought had already become an excessively radical democracy. The emergence of new patterns of political leadership in this period, often associated with Cleon, is likely to be linked to these military changes.

The intensity of feeling associated with these changes is reflected in one of the most popular media of the day — Attic tragedy. The rituals and codes of hoplite warfare had long had analogues in the recurrent themes of Greek tragedy — supplication, oracles and their interpretation, the willingness to risk war, the burial of the dead, especially war dead, devotion to the common codes of the Greeks.¹⁰³ These themes are not purely mythic or literary; they reflect matters of life and death for every military-age male in the audience. Similarly, the social tensions behind the political and military changes can also be detected in Athenian drama. In Euripides' *Heracles Driven Mad*, for example, the heavy-handed tyrant Lycus belittles Heracles by calling him:

A man who, coward in everything else,
Made his reputation fighting beasts,
Who never buckled shield upon his arm,
Never came near a spear, but held a bow,
The coward's weapon, handy to run away.
The bow is no proof of manly courage;
No, your real man stands firm in the ranks
And dares to face the gash the spear may make.

These are the claims of the unregenerate hoplite fighter put in the mouth of one of Euripides' most melodramatic villains. Old Amphytrion gives him the lie:

Your spearsman is the slave of his weapons;
Unless his comrades in the ranks fight well,
... he dies, killed by their cowardice;
And once his spear, his sole defense, is smashed,
He has no means of warding death away.
But the man whose hands know how to aim the bow,
Holds the one best weapon: a thousand arrows shot,
He still has more to guard himself from death.

He stands far off, shooting at foes who see
 Only the wound the unseen arrow plows,
 While he himself, his body unexposed,
 Lies screened and safe. This is best in war:
 To preserve yourself and to hurt your foe
 ...
 Such are my arguments, squarely opposed
 To yours on every point at issue here.¹⁰⁴

Passages such as this remind us once again of the extraordinary changes that were taking place in fifth-century Athens. The forms of political life, cultural expression, religion, economics, philosophy were all being radically transformed, and with them land warfare and the codes governing it.

In Thucydides' work, in the plays of Euripides and in much of the literature of the age war has a central role.¹⁰⁵ But, as we have seen, the significance of war in Greek culture is not measured by its frequency or intensity, or even by its literary prominence. Land warfare for the early Greeks was an elaborate and stylized system; it constituted a code, functioned as a ritual, especially in its echoes of the Greek pattern of animal sacrifice, and as a representation of social reality. Its true significance is to be found in its close links to almost every major feature of the culture, including its religion, social structure and literature, and in its symbolic power and implications.

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1 Yannis Ritsos, *Exile and Return: Selected Poems, 1967–1974*, trans. Edmund Keeley (New York, 1985), pp. 85 f.

2 Ritsos' view about the cults of Ares, however, matches that of the leading scholar of ancient Greek religion, Walter Burkert. See Burkert's *Greek Religion*, trans. J. Raffan (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), pp. 169 f.

3 Behind the movements of the last generation, to be sure, is a long tradition including Max Weber's definition of the Greek polis as "a community of warriors": *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen, 1921), p. 558.

4 A. Momigliano, "Some Observations on Causes of War in Ancient Historiography", *Acta Congressus Madvigiani: Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Classical Studies, 1954*, i (Copenhagen, 1958), pp. 199–211; reprinted in his *Secondo contributo* (Rome, 1960), pp. 21 ff.; and *Studies in Historiography* (London, 1966), ch. 7.

5 *I bid.* y in *Secondo contributo* p. 25. Cf. Y. Garlan, *War in the Ancient World*, trans. J. Lloyd (London, 1975), pp. 16 f. The analogy to contraception is misleading: Geneva, for example, had already entered "the age of contraception" by the end of the seventeenth century: see P. Laslett, *The World We Have Lost* (New York, 1965), pp. 101, 132; and the Greeks of antiquity did not regard birth as something about which nothing could be done: see E. Eyben's survey, "Family

Planning in Antiquity”, *Ancient Soc.*, xi-xii (1980–1), pp. 5–82.

6 The lectures were published in E. Gareau (ed.), *Classical Values and the Modern World* (Ottawa, 1972), pp. 19–78.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 37.

8 J. de Romilly, “Guerre et paix entre cités”, in J. P. Vernant (ed.), *Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne* (Civilisations et sociétés, xi, Paris, 1968), pp. 207 ff. Note the criticisms of P. Ducrey, *Le traitement des prisonniers de guerre* (Ecoles françaises d’Athènes, xvii, Paris, 1968), p. 3.

Dover commented in *Greek Popular Morality* (Oxford, 1974), p. 315, “It being taken for granted that there must be wars (Xen. *Hell*, vi 3.15), just as there must always be bad weather, the practical problem was always a problem of when, where and how”. From such a comment one might forget that the passage under discussion (“wars are forever breaking out and being concluded”) is part of an argument for settling a war and arranging peace as quickly as possible.

9 M. I. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, 1983), p. 67, cf. p. 60: “there were . . . few years in the history of most Greek city-states (of Sparta and Athens in particular) and hardly any years in succession, without some military engagements”. A similar argument is presented by Garland, *War in the Ancient Worlds* p. 18. He argues that the alleged failure of the ancients to think deeply about the causes of war may be “because it was so widespread and perennial that it appeared to be outside human initiative and to fall within the domain of nature or the realm of the gods”. A passage that is often adduced as support of this view (Plato, *Laws*, 625 e ff.) is in fact a statement that one individual, Plato’s Cretan lawgiver, “condemned the stupidity of the mass of men in failing to perceive that all are involved ceaselessly in a lifelong war against all states . . . for . . . ‘Peace’... is nothing more than a name”. It does not establish that most Greeks thought war was the normal or natural state of affairs.

10 Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World*, p. 113, citing R. Meiggs, *Athenian Empire* (Oxford, 1972), ch. 21, and W. V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome* (Oxford, 1979), ch. 1. To show unanimity on questions of war among the Greeks Finley adduces only the Athenian decision to invade Sicily, by no means a typical event.

11 H. Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York, 1963), p. 2.

12 Wilfred Owen, “Dulce et Decorum Est”, in *Poems*, ed. E. Blunden (London, 1933), p. 66.

13 Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 1021.

14 F. Frost, “The Athenian Military before Cleisthenes”, *Historia*, xxxiii (1984), pp. 283–94.

15 *Ibid.*, pp. 292 f. Cf. H. van Effenterre, “Clisthène et les mesures de mobilisation”, *Revue des études grecques*, lxxxix (1976), p. 4. The Solonian law cited by Gaius *apud* Justinian’s *Digest*, 47.22.4, hints at the role of societies formed for profit from booty in early warfare.

16 On the military significance of Cleisthenes’ reforms, see P. Siewert, *Die Tnttyen Atlikās und die Heeresreform des Kleisthenes* (Vestigia, xxxiii, Munich, 1982). For a criticism of Siewert, see G. R. Stanton, “The Tribal Reforms of Kleisthenes”, *Chiron*, xiv(1984), pp. 1–41.

17 Under these circumstances one would expect a shift in the way the protecting goddess of the city was represented — an increasing emphasis on her warlike aspects would be a likely reflection of the new concerns of the polis. It is not surprising, then, to find that while the veneration of the old olive-wood, probably seated, Athena Polias continued, the goddess's iconography in the fifth century presented her in warlike aspect, both in the bronze Promachos and in the chryselephantine Parthenos. Cf. C.J. Herington, "Athena in Athenian Literature and Cult", *Parthenos and Parthenon*, supplement to *Greece and Rome*, x (1963), pp. 61–73.

18 M. I. Finley, "Sparta", in Vernant (ed.), *Problèmes de la guerre*, p. 154: "After the Second Messenian War and the sixth-century revolution, Sparta was, if anything, less willing to join battle than many other Greek states".

19 On Elis, see Diodorus Siculus, 8.1.3. There is evidence for frequent warfare between Thebes and opponents such as Tanagra, Corone and Thespieae (Herodotus, 5.79.2) and between Sparta and Arcadian cities such as Tegea (Herodotus, 1.67). Note, however, that it is by no means clear that these conflicts were always official state action. The example of Attica reminds us of the activities of groups of private citizens joined together for the acquisitions of war. See Frost, "Athenian Military before Cleisthenes", pp. 286–9.

20 Greek literature constantly deplores war, as has often been pointed out, most recently by Peter Karavites, "Greek Interstate Relations in the Fifth Century B.C.", *Parola del passato*, ccxvi (1984), pp. 163–5. See also P. Ducrey, *Warfare in Ancient Greece*, trans. J. Lloyd (New York, 1985).

21 Classical scholarship has clarified many individual points in Greek military procedure in recent years. Especially valuable are the volumes by W. K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*, four of which have now been issued by the University of California Press. The first of these originally appeared as *Ancient Greek Military Practice* (Univ. of California Publications in Classical Studies, vii, Berkeley, 1971).

22 The description in the text is a composite drawn from sources that apply to several Greek cities, especially Athens, during the archaic and early classical periods. Since Spartan military and social practices differed in important respects, evidence relating to Sparta has been used very sparingly. On Spartan military matters, see most recently J. F. Lazenby, *The Spartan Army* (Warminster, 1985).

23 Border disputes: the Cynourian land between Argos and Sparta, the *hiera orgas* dispute between Athens and Megara or the Oropus question between Athens and Boeotia.

Ritual matters: the obligations owed to the Athenians by the Aeginetans based on their possession of the figures of Damia and Auxesia (Herodotus, 5.82 f.); the Corcyreans' failure to allow the proper role for a Corinthian representative in matters of sacrifice (Thucydides, 1.25.4).

24 The *hiera orgas*, for example, so prominent in the common ancient view of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, was almost surely not prime farmland but a woody, mountainous tract, significant more for its links to the Eleusinian cult than for its economic value. See W. K. Pritchett, "The Attic Stelai", *Hesperia*, xxv (1956), p. 256.

25 On declarations of war, see Thucydides, 1.29.1, and the discussion in Ducrey, *Traitement des prisonniers de guerre*, p. 3. In times of especially intense

warfare a state might refuse to send heralds to or accept them from its opponent. This would result in an “undeclared war”, an *akeruktos polemos*, and might also preclude the usual truces for pan-Hellenic festivals such as the Olympic games (cf. Philostratus, *PenGymn.*, 7), rule out most forms of negotiated settlement and even prevent the truce for the taking-up of the dead after a battle. See J. L. Myers, “AKERUKTOS POLEMOS”, *Classical Rev.*, Ivii (1943), pp. 66 f.; Garland, *War in the Ancient World*, p. 48.

26 Some of these sacrifices were purificatory ones: see Onasander, 5. On sacrifices to Eros in Sparta, Crete and Thebes, see Athenaeus, 13.561e. On the Hyakinthidai *et al.*, see Burkert, *Greek Religion*, p. 267; Walter Burkert, *Homo Necans*, trans. P. Bing (Berkeley, 1983), pp. 64 f., who notes the parallel to the sacrifice of Makaria in Euripides, *Heraklidae*.

27 Was there also a norm of sexual abstinence before war? See Burkert, *Homo Necans*, p. 61 n. 12.

28 See A. Andrewes, “The Hoplite Katalogos”, in G. S. Shrimpton and D. J. McCargar (eds.), *Classical Studies Presented to M. McGregor* (Locust Valley, 1981). The system in theory provided that all hoplites would serve in turn, but it is likely that in practice provision was made for volunteers and for the generals to select individuals they knew would be especially valuable. Aristophanes shows us the reactions of a citizen who found his name on the list when he had not expected it. In the Athens of Aristotle’s day this was done by calling up certain age groups, each of which was associated with a hero; for example, the call might be for all hoplites from twenty to forty years old. Each annual group had a hero whose name could also be used to call up the troops. Thus the marshalled army was not simply an array of men of various ages but a network of protecting heroes. The system is described in the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia*, 53: see P. Rhodes’s commentary *ad loc.*; C. Habicht, “Neue Inschriften”, *Athenische Mitteilungen*, Ixxvi (1961), pp. 143–6; Vernant (ed.), *Problèmes de la guerre*, p. 163.

Exemptions from military service were extended to members of the boule, the annual magistrates, choreutai and a few others.

29 On problems of food supply caused by the absence of an adequate commissariat, see J. K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley, 1970), pp. 43–66.

30 The price of armour is hard to determine but may be estimated in two ways. U. Kahrstedt, *Staatsgebiet u. Staatsangehörige* (Studien zum öffentlichen Recht Athens, i, Göttingen, 1934), pp. 359 f., argued that at the end of the archaic period Athens sometimes subsidized the cost of purchasing armour by making a grant of approximately 30 drachmae to qualified individuals. This figure may not have covered the full cost of armour, to judge from estimates of the cost of bronze and workmanship. The price of bronze in fifth-century Athens may be derived from the material in M. Price, “Early Greek Bronze Coinage”, in C. M. Kraay and G. K. Jenkins (eds.), *Essays in Greek Coinage Presented to Stanley Robinson* (Oxford, 1968), p. 103. This suggests that at the level of 85 per cent copper and 15 per cent tin, bronze would cost approximately 65 drachmae per talent or about 2–6 drachmae per kilo. Such armour would surely weigh at least 10 kilos, perhaps a good deal more if a shield alone weighed 7–5 kilos, as estimated by P. Connolly, *Greece and Rome at War* (Englewood Cliffs, 1981), pp. 47 f.; cf. P. Krentz, “The Nature of Hoplite Battle”, *Classical Antiquity*, iv (1985), p. 52 n. 14. 10 kilos of bronze would cost about 26 drachmae, and the workmanship might well double the cost. In addition one would need a sword of high-quality iron, probably a

dagger as well, and a strong wooden shaft for the thrustingspear. These very crude calculations suggest 75–100 drachmae as a conservative estimate.

The second method of calculation is to work from the prices given to actual pieces of armour. This method is no less hazardous than the other, for the examples are so few and problematic. The most explicit evidence comes from mid-fourth-century Thasos: J. Pouilloux, *Recherches sur l'histoire et les cultes de Thasos*, i (Études Thasiennes, iii, Paris, 1954), no. 141, pp. 371–80. This implies a full suit of armour would cost not less than 3 *mnai*, or 300 drachmae — a high figure by comparison to those derived above and the (admittedly rather poor) evidence for classical Athens: see Pritchett, “Attic Stelai”, pp. 306–8. If we estimate a spear at between 2 and 3 drachmae and a shield at 20 drachmae, the range of 75–100 drachmae per outfit seems plausible. For an army of five thousand, the total cost of such armour would be between 60 and 80 talents; if the Thasian figures are correct, the armour for such an army would cost not less than 250 talents.

31 Pritchett, *Ancient Greek Military Practice*, p. 119. H. Popp, *Die Einwirkung von Vorzeichen, Opfern und Festen auf die Kriegführung der Griechen* (Erlangen diss., Würzburg, [1957]), showed that omens, etc., were taken very seriously. See also M. G. Goodman and A. J. Holladay, “Religious Scruples in Ancient Warfare”, *Classical Quart.*, xxxvi (1986), pp. 151–71.

32 Herodotus, 9.28 (Plataea); Thucydides, 2.13 (Peloponnesian War). The Spartans at Plataea brought seven helots with every hoplite plus heavy-armed Perioikoi, a total of forty-five thousand men.

33 On the presence of prostitutes, see Alexis of Samos, quoted in Athenaeus, 13.572 f.

34 Stratagems came to have a very important role in ancient warfare, even if many of them seem naïve or clumsy to us. But in this period hoplite armies would not normally try to surprise other hoplite armies. See Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, ii, p. 160. Such measures were for light-armed troops, barbarians and the semi-civilized. There were, however, exceptions to the norm: for example, Diodorus Siculus, 12.6.2 (447 B.C.).

35 Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, ii, pp. 156 ff., discusses surprise attacks. These might be expected in sieges, in attacks by light-armed troops or as a result of naval operations (cf. Herodotus, 6.88), but among hoplite armies are unusual in this period.

36 Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, ii, pp. 147 ff.

37 Did they invoke the enemy's gods as they crossed the border through an *epitheasmos*? The evidence is gathered *ibid.*, iii, pp. 322 f. Thucydides, 2.74 f., applies to the undertaking of a siege, not to an army's crossing of the border. Thucydides, 4.87, is only slightly better evidence, and Onasander, *Strat.*, 4.1–3, is late.

38 On these sacrifices, the *diabateria*, see Burkert, *Homo Necans*, p. 40 n. 22; Popp, *Einwirkung von Vorzeichen*, pp. 42–6. On taunts, see Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, ii, p. 153.

39 On ritual purification, see Onasander's treatise, *The General*, 5. The extent

of hoplite training was probably quite low in most Greek cities. See most recently E. Wheeler, "Hoplomachia and Greek Dances in Arms", *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, xxiii (1982), pp. 223–33; Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, iv.

40 This was Nestor's advice in *Iliad*, 4.297–300. Cf. Hesychius, s.v. *laurostatai* (Lambda 25, Latte); cf. Pollux, 4.106. Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 3.1.8, speaks of putting the best troops in the front and the rear and the weaker in the middle, but he seems to be thinking of the order of troops during a march.

41 On the distance between hoplite fighters, see especially George Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* (London, 1978), pp. 150–3; A. J. Holladay, "Hoplites and Heresies", *IL Hellenic Studies*, cii (1982), pp. 94 ff.; J. K. Anderson, "Hoplites and Heresies: A Note", *IL Hellenic Studies*, civ (1984), p. 152; and most recently Krentz, "Nature of Hoplite Battle", pp. 50 ff.; Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, iv. The tactical manual of Asclepiodotus, although written later than our period, provides a useful hint that practice varied: if an army charged it might draw itself into "compact spacing", that is, about a yard from right shoulder to right shoulder; an army that was about to receive such an attack might draw in even closer to "locked shields" — half that distance. But the most common pattern seems to have been "an interval of four cubits" — that is, about six feet from right shoulder to right shoulder.

42 Burkert, *Greek Religion*, p. 60. On the role of omens, etc., see Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, iii, chs. 1–4; Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World*, pp. 94 f.; and the works cited in n. 31 above. The Persians and the Greeks delayed ten days before the battle of Plataea, each waiting for favourable omens.

43 Porphyry, *de abstinence*, 2.56, cites Phylarchus to show that human sacrifice was regularly performed before battle. See the discussion in M. P. Nilsson, *Griechische Feste* (Leipzig, 1906), p. 406 n. 1.

44 Burkert, *Greek Religion*, p. 58.

45 *Ibid.*, p. 267, citing *Homo Necans*, pp. 46–8, 64–6.

46 On the Pyrphoroi, see Euripides, *Phoenissae*, 1377 f., and the scholia ad lōc. The principal modern discussion is F. Schwenn, "Der Krieg in griechischen Religion", *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, xxi (1922), pp. 58 ff. Schwenn also discusses the sacral role of the trumpet.

47 The Dorian Greeks, especially the Spartans, had somewhat different practices: they used music extensively at this point, with *auloi*, instruments like a recorder, playing loud and the troops singing: Thucydides, 5.69–70, describes a battle between Argives and Spartans and suggests that the use of *auloi* was distinctive of the Spartan army. The Spartans, we are told, sang verses from Tyrtaeus. The use of the paeon as a battle hymn was also primarily Dorian: Thucydides, 7.44.6. On the pace at which the two armies drew near together, see J. A. S. Evans, "Herodotus and Marathon", *Fbrilegium*, vi (1984), p. 5 n. 16.

48 The words for "battle-cry", however, are not restricted to war contexts. It was also a shout of joy or ecstatic release: see Liddell, Scott and Jones, *Greek Lexicon*, s.w. They were probably also used in a *komos* when the victorious army returned home: see Aristophanes, *Birds*, 1763. As Burkert, *Homo Necans*, p. 48 n. 49, points out, Pindar, fr. 78, makes explicit the link between the war-cry and sacrificial aspects of warfare.

49 See the bibliography in n. 41 above.

50 Note especially Thucydides, 4.96.2.

51 The *trope* was not inevitable: Thucydides, 1.105. The flight that followed could be terrible, and one must assume that despite supplication many were killed

in the heat of the moment. But if a person were taken prisoner he was not to be put to death: Euripides, *Heracleidae*, 961–74, 1017–55. Nor was the body of an enemy to be mutilated.

52 This phase of the battle is often neglected by those who wish to emphasize the anonymous, collective nature of hoplite warfare. See, for example, M. Détienne, “La phalange”, in Vernant (ed.), *Problèmes de la guerre*, p. 125. The *trope*, however, is not merely a break in the ranks, it is a transformation of the type of fighting and the role of the individual warrior.

53 On the limitation of pursuit, see P. Krentz, “Casualties in Hoplite Battles”, *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, xxvi (1985), p. 20.

54 According to Diodorus Siculus, 8.27.2, Spartan soldiers wrote their names on a small stick which served as a bracelet, so that if they died they could be readily identified. Athens in the classical period and some other Greek states normally brought the ashes of the fallen warriors back to the home city for burial, individual or collective. See the exchange between Noel Robertson, “The Collective Burial of Fallen Soldiers”, *Echos du monde classique*, new ser., ii (1983), pp. 78–92, and Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, iv, pp. 94–259.

55 Xenophon, *Agésilas*, 2.15; the evidence applies to Sparta, but the practice was probably pan-Hellenic.

56 Burkert, *Greek Religion*, p. 267. See also Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, ii, pp. 246 f.; Garland, *War in the Ancient World*, p. 62; W. C. West III, “The Trophies of the Persian Wars”, *Classical Philology*, lxiv (1969), pp. 7–19.

57 For a mythological precedent for the practice: Diodorus Siculus, 3.71.6.

58 In Herodotus, 1.82.5, it is holding the field and stripping the armour from the dead that defines victory. Cf. Thucydides, 4.44.

59 On the treatment of captives, see above, n. 51; Ducrey, *Traitement des prisonniers de guerre*; Pritchett, *Ancient Greek Military Practice*, p. 81; Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, ii, p. 173; P. Karavites, *Capitulations and Greek Interstate Relations* (Hypomne-mata, lxxi, Göttingen, 1982). The evidence seems at first glance to conflict. Certainly on many occasions Greeks killed other Greeks taken in war. But part of the difficulty is created by a conflict between two norms — one enjoining ransoming rather than killing or enslaving of Greeks taken in battle (for example, Euripides, *Herakles Mainomenos*, 961, 1019), the other allowing the victorious besieger of a city to treat the captives as he saw fit (for example, Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.6.14). This could result in the death of military-age males and the enslavement of women and children. Much of the evidence used to suggest that the Greeks enslaved other Greeks after battles in fact applies to sieges. Siege warfare too was governed by a code, but a radically different one from that which applied to hoplite battles.

60 Among the Peloponnesians there was an fixed sum, 2 *mnas* (200 drachmae) for each soldier captured: Herodotus, 6.79.1. This is approximately twice the amount calculated as the value of a set of bronze armour. 1 *mna* per person is mentioned as the ransom collected by Dionysius of Syracuse in 384 B.C: Diodorus Siculus, 14.111.4.

61 It was not solely an exchange between states. Since the invading state often pillaged for a while before the hoplite battle, considerable wealth could be gathered. If the invader were then defeated, much of this wealth would then be recycled by the victorious army into other segments of the society.

62 See the figures in Pritchett, *Ancient Greek Military Practice*, pp. 75 ff. Even allowing for exaggeration by the victorious party, the amounts are huge when

compared to other items in the state's budget. The total cost of the Parthenon, for example, is estimated at 469 talents: R. S. Stanier, "The Cost of the Parthenon", *Il Hellenic Studies*, lxxiii (1953), pp. 68–76.

63 On tithes from booty, see Pritchett, *Ancient Greek Military Practice*, pp. 93–100. The Athenians often made a dedication in their own land, as in the monument commemorating the victory over the Boeotians and Euboeans discussed in Herodotus, 5.77, or the temple to Eukleia, Good Fame, from the spoils at Marathon. On Eukleia, see H. A. Shapiro, "Ponos and Aponia", *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, xxv (1984), pp. 108 f.

64 On prizes to generals, see Pritchett, *Ancient Greek Military Practice*, pp. 83 f. The amounts could be very substantial: Demosthenes' three hundred panoplies mentioned in Thucydides, 3.114, might well have been worth 3–5 talents.

65 For example, Plutarch, *Cimon*, 13.

66 See Herodotus, 9.81; Plutarch, *de fato*, 569 e; Pritchett, *Ancient Greek Military Practice*, pp. 82 ff. Plato, *Symposium*, 220 d (cf. Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, 7), indicates that in Athens the generals awarded the *aristeia*. Some of the difficulty involved in the awarding of *ansteia* might be avoided by using athletic competitions to determine the winners of prizes: Xenophon, *Heiuenica*, 3.4.16, 4.2.5; *Agésilas*, 1.25. On *lipostatia* and related charges, see G. Busolt and H. Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde*, ii (Munich, 1926), p. 1127 n. 2.

67 On arrival ceremonies in Greek times, see S. MacCormack, *Art and Ceremony* (Berkeley, 1981), pp. 19, 281 n. 14. On other major points of contrast between this pattern of warfare and that used by the Romans, see Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World*, pp. 129 f.

68 In the fourth century there were banquets in the agora celebrating victories: Theopompus, *FGrHist*, 115 F 213, *apud* Athenaeus, 12.532 d.

69 Thucydides, 2.34, describes the Athenian "ancestral custom". On the practice, see the discussions cited in n. 54 above; Nicole Loraux, *Uinvention d'Athènes* (Paris, 1981).

70 The evidence for the funeral orations is well set forth in Loraux, *Invention d'Athènes*. On funeral games, see Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, iv, pp. 106–24. On the funeral feast (the *perideipnori*), see Demosthenes, *de corona*, 288; and, more generally, D. Kurtz and J. Boardman, *Greek Burial Customs* (London, 1971), pp. 146 f.; Burkert, *Greek Religion*, p. 193 and n. 28.

71 Athens, for example, denied Cimon the right to put his name upon the Herms set up to commemorate his victory: Aeschines, 3 (Against Ctesiphon), 183–6; Plutarch, *Cimon*, 7.4. Détiénne, "Phalange", p. 128, notes the Spartan parallel in Thucydides, 1.132. Note also the apparent taboo against the naming of individuals or the recounting of individual exploits of heroism in the Attic funeral orations prior to that given by Hyperides.

72 The impermanence of the trophy corresponds to the Greek habit of often making treaties for a fixed period of time, rather than for ever, as the Romans did. Cf. de Romilly, "Guerre et paix entre cités", p. 208. Greek alliances, however, are sometimes made "for ever": *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, ed. R. Meiggs and D. M. Lewis (Oxford, 1969), nos. 10, 63, 64.

73 Herodotus, 7.9 beta, trans. Rawlinson. Walbank in his commentary on Polybius, 13.3.4, follows Jacoby in suggesting that this passage may reflect a democratic criticism of archaic battle techniques. One can well imagine it appealing to an intelligent light-armed soldier.

74 The norms governing hoplite warfare were not always observed even in the

good old days. Herodotus, 6.75–84, for example, tells a story about Cleomenes of Sparta that makes him an almost paradigmatic inversion of the warrior code. When Cleomenes received bad omens at the crossing of the River Erasinus, he recognized that the local divinities were opposed to him. He withdrew but vowed that the Argives would not escape him. He then by-passed the local divinities by moving his troops by sea to Nauplia, defeated the Argives by a stratagem, and when they took refuge in a sacred grove, gathered their names by interrogating his captives, and then sent a herald to call them out one by one, on pretence of having received their ransoms. He massacred about fifty of them before the others found out what was happening. He then had brushwood piled up around the grove and set it on fire. The hoplite class of Argos was virtually wiped out by this atrocity: Herodotus, 7.148, estimated the losses at six thousand. (For a lower estimate, see W. G. Forrest, “Themistocles and Argos”, *Classical Quart.*, x (1960), p. 221.) But Cleomenes was not through. He proceeded to attempt to offer a thanksgiving sacrifice at the Argives’ most-esteemed temple, and when the priest would not allow him to sacrifice had him scourged. Herodotus makes of this story a warning tale about the dangers of violating the warrior code — much as the story of Croesus in the first book becomes a paradigm of how not to consult an Oracle.

⁷⁵ Polybius, 13.3.2–6, trans. Patton. See Walbank ad loc; Livy, 42.47.5. Polybius is probably alluding to a document that Strabo (10.1.12) reported — an agreement between Chalcis and Eretria that outlawed “missiles”, that is, the use of the sling, in the so-called Lelantine War, perhaps in the eighth century B.C.

⁷⁶ The code is often referred to as the *nomima ton Hellenon*, “the conventional practices of the Hellenes”. See R. von Scala, *Studien des Polybios*, I (Stuttgart, 1890), pp. 299–324; F. Kiechele, “Zur Humanität in der Kriegführung der griechischen Staaten”, *Historia*, vii (1958), pp. 129–56; and the bibliography cited in n. 59 above.

⁷⁷ Herodotus, 5.89.2; the advice, however, was not taken.

⁷⁸ See the document cited in Strabo, 10.1.12. On the scale of the Lelantine War, see S. D. A. Lambert, “A Thucydidean Scholium on the ‘Lelantine War’”, *Il. Hellenic Studies*, cii (1982), pp. 216–20.

⁷⁹ On single combat, see Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, iv, p. 16. The practice goes back to the archaic period, for example Pittacus of Mytilene: Diodorus Siculus, 9.12.1; cf. Frost, “Athenian Military before Cleisthenes”, p. 287; see also Herodotus, 1.82, 6.92.3; a further instance is contemplated in the Argive-Spartan treaty of 420 cited in Thucydides, 5.41. On the reluctance to overthrow a hoplite-based government, note the results of the Spartan proposal in Herodotus, 5.91.

⁸⁰ Xenophon, *Agessiaus*, 2.14–16, trans. Marchant.

⁸¹ Krentz, “Casualties in Hoplite Battles”, pp. 13–20. Civil war was often bloodier, but the statement that the Thirty killed more in eight months than were killed in ten years of the Peloponnesian War (Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 2.4.21) is probably exaggerated. On casualties, see also Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, ii, p. 261.

⁸² States that did engage in frequent warfare might be expected to find their hoplite class declining over time. This may have been the case in Sparta in the classical period and part of the explanation for what Aristotle observed about Athens after the Peloponnesian War: *Politics*, 5.1303 a 8 ff.

⁸³ See n. 45 above.

⁸⁴ The battle-cry is personified in Pindar, fr. 78:

Hear me, Alala, daughter of Polemos,
Pour forth the proemium, for with you
Men offer the sacrifice of the most upstanding death
For their city.

Atdoi, oboe-like instruments, were also used both in sacrifice (Burkert, *Homo Necans*, p. 4) and in the march into battle; but it is not clear that the Athenians used *auloi* in war. See above, nn. 47, 48.

⁸⁵ So Burkert, *Homo Necans*, pp. 48 ff., esp. p. 50: “the ritual meal functioned as a bond within the community”.

⁸⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 102.

⁸⁷ Thucydides, 1.105.4. Thucydides alludes to the taunts of the elders in this case. Women also played an important role in the assessment of military conduct. Along with the old men they served as repositories of civic praise and blame and sometimes of physical attacks on soldiers who seemed to have acted as cowards.

⁸⁸ On sacrifices to Eros before battle, see especially Athenaeus, 13.561 e. Cf. n. 26 above.

⁸⁹ Burkert, *Greek Religion*, p. 267.

⁹⁰ Herodotus, 5.77, trans. Rawlinson. On the inscription and the textual problems, see *Epigrammata graeca*, ed. D. Page (Oxford, 1975), p. 9. Note a similar theme in the dedication mentioned in Herodotus, 5.102.

⁹¹ See, for example, the often quoted comment of G. Glotz, “the people under arms always lived as a reflection of the Cleisthenic city”: *Histoire grecque*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1925–38), ii. Cf. van Effenterre, “Clisthène et les mesures de mobilisation”, p. 3. See also Frank Adcock, *The Greek and Macedonian Art of War* (Berkeley, 1957), p. 67: “No form of combat could so plainly exhibit the community solidarity that was of the essence of the Greek city-state”. Burkert, *Homo Necans*, p. 47: “War is ritual, a self-portrayal and self-affirmation of male society. Male society finds stability in confronting death, in defining it through a display of readiness to die, and in the ecstasy of survival”.

⁹² Demosthenes, 60 (Epitaphios), 27.

⁹³ Aristagoras, in Herodotus, 5.97.1.

⁹⁴ The comment is reported in Plutarch, *Moralia*, 241 f *et al.*

⁹⁵ Bronze is often linked to the sacred realm — it was bronze that was used for the inscribing of sacral laws, bronze that was dedicated in temples and kept safe in a special storage spot on the Acropolis in Athens, bronze that sheathed the temple of Athena at Sparta. Note also its association with Zeus Polieus: E. Simon, *Festivals of Attica* (Madison, 1983), p. 9; and with Athena: M. Détienne and J. P. Vernant, *Les ruses de l'intelligence* (Paris, 1974), pp. 172 f.

⁹⁶ The differentiation of roles is likely to have been a gradual one in Greek society; early tombs, for example, sometimes contain both spears and arrows — an indication that the same individual might be both spearman and archer. By the late archaic period, however, the spearmen had asserted a primacy for themselves in the civic structures of many Greek city-states. This may also be reflected in the fact that Athenian naval activity was not normally organized in tribal fashion. The evidence is to be found in B. Jordan, *The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period* (Berkeley, 1975), pp. 205 f., 225–30. Cf. also E. L. Wheeler, “The Prohibition of Missiles”, in *Abstracts of the 1986 Annual Meeting of the American Philological*

Association (Decatur, Georgia, 1986), p. 7.

⁹⁷ *LG*, i2 79, 929. On these lists, see D. W. Bradeen, *The Athenian Agora: inscriptions: Funerary Monuments* (Agora Publications, xvii, Princeton, 1974). On the role of archers in the Athenian military, see A. Plassart, “Les archers d’Athènes”, *Revue des études grecques*, xxvi (1913), pp. 151–213; Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, pp. 203–10.

⁹⁸ On the social status of thetes, *I.G.*, i3 138, is especially revealing: the most recent discussion of the inscription is by David Whitehead, *The Demes of Attica* (Princeton, 1986), p. 35 n. 130. There was, of course, a strong counter-current, pressing the claims of light-armed troops and of the citizens who served in the navy. C. W. Fornara has provided a useful discussion of the fifth-century treatments of the relative contribution of hoplites and the fleet at the time of the Persian invasion: “The Hoplite Achievement at Psytaleia”, *Il. Hellenic Studies*, xcvi (1966), pp. 51–4. This article cites many of the literary texts that reflect the devaluation of naval service; there are also hints of this in the inscriptions: the order of groups in *LG*., ii2 1951, for example, may reflect the low political status of archers and sailors. Unlike the land army the navy relied only minimally on the tribal structure, as the evidence gathered in Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, pp. 130–4, 164 ff., 225–30, indicates.

⁹⁹ See A. W. Gomme, *Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, i (Oxford, 1945), pp. 12–15; Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, ii, pp. 173 f.; Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice*, ch. 2; J. G. P. Best, *Thracian Peltasts* (Groningen, 1969), esp. p. 95.

¹⁰⁰ On the connection between military and political power in the ancient polis, see Aristotle, *Politics*, 4.1297 b 22: “as the states grew and the wearers of heavy armour had become stronger, more persons [sc. than merely the cavalry] came to have a part in the government” (trans. H. Rackham). The same principle would, of course, apply to the growing role of light-armed troops in the fifth century B.C.

¹⁰¹ See the works cited in n. 99 above, esp. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice*.

¹⁰² See especially Thucydides’ account of the Pylos campaign and the explication by W. R. Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton, 1984), pp. 108–18.

¹⁰³ See now J. Winkler, “The Ephebes’ Song”, *Representations*, no. 11 (summer 1985), pp. 26–62.

¹⁰⁴ Euripides, *Herakles Atainomenos*, 157–204, excerpted, trans. W. Arrowsmith. The date of the play cannot be precisely fixed, but the decade 425–415 seems secure. On the passage, see most recently Richard Hamilton, “Slings and Arrows”, *Trans. Amer. Philol. Assoc.*, cxv (1985), pp. 19–25.

¹⁰⁵ See the discussion of S. Said and M. Trédé, “Art de la guerre et expérience chez Thucydide”, *Classica et mediaevalia*, xxxvi (1985), pp. 65–85. Cf. Said’s earlier article on Herodotus: “Guerre, intelligence et courage dans les Histoires d’Hérodote”, *Ancient Soc*, xi–xii (1980–1), pp. 83–118.

Fighting by the Rules: The Invention of the Hoplite Agón

Peter Krentz

Abstract

This examination of the unwritten rules of Greek warfare suggests that the ideology of hoplite warfare as a ritualized contest developed not in the 7th century, but only after 480, when nonhoplite arms began to be excluded from the phalanx. Regular claims of victory, in the form of battlefield trophies, and concessions of defeat, in the form of requests for the retrieval of corpses, appeared in the 460s. Other 5th-century changes in military practice fit the theory that victories over the Persians led to the idealization of massed hand-to-hand combat. Archaic Greeks probably fought according to the limited protocols found in Homer.

In a collection of essays published in 1968, Jean-Pierre Vernant, Marcel Detienne, and Jacqueline de Romilly spoke of Greek warfare as an *agôn*, a contest, conceived like a tournament with ceremonies and rules.¹ Though it was not altogether new, this idea soon spread to other influential French scholars such as Yvon Garlan and Raoul Lonis.² Pierre Ducrey and W. Kendrick Pritchett have put the subject on a much firmer foundation by meticulously collecting the evidence for many Greek military practices, and Victor Davis Hanson has described the misery of Greek battle in gritty detail, even while popularizing the idea that Archaic warfare followed unwritten protocols.³ This view of Greek warfare dominates the field.⁴

Josiah Ober has made the most explicit attempt to set out the unwritten conventions of hoplite warfare. In his article “The Rules of War in Classical Greece,”⁵ Ober lists a dozen “common customs (*koina nomima*) of the Greeks” that governed interstate conflict. He maintains that these rules of war developed after the Homeric epics were put into writing about 700, and that they broke down after about 450, especially during the Peloponnesian War. During the Archaic period, the rules of hoplite warfare “helped to maintain the long-term practical workability of the hoplite-dominated socio-military system” by making frequent wars possible without risking “demographic catastrophe.”⁶ Hanson also believes that hoplite ideology dominated Archaic warfare, as farmers agreed to decide disputes through pitched battles. “After the creation of the hoplite panoply,” he writes, “for

nearly two and a half centuries (700–480 B.C.) hoplite battle *was* Greek warfare.”⁷ Hanson attributes the breakdown of this admirable system to the Persian Wars and the growth of the Athenian empire, a generation before the Peloponnesian War.

The earliest references to Greek military protocols come in Euripides and in speeches in the historians Herodotos, Thucydides, and Xenophon. In the *Herakleidae* Euripides mentions “the customs of the Greeks” (τοῖσιν Ἑλλήνων νόμοις, 1010) regarding the killing of prisoners. In the *Suppliants* he refers to customs regarding burial of enemy soldiers: the “customs of the gods” (νόμια θεῶν, 19), the “customs of all Greece” (νόμια πάσης Ἑλλάδος, 311), “the custom of all Greeks” (τὸν Πανελλήνων νόμον, 526, 671). In Herodotos, Xerxes refers to “the customs of all people” (τὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων νόμια, 7.136.2) about the inviolability of heralds, and Mardonios describes the way in which he heard the Greeks were accustomed (ἐώθασι, 7.9β.1) to wage war. In Thucydides, Archidamos says it is not “customary” (νόμιμον, 1.85.2) to attack someone prepared to make restitution, the Mytilenians refer to “the custom established among the Greeks” (τὸ καθεστὸς τοῖς Ἑλλήσι νόμιμον, 3.9.1) about those who revolt during a war, the Plataians cite the “common customs among the Greeks” (τὰ κοινὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων νόμια, 3.59.1) regarding treatment of enemies who surrender, and a Theban herald (in Thucydides’ summary) refers to “the customs of the Greeks” (τὰ νόμια τῶν Ἑλλήνων, 4.97.2) regarding invaders and sanctuaries. In Xenophon’s summary of the Eleians’ refusal to let Agis pray for victory in war, the Eleians cite “the old custom” (τὸ ἀρχαῖον νόμιμον, *Hell.* 3.2.22) that Greeks not consult an oracle about a war against other Greeks.

Claims made in the second half of the 5th century, however, do not prove that the customs were really old. By the time of the Peloponnesian War, for example, Thucydides could describe the annual public burial of Athenian war dead as an “ancestral custom” (πάτριος νόμος, 2.34.2). Kimon probably began this practice when he brought back the ashes of the men who died at Eurymedon (Paus. 1.43.3), and the law requiring public burial at home probably goes back no further than the mid-460s. So this “ancestral custom” started only one generation before the Peloponnesian War.⁸

Some customs—the ones in which the gods took an interest—certainly go back to Homer: oaths, including oaths sworn as part of a negotiated surrender, were respected; heralds, priests, and suppliants in sanctuaries were inviolable; the dead were buried.⁹ What about the other alleged protocols? Do the rules apply to the fighting in the *Iliad*? If not, when do they first appear? I will argue that some practices go back to Homer, that others are matters of tactics rather than

conventions, and that several important new rules and practices appear only in the 5th century. I will propose an alternative model below for the development of Greek warfare, agreeing with Hans van Wees' recent suggestion that the hoplite phalanx did not reach its Classical form until after the Persian Wars.¹⁰ A new, nostalgic ideology of war developed as fighting became more destructive.

A Review of Military Protocols

Ober assumes rather than defends the existence of his informal rules, which he draws from the works of other scholars. Nevertheless, Ober's formulation of the rules (indicated by italics) will serve as a convenient foil for discussion. I consider them not in descending order of formality, as Ober lists them, but in the order in which they would arise during a campaign.

The state of war should be officially declared before commencing hostilities against an appropriate foe.

In their study of Greek diplomacy, Frank Adcock and D. J. Mosley say that "although surprise attacks were made it was the habit of the Greeks to make a formal declaration of war."¹¹ So it would certainly seem from Herodotos and Polybios. Herodotos has the Persian Mardonios say (7.9β.1, Waterfield trans.):

Besides, from all I hear, the Greeks usually wage war in an extremely stupid fashion, because they are ignorant and incompetent. When they declare war on one another they seek out the best, most level piece of land, and that is where they go to fight. The upshot is that the victors leave the battlefield with massive losses, not to mention the losers, who are completely wiped out.

And Polybios, comparing the practices of his own day to those of an earlier era he admired, says (13.3.2–6, Patton trans.):

The ancients would not even consent to get the better of their enemies by fraud, [3] regarding no success as brilliant or secure unless they crushed the spirit of their adversaries in open battle. [4] For this reason they entered into a convention among themselves to use against each other neither secret missiles nor those discharged from a distance, and considered that it was only a hand to hand battle at close quarters which was truly decisive. [5] Hence they preceded war by a declaration [τοὺς πολέμους ἀλλήλοις προύλεγον], and when they intended to do battle gave notice of the fact and of the spot to which they would proceed and array their army. [6] But at the present they say it is a sign of poor generalship to do anything openly in war.

The earliest attested instance of a herald declaring war, however, is the Corinthian herald sent to Corfu before the Corinthian fleet set sail

in 435 (Thuc. 1.29.1).¹² In his detailed description of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War a few years later, Thucydides has the Lakedaimonian king Archidamos say that it is not “customary” (νόμιμον, 1.85.2) to attack someone prepared to make restitution. Rather than declaring war on Athens, the Lakedaimonians sent delegations making various demands, which the Athenians rejected, though they said they were willing to go to arbitration as required by treaty (Thuc. 1.145.1). Once the Peloponnesians were on the march, a final ambassador was refused admission (Thuc. 2.12.1–2). These delegations, sent to negotiate before an invasion, sound Homeric: a young Odysseus went to Messene to seek reparations for 300 sheep and their shepherds that the Messenians had taken (*Od.* 21.16–21), and Menelaos and Odysseus went to Troy to demand the return of Helen (*Il.* 3.205–224, 11.138–142). Greek practice, therefore, remained fundamentally the same from Homer to Thucydides: Greek states normally sought reparations for injuries before invading enemy territory, but did not declare war in the formal Roman manner.

Hostilities are sometimes inappropriate: sacred truces, especially those declared for the celebration of the Olympic games, should be observed.

Abundant evidence shows that Greeks observed an ἐκεχειρία, literally a “hands-off,” for the Eleusinian Mysteries and the panhellenic festivals at Olympia, Delphi, Isthmia, and Nemea.¹³ These truces protected pilgrims and contestants going to and from the festivals, as well as the state sponsoring the festival. They did not prohibit all warfare. Moreover, to be valid the truces had to be declared and accepted. People celebrating a festival were not necessarily immune from attack. In fact, as Aineias Taktikos noted in the 4th century, an ideal time to attack an enemy was during a festival (4.8).¹⁴

It is not certain when the custom began. Homer does not mention any of these festivals or the sacred truces for them. The Olympic truce was alleged to have begun in the 8th century, but the earliest historical reference appears in an inscription from Selinous dated ca. 460, about the same time the Eleusinian truce first appears in an inscription.¹⁵ The truces for the festivals at Delphi, Isthmia, and Nemea could not predate the founding of the festivals in 582, 581, and 563, respectively. Given the state of our evidence, it would be rash to assert that these truces began only in the 5th century, but nothing puts them in the 7th century either.

War is an affair of warriors, thus noncombatants should not be primary targets of attack.

No one ever claims that civilians should not be attacked. In practice invaders did not attack noncombatants because defenders got them out of the way, either behind city walls or off to a friendly state or into the hills.¹⁶ For example, when Agesilaos invaded Akarnania in 389, the Akarnanians fled into walled cities and sent their cattle to the mountains (Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.4). Similarly, each time the Peloponnesians invaded during the Archidamian War, the Athenians brought their children, women, and possessions into the city, and sent their sheep and catde to Euboia and other islands (Thuc. 2.14.1). This alleged protocol is therefore no protocol at all, but rather a matter of military tactics.

Battles should be fought during the usual (summer) campaigning season.

In the 4th century, Demosthenes remarked that the Lakedaimonians, like everyone else, used to campaign only during the four or five summer months (9.48). But no source turns this fact into a *should*, into a rule of proper conduct. Battles in the Archaic period were fought during the summer because for Greece's farmer-soldiers, fighting at other times of the year was impractical if not impossible. When increased economic resources in the 5th century made pay for military service the norm, at least in Athens, campaigns occurred at other times of the year too. The timing of campaigns was another matter of military tactics rather than military conventions.

A battle is properly prefaced by a ritual challenge and acceptance of the challenge.

The title of Pritchett's chapter on this subject, "The Challenge to Battle," does not include the word "ritual," and even so it suggests something more formal than what he describes.¹⁷ Despite Polybios 13.3.5 (quoted above), there is no known case in Archaic or Classical history of a Greek herald issuing a challenge to battle at a particular time and place—though a *Persian* herald challenges the Lakedaimonians at Plataia to a single combat between equal numbers of Persians and Lakedaimonians (Hdt. 9.48).

Pritchett takes the deployment of an army in battle formation as a challenge to fight: "phalanx battles normally began when both sides were ready. They were, to use Polybios's phrase, μάχαι ἐξ ὁμολόγου" (battles by agreement).¹⁸ In this sense, each of the four days of fighting in the *Iliad* begins with a "challenge to battle": both sides arm and go out to fight (3.1, 8.53–59, 11.15–66, 20.1–4). The formal language mentioned by Pritchett, however, does not appear in Homer. When does it first occur? The phrase "by agreement" (ἐξ ὁμολόγου) is

common in Polybios (1.87.9, 2.66.4, 3.90.5, 4.8.11, 11.32.7, F144), but absent from the Classical historians. Another term for pitched battle, παράταξις, is also common in Polybios and absent from the Classical historians—or rather all but absent, for Thucydides does use it once, when he says that the battle of Amphipolis in 422 was *not* a pitched battle (μὴ ἐν παρατάξεως, 5.11.2).¹⁹ The verb παρατάσσω occurs frequently in Thucydides and Xenophon, but only three times in Herodotos (8.95.1, 9.31.2, 32.2). I wonder whether Archaic troops were ever deployed more specifically than they are in the *Iliad* where the heroes sometimes arrange their men in five sections under five named leaders (4.293–296, 16.171–198). Nestor places the chariots in front, the brave infantry at the back, and the cowards in the middle (4.297–300).²⁰ The linguistic evidence, therefore, points to a more formal deployment only after the Persian Wars.

The main issue, however, does not revolve around terminology. Homeric warriors happily deceived their enemies, yet Herodotos's Mar-donios and Polybios (quoted above) assert that Archaic Greeks fought open battles when both sides were ready. Their assertions do not apply to Classical warfare, which is full of deceptions.²¹ It is true that Greeks deployed in a plain rarely attacked an enemy's camp or sprang an ambush during a battle. Commanders who brought their armies out into a plain believed that their troops were a match for the enemy. Under those circumstances, they generally hesitated to try risky deceptive maneuvers. A desperate, or daring, commander might, like Peisistratos in 546, attack during the afternoon siesta (Hdt. 1.63). And if the risks could be minimized, even a Lakedaimonian king might attack a camp during a meal. When the Argives put off battle in 494, Kleomenes observed that they were obeying his herald's commands, and had his men attack after the herald gave the order for breakfast (Hdt. 6.77–78). These examples from the Archaic period suggest that practice had not changed from what Homer describes.

Greeks did not feel obligated to accept a challenge to battle if they were heavily outnumbered. Most battles took place between armies of about the same size.²² If the defending army was heavily outnumbered—as must often have been the case, given the variations in size among the Greek poleis—the leaders usually declined a battle. Perikles' famous refusal to lead the Athenians out to fight a land battle in the Peloponnesian War was not a strategy devised on the spur of the moment in 431.²³

Use of nonhoplite arms should be limited

Despite Polybios's claim (quoted above) that “the ancients” agreed not to use unseen missiles or missiles shot from a distance, the only such

agreement known is the one Strabo says was inscribed on a column in the sanctuary of Artemis Amarynthia, prohibiting missiles in the Lelantine War (10.1.12). Polybios and Strabo probably drew on the 4th-century historian Ephoros for this pact, and Everett L. Wheeler has argued that Ephoros invented it as part of a protest against the catapult, a frightening new distance weapon in his day.²⁴

But even if the agreement is historical, it is the exception rather than the rule. Archaic battles included many projectile weapons, with light-armed men—javelin- and stone-throwers, slingers, and archers—fighting in the phalanx, not in separate units or behind the hoplites.²⁵ The 7th-century poet Tyrtaios, for example, advises (F 11.35–38, West trans.):

You light-armed men, wherever you can aim
from the shield-cover, pelt them with great rocks
and hurl at them your smooth-shaved javelins,
helping the armoured troops with close support.

In the Archaic period, the distinction between “light-armed” and “hoplite” was not always sharp, as a few examples will demonstrate. Athenian red-figure vases sometimes depict archers with greaves, helmets, and shields, and a mid-6th-century bronze statuette of Herakles as an archer, found near Amphipolis, wears a bronze cuirass. A 6th-century molded pithos found at Sparta shows a slinger with a crested helmet. The north frieze of the 6th-century Siphnian Treasury at Delphi has two giants, armed with helmets and shields, throwing stones. The interior of a 6th-century cup found in the Athenian Agora shows a running warrior wearing an Oriental leather cap and greaves, carrying a hoplite shield and two spears.²⁶ The Chigi vase from Corinth, ca. 640, shows fully armed hoplites with two spears, one a javelin.²⁷ Athenian vases continue into the 5th century to show some hoplites with javelins, and burials excavated at Sindos, in northern Greece, regularly include a larger and a smaller spear until the late 5th century.²⁸

This mix of warriors and weapons sounds very Homeric.²⁹ By Thucydides’ time, hoplites and light-armed troops normally fought in separate units. Before the hoplites engaged at the battle of Syracuse in 415, for example, the stone-throwers, slingers, and archers routed each other repeatedly, “as was likely for light-armed troops” (Thuc. 6.69.2). When did the Greeks exclude nonhoplite troops from the phalanx? There may have been a small cavalry force at Athens in the 6th century, but only after 479 did the Athenians establish what I. G. Spence calls a “proper cavalry corps,” increased to 1,000 plus 200 mounted archers by 431.³⁰ True horsemen, as opposed to mounted hoplites, do not appear in Peloponnesian cities until the late 5th or

early 4th century.³¹ The Athenian contingent of infantry archers first appears at Plataia in 479.³² As for light-armed soldiers, Thucydides says that at the time of the battle of Delion (424), Athens had no organized light-armed troops (ψιλοὶ ἐν παρασκευῇς, 4.94.1). Little more than a dozen years later, however, Athens did have its own light-armed men, and no longer had to depend on Thracians or allies.³³ The Thebans had their *hamippoi*, infantry fast enough to serve with cavalry, by 418 (Thuc. 5.57; Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.23).

Pursuit of defeated and retreating opponents should be limited in duration.

No such rule is attested for Greeks in general. Thucydides says that the Lakedaimonians fought stubbornly until they routed the enemy, but then pursued them neither far nor for a long time (5.73.4). He does not explain their reasoning, and the fact that he makes the point at all suggests that other Greeks pursued their opponents long and hard. Seven hundred years later Plutarch explained that the Lakedaimonians thought it ignoble for Greeks to kill men who had fled, and added that the policy had the practical benefit of making enemies more inclined to run (*Lyc.* 22.9–10; *Mor.* 228F). Perhaps the cautious Lakedaimonians thought more about not exposing their troops to a reverse if they scattered in pursuit. After the battle of Haliartos in 395, the Thebans pursued the Lakedaimonians into the hills, where they rallied, first with javelins and stones, and killed more than 200 Thebans. Lakedaimonian practice avoided such a reverse.

When they had the opportunity to do so safely, Greeks showed little hesitation in slaughtering their enemies. In a fragmentary poem found on papyrus, Tyrtaios seems to imagine that the Messenians “win kill every Spartan that they catch fleeing the battle” (F 23a.20–22, West trans.). In 510, the Krotoniates routed the invading Sybarites and did kill every one they caught (Diod. Sic. 12.10.1). Fleeing from the Athenians after a defeat in 460, some Corinthians became trapped in a field surrounded by a ditch, with no exit. The Athenians blocked the front with hoplites, surrounded the Corinthians with light-armed troops, and stoned them all to death (Thuc. 1.106.1–2). After the battle of Delion in 424, the Boiotians and especially the Boiotian and Lokrian cavalry chased and killed Athenians until darkness stopped the pursuit (Thuc. 4.96.7–8). In 392, at the battle between the Corinthian long walls, the Lakedaimonians killed so many Corinthians, Xenophon says, that “men used to seeing mounds of grain, wood, and stones now saw mounds of corpses” (*Hell.* 4.4.12). In 368, the Lakedaimonians killed more than 10,000 Arkadians without losing a single man in what was called—from the Lakedaimonian point of view

—the “Tearless Battle” (Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.31; Diod. Sic. 15.72.3).

The extent of a pursuit therefore appears to be another matter of military tactics rather than military protocols.

Punishment of surrendered opponents should be restrained.

In Euripides’ *Herakleidai* (961–966, 1009–1011), “the customs of the Greeks” forbid later killing a prisoner taken on the battlefield, but do not say that a soldier offering to surrender must be spared. Warriors never spare individuals who try to surrender during combat in the *Iliad*: when Menelaos was once about to show mercy, Agamemnon told him not to spare anyone, not even the unborn child (6.37–65). Other rejected appeals include 11.122–147, where Agamemnon cuts off Hippolochos’s arms and sends him spinning away like a log, and 21.64–135, where Achilles feeds Lykaon’s corpse to the fish. For an example of mercy granted during fighting, we have to go to Odysseus’s Cretan tale at *Od.* 14.276–284, where the Egyptian king spares him as he grasps the king’s knees. In his recent study of supplication, Fred S. Naiden suggests that Greek soldiers did not spare battlefield suppliants either because they might fight again, or because, on the principle of reciprocity, they deserve no mercy.³⁴ The same rationale applies to cities taken by storm: Homeric heroes kill the men and enslave the women. That’s what Achilles did at Lyrnessos (17. 2.691), Lesbos (*Il.* 9.665–666), Skyros (*Il.* 9.667–668), and Tenedos (*Il.* 11.623–626). It’s what Odysseus does to the Kikonians (*Od.* 9.39–61). And it’s what Hektor imagines will be done to Troy (*Il.* 6.447–465).

The evidence for later warfare shows little change. When a city fell, by siege or assault, the defeated might be killed or sold into slavery. As Xenophon’s Cyrus says, “it is a custom established for all time among all people [νόμος γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις αἰδώς] that when a city is taken in war, the persons and the property of the inhabitants belong to the captors” (*Cyr.* 7.5.73).³⁵

Erecting a battlefield trophy indicates victory; such trophies should be respected.

This rule applies very well to the fighting in Thucydides and Xenophon, as Pritchett’s catalogue of examples shows.³⁶ Pritchett finds a trophy in 77. 10.465–468, where Odysseus dedicates Dolon’s equipment to Athena and puts it on a bush. But he puts it on the bush only in order to find it later, when he recovers it and plans to offer it elsewhere (10.570–571).

When did the custom of erecting trophies begin? Herodotos never

mentions them, nor does he mention the *epinikia*, the victory sacrifice that accompanied the erection of a trophy.³⁷ The earliest literary reference probably comes from the mock-epic *Batrachomyomachia*, tentatively dated to the first half of the 5th century.³⁸ More securely dated are the references to trophies in lines 277 and 954 of Aeschylus's *Seven against Thebes*, produced in 468.

The earliest physical remains of trophies belong to monuments from the Persian Wars: the marble columns erected, probably in the 460s, at Marathon and Salamis.³⁹ Battlefield trophies of the simple sort mentioned in Thucydides and Xenophon—pieces of captured armor and weapons hung on a post or tree—do not appear in vase painting until the middle of the 5th century, as John Beazley observed.⁴⁰ Trophies appear in other art forms (relief sculpture, coins, and gems) later still.⁴¹ The later trophies differ from the monuments of the Persian Wars in several ways: they were erected immediately, constructed of perishable materials, and placed where the enemy turned to flee, rather than where most of the enemy died.⁴²

After a battle, it is right to return enemy dead when asked; to request the return of ones dead is tantamount to admitting defeat.

Greeks took no unwritten law more seriously than the obligation to allow defeated enemies to retrieve and bury their dead.⁴³ Pritchett's exhaustive study of the burial of Greek war dead details the conventions. A herald regularly asks for a truce, and Justin says that the Greeks considered the sending of this herald as a concession of defeat (6.6.10). The last sentence of Xenophon's *Hellenika* comments on the odd result of the battle of Mantinea in 362, when "both sides returned the dead under a truce as though victorious, and both received back their dead under a truce as though defeated" (7.5.26). The Lakedaimonians condemned their king Pausanias to death in 395 partly because he opted to retrieve the corpses of Lysandros and others under a truce, rather than try to recover them by fighting (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.22–25).

The right to bury the dead also appears in Homer (see note 9), but an important change occurs. The *Iliad* has a burial truce after the first day of battle, but not after the second, third, and fourth, so it does not appear to be standard practice. When the Trojan herald Idaios makes the request that first day, not only does he not concede the victory, he promises to fight again (7.396).⁴⁴ By Thucydides' time, the losers' request for permission to retrieve their dead has become as regular as the erection of trophies—in fact, Pritchett notes that "the context in which historians refer to the ἀναίρεσις τῶν νεκρῶν (retrieval of

corpses) is repeatedly that of justification for erection of the trophy.”⁴⁵ “Historians” here does not include Herodotos, who no more mentions burial truces than he does trophies.

Prisoners of war should be offered for ransom, not summarily executed or mutilated.

As discussed above, Greeks never felt a moral obligation to take prisoner an opponent begging for mercy during a fight. But both Homeric and Classical ethics dictated that prisoners taken in another context should be spared.⁴⁶ In the *Iliad* Achilles is said to have released for ransom Priam’s sons, Isos and Antiphos, whom he caught on Mt. Ida (11.104–106), and to have sold at least one other, Lykaon, whom he caught in Priam’s garden one night (21.35–41), and probably more, given the plural references at 21.102 and 22.45. Achilles’ sacrifice of twelve Trojans on Patroklos’s funeral pyre (23.175–176) indicates not that killing prisoners was acceptable behavior, but that his anger still raged out of control. In Thucydides, as well as in Euripides’ *Herakleidae* (quoted above), we find the claim that by Greek custom captors should not execute prisoners who had surrendered (3.58, 3.66.1). An incident early in the Peloponnesian War shows that other captives ought not to be killed either. In 430 the Athenians executed a half-dozen Peloponnesian ambassadors intercepted on their way to the Persian king. They threw the bodies into a pit, thinking they were justified since the Lakedaimonians had begun acting this way at the beginning of the war, when they had killed and thrown into pits all the Athenian and allied traders they caught on merchant ships around the Péloponnèse (Thuc. 2.67.4). This phrasing suggests that the Athenians were retaliating against what they perceived as improper behavior.

Sparing prisoners did not necessarily mean releasing them for ransom. They might be sold into slavery or forced into exile. After an extensive survey of captives’ fate, Pritchett concludes that ransoming was relatively infrequent and done for financial, not humanitarian, reasons.⁴⁷ The only real evidence for better treatment of prisoners in the Archaic period is the 4th-century orator Aischines’ reference to an oath supposedly sworn by the Amphiktyons at the time of the First Sacred War (early 6th century?) not to depopulate any Amphiktyonic polis (2.115). The authenticity of this oath is tied up with the knotty question of the historicity of the First Sacred War itself, which John Davies pronounced “a plausible hypothesis, but no more.”⁴⁸ Because the Amphiktyonic oath inscribed at Athens in 380 makes no reference to this clause (*CID* I 10, lines 4–10), it seems safer to conclude with Pritchett that Greeks treated captives similarly from Homer’s time

through the Classical period.

Fifth-Century Changes

The preceding analysis suggests that the list of customary practices traceable to Homer includes demands for satisfaction prior to an invasion. Treatment of surrendered opponents and prisoners of war does not change in the Archaic period, and does not deserve the term “convention.” Other alleged military protocols turn out to be a matter of military tactics rather than of formal conventions designed to ameliorate warfare: noncombatants were not attacked because cities got them out of the way; campaigns usually took place in the summer because the weather was most reliable then and farmers could afford to leave their fields, trees, and vines; victors sometimes refrained from vigorous pursuit of a defeated army because scattering in pursuit might make them susceptible to a counterattack.

Some important changes remain. Nonhoplite arms began to be excluded from the phalanx about the time of the Persian Wars, when cavalry and light-armed troops started to fight in their own distinct units. Only thereafter do we find the word *παράταξις* for a pitched battle. Regular claims of victory, in the form of battlefield trophies, and concessions of defeat, in the form of requests for the retrieval of corpses, appeared in the 460s.⁴⁹ Trophies placed at the “turning” only make sense when the first turn generally became a rout, as it did in Classical hoplite battles, but not in Homeric fighting.⁵⁰ Hoplite warfare, therefore, did not break down gradually in the 5th century, but quite the opposite. New military protocols developed not in the 7th century, but only after 480.

Other relevant military practices also developed in the 5th century rather than the 7th. The paean sung before joining battle first appears in Aeschylus’s account of the battle of Salamis in 480 (*Pers.* 393).⁵¹ In the *Iliad* the Greeks sing paeans to appease the god who sent a plague (1.472–474) and to celebrate a victory (22.391–394), but they advance into battle in silence (3.8–9, 4.427–432). The Dorians by the time of Thucydides, and the Athenians by the time of Xenophon, also advanced to fight singing the song that brought courage to friends and dispelled fear of the enemy (Aesch. *Sept* 270). As Pritchett points out, Greeks who advanced singing the paean gave up any attempt to achieve surprise.⁵²

Second, Herodotos mentions *aristeia*, the awards for individual bravery in battle, for sixteen individuals, while Thucydides and Xenophon mention no such awards, since individual exploits mattered less in Classical battles than they had in Archaic warfare.⁵³ A change in shield devices also emphasizes the egalitarianism of the Classical

phalanx. Apparently a matter of individual choice in the Archaic period, shield devices tended to become standardized in the 5th and 4th centuries: a *lambda* for the Lakedaimonians, a *sigma* for the Sikyonians, a *mu* for the Messenians, the club of Herakles for the Thebans, the trident of Poseidon for the Mantineians.⁵⁴ This stress on the similarity of hoplites goes ideologically hand in hand with the exclusion of other troops from the phalanx.

Third, dedications of armor at panhellenic sanctuaries, extremely common in the Archaic period, decline in the 5th century. At Isthmia excavators have found none after the destruction of ca. 470–450, at Olympia few after the 430s, at Delphi few after the spoils sent by Tegea and Mantinea in 423.⁵⁵ This change in offering patterns anticipates Plato's advice that Greeks should not dedicate armor and weapons if they want to preserve good relations among Greeks (*Resp.* 469e–470a).⁵⁶ We have here a new military protocol designed to ameliorate warfare.

Finally, in Xenophon's summary of the Eleians' refusal to let Agis pray for victory in war, the Eleians cite an "old custom" (ἀρχαῖον νόμιμον, *Hell.* 3.2.22) that Greeks not consult an oracle about a war against other Greeks. This alleged protocol does not appear on Ober's list, presumably because the assertion is so flagrantly untrue for Archaic warfare. Herodotos, for instance, relates that the Lakedaimonians once misinterpreted a Delphic oracle and ended up confined in the chains they had brought for their intended Tegean prisoners (1.66).⁵⁷ The Eleians are not necessarily inventing the prohibition they cite. It fits with the previous decline in panoply offerings at panhellenic sites. But "old" cannot mean more than one generation, since the Lakedaimonians consulted Delphi in 432 about going to war with Athens (Thuc. 1.118.3).

It is of course true that we have less—much, much less—information about Archaic than about Classical warfare. The fact that extant literary sources do not attest a practice until the 5th century does not disprove its existence earlier. But the material evidence supports the conclusion that some military protocols came late rather than early. If we can find a coherent theory to explain this late development, we ought to accept it.

The Development of Greek Warfare

I suggest the following alternative model for the development of hoplite warfare. Although they improved their equipment, Archaic Greeks continued to fight in the way Homer describes. The fighting was "mass" fighting, but not "massed" fighting.⁵⁸ That is, battles were not simply fought by champions in front of nameless, and

unimportant, followers. The mass of men mattered. But they did not deploy in a tight formation, massed together. Rather, they advanced, retreated, and advanced again in a formation loose enough to allow horses, perhaps even chariots, to approach the killing zone and withdraw again. Brave men moved forward; tired men, frightened men, wounded men moved back. In exceptional circumstances, such as a struggle over a fallen warrior or a break in a wall, a group of men might bunch together. Stones, javelins, and arrows flew, thrown and shot by some of the same men who dared to advance and fight hand-to-hand, as well as by less courageous men who hung back. This kind of fluid battle had no single turning point.

Then the Medes came. At Marathon in 490, the Athenians confronted a larger Persian force.⁵⁹ They knew how the Persians fought, from their experience during the Ionian Revolt a few years earlier when they were routed in a battle at Ephesos (Hdt. 5.102). They knew the Persians liked to soften the enemy with a barrage of arrows before closing. At Thermopylai ten years later, the Greeks were told that the Persians shot so many arrows that the shafts hid the sun—leading to Deianekes’ famous remark that this news was good because the battle would take place in the shade (Hdt. 7.226.2). The Athenians decided to arm entirely with hand-to-hand weapons (Herodotos says they had no cavalry or archers, 6.112.2) and charge at a run (Herodotos also reports that they were the first Greeks to run against the enemy, 6.112.3). The effect must have been something like what happened in Cilicia, when Cyrus the Younger arranged his Greek mercenaries four deep for a parade and had them charge, wearing their bronze helmets, crimson chitons, greaves, and shields. They went faster and faster, finally breaking into a run toward the camp, and frightened away the Cilician queen and the people in the market, who left everything behind as they fled (Xen. Cyr. 1.2.16–18). So, at Marathon, the Athenian charge routed the Persian wings, once and for all.

The experience encouraged the Athenians to behave more like foxes than hedgehogs. They realized the physical and psychological power of a massed infantry charge, and continued to exclude nonhoplite forces from their phalanx. But they also appreciated the value of organized contingents of horsemen and archers. They soon established a larger cavalry force and started an archery contingent, with some success at Plataia, where an archer killed the Persian cavalry commander Masistios (Hdt. 9.22.1). By 431 they even had Persian-style mounted archers, a remarkable instance of Persianization.⁶⁰

Athenian hoplites, on the other hand, especially after Salamis and the growth of the Athenian navy, remembered Marathon as the essence, the model, of what warfare should be.⁶¹ “We know,” writes

Nicole Loraux, “that in the 5th century a whole ideological structure was built up around Marathon at the expense of Salamis, the victory of the oarsmen people.”⁶² In his *Laws* Plato argued not only that the infantry battle of Marathon began the salvation of Greece and that of Plataia finished it, but also that these battles made the Greeks better, while the naval battles of Artemision and Salamis made them worse (707c). We can trace this idealization of Marathon back to the 420s, when Aristophanes spoke of the *Marathono-machai* (*Ach.* 182, *Nub.* 689), to the 450s, when Aeschylus’s epitaph mentioned his courage at Marathon, and to the 460s, when the Athenians erected a marble monument at the battle site.⁶³ Perhaps it was also in the 460s, at the instigation of Miltiades’ son Kimon, that a few lines honoring the Marathon fighters were added to an inscribed epigram honoring the men who fought at Salamis.⁶⁴ Hoplites made sure that Salamis did not eclipse the memory of Marathon.

As for the Lakedaimonians, they visited the battlefield at Marathon and, no doubt, asked the Athenians how they did it. To judge by Herodotos’s account of Thermopylai in 480, the Lakedaimonians continued to use a fluid fighting style effectively. They repeatedly pretended to flee, only to turn on the barbarians when they pursued in disorder (7.211.3). The struggle over Leonidas’s body sounds truly Homeric, with the Greeks routing the Persians four times before they were able to drag the corpse away (7.225.1). But at Plataia in 479 it is clear that the Lakedaimonians admired Athens’ way of fighting, for the Lakedaimonian king Pausanias asked the Athenians to switch places with the Lakedaimonians and oppose the Persians, since the Athenians had the experience of Marathon (Hdt. 9.46.2–3). Later he asked for the aid of the Athenian archers (Hdt. 9.60). In the battle, the Persian archers shot from behind a fence of wicker shields until the Greeks charged. Unable to get away—probably there were too many of them too close together—the Persians threw away their bows and tried to fight hand-to-hand, rushing out individually or in small groups (Hdt. 9.62). The Greeks won, then, by charging *en masse* to close quarters, just as the Athenians had done at Marathon.⁶⁵ These great victories, Marathon and Plataia, won by hard hand-to-hand fighting, loomed large in the collective memory of hoplites.

After Xerxes’ retreat, the Greeks soon launched counterattacks as far away as Cyprus and Byzantion (Thuc. 1.94.2). With the growth of the Athenian empire, war became much more destructive than it had been in the Archaic period. Earlier, as Thucydides points out (1.15), neighbors fought most wars without coalitions of allied forces, except in the shadowy Lelantine War. As Classical Athens accumulated a monetary surplus through campaigns against enemies and taxes from allies, the nature of warfare changed. Athens sent out expeditionary

forces that remained in the field much longer than Archaic campaigns had lasted. As early as the 460s, the Athenians sustained the siege of Thasos for more than two years (Thuc. 1.101.3).

By the time Herodotos wrote Mardonios's speech, hoplites had idealized the Archaic way of war as a ritualized *agôn*, or contest. The story of the mantis Tisamenos makes it unlikely that the term *agôn* was in general use for "batde" before the Persian invasions. When Tisamenos asked the Delphic oracle about a child, the Pythia predicted that he would win five *agones*. So he trained for the pentathlon, and almost won at the Olympics (he lost in wrestling). The Lakedaimonians then realized that the oracle meant five battles, and persuaded Tisamenos to become their seer. He then helped the Lakedaimonians win five victories, beginning with the batde of Plataia in 479.⁶⁶ The earliest text to use *agôn* in the sense of "batde," Aeschylus's *Eumenides* (914), dates to 458.⁶⁷

The Archaic way of war was not a single, head-on collision of hoplite phalanxes, excluding cavalry and projectile weapons, commemorated by a battlefield trophy. The idea of agonistic warfare matters—it helps to explain why the Classical Greeks fought big battles such as Mantinea, Koroneia, and Leuktra. But we should not treat the Classical *agôn* as a debased form of an Archaic way of war that never existed. Despite changes in armor and weapons, Archaic Greeks fought according to the conventions found in Homer. Greeks invented the hoplite *agôn* in the mid-5th century.

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Notes

¹ Vernant 1968, with Vernant (“la guerre grecque classique est un *agón*,” p. 21); Détienne (“le heurt des phalanges est soumis à règles, il a des aspects ludiques: c’est un *agón*, à la fois concours et combat, épreuve et jeu,” p. 123); and de Romilly (“La guerre entre cités était, en effet, un état latent mais non pas incontrôlé. Conçue comme un tournoi, elle comportait ses rites et ses limites,” p. 211).

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² See Brelich 1961; Garland 1974, 1975; and Lonis 1979.

³ Ducrey 1999; Pritchett 1971–1991; Hanson 1995, 2000b.

⁴ In his *Warfare in Ancient Greece: A Sourcebook*, a textbook intended for undergraduates, Sage describes the way of war in Archaic Greece as “short sharp clashes that were the product of mutual agreement and had some aspects of an arranged contest” (1996, p. xvii). Connor describes the “extensive codification and thorough ritualization” of Archaic land warfare (1988, p. 18), and phrases such as “rules of combat [batde, conflict, conduct]” run throughout Mitchell 1996.

⁵ Ober 1996.

⁶ Ober 1996, pp. 60–61.

⁷ Hanson 1995, p. 241.

⁸ Pritchett 1985, IV, pp. 112–124. The 460s date fits the earliest inscriptional evidence for the burial games (*IG* I3 523–525, the first of which, however, Lewis and Jeffery incline to put ca. 479) and the earliest inscribed casualty list (*IG* I3 1144).

⁹ On oaths, see Karavites 1992. On heralds, “messengers of Zeus and men,” see *Il.* 7.274–276 and elsewhere; in the *Odyssey*, the Laistrygonians reveal their inhumanity by eating Odysseus’s herald (10.110–117). On priests, note that

Odysseus spares a sacred grove of Apollo, along with the priest, Maron, and his child and wife (*Od.* 9.197–201; the troubles in the *Iliad* begin when Agamemnon mistreats Chryses, another priest of Apollo, by refusing to accept ransom for his daughter, 1.9–100). On suppliants in sanctuaries, see Parker 1983, pp. 181–182, and Karavites 1992, pp. 150–155. On burying the dead, see *Il.* 7.394–432, where the Greeks accept the Trojan herald Idaios's request for a truce to bury the bodies. Achilles' attempt to mutilate Hektor's body is the exception that proves the rule. Apollo protects the body, and in the end Zeus has Achilles grant Priam's request for a truce to hold Hektor's funeral.

¹⁰ See van Wees 2000, pp. 155–156.

¹¹ Adcock and Mosley 1975, p. 202.

¹² There is some possible negative evidence: early in the 5th century Aigina and Athens fought a “war without a herald” (πόλεμος ἀκήρυκτος, *Hdt.* 5.81.2), and the Lakedaimonians and Messenians are said, by much later writers, to have done the same earlier still (*Paus.* 4.5.8, *Plut. Pyrrh.* 26.11). If this expression means “unannounced,” as Myres (1943) argued, it implies that a war would normally be announced. But it may carry the sense, well attested in the 4th century, of a war so bitter that the two sides did not communicate through heralds.

¹³ See Baltrusch 1994, pp. 117–122, with literature cited. Herodotos (6.106.3–107) mentions a rule (νόμος) forbidding the Lakedaimonians from marching out before the full moon, but as Pritchett notes (1971, I, p. 120), the ban applied only to marching, not fighting.

¹⁴ For example, Kolophonian exiles shut the gates against the men of Smyrna when they were outside celebrating a festival of Dionysos (*Hdt.* 1.150); the Aiginetans attacked the Athenians during a festival at Sounion (*Hdt.* 6.87); the Athenians hoped to surprise the Mytilenians while they were outside the city celebrating a festival of Apollo (*Thuc.* 3.3.3); and Phoeidas seized the Theban Kadmeia during the Thesmophoria (*Xen. Hell.* 5.2.29).

¹⁵ For the reference to the Olympic truce, see Jameson, Jordan, and Kotansky 1993: side A, line 7. For the Eleusinian truce, see *IG* I3 6 B 8–47. The story of the Olympic truce's origin appears in Phlegon, *FGrHist* 257 F 1, *Plut. Lyc.* 1.1–2, and *Paus.* 5.4.5–6, 20.1. The “discus of Iphitos,” apparently seen by Aristotle, contained an inscribed version of the truce, but was probably made to justify Eleian control of the games (Lämmer 1982–1983, pp. 49–50).

¹⁶ Müller (1975) catalogues the occasions on which Greeks sent children, women, and possessions away for safety. Pritchett (1991, V, pp. 350–351) notes some additions, mostly from after 350.

¹⁷ Pritchett 1974, II, pp. 147–155.

¹⁸ Pritchett 1974, II, p. 148.

¹⁹ For the term παράταξις, see *Isoc.* 10.53, *Dēm.* 9.49, *Aeschin.* 3.88, *Polyb.* 2.18.2, 2.21.5, 2.26.8, 2.51.3, 2.70.6, 6.26.11, 15.12.3, 30.4.2. *Plutarch (Mor.* 231E) describes the battle that broke out after the “Battle of Champions” (*Hdt.* 1.82) as a μάχη ἐκ παρατάξεως, but Herodotos does not.

²⁰ Xenophon's Sokrates also recommends putting the best men in the front and the back (*Mem.* 3.1.7–8).

²¹ See Krentz 2000.

²² Hanson 1995, p. 277.

²³ In addition to the Greeks who abandoned their cities in the face of the Persians (Byzantines and Chalkedonians, *Hdt.* 6.33.2; Naxians, *Hdt.* 6.96;

Phokians, Hdt 8.32; and the Athenians themselves, Hdt. 8.41), we know of many invasions before 431 that did not culminate in a battle: Tolmides' capture of Chaironeia in 447 (Thuc. 1.113, though he was ambushed on his way home); the unsuccessful Athenian siege of Oiniadai in 454 (Thuc. 1.111.3); the Athenians' failure to take Pharsalos in 454 (Thuc. 1.111.1), when the Thes-salian cavalry kept them pinned to their camp, and similarly in 457 (Diod. Sic. 11.83.3–4); the unopposed Lakedaimonian burning of trees in the Megarid in 457 (Thuc. 1.108.2); the Phokian invasion of Doris in 457, when the Phokians captured one city before the Lakedaimonians arrived and compelled them to leave (Thuc. 1.107.2); Miltiades' unsuccessful siege of Paros in 489 (Hdt. 6.133–135); the Phokians' flight to the mountains before their night assault on the invading Thes-salians, probably in the 480s (Hdt. 8.27); Histiaios's siege of Thasos in 494 (Hdt. 6.27); Hippokrates' sieges of Kallipolis, Leontinoi, Naxos, and Zankle in the 490s (Hdt. 7.154.2); Miltiades' siege of Myrina on Lemnos in the 490s (Hdt. 6.140.2); the Lake-daimonian siege of Samos in ca. 523 (Hdt. 3.47, 54–56); the siege of Kirrha or Krisa in the early 6th century (Isoc. 14.33, Aeschin. 3.107–113, Diod. Sic. 9.16, Paus. 10.37.4–8). Campaigns without battles surely go underreported in our sources. For an argument that the Athenians had devised their Peloponnesian War strategy by the 450s, when the long walls were built, see Krentz 1997.

²⁴ Wheeler 1987.

²⁵ See van Wees 2000, pp. 146–156.

²⁶ For a list of armed archers on Athenian vases, see Lissarrague 1990, p. 129; the statuette of Herakles is Boston 98.657 in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston; for the molded pithos, see Wace 1905–1906, p. 292 and pl. 9; for the Siphnian Treasury stone-throwers, see *FdD* IV.2, pp. 84, 89. The Agora cup is published in *Agora* XXIII, pp. 299–300, no. 1678 and pl. 109.

²⁷ For the Chigi vase, see van Wees 2000, pp. 136–137. [See also figs. 1 and 9 in J. M. Hurwit's article "Reading the Chigi Vase" in this issue of *Hesperia*. –Ed.]

²⁸ *Sindos* (1985), a museum exhibition catalogue, documents the Sindos finds.

²⁹ In the *Iliad* spears are more often thrown (87 times) than thrust (79 times), arrows outnumber swords as weapons (21:19), and warriors throw stones 12 times (van Wees 1994, p. 144). Some contingents specialize in archery—Paionians (2.848, 10.428) on the Trojan side and Lokrians (13.712–718) and Philoktetes' men (2.718–720) on the Greek—but there are also individuals like Alexandras and Teukros who fight now with a bow (11.369–378, 8.266–272), now with a spear (3.330–339, 15.478–483), and even individuals who seem to have bows and other weapons in the same fight, such as Pandaros (spear and bow, 5.171–216, 238–285), Meriones (spear and bow, 13.159, 650–652), and Helenos (sword and bow, 13.576–595). The Lokrians fight well with bows and slings, without helmets, shields, or spears (13.712–718), but other archers, such as Pandaros, do have armor (5.294–295), and the Catalogue of Ships describes the Lokrian leader Aias as an expert with the spear (2.527–530). All seven of the named warriors who throw stones (Agamemnon, Aineias, Aias, Dio-medes, Hektor, Patroklos, and Peiros—a real roster of champions) fight elsewhere with other weapons (Pritchett 1991, V, pp. 4–5).

³⁰ Thuc. 2.13.8; Spence 1993, pp. 9–19; Bugh 1988, p. 39.

³¹ Spence 1993, pp. 1–9.

³² Hdt. 9.22, 60; archers on ships appear at the battle of Salamis a year earlier, Aesch. *Pers.* 454–464. See Plassart 1913.

³³ Thuc. 8.71.2; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.33–34. See Best 1969.

34 Naiden 2000, pp. 71–72.

35 For similar sentiments, see Herakleitos, *FVorsokr* F 53; *Dissoi Logot*, *FVorsokr* vol. 2, p. 410; PL *Resp.* 468a, *Leg.* 626b; Arist. *Pol.* 1255a.

36 Pritchett 1974, I, pp. 246–275.

37 Pritchett notes that none of the 96 occurrences of θύω in Herodotos refers to a post-batde sacrifice (1979, III, p. 186).

38 *Batrachomyomachia* 159: στήσομεν εὐθύμως τό μύοκτονον ὧδε τρόπαιον. The date depends on the poem's attribution (by Plutarch and the Suda) to Pigres, the son (Plut. *Mor.* 873F) or the brother (Suda s.v. Pigres) of the Carian Artemisia famous from her participation in Xerxes' invasion of Greece, in which Pigres also participated (Hdt. 7.98.1).

39 For Marathon, see Vanderpool 1966. For Salamis, Wallace 1969.

40 Beazley made the observation after listing eleven Attic red-figure examples, one Boiotian black-figure, and one Campanian red-figure, in Caskey and Beazley 1963, pp. 66–67. The Boiotian black-figure fragment was originally published as late 6th century (*Kabirenheiligtum bei Theben* I, p. 123 and pl. 19.7), but fits better in the late 5th century (*Kabirenheiligtum bei Theben* IV, pp. 5–7).

41 Woelcke 1911; Janssen 1957.

42 Often, of course, most of the casualties would fall near where they first turned and fled. But the findspot of the fragments excavated by Vanderpool at Marathon does not, *pace* West 1969, p. 7, fit “the topographical requirements for the trophy.” According to later practice, we would expect to find a trophy nearer the Athenian burial mound, or *soros*. The monument apparently stood near the ancient marsh, where the largest number of Persians died.

43 The Thebans came closest to violating the rule, first when they refused to return the Athenian dead at Delion until they recovered the temple the Athenians had fortified, on the grounds that the Athenians had violated the rules of the Greeks regarding sanctuaries (Thuc. 4.97–101), and again when they attached conditions to the truce at Haliartos in 395 (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.24). On the first occasion, the Theban case had some plausibility, since Athenians and other Greeks regularly denied burial to temple-robbers.

44 Similarly, when Priam asks Achilles to return Hektor's body for burial, Priam too promises to fight again (*Il.* 24.666).

45 Pritchett 1985, IV, p. 247. For examples, see Thuc. 1.63.3; 2.79.7, 82, 92.4; 4.72.4, 101.4; 5.10.12–11.2, 74.2; 6.70.3–71.1, 97.5, 103.1; 7.5.3, 72.1–2; 8.106.4; Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.21; 6.2.24, 4.14–15; 7.1.19, 4.25, 5.13, 5.26.

46 See Ducrey 1999.

47 Pritchett 1991, V, pp. 245–312.

48 Davies 1994, p. 206.

49 I pass over here the truces for festivals that appear about 460, because they may have started earlier. In seeking to explain the Olympic officials' change in name from διατατήρ to Ἐλλανοδίκας ca. 480, Siewert (1992, p. 115) suggests that, because of the Olympic truce, the Eleians were named the guardians of the panhellenic truce agreed upon in 481 for the defense against the Persians. Alternatively, the truce of 481 may have prompted the Olympic truce.

50 The batde of Solygeia in 425, where the Corinthian left wing retreated to a hill, regrouped, and charged again (Thuc. 4.43.2–3), resembles the fighting in the *Iliad* more than it does other Classical battles.

51 Pritchett (1971, 1, pp. 105–108) has collected the evidence.

52 Pritchett 1971, 1, p. 105. For instance, at the Nemea River in 394 the Lakedaimonians did not realize the allied troops were advancing until they heard the paean, whereupon they immediately deployed for battle (Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.19).

53 Pritchett (1974, II, pp. 276–290) has assembled the evidence for *aristeia*.

54 Anderson 1970, pp. 17–20.

55 Jackson 1991, pp. 246–247, and 1992. His volume on the arms and armor found at Isthmia is in preparation.

56 Hanson (1995, p. 344 note) dismisses the decline in panoply dedications by suggesting that hoplite battles became less common. But Connor (1988, pp. 6–8) argues that scholars have overestimated the frequency of Archaic wars. For a plausible argument that a specific dedication at Olympia led to a ruthless reprisal at Sepeia in 494, see Jackson 2000.

57 Connor (1988, p. 9) includes the consultation of an oracle in his description of a typical Archaic military campaign.

58 On fighting in Homer, see Snodgrass 1993 and van Wees 1994 against Pritchett (1985, IV, pp. 7–44), who accepts Latacz's 1977 argument that Homer describes phalanx warfare.

59 Marathon continues to produce controversy. For two good recent studies, see Evans 1993 and (even better) Lazenby 1993, pp. 45–80.

60 See Miller 1997 for a study of how profoundly Persian culture influenced the Greeks, who professed to despise oriental luxury.

61 On the paradigmatic function of Marathon in Athenian ideology, see Prost 1999 with literature cited. On the hoplite ideal, see also Hanson's excellent brief summary (2000a, pp. 219–222). Of the sixteen passages Hanson cites (p. 229, n. 32) denigrating cavalry and light-armed troops, only one, *Il.* 11.385–387, was written before the second half of the 5th century.

62 Loraux 1986, p. 161.

63 Aeschylus, the great Athenian poet who fought in the battle of Salamis and described it in his *Persians* (472), wrote an epitaph for himself that mentioned neither tragedy nor Salamis, but said that the grove at Marathon and the Persians who landed there witnessed his courage (Paus. 1.14.5).

64 ML no. 26, with Amandry 1960.

65 In describing the Greek formation, Herodotos says that 35,000 light-armed helots protected the 5,000 Spartiates, seven stationed with each man (περί ἄνδρα ἑκαστον ἑπτὰ τεταγμένοι, 9.28.2), and that the other Greeks had one light-armed soldier for each hoplite. These troops all fought in the battle (9.61.2), and since Herodotos says lack of armor hurt the Persians because they were fighting against hoplites (9.63.2), Hunt (1997) has plausibly suggested that the Spartiates formed only the front line, with the less heavily equipped helots behind them, making the phalanx eight-deep.

66 Pritchett asserts that “the extension of the word [*agôn*] from ‘agora’ (Homer) to either an athletic contest or a military one seems to have developed more or less simultaneously” (1974, II, p. 284, n. 28), and finds the oracle's ambiguity in the numeral five. But the earliest evidence he can find of *agôn* in a military sense is Aesch. *Pers.* 405, dated to 472.

67 Harrison (1971) argues persuasively that the word in the “Kallimachos epigram” (*IG* I3 784 = ML no. 18), inscribed before 480, refers to an agonistic victory rather than to the battle of Marathon. Korres (1994, p. 174) gives a reconstruction drawing of this monument, including the base, the Ionic capital,

and the Nike statue (ACT, 690) that stood atop the column.

Part II

Religious, Social, Economic and Legal Aspects

Religious Scruples in Ancient Warfare

M.D. Goodman

A.J. Holladay

M.I. Finley in his *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, 1983), 92–6 has recently cast doubt on the extent to which religious phenomena were taken seriously in ancient times. We believe that in stressing the reasons for scepticism he has overlooked much positive evidence for the impact of religious scruples on political behaviour and that in generalising he has undervalued the differences in this respect between ancient societies. The significance of some of this positive evidence is admittedly uncertain since in civilian life scruples might be easy to observe without great suffering.¹ The acid test is in time of war, so that is the concern of our present enquiry. That attitudes varied can be shown only by comparing societies. We have here limited our discussion to three for which the evidence is well preserved: the world of the Greek city before Alexander the Great, Rome before Constantine, and the Jews in the Hellenistic and Roman period.² Elucidation of the reasons for their distinct attitudes would reveal much about each of these societies and its religious practices and conceptions, but there will be space here only to show that considerable variety did indeed exist.

Most ancient peoples assumed that their gods approved of war; the pacifism of some pre-Constantinian Christians was exceptional. Nor did such rules in combat as were observed necessarily have a religious foundation. Ancient like modern scruples were often based on moral and humanitarian grounds, as in the treatment of corpses and civilians; the gods, as the guardians of general morality, might be involved in such matters, but only at a remove. Even more apparently blatant religious phenomena such as omens and auspices were probably seen not as reflexions of divine wishes but as part of the natural world, of which note should be taken, as with signs of the weather: but prayers to the gods to send better omens showed a belief that gods could alter nature within the limits of Fate, although in the meantime it was foolish rather than impious to ignore the signs. In contrast, portents are often ascribed to intervention by a particular deity and were probably obeyed for more specifically religious reasons.

The desire to have the gods on your side in warfare was doubtless

always in some sense a military tactic. Victory was more likely if the favour of a particular deity could be ensured either as a result of past connexions, cult and history or through sacrifices and prayers, the avoidance of hubristic activities and the observance of taboos. Some exceptionally pious people may have performed their religious duties in war as in peace from pure motives of love and respect for the deities involved, but the average human being probably did so for fear of the consequences if he did not. It is however significant that ancient writers themselves thought they could distinguish between religious and secular reasons for doing things, since otherwise the use of *δικαιοσύνη* and *εὐσέβεια* as separate terms would have been meaningless. Plato's *Euthyphro* shows that the concept of piety was not entirely clear, but *Euthyphro*'s last definition, that holiness is the part of the right which has to do with pleasing the divinity (12e: τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν), was reckoned by Plato not inaccurate (if insufficient), and we shall adopt it here.

Of course in many cases it is impossible to tell whether the religious reasons given in the sources for particular actions were invented to explain decisions already taken on other grounds. We have tried to isolate those occasions when the action or inaction which actually occurred is said to have been dictated by the will of the gods, as revealed by omens, portents or oracles, even though the participants must have been well aware at the time that military disaster was a probable result of such piety. We have checked in each case that no other, non-religious reason can be plausibly surmised for the behaviour attested. We have paid most attention to the stories of divine interference which were least likely to have been fabricated after the event, making use of the fact that all three societies here examined believed that the gods desired a cessation of military activity on fixed holy and prescribed days. Observance of such taboo days even when this was tactically detrimental would seem to be a sure sign that religious scruples were taken seriously.

I Sparta and the Greeks

The holy days and festivals of the Greeks might be celebrated by individual cities, by ethnic groups (e.g. Dorians or Ionians), or by all Greeks. Some truces were merely designed to avert war in order that the Games or festivals could be celebrated, whereas other feasts prohibited all kinds of activity as an essential part of the feast itself (as with the Jewish Sabbath). The situation of the Greeks however differed greatly from that of the Jews, whose holy days recurred weekly and could not usually be breached without very severe social and religious consequences. For the Greeks the festival only occurred

annually, biennially or quadrennially, and for a breach of the peace there was often a prescribed monetary penalty, payment of which, combined with suitable professions of penitence, could settle the matter (cf. Thuc. 5.49). There was also no need to observe the festivals wherever you were. The aim was to be there on the spot and if this was impossible they were ignored.³ The celebration was a public not a private affair.

On the other hand there were many Greek festivals and the period entailed by some of them (ἱερομηνίαί) was quite lengthy. For example, although the contests in the Olympic Games only lasted five days, a considerably longer period of time was needed to enable competitors and spectators to travel safely to and from Olympia.⁴

The heavy ecclesiastical calendar in the summer months might seem to provide a serious obstacle to military activity for any pious state, but in fact it was not a very serious problem in early times, when the nature of Greek warfare was restricted and almost gentlemanly. Greek states made a practice of attacking each other when the corn had grown sufficiently to be destructible, but settling the quarrel with a quick battle and returning home in time to harvest their own crop.⁵ This would mean that wars should be over in time for the celebration of the feasts.

However, the Greek states began to find it impossible to maintain this routine when they came into conflict with Persia or Macedon; even within Greece itself during the protracted struggles of the Peloponnesian War, the Corinthian War and that between Sparta and Thebes in the years 379–362 B.C., battles might occur at inconvenient times whether by accident or malice.

Although no doubt all Greek states would have preferred to respect the festivals if possible, not all of them were renowned for willingness to sacrifice, or even jeopardise, their interests in order to do so. We hear of cities which claim a feast as a reason for inaction, or restricted action, but their motives are often suspect.⁶

Some states were on occasion positively unscrupulous in the matter of religious observance – notably Argos. On one occasion she moved the date of a traditional festival in the hope of deterring a Spartan invasion,⁷ and on another she ‘stopped the clock’ in order to attack an enemy during a festival period.⁸ Accusations of attacks in time of local feasts are also levelled against Thebes (at Plataea in 431 B.C.) and Athens (at Mytilene in 427 B.C.). Phoebeidas’ attack on the Cadmeia of Thebes during the Thesmophoria in 382 B.C. was not authorised by Sparta, and later he was punished.⁹ The Eleian charge against the Spartans for breach of the Olympic truce in 420 B.C. may be unjustified. It is possible that the Spartans were taking advantage of a

technicality in the timing of the truce, but their logic seems valid and, as has been pointed out, they also had a political case that might have eliminated the offence altogether.¹⁰ The eminent Spartan Lichas, who entered as a competitor in defiance of the Eleian ban, was, however, clearly flouting the holy law and was punished by scourging on the spot. But his entry, like all others, was that of a private individual, not a state.¹¹

Interference with the control of shrines and festivals occurs from time to time.

Possibly the Phocians were guilty of some forms of sacrilege during the period when they controlled Delphi after the mid-450s B.C. Sparta evicted them briefly but the Athenians restored their control, thus sharing any guilt involved. But we lack details of this episode.¹²

On the eve of the Peloponnesian War Corinth suggested that the resources needed to create and finance a large fleet against Athens might be obtained from Delphi and Olympia. They spoke euphemistically of loans, but the authorities there were only custodians of the treasures (which were, in any case, mainly in non-negotiable form) and were not in the lending business. Pericles uses less euphemistic language.¹³ This plan foreshadows the actual events of the next, and more impious, century.

In 390 B.C. the Argives seized control of the Isthmian Games from Corinth. The Spartan king Agesilaus took it from them and gave it to some Corinthian exiles, but when he withdrew the Argives resumed control.¹⁴ Next came the fighting at Olympia in 364 B.C.¹⁵ when some Arcadians drove out the Eleian controllers of the Games and presided in their place; but in addition they had seized the temple treasures. The Eleians attempted to regain control when the contests were already in progress, but failed after showing courage and persistence beyond their norm. Xenophon was moved to comment that the God must have inspired them; but they were nevertheless overborne by the ungodly.¹⁶ So a holy war was not guaranteed success.

Some ten years later the Phocians plundered the temple treasures at Delphi in the Third Sacred War. This ultimately provided the justification for the intervention in Central Greece of Philip of Macedon, who claimed to champion Apollo. The villains had already been condemned by the Council of the Amphictyons on other, more dubious, grounds,¹⁷ and because of the strength of Philip they were eventually brought to book and severely punished.¹⁸ Amongst the few states which supported them were Athens and Sparta, the latter driven into this unaccustomed situation through her hatred of Thebes.¹⁹ Since her great defeat at Leuctra in 371 B.C. Sparta's policy had been overwhelmingly dictated by this hatred, and her strength was no

longer great enough to enable her to assert and maintain her own principles.

In spite of this lapse Sparta was the one Greek state which held the reputation of being willing on occasion to sacrifice her own and, often, her allies' interests in fulfilling her duty to the gods.

The Spartans of course enjoyed a high reputation for piety in many fields.²⁰ (Argos' attempt to defend herself by festivals is proof.) They sought to protect Delphi on many occasions (as during the Second Sacred War and in the first clause of the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5.18.2)) and had always paid great respect to her oracles even when they ordered her to do unpalatable things.

The expeditions to depose the tyrant Hippias of Athens in 511 and 510 B.C. are such a case in Herodotus' view, and the arguments for believing that Sparta already desired so to act are unconvincing. Even when Sparta did wish to go to war she always consulted the oracle, usually through the special officials known as 'Pythoi': examples are the war against Tegea c. 580 B.C., that against Argos c. 494 B.C. and the Persian invasion of 480 B.C. Others are referred to elsewhere in our text. Similar respect is shown in civilian matters, as with the Rhetra of Lycurgus (issued with the authority of Delphi) and other notable events.²¹

Sparta's observance of omens and portents is also well attested. In 38 years there are ten known cases of expeditions aborted through earthquakes and bad omens. This worked to the detriment of her own, and her allies', interests. Even the hard-headed Thucydides accepted this scrupulousness for a fact and did not attempt to rationalise it by producing more material explanations, so it is otiose for modern historians to try to do so. This case has been well argued by H. Popp,²² and it is only proposed to give a brief summary here.

Other Greek states also took omens and portents into account, of course, but rarely do we hear of them sacrificing their interests as Sparta did. The most notable exception is the eclipse of the moon which prevented an Athenian retreat from Syracuse,²³ while there might still have been some slight hope of escape. It is important to notice that the reaction to this phenomenon came first from the ranks and not, as one is tempted to think, from the ultra-religious Nicias. Perhaps the soldiers were thoroughly cowed by the recent defeats and therefore more prey to superstitious fears. But even at home in Athens before her great defeat the reaction to the Hermokopid affair had shown strong superstitious feeling. Certainly we hear little of serious obstruction by omens and portents to the operations of Greek states other than Sparta.

So far as omens were concerned the most impressive evidence

comes from Xenophon's *Anabasis*. The author was, by his own profession, a devout believer in divine signs, and there is no cause for surprise that he should follow them religiously, in both his public and his private life. (He was also, of course, a great admirer of Spartan ways and of King Agesilaus.) But he was not the leader of the Ten Thousand, having declined the position on the direction of the gods.²⁴ Yet he records that the army was regularly directed by omens and on one occasion suffered appalling hardship from hunger in a siege when the omens, repeatedly taken for four days, would not approve a sortie.²⁵ It is puzzling to know if this was truly typical of Greek armies and, if so, why there is so little trace in our sources. Naturally, it would only be recorded if the omens seriously interfered with operations – but in the vast sweep of history covered by Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon one would have expected this to have happened many times to other states than Sparta – and two of these writers were eager to report such things, whilst the third accepted his obligation to do so. Perhaps some generals kept tighter control over their soothsayers or were more adroit at concealing, or interpreting, the omens.²⁶

The influence of portents on the Spartans is exemplified in the Persian Wars by the eclipse of the sun which, according to Herodotus, prevented King Cleombrotus from attacking the Persian army after Salamis.²⁷ But by far the most commonly reported phenomenon that obstructed their operations was the earthquake. Pausanias noted this Spartan characteristic²⁸ and there are many known examples: we hear of it in 426, 414 and 399 B.C. (Thuc. 3.89.1; 6.95.1; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.24). A particularly interesting case occurred in 388 B.C., when King Agesipolis invaded the Argolid (after consulting Zeus and Apollo) and an earthquake occurred. His men were disturbed, but he claimed that as it had occurred *after* the invasion, and not before, it need not deter them. However, as a thunderbolt killed some of his men soon after, they may have doubted his interpretation and the adequacy of his sacrifice to Poseidon (ibid. 4.7.2–7).

The Spartans were equally meticulous about omens on all occasions – before starting campaigns, before crossing frontiers, before, and even within, battles. This appears sensationally at the battle of Plataea in 479 B.C. The Greek army had awaited battle for ten days because omens were unfavourable for attack,²⁹ and even when the Persians attacked, Pausanias, the Spartan commander, insisted on taking final omens to authorise engagement and kept his troops exposed to enemy fire whilst sacrifices were repeated until he got a favourable response (Hdt. 9.62). King Agesilaus exposed his men to similar danger in Akarnania in 389 B.C. (Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.9).

Less spectacular, but often very damaging to the Spartans' interests,

were the occasions when they abandoned campaigns at the outset or in mid-course, as in 419 B.C. (twice: Thuc. 5.54.2 and 55.2), in 416 B.C. (ibid. 5.116), and in 396 B.C. (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.15).

On all these occasions Sparta's enemies benefited greatly from her scrupulousness. It is not made clear by our sources whether sacrifices were always repeated in the hope of more favourable results, but it seems likely, as with Xenophon (cf. n. 24) and the Spartan commander Derkyllidas in 399 B.C. (Xen. *Hell.* 2. 1.17). But, if so, they failed, whereas the latter two were successful. Our sources do not tell us whether later Spartan leaders ever used again King Cleomenes' method of avoiding bad omens by taking a different route (Hdt. 6.76). On a rare occasion a Spartan commander, Anaxibios, is said to have ignored bad omens (cf. n. 26), but the evidence shows clearly the great, and often dangerous, respect shown by Spartans for portents and omens.

Similarly Sparta is credited with a more scrupulous respect for festivals than other Greek cities,³⁰ and on occasion she is said to have taken great risks, sometimes at her allies' expense (and ultimately hers) and in other cases purely at her own. In 388 B.C. (as already mentioned) Argos tried to avert a Spartan invasion under King Agesipolis by shifting the normal date of a festival. Agesipolis reacted by going to Olympia to ask Zeus if he had to respect this phoney truce and was assured that he need not. But to make absolutely certain he then went to Delphi to ask Apollo if he agreed with his father.³¹ What he could have done if this time the answer had been affirmative is unclear, but fortunately for him it was not.

The first instance of scrupulosity concerning local festivals in the historic era³² is at the time of Marathon, in the first Persian invasion of 490 B.C. When the Persians landed at Marathon the Athenians despatched Pheidippides to Sparta to summon help. He arrived on the second day after his departure from Athens, but found the Spartans celebrating a festival. Herodotus says that they did not like to break the established law but they promised to come as soon as the full moon had arrived, and in fact did so, sending two thousand men who marched at remarkable speed, covering about one hundred and forty miles in three days.³³ There is no reason to doubt the Spartans' sincerity nor to explain their delay by postulating trouble with the helots or the Arcadians.³⁴ Even though Sparta was unable to take with her any units from her Peloponnesian allies she was prepared to send a substantial army at great speed. She probably thought that the Athenians could hold out for long enough, but Marathon was fought a short time before the Spartan arrival.

When Xerxes invaded Greece in 480 B.C., after a false start at Tempe the Greeks voted in a council at the Isthmus to fight at

Thermopylae, with the fleet at Artemisium. The Spartans were celebrating the Carneia, and as the Olympic Games were unusually late this year, these too were in progress.³⁵ There is no reason for suspecting that the Persians in this year, or in 490 and 479 B.C., timed their attacks to coincide with Greek festivals : they are unlikely to have known, and certainly did not care. (Herodotus even represents Xerxes as finding this out after the event.)³⁶ But the result was that Sparta only sent three hundred Spartiates (with helots) and a King, and the Peloponnesians pleaded the Olympic truce as a reason for sending correspondingly small forces. If Sparta had thought that a larger force was essential, there might have been problems, since many of the allies failed to produce troops next year at Plataea, and it is likely that these were unwilling to fight for Central Greece, as Herodotus suggests elsewhere.³⁷ But Sparta was bound by her acceptance of the leadership of the Greeks to defend the position chosen by the majority at the council, and there is no ground for doubting her sincerity about the Carneia. Only her optimism should be faulted as in 490 B.C. As Busolt pointed out, Sparta's willingness to send a Spartiate force at all shows a readiness to break the rules at least in a case of extreme need (since Delphi needed protection and Sparta's oath had to be honoured). She would have sent more troops (perioeci easily, and even Spartiates) if she had thought it necessary.³⁸ Popp, in dealing with Busolt's point, failed to acknowledge that Sparta demonstrated by her action that her piety, though remarkable, was not total and suicidal. Pritchett's belief³⁹ that the obstacle to full-scale Spartan action was a law prohibiting expeditions leaving before the full moon, but that this was extended by Leonidas' force departing before the month began, still shows that Sparta could have sent more troops if they had thought it necessary. A similar problem arises over the events of 479 B.C.

In 479 B.C. when Mardonius re-entered Attica, the Athenians had no doubt hoped that this would be prevented by Sparta and the allies, but there was no clear obligation on Sparta to do so if the majority of the free Greeks did not consent. The Athenians therefore evacuated Attica once more, but sent protests to Sparta, supported by the Megarians, demanding action. When the envoys arrived, the Spartans were celebrating the Hyacinthia and told them that they could not act immediately. Herodotus reports that they thought nothing so important as the service of the God.⁴⁰ We are told that the ephors delayed action for ten days but then acted suddenly and sent off in great haste the largest force that Sparta ever mustered so far as we know.⁴¹ The size of this force shows that Spartan delay was not due to fear of Argos, as has been suggested. The presence of contingents from Mycenae and Tiryns points the same way.⁴² The failure of Sparta to

act *before* the Hyacinthia however does need explanation and, as suggested above, this may have been due to a lack of clear obligation. But Athenian pressure at last prevailed (even though Herodotus puts their final threat after the first troops had left).

A remarkable feature of the 480–79 B.C. campaign, which seems to have been overlooked, is that the Greeks apparently made no objection to providing ships for continuous service in the fleet even while they were withholding or restricting land forces on account of the festivals. In the case of Sparta this is largely explicable by the fact that few Spartiates served with their ships, which were, in any case, few in number. But this was not true of the other allies, whose ships were manned by citizens; in the case of Athens in 480 B.C., by the whole citizen body. This curious phenomenon persists throughout later wars, the sole apparent exception being the delay of the Corinthian fleet in 412 B.C. (as already noted) at a time when no urgency seems to have been felt. Perhaps the explanation lies in the greater difficulty of preparing and assembling a fleet as compared with a hoplite army, rather than lack of ancient tradition and religious belief among these sailors.

In the years after the Persian Wars Sparta faced revolts among her allies, but we do not have details and so cannot know if her holy days were threatened. But the siege of Ithome after the Helot Revolt of 464 B.C. and of Pylos in 425 B.C.⁴³ when she withdrew her troops from Attica must have kept many soldiers away from festivals. The garrisoning of Deceleia in 413 B.C. need not have involved many Spartiates⁴⁴ any more than service with the fleet in the Iranian War.

But more serious problems arose in the period of instability following the Peace of Nicias (421 B.C.) when some of Sparta's allies joined Argos and Athens in a hostile alliance. On several occasions the Spartans withdrew from, or failed to begin, operations that were urgently required in order to save their allies and protégés. The cause was usually the Carneia and at least once the occurrence of bad omens just before the Carneia, which delayed action until the feast was due. This occurred in 419 B.C. when the expedition to save Epidaurus from Argive attack was recalled (and similarly a later one, because of bad omens) so that one third of Epidaurian territory was ravaged (Thuc. 5.54).

In 418 B.C. after their great victory at Mantinea, the Spartans immediately celebrated the Carneia, thus failing to prevent their enemies from carrying out the circumvallation of her ally Epidaurus (Thuc. 5.75–6). In 417 B.C., when her oligarchic protégés in Argos were being threatened by the democrats, the Spartans were celebrating the Gymnopaediae. The democrats had chosen this time deliberately (one of the few cases of malice known) and were able to

kill some oligarchs and banish others. Continuous pressure from their long-suffering friends eventually persuaded the Spartans to postpone the festival in order to act. But when they heard that the oligarchs had been defeated they returned home and celebrated the festival after all (Thuc. 5.82). It seems that the date for this festival was less sacrosanct than for the Carneia and Hyacinthia.

In the Corinthian War the pressure became greater,⁴⁵ because Sparta was now confronted by a serious challenge on land and the threat to her festivals increased. While she was besieging Corinth in 390 B.C. her commander allowed the Amyclaeans in the army to return to celebrate the Hyacinthia. Xenophon says 'The Amyclaeans invariably go back home to the festival of the Hyacinthia for the paean to Apollo, whether they chance to be on campaign or away from home for any other reason'. They were escorted a certain distance but on its return the escort fell into an Athenian ambush and was defeated with the loss of 250 Spartiates-a very large number indeed.⁴⁶ Again, this was not a suicidal act, but it involved greater risk than other Greeks would have incurred purely for the sake of attending a festival.

Between the King's Peace of 387/6 B.C. and the liberation of the Cadmeia in 379 B.C. Sparta was dominant in the Greek world and could usually time her expeditions for her own convenience. But when the news of her defeat at Leuctra reached Sparta, we are told by Xenophon, it was the last day of the festival of the Gymnopaediae, when the chorus of men was in the theatre.⁴⁷ Sparta had not used the option of postponing the festival but had sent her forces out when it was necessary : she was devout but not to the point of extinction.

II Rome Before Constantine

It is often asserted that Rome was more thoroughly militarised than any other ancient society, and Romans certainly went further than others in ensuring that divine approval for their wars could almost always be assured : unfavourable portents were easily expiated and so long as the sacred chickens kept their natural appetites the gods were reckoned to view aggression with favour. As a result there is no certain evidence that the observance of religious scruples ever acted to Rome's detriment.⁴⁸ The whole Roman religious calendar was geared to war.⁴⁹

None the less, Macrobius, *Saturnalia* 1.16, records days in each year when, according to Roman pagan custom, it was *nefas proelium sumere*. His list was culled from various sources and makes no distinction between different periods of Roman history, but it includes the days when the *Feriae Latinae* and the *Saturnalia* were celebrated and the

three days when the open *mundus* allowed access to the upper world by the spirits of the dead, i.e. 24 August, 5 October, and 8 November.⁵⁰ He also states that it was bad to instigate warfare on the black days (*dies atri*) which followed the Kalends, Nones and Ides of every month (*postridui*).⁵¹ These dates are not marked in the official *fasti* for the avoidance of business, although the opening of the *mundus* and the unlucky nature of the *postridui* in January are noted in some of the extant calendars,⁵² but this should not be taken as a reason to dispute Macrobius' evidence. Plutarch, referring to restrictions on fighting on 18 July, the anniversary of the Roman defeat at the battle of Allia, further suggests that the strength of pagan Roman abhorrence at fighting on such days varied with regard to the taboo day in question, Allia day being one of those *μάλιστα ἀποφράδων*.⁵³

However, observance of such restrictions seems never to have been to Rome's disadvantage. The truce during the *Feriae Latinae* presumably originated in the Latin league, since the festival celebrated the links which bound the Latin cities together and had much the same rationale as the truces observed among themselves by Greek states,⁵⁴ but it is unknown whether this truce was ever a problem for Rome in her struggle for supremacy over the Latins. It may be significant that the Roman consuls seem quite early to have gained the right to fix the date of the festival in any particular year to their own convenience.⁵⁵ After 338 B.C. the truce presumably became irrelevant. The festival itself in the later Republic provided some hindrance to warfare through the normal requirement that both consuls be present at the sacrifices in person,⁵⁶ but in times of crisis a dictator *Feriarum Latinarum causa* could be appointed.⁵⁷

In contrast, restrictions on warfare during *dies atri* will have applied in all the wars of the late Republic and early Empire. Strikingly, however, the taboo on a particular day is never mentioned as a reason for not having fought or as an explanation of defeat. On the contrary, when Lucullus in 69 B.C. was warned by his officers for deliberately offering battle to Tigranes on 6 October, described by Plutarch as one of the days *τῶν ἀποφράδων ἃς μελαίνας καλοῦσιν* because it was the anniversary of the defeat at Arausio in 105 B.C., he is portrayed as proudly replying that he preferred to ignore the taboo and instead to render the day auspicious by his own victory.⁵⁸ Furthermore, Plutarch suggests that Lucullus moved rapidly in marching to face Tigranes so that he was able to attack early in the morning of 6 October, in which case he will have undertaken the crucial march from Tigranocerta on 5 October, the dread day when the *mundus* lay open. If so, it is significant that Plutarch sees no reason to comment on this infringement of another taboo.⁵⁹

Roman sources rarely give precise calendar dates for military

manoeuvres but, when on one occasion a defeat occurred on a forbidden day, it is striking that, despite ample hostility in the sources against the general involved, infringement of the taboo is not one of the accusations brought against him. According to Claudius Quadrigarius in the early first century B.C. the battle of Cannae took place on 2 August 216 B.C.,⁶⁰ a *diespostriduanus* on which warfare was forbidden.⁶¹ The day was presumably already taboo at least by the time of Quadrigarius, since otherwise he would not have mentioned it, and it is very likely that it was one of the *dies atri* formally recognised by the Roman religious authorities already at the time of Cannae.⁶² There is indeed no reason to deny the assertion of later sources that the *dies postriduari* were first included among the black days of the state as early as the fourth century B.C.⁶³ At Cannae the Roman commander Terentius Varro was entirely responsible for choosing the day for the battle,⁶⁴ and Polybius and Livy provide detailed accounts of the signs and prodigies which he culpably ignored.⁶⁵ Appian further describes how Aemilius prevented an attack by Terentius Varro two days earlier precisely by declaring the day ill omened.⁶⁶ It is therefore significant that none of these writers is concerned to point out the taboo which should have precluded battle on 2 August, although Livy at least should have known the date from Quadrigarius. It seems that the more ambiguous portents and omens which preceded the battle were seen as of far greater religious importance than the unpropitious day.⁶⁷

According to Frontinus, P. Scipio successfully overcame the reluctance of his brother to fight on a *dies religiosus* in 190 B.C. by pointing to the favourable weather conditions. The great Roman victory of Magnesia ensued. Frontinus approves of this contravention of religious custom by the Scipios; the fuller accounts of the battle ignore it.⁶⁸

In no other case can an infringement of a taboo day be shown so clearly. Perhaps commanders avoided unpropitious days whenever possible but did not let religious scruples alter the course of a campaign in any important way, offering suitable vows to avert the ill omen of an unlucky date in warfare as in religious rites.⁶⁹ When delay could be detrimental a Roman general could always excuse his breaking of the taboo by claiming that it was only forbidden to attack, not to defend oneself, on such days.⁷⁰

Restrictions of this sort became more significant when they applied to individual commanders rather than the state as a whole. According to Macrobius, some aristocratic families, including the Claudii, Aemilii, Julii and Cornelii, observed special festivals as days of rest.⁷¹ Presumably the work prohibited did not include warfare since none of these families were hindered in successful military careers. More of a

problem were the taboos attached to some of the priesthoods, which were often shared out in the Republic among the same nobles as filled the great state magistracies.⁷² Some of these taboos made political duties difficult and might prejudice the efficient management of a campaign.

The most obvious restrictions surrounded the *Flamen Dialis*⁷³ who was not permitted to see armies in battle array or take an oath. Few who held the priesthood made any attempt at a political or military career. C. Valerius Flaccus reached the praetorship in 183 B.C.,⁷⁴ but the senate ensured that this appointment did not endanger the state by ordering that his *provincia* be confined within the city of Rome.⁷⁵ The election of L. Cornelius Merula as suffect consul in 87 B.C. at the instigation of Gnaeus Octavius was desired by Octavius precisely because, as *Flamen Dialis*, Merula could play no active part in war, leaving Octavius as, in effect, sole consul in the struggle against the deposed Cinna. Merula's only remarkable act was his pious refusal to sully the tokens of his priesthood when he killed himself on Cinna's return to the city.⁷⁶

Restrictions on his political power thus prevented any *Flamen Dialis* from being in a position to endanger public security through his personal taboos. However, the taboos affecting the other *flamines*, which may in origin have been no less complex than those of the *Flamen Dialis*,⁷⁷ did not, by the middle Republic, prevent them from gaining command of armies. Their sacred duties interfered with their political careers only when they or a political enemy claimed that they should not be posted outside Rome because their continual presence for the performance of sacrifices was essential for the city's welfare. Such claims were always taken seriously and effectively blighted the careers of Regillus in 215 B.C., Q. Fabius Pictor in 189 B.C. and L. Valerius Flaccus, consul in 131 B.C.,⁷⁸ but the restrictions only applied when the state was in no danger. The fact that both Pictor and Flaccus were able to fight bitterly, if unsuccessfully, for the right to a foreign command shows that such commands were not totally impossible.

The whole notion of such taboos lying dormant until specially invoked by a rival senator is rather strange. Even odder is the attitude revealed by the career of P. Licinius Crassus, praetor in 176 B.C. Crassus tried in that year to avoid a command in Nearer Spain for reasons that are unclear.⁷⁹ He claimed that he was detained in Rome by the need to carry out regular sacrifices (*sacrificiis sollemnibus*).⁸⁰ Livy does not record to which priesthood he belonged, but Crassus' excuse was accepted by the senate and people after he swore an oath about his religious obligations in front of the assembly.⁸¹ The decisive factor was apparently the priest's own conscience, for when Crassus became consul in 171 B.C. his colleague failed in an attempt to

exclude him from the glamorous command in Macedonia on the grounds of his behaviour five years earlier. Crassus' colleague argued that the fixed sacrifices which had required his presence in Rome when praetor must still need his presence when consul, but the senate chose to ignore this argument and to allow Crassus to lead the Roman forces against Perseus.⁸² It is again probably significant that, although Crassus' campaigns were not successful, no extant source blames his failure on his dereliction of his sacred tasks.⁸³

Crassus' career shows how Romans could accept appeals by individual politicians to religious scruples while at other times being unconcerned by disregard of the same scruples. Approval of the more conscientious attitude is clearest on one occasion when scrupulous behaviour may have acted to Rome's disadvantage. According to Polybius the whole Roman army was delayed for a month at the start of the campaign against Antiochus III in 190 B.C. because Scipio Africanus, who was acting as legate to the commander, his brother L. Scipio, was required by the taboos which affected him as a Salian priest outside Rome to remain stationary for the month of March.⁸⁴ A purely political explanation for this delay, though possible, is implausible and never suggested in ancient sources. A rapid push south at this time could have prevented Antiochus' build-up of forces and brought a speedier victory. The sympathetic attitude of the ancient writers to Africanus' scrupulosity is therefore due not just to their political bias but also to a general Roman belief that it was justified to put religious duties above military expediency in such a case.

This attitude appears all the more remarkable when it is recalled that Africanus' scrupulous behaviour over his own taboo was followed within two months by the deliberate infringement of a *dies religiosas* by the whole army at his insistence (see above, n. 68 on the battle of Magnesia). Africanus was apparently censured neither for putting religion above military necessity in the one case nor expediency above religion in the other. It is a little surprising that such duties of patrician nobles with Salian priesthoods did not interfere more often in the conduct of war, for, although resignation seems to have been permitted for Saltans unlike other priests when they took up magistracies,⁸⁵ it was evidently not universal since at least one Salian, Appius Claudius Pulcher, consul in 143 B.C., achieved military glory while in his priestly office.⁸⁶ Scipio Africanus, at any rate, was a *privatus*, and either could not or would not resign from his Saliate.⁸⁷ Then, for the only recorded time in pagan Roman history, religious scruples may have acted, however slightly, to the detriment of the state.

When the Empire became Christian, religion did not hinder military

activity any more than it had done before. Some Christians before Constantine were pacifists but others certainly were not⁸⁸ and there is no trace of any upheaval in Christian thinking in the years immediately after A.D. 312.⁸⁹ As in so much else the Church simply gave a new veneer to earlier Roman attitudes to war. It may, for example, have been normal for all Christians including Arian barbarians to avoid warfare on Easter Day, since this is implied by Orosius in his description of the battle of Pollentia of A.D. 402,⁹⁰ but, if so, the restriction is not known to have acted to Rome's disadvantage in any campaign, including this one.⁹¹

III Jews in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods

Gentile authors ascribed Jewish failures in war to an overscrupulous regard for religious taboos, even though on the surface the religious aspects of warfare were less prominent for Jews in the Hellenistic and Roman periods than for their Roman contemporaries and the Greeks before Alexander.⁹² Early Israelites had waged holy wars in which God fought on behalf of his people and the defeated enemy was consecrated to the divinity,⁹³ but by the Hellenistic period such warfare was only legendary.⁹⁴ War was secularised from the tenth century B.C. : by the end of the seventh century B.C. Jeremiah could even write of God fighting against Israel for their chastisement.⁹⁵ Even if the original concept of the holy war was revived in the Maccabean struggle of the second century B.C. and in the great revolt against Rome in the first century A.D.,⁹⁶ no source claims that those struggles were also due to direct divine inspiration and intervention. On the contrary, Jews now saw themselves as fighting for God, to protect his worship, rather than God fighting for them as in ancient times.⁹⁷

Jewish belief that God's aid in warfare was no longer direct did not preclude hope for divine guidance through omens and portents. Various methods of foretelling the future are described without censure in the biblical record of wars under the early kings. Omens⁹⁸ and oracles⁹⁹ are both recorded, but it was more common in the early monarchy to enquire about the future directly from prophets,¹⁰⁰ whose answers were forthcoming only through direct divine inspiration rather than the technical interpretation of omens. In the midst of battle commanders therefore depended heavily on the sanctity and goodwill of such men.¹⁰¹

By Hellenistic times, however, Jewish prophets were no longer regularly to be found.¹⁰² Since no recognised technique had been developed among Jews for inquiring about omens, Jewish commanders were, when compared to their pagan counterparts, bereft of divine guidance. Resulting Jewish scepticism about divination

before battle is delightfully illustrated by a story recorded by Hecataeus of Abdera.¹⁰³ Popular beliefs about the efficacy of omens were considered by many Jews to be indicative of a susceptibility to idolatry rather than a readiness to recognise divine advice.¹⁰⁴ Instead of receiving specific guidance like that provided by Roman auspices, the Maccabees could only study intently the books of the Law (II Maccabees 8.23). Direct divine communication through the *Urim* and *Thummim* was a phenomenon of the distant past.¹⁰⁵

More general, unsought, portents were more readily recognised as divinely inspired but, again, the Jewish state lacked professional interpreters. The sacred books provided few helpful precedents: the sun and moon had stood still for Joshua, but this was not reckoned as a portent for good or evil but as a divine tactic for ensuring victory in one day.¹⁰⁶ In later biblical times portents of disaster were always and only understood through the direct inspiration of prophets.¹⁰⁷ The lack of prophets therefore made portents, like omens, unintelligible in post-biblical Judaism.¹⁰⁸

Jewish religious doctrine was not, then, particularly likely in itself to promote warfare by the Hellenistic period. By contrast, the problems involved in fighting at times devoted to divinely ordained rest were more acute for Jews than for Greeks or Romans.

The most potentially damaging restriction on warfare was the taboo against fighting during the Sabbatical Year. Once every seven years the land of Israel was allowed to rest from all forms of agricultural production.¹⁰⁹ In the description of eschatological war given in the War Rule found at Qumran, a document which probably dates from the late first century B.C. or early first century A.D., it is taken for granted that war too will not take place during such years.¹¹⁰ This restriction on fighting had a dramatic practical effect on at least one occasion: a siege had to be abandoned by John Hyrcanus in 135 B.C. because of the onset of the Sabbatical Year.¹¹¹ Josephus' chronology of later Sabbatical Years is confused, so it is impossible to be certain that this taboo was broken on later occasions,¹¹² but it is not likely to have been kept scrupulously since attitudes towards even the agricultural restrictions on the Sabbath Year relaxed during the first century A.D.¹¹³ and, in the Pentateuch unlike Josephus, fighting is not one of the forms of work explicitly forbidden during the year.

In contrast, there is no reason to suppose any general diminution in the observance of major festivals during this period. It was incumbent on all adult male Jews to celebrate each year the three pilgrim festivals of Passover, Pentecost and Tabernacles by worshipping at the Jerusalem Temple.¹¹⁴ Many who lived far away from Jerusalem went only rarely, but in Judaea the pilgrimage was sufficiently observed even in wartime for most of the population of Lydda in A.D. 66 to go

up to the Temple for the feast of Tabernacles.¹¹⁵ More crucially, however, rest from work was obligatory for all Jews, wherever they might be, on some of these festival days, and also at the New Year and on the Day of Atonement.¹¹⁶ Josephus provides explicit evidence that marching to battle could be considered one of the forms of work forbidden on such days.¹¹⁷ It was presumably not by chance that Sossius is said to have captured the Temple in 37 B.C. on the Day of Atonement, when the Jewish defenders might be reluctant to fight.¹¹⁸ Josephus expected Jews who did fight on festival days to have a bad conscience.¹¹⁹ It is however significant that the one occasion when festival restrictions are said actually to have prevented Jews from marching to war occurred in 129 B.C. during the campaign of Antiochus VII Sidetes against the Parthians, when John Hyrcanus, to whom invocation of the taboo was accredited by Nicolaus of Damascus, was probably an unwilling ally and certainly not deeply concerned to achieve victory.¹²⁰ In fact the pilgrim festivals, when great crowds gathered in Jerusalem, became in the first century A.D. occasions particularly prone to erupt into violence despite the religious prohibition on aggression on such days.¹²¹

The restrictions on Jewish soldiers most noticed by gentile writers were not caused by the Sabbatical Year or the festivals but by the more stringent and frequent taboos incurred on the Sabbath, which fell so much more often than non-Jewish holy days.¹²² Jewish refusal to fight on Saturdays was believed by both Jews and gentiles to have led at times to disaster.

It is perhaps surprising that it did not *always* lead to defeat. According to Josephus, following I Maccabees, Jews had declined to take any part in warfare on the Sabbath until a massacre of Maccabean partisans in the mid-160s B.C. led to a change in the law so that 'to this day we fight εἴ ποτε δέησῃτε'.¹²³ Josephus defines this last phrase elsewhere as an occasion when the other side has begun the battle.¹²⁴ Modern scholars have almost all accepted this account, pointing, as evidence for the relaxation of the taboo in the second century B.C., to Pompey's siege of Jerusalem, when he was opposed whenever he attacked the city directly on the Sabbath but was left undisturbed to build up siege works on the sacred day.¹²⁵ To explain Jewish aggression on Saturdays during the first revolt against Rome it is usually assumed that, under pressure of the war, Jews widened the definition of defensive warfare to permit combat in any campaign already under way.¹²⁶

Reliance on Josephus' picture is, however, not satisfactory. Josephus seems to be mistaken both in asserting that there was a total ban on Sabbath warfare before the Maccabees and in claiming a generally recognised change in the law under their regime.

The arguments against the existence of a total ban before the Maccabees have recently been forcefully presented by B. Bar-Kochva.¹²⁷ Jews served as mercenaries in Persian and Hellenistic armies and must have fought on Saturdays, but there is no evidence that they were censured for this behaviour. According to the Book of Nehemiah, the pious exiles who returned to Jerusalem from Babylon worked for fifty-two days to rebuild the city's fortifications, while guards watched over them day and night.¹²⁸ Admittedly Agatharchides, quoted by Josephus, claims that Jewish superstition was revealed by the lack of resistance to Ptolemy in 302 B.C. when he seized Jerusalem on a Saturday, but he may be mocking not their refusal to fight but their foolishness in remaining unarmed because they did not believe that Ptolemy, who had entered the city to offer sacrifice at the Temple, had any hostile intentions.¹²⁹ Nor need I Maccabees 2.29–41, which describes how Jewish troops attacked by soldiers of Antiochus Epiphanes submitted to massacre on the Sabbath, assume a Sabbath ban: the *hasidim* may have argued for the piety of martyrdom on any day of the week, showing concern for the Sabbath only because the enemy had explicitly challenged them to die for their religious beliefs, of which one prime example was Sabbath rest.¹³⁰ For the author or epitomator of II Maccabees the piety of the Jews is a major element of the tragic history, so his emphasis on the Sabbath as a factor in warfare should be treated with caution when other reasons for the course of events can either be posited from the general situation or gleaned from I Maccabees.¹³¹ The ruses used by Ptolemy or by Apollonius, who came to Jerusalem 'pretending peace' (II Maccabees 5.25), would have been unnecessary if anyway no opposition could be expected on the Sabbath day.¹³²

Josephus is equally mistaken in asserting a general acceptance of the piety of defensive warfare on Sabbaths after the Maccabean uprising. The Book of Jubilees, probably composed during or immediately after the Maccabean wars,¹³³ still forbade *all* warlike activities on the Sabbath,¹³⁴ and the Qumran sect, which took Jubilees to be authoritative, was similarly strict.¹³⁵ Nor was this attitude confined to obscure sects. Josephus puts into the mouth of Agrippa II in A.D. 66 the statement that the Jewish rebels were bound to fail in the fight against Rome since they had a choice of either being defeated because of their refusal to take any action on the Sabbath or alienating God by deliberately failing to serve him as required.¹³⁶ It will not do to dismiss this speech as 'mere demagoguery';¹³⁷ if either the original audience of the oration or the readership of the *Bellum* knew that this religious rule did not apply, the passage would not serve Josephus' literary purpose. According to Josephus, when a scout during the Jewish revolt against the Parthians in Nehardea in the mid-

first century A.D. reported to the Jewish commander Asinaeus that they were cut off by Parthian troops, the scout assumed that they were bound to surrender **διὰ τὸ κατείργεσθαι προαγορεύσει τῶν πατρῶν εἰς τὸ ἀργεῖν**, and Asinaeus' decision to fight was a purely personal one and not the upholding of a new legal principle in preference to an old one.¹³⁸ John of Gischala is made by Josephus to claim to Titus in A.D. 67 that on the Sabbath it is **ὄπλα κινεῖν . . . ἄθέμιτον**.¹³⁹ Frontinus, writing under Domitian, claimed that Vespasian won a victory over the Jews by cleverly attacking on the Sabbath day' on which it is *nefas* for them to do any business'.¹⁴⁰ Josephus himself justifies the dismissal of his own troops in Tarichaeae in A.D. 67 by the fact that it was impossible for them to bear arms against Tiberias on a Saturday **κἂν μεγάλη τις ἐπείγειν ἀνάγκη δοκῇ**.¹⁴¹

Attempts have been made to explain away these contradictions either by trying to discredit the testimony in Josephus and Frontinus about the continuation of scruples into the first century A.D.¹⁴² or by adducing from the rabbinic laws in the *Tosefta* a prohibition against carrying arms on the Sabbath even when in danger and by distinguishing between that prohibition and a generally held belief that self-defence was permissible.¹⁴³ This latter explanation is possible, but it is implausible not least because the *Tosefta* was redacted to its present form only in the third century A.D.¹⁴⁴

It seems preferable to accept that there existed a genuine uncertainty about the correct way to keep the Sabbath in wartime. Such uncertainty is not surprising. Josephus attributes the alleged change in attitude to fighting on Saturdays to Mattathias, the rebel leader: he taught (ἐδίδασκεν) that self-defence was justified.¹⁴⁵ But Mattathias was only a humble priest, and the penalty for infringement of the Sabbath by an individual was to be cut off from the community.¹⁴⁶ No individual or institution in Judaism before A.D. 70, and probably for some time afterwards, had undisputed authority to change law in this way. Indeed, study of the Dead Sea Scrolls has emphasised that attitudes towards and interpretations of the Pentateuchal Law within the Jewish community from the Persian to the early Roman periods were remarkable for their diversity.¹⁴⁷ The picture of a steadily evolving system of interpretation, fostered by later rabbis to gain acceptance of their own views as the last in a long line of tradition, was first drawn up only in the second century A.D. and is misleading for the first century.¹⁴⁸

As a result, Jews in the first century A.D. could be certain only of the undisputed piety of allowing yourself to be killed for refusing to fight on the Sabbath.¹⁴⁹ They knew that *some* Jews believed that the

law was not broken by fighting in self-defence on the day of rest,' but how to decide in practice when a battle was ὑπὲρ τοῦ σώματος¹⁵⁰ is impossible without further guidelines. Later rabbinic texts claim that the early-first-century A.D. Pharisee Shammai gave some such guidance, interpreting defensive warfare widely to permit offensive operations so long as they had begun at least three days before the Sabbath,¹⁵¹ but this definition was not accepted even by Josephus, although he describes himself as a Pharisee, and there is no reason to believe that it was widely influential.¹⁵² For most Jews it seemed best to escape the problem by avoiding warfare altogether, and by the first century A.D. Jews were no longer often found as mercenaries or in Roman military service.¹⁵³

However, when the great revolt against Rome broke out in A.D. 66 and Jews were forced to fight, many of them deliberately attacked the enemy on Sabbaths.¹⁵⁴ There is no evidence that they justified this behaviour by asserting that the holy aims of the war now justified abrogation of the taboo.¹⁵⁵ They presumably just hoped that their lenient interpretation of defensive warfare would be acceptable to God. They could not, of course, be certain, and it can be assumed that nagging doubts about possible guilt made them less effective as soldiers. In the end they had no answer to Josephus' assertion that their eventual defeat was due not least to ταῖς πρὸς θεὸν ἀσεβείαις.¹⁵⁶

It is unknown how long this ambivalence towards fighting on the Sabbath had been prevalent among Jews. No ancient text takes Joshua to task for marching for seven days around Jericho. But it may be relevant that examination of the Babylonian chronological dates reveals that the capture of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar, the beginning of the second siege by the same king, and the final capitulation of the city in 587 B.C. all took place on Saturdays.¹⁵⁷ Religious scruples taken seriously could have serious consequences.

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¹ In civilian life, the seriousness with which feasts were observed varied. Some Romans and (though this is not explicitly attested) possibly some Greeks were appalled at the laziness of Jews for having a weekly rest (cf. Seneca, *De Superstitione*, ap. August. *De Civ. Dei* 6.11; Tac. *Hist.* 5.4), but Macrobius (*Sat.* 1.16.9) none the less states that Roman religious feasts too were meant to be observed by rest. A fine had to be paid if any Roman was seen by a priest doing work on a rest day. Xenophon claims that no Athenian would dream of doing anything important on the Πλυντήρια (*Hell.* 1.4.12). Perhaps the degree of respect paid to such occasions was sometimes a rather personal matter, as with Christian days like Good Friday in Western Europe today. Xenophon was a notably pious man and had an axe to grind in stressing the importance of the Πλυντήρια. Alcibiades and his friends obviously thought that it would not do him any harm to return on that day and, as it turned out, they were right. The passions of the

Hermokopid affair were not reawakened on this occasion, any more than in 412/11, although the Eumolpidae and Kerykes raised objections at first (Thuc. 7.53.2).

H. W. Parke, *Festivals of the Athenians* (London, 1977), 190, estimates the normal Athenian attitude at a rather low level. Macrobius hints at a Roman means of avoiding private inconvenience when he notes that according to Scaevola work was permitted whenever it was necessary to avoid loss (*Sat.* 1.16.11): public *dies nefasti* were by contrast carefully observed by the cessation of official public business. Although Jewish attitudes towards labour performed on the Sabbath were altogether stricter, they too varied considerably, as is easily seen from a comparison of the rabbinic laws preserved in the *Mishnah* (*Shabbat* 7.2, and *passim*) with the sectarian customs of the Essenes (cf. *Jos. B.J.* 2.147).

2 Comparable scruples undoubtedly manifested themselves in other religions and societies. For example, the Hittite King Mursilis II returned to his capital in the middle of a war to celebrate the *purulliyas* festival (O. R. Gurney, *The Hittites* (Harmondsworth, 1953) 152). But the Greeks, Romans and Jews provide by far the richest material.

The section on Greece is primarily the work of A.J.H., that on Rome and the Jews of M.D.G.

3 W. K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War* (California, 1979), iii. 185, notes that he can only find two instances of any attempt to organise celebration in the field – and of these one is unclear and the other is the work of Alexander the Great, who was something of a law unto himself: on another occasion he altered the calendar to postpone an unlucky month when launching a campaign (Plut. *Alex.* 16).

4 For the dates and duration of the various festivals, so far as they are known, see H. Popp, *Die Einwirkung von Vorzeichen, Opfern und Festen auf die Kriegführung der Griechen im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Erlangen Dissertations, 1957), 75–144.

5 Thuc. 3.15.2; also Mardonius in Hdt. 7.9 (2) and 9.48.

6 E.g. Elis and other states in 480 B.C. (Hdt. 7.206). Their lack of enthusiasm for fighting north of the Isthmus in 479 B.C. weakens Popp's case for believing their sincerity (op. cit. 127). Cf. also Thuc. 5.54.4 and 8.9–10 for other cases.

7 Xen. *Hell.* 4.7.2.

8 Thuc. 5.54.

9 Thuc. 3.3 and 3.56; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.29. How far purely local festivals were meant to be respected by outsiders is not clear.

10 Thuc. 5.49. After the Olympic truce was proclaimed in Elis there would be a lapse of time before heralds could proclaim it in other cities of Greece. This was the case in 420 B.C., when the Spartans were accused of violation and defended themselves by pointing out that the heralds from Elis had not yet made their proclamation in Sparta and asking why, if a proclamation in Elis was the relevant, and sufficient, one, the heralds came to proclaim it also in Sparta. They also could claim that their action was not warlike. See A. Andrewes in A. W. Gomme. *H.C.T.*

ad loc.

¹¹ Thuc. 5.50.

¹² Thuc. 1.112. It was proclaimed as a Sacred War (the Second). When Delphi regained independence it gave strong support to Sparta (Thuc. 1.118.3).

¹³ Thuc. 1.121 and 143.

¹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.1.

¹⁵ In 398 B.C. King Agis of Sparta went to Olympia to offer sacrifice; he had previously been banned from this, but this time no-one prevented him. In the settlement with Elis which followed, Sparta did not deprive her of the presidency of the Games, although Pisa was claiming it (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.26 and 31). So Sparta's piety stood up well to strain.

¹⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.28–32.

¹⁷ Diod. 16.23.

¹⁸ Dem. 19.25.

¹⁹ Paus. 3.10.3.

²⁰ This reputation is endorsed, among contemporary historians, explicitly by Herodotus and Xenophon, the believers, and implicitly by Thucydides, the sceptic (cf. 5.54). As a conscientious historian he could not omit oracles and omens when men acted under their influence. See also Plato, *Ale.* 2.148d–149c and Cicero, *De Div.* 1.95.

²¹ King Demaratus was deposed at the order of the Pythia even though he was popular (Hdt. 6.65–7; Paus. 3.4.4). Kings Agesilaus and Pleistoanax were affected by its pronouncements (Xen. *Hell.* 8.3.1; Thuc. 5.16). A revealing story about the different attitudes of Sparta and Athens concerns the murder of the Persian envoys before 490 B.C. The Spartans regretted it and sent two noblemen as scapegoats to appease the wrath of Talthybius. The Athenians betray no such scruples.

²² Op. cit. in n. 4.

²³ Thuc. 7.42.

²⁴ Xen *Anab.* 6.1.24.

²⁵ Xen. *Anab.* 6.4.19–25.

²⁶ Greek generals were empowered to take decisions, if need be, contrary to the omens (Pritchett, op. cit. in n. 3, 48–9). We hear of a Spartan commander, Anaxibios, who did so and suffered defeat (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.36). If a Spartan could do this we can be sure that other Greeks did. Of course, we are unlikely to be told of this in cases where generals ignored omens and got away with it. Generals might also 'edit' omens as the Athenian general Thrasyllus did before the battle of Arginusae (Diod. 13.97.5–7). The Spartan King Agesipolis 'interpreted' a portent in 388 B.C.

It is possible that the Ten Thousand, in their isolation and peril, and with the pious Xenophon among them, were very susceptible like the Athenians at Syracuse.

²⁷ Hdt. 9.10.

²⁸ Paus. 3.5.8.

²⁹ Rationalisations of this delay are common and denounced by Popp (op. cit. n. 4, 49) and Pritchett (op. cit. in n. 3, 78–9). A. R. Burn, *Persia and the Greeks* (London, 1962), professes the same view in general (pp. 262, 508) but deserts his

principle in this case.

³⁰ But it should be noted that the Syracusans delayed their pursuit of the retreating Athenians in order to celebrate a feast (Thuc. 7.73.2) and the Corinthians also delayed their fleet for the Games (Thuc. 8.9.1). But in neither case was action urgent.

³¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.7.2.

³² The withdrawal of Spartan troops from Messenia under truce during wartime in order to celebrate the Hyacinthia (Paus. 4.19.4) cannot be confidently treated as historical, though it may reflect a real event and certainly reflects Greek views of the Spartan pattern of behaviour. Cf. the real event of 390 B.C. (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.11), when, however, no truce was made.

³³ Hdt. 6.106 and 120.

³⁴ It would, of course, be quite circular, and therefore illegitimate, to use the Spartan delay as an argument for the existence of such wars. It is necessary to provide good independent evidence for them and this has not been done. The Helot War of c. 490 B.C., in which some believed, has been dealt with by H. T. Wade-Gery in *Studies in Ancient Greek Society and Institutions* (Oxford, 1966), 289–302: cf. also *GHI*, p. 47, no. 22. The coin evidence used by J. F. Wallace in *JHS* 74 (1954), 32–5 cannot be dated with sufficient accuracy to prove his case. It is true that Sparta received no support from her Arcadian allies in her (belated) Marathon expedition but nor did she from Corinth, Elis and her other allies, by whom no revolt is alleged.

³⁵ Hdt. 7.206.

³⁶ Hdt. 8.26.

³⁷ Hdt. 7.207, 8.40 and 74.

³⁸ If Sparta had decided that more troops were needed at Thermopylae, and increased her contingent, she would no doubt have pressed her allies to do the same, arguing that the need of Greece, and their oaths, should over-rule the normal truce, which was in any case between Greeks and had no relevance to a foreign threat. If the Persians had already been threatening the Isthmus nothing would have been said about the Olympic truce. The Eleians in 364 B.C. were clearly thought to be right in breaking the truce against violators, since Xenophon credits them with divine inspiration (cf. n. 16) and even the Arcadians restored their presidency of the Games (*Hell.* 7.4.34–5).

³⁹ Op. cit. in n. 3 above, vol. 1, p. 120.

⁴⁰ Hdt. 9.7.

⁴¹ Hdt. 9.8–10.

⁴² Hdt. 9.28. The departure by night can hardly have been meant to surprise the Argives (Popp, op. cit. 112–13) since the dates of the Festival would be known. It must have been a dramatic gesture.

⁴³ When news of the occupation of Pylos in 425 B.C. reached Sparta we are told that owing to a festival they delayed action – but their main army was already away in Attica, so it is not likely to have been a major feast (Thuc. 4.5).

⁴⁴ The garrison was rotated between Sparta's allies (Thuc. 7.27) but the King was probably there all the time as Thucydides implies in this passage, and he would need a small force of Spartiates, possibly the King's Three Hundred (for which see Hdt. 7.205), to provide stiffening and control.

⁴⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 5.29.

⁴⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.11–17. Different details are given in other accounts but none

record a smaller disaster.

⁴⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.16.

⁴⁸ On the whole question of Roman attitudes to warfare, see W. V. Harris, *War and imperialism in Republican Rome* (Oxford, 1979).

⁴⁹ See, e.g., H. Le Bonniec, 'Aspects religieux de la guerre à Rome', in J.-P. Brisson, ed., *Problèmes de la guerre à Rome* (Paris, 1969), 101–3.

⁵⁰ Macro. *Sat.* 1.16.16.

⁵¹ Macro. *Sat.* 1.16.21, 24. Cf. in general on all these days A. K. Michels, *The Calendar of the Roman Republic* (Princeton, 1967), 62–6; A. D. Nock, 'The Roman army and the Roman religious year', *Harvard Theological Review* 45 (1952), 190–2. Nock suggests that the Volcanalia, in early Autumn, should be added to the list.

⁵² *CIL* I2 (1893), 296. Most of these days are *dies comitiales*. It is possible that the *Fasti Antiates* mark 6 October as *nefastus* because this was a black day (see below, n. 58). If so, this was a mistake, since the other *fasti* do not agree. Cf. Michels, op. cit. 66, 133.

⁵³ Plut. *Camillus* 19.7–8. Michels, op. cit. 25 notes that this day is marked in the *Fasti Antiates Miores*. The ban on all military activity in March implied in Suet. *Otho* 8 and Tac. *Hist.* 1.89 probably refers only to a taboo specific to the Salii; cf. J. P. V. D. Balsdon, 'The Salii and campaigning in March and October', *CR* 16 (1966), 146–7. See below, p. 164.

⁵⁴ Dion. Hal. 4.49. See the brief account in W. W. Fowler, *The Roman Festivals of the Period of the Republic* (Oxford, 1899), 95–7; Y. Garlan, transi. Janet Lloyd, *War in the Ancient World* (London, 1975), 50–1.

⁵⁵ Cf. A. Alföldi, *Early Rome and the Latins* (Ann Arbor, 1963), 29–34. Alföldi's denial of early Roman control of the rituals need not be accepted.

⁵⁶ Note the complaints against Flaminius for his failure to carry out the *Feriae Latinae* before taking over his command in 217 B.C. (Livy 21.63.5); cf. also Livy 25.12.1–2 about 212 B.C.

⁵⁷ Alföldi, op. cit. 32; *CIL* I2 (1893), 58.

⁵⁸ Plut. *Lucullus* 27.7.

⁵⁹ Appian, *Mithrid.* 12.85 gives a different account, but K. Eckhardt, 'Die armenischen Feldzüge des Lukullus', *Klio* 10 (1910), 96–111, prefers Plutarch's version, which he believes to be derived from Sallust.

⁶⁰ Quoted by Macro. *Sat.* 1.16.26; Aul. Gell. *Noct. Att.* 5.17.3–5.

⁶¹ Macro. *Sat.* 1.16.16. When discussing Cannae at *Sat.* 1.16.26, Macrobius does not suggest that the date was unpropitious because it was a *dies postridianus* but because it fell four days before the Nones.

⁶² Livy 22.10.6 records the explicit mention of such days in the words of the people's vow taken in 217 B.C.

⁶³ Macro. *Sat.* 1.16.22–7; cf. Varro, *De L.L.* 6.29, and Livy's own comments in Livy 22.10.6.

⁶⁴ B. Caven, *The Punic Wars* (London, 1980), 136.

⁶⁵ Livy 22.45ff.; Polybius 3.112.

⁶⁶ Appian, *Hannib.* 18.

⁶⁷ Floras 1.12.15–22 may refer to the unpropitious day when he states that *dux, terra, caelum, dies, tota verum natura* led to the destruction of the Roman army, but *dies* here probably refers to the bad weather.

⁶⁸ Frontinus, *Strat.* 4.7.30; cf. Livy 37.37ff. The day concerned was probably

the *dies postridianus* 2 May. The battle of Magnesia took place towards the end of December (Julian date); cf. F. W. Walbank, *Philip V of Macedon* (Cambridge, 1940), 332. This would correspond to the end of April or beginning of May according to the current Roman calendar.

69 Cf. Livy 22.20.6 for a deliberate vow that performance of religious rites will not be invalidated if they occur on a black day.

70 Macro. *Sat.* 1.16.20.

71 Macro. *Sat.* 1.16.7.

72 For recent discussions, see G. J. Szemler, *The Priests of the Roman Republic: A Study of interactions between Priesthoods and Magistracies* (Brussels, 1972); A. Wardman, *Religion and Statecraft among the Romans* (London, 1982), esp. 17–20.

73 See the list of restrictions in J. Marquardt, *Römische Staatsverwaltung* iii.328ff.

74 Szemler, op. cit. 166–7; T. R. S. Broughton, *MRR* i.289.

75 Livy 39.45.4.

76 Appian, *B.C.* 1.65. Cf. Szemler, op. cit. 171 ; Broughton, *MRR* ii.52.

77 *OCD2* s.v. *Flamines*. Cf. *PWRE* vi.2486–90 on the gradual relaxation of restrictions.

78 Livy 24.8.10; 37.51.1–7; Cic. *Phil.* 11.8, 18. In the two latter cases the opposition was led by the current *pontifex maximus* but the political motives behind his action are obscure.

79 Harris, op. cit. 37, suggests that Crassus objected to a command in a province too nearly pacified to leave him an opportunity for glory.

80 Livy 41.15.9.

81 Livy 41.15.10; note that Livy records in the same passage an identical oath taken by another praetor, M. Cornelius.

82 Livy 42.32.1–3.

83 The speaker in Tac. *Ann.* 3.58 assumes, probably wrongly, that a failure to carry out statutory sacrifices, rather than any specific taboo, is the only reason for stopping priests from leaving Rome.

84 Polybius 21.13.10–14; cf. H. H. Scullard, *Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician* (London, 1970), 205. The account in Livy 37.33.6–7 is a confused version of Polybius; cf. Briscoe, *ad loc.*, who also comments on the date.

85 Val. Max. 1.1.9 gives an anecdote to this effect about an otherwise unknown L. Furius Bibaculus, who was praetor and a Salian priest probably in the second century B.C. For imperial examples, see *PWRE* s.v. ‘*Salii*’.

86 Broughton, *MRR* i.436. He celebrated a triumph against the will of the Senate by invoking the protection of his daughter, who was a vestal. It seems unlikely that such a man will have broken the taboos of a *salius*, especially since he took great pride in his expertise at the Salian dances (Macro. *Sat.* 3.14.14.).

87 For a demonstration that Africanus was not a magistrate, see H. H. Scullard, *Roman Politics 220–150 B.C.* (Oxford, 1951), 284–5 (Appendix XVI).

88 J. Helgeland, ‘Christians and the Roman army from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine’, *ANRW* II 23.1 (1979), 724–834 denies the influence of pacifist arguments on pre-Constantinian Christians; L.J. Swift, ‘War and the Christian conscience’, *ibid.* pp. 835–68 asserts it. Both articles have large bibliographies.

89 Helgeland, op. cit. 816.

90 Orosius 7.37.2. Orosius may exaggerate the degree of the sacrilege in his

desire to find a religious justification for the later sack of Rome: admitting that at Pollentia *pugnantes vicimus*, he asserts that because Easter had been violated *victores victi sumus*.

91 It may be significant that Claudian and Prudentius, who wrote full accounts immediately after the battle, do not mention or try to excuse the date. Cf. Claudian, *De Bello Getico* 616ff.; Prudentius, *Contra Orationem Symmachi* 2.696ff.; Prudentius even asserts (2.745) that *hie Christus nobis Deus adfuit et mera virtus*. But perhaps they wanted to avoid embarrassing their patrons, Honorius and Stilicho.

92 Agatharchides, ap. Jos. *c.Ap.* 1.209–11; Strabo, *Geog.* 16.2.40; Seneca, ap. Augustine, *De Civ. Dei* 6.11; Frontinus, *Strat.* 2.1.17; Plut. *De Superstit.* 8, pp. 169. Cf. R. De Vaux, *Ancient Israel: its Life and Institutions* (London, 1961), 258–67.

93 I Samuel 23.9f.; 30.7f. Cf. M. Hengel, *Die Zeloten* (Leiden and Cologne, 1976), 277–95.

94 The last holy wars occurred in the reign of David according to De Vaux, op. cit. 265; in the time of Saul according to *Encyclopedia Judaica* viii.347.

95 Jeremiah 21.5.

96 Hengel, op. cit. 289–93; cf., e.g., the destruction of the altars in Philistine territory described in I Maccabees 5.68. Against Hengel's arguments for the revolt against Rome, see below, note 155.

97 De Vaux, op. cit. 262.

98 I Samuel 14.9–12.

99 I Samuel 23.10–12. God speaks from the *ephod* through the *Urim* and *Thummim*; cf. Numbers 27.21; Deuteronomy 33.8. The way this oracle functioned is obscure, but it was in regular use during the early monarchy; cf. I Samuel 28.6.

100 Ahab in the ninth century B.C. asked the advice of 400 prophets before going to war (I Kings 22.5–6). Their prophecy was a deliberate ploy by God to entice him to destruction (I Kings 22.20–23).

101 Contrast the prophet who volunteered correct information to Ahab (I Kings 20.13–14, 22, 28) with Elisha's statement to Jehoram that he could refuse to prophesy if he so wished (II Kings 3.13–14).

102 Jos. *c.Ap.* 1.41. However, the Hasmonaean John Hyrcanus was so closely in touch with τὸ δαμόνιον that he was never ignorant about the future (Jos. *B.J.* 1.69).

103 Hecataeus, ap. Jos. *c.Ap.* 1.201–4. As the seer took the auspices, a Jewish archer shot the bird he was observing, arguing that if the bird had been gifted with divination it would not have let itself be killed.

104 M. D. Goodman, *State and Society in Roman Galilee, A.D. 132–212* (Totowa, 1983), 208.

105 Josephus, *A.J.* 3.218, claims that the oracle ceased only two hundred years before his time, but the *Mishnah*, *Sotah* 9.12, dates its end to the last of the first prophets and no consultation of the oracle is recorded after the Exile (586 B.C.).

106 Joshua 10.10–14.

107 Since such inspiration permitted insight into the divine will without the benefit of portents, these latter are naturally rarely recorded, but cf. Amos 4.6ff.

108 Cf. the portents recorded by Jos. *B.J.* 6.284–315, with a parallel account, presumably from the same source, in Tac. *Hist.* 5.13. See the detailed discussion of both passages in P. Fornaro, *Flavio Giuseppe, Tacito e L'Impero* (Turin, 1980). On

'false' prophets, see Jos. *B.J.* 6.285–6.

109 Leviticus 25.4–5; Nehemiah 10.32; Jos. *A.J.* 14.202.

110 1 QM 2.8–9; G Vermes, *The Dead Sea Scrolls in English* (Harmondsworth, 1962), 126. Cf. Y. Yadin, *The Scroll of the War of the Sons of Light against the Sons of Darkness* (Oxford, 1962), 20.

111 Jos. *A.J.* 13.230–5; *B.J.* 1.59–60.

112 R. North, 'Maccabean Sabbath Years', *Biblica* 34 (1953), 501–15. B.Z.Wacholder (*Hebrew Union College Annual* 44 (1973), 153ff.) is the most recent author to attempt to reconstruct the cycle of Sabbatical Years in later antiquity. He concludes (pp. 166rT.) that Josephus is impossibly confused about the Sabbatical Year which fell around 37 B.C. when Herod captured Jerusalem (*A.J.* 14.475; cf. also R. Marcus, Loeb edition, *ad loc.*). None the less, if his reconstruction is correct the popular rebellion against the Roman census in the autumn of A.D. 6 took place at the beginning of a Sabbatical Year (Jos. *A.J.* 18.1–6, 26). Against his dates, however, see B. Bar-Kochva, *The Battles of the Hasmonaeans: The Times of Judas Maccabaeus* (Jerusalem, 1980), 258 (in Hebrew).

113 Goodman, *op. cit.* (n. 104), 102–3.

114 Deuteronomy 16.1–16.

115 Jos. *B.J.* 2.515–16. Those left behind were massacred by Cestius Gallus. On the extent to which the pilgrimage was observed, see J. Jeremias, *Jerusalem in the Time of Jesus* (London, 1969), 58–84.

116 Leviticus 23.7–8, 21, 28–32, 35–6. Observation of such rest days outside Jerusalem is attested at Elephantine as early as the fifth century B.C.; cf. J. B. Segal, *The Hebrew Passover from the Earliest Times to A.D. 70* (London, 1963), 224.

117 Jos. *A.J.* 13.252.

118 Jos. *A.J.* 14, 487. Philo, *De Spec. Leg.* 1.186 testifies to the zeal with which the Day of Atonement was universally observed.

119 Jos. *B.J.* 2.515, 517.

120 Jos. *A.J.* 13.252. See T. Rajak, 'Roman intervention in a Seleucid siege of Jerusalem?', *GRBS* 22 (1981), 72; M. Pucci, 'Jewish-Parthian relations in Josephus', *The Jerusalem Cathedra* 2(1983), 13–16.

121 E. M. Smallwood, *The Jews under Roman Rule* (Leiden, 1976), 146, 163, 166, 264.

122 See the authors quoted above, n. 92.

123 Jos. *A.J.* 12.277.

124 Jos. *A.J.* 14.63–4.

125 Jos. *A.J.* 14.63; *B.J.* 1.146.

126 For the clearest expression of this view, see M. D. Herr, 'The problem of war on the Sabbath in the Second Temple and the Talmudic periods', *Tarbiz* 36 (1961), 248ff. (in Hebrew).

127 *Op. cit.* (n. 112), 331–42. The arguments in the rest of this paragraph are his.

128 On mercenaries, see especially A. Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt* (Tel Aviv, 1978), 46–53 (in Hebrew); on the building of the walls, cf. Nehemiah 4.3, 12, 15–17; 6.15; Bar-Kochva, *op. cit.* 333, 429.

129 Jos. *c.Ap.* 1.209–11 ; for the narrative of events, see *A.J.* 12.5–6.

130 I Maccabees 2.29–37; II Maccabees 6.11.

- 131 II Maccabees 5.25–6; 8.25–8; 15.1–5; cf. the detailed discussion by Bar-Kochva, op. cit. 336–41.
- 132 Bar-Kochva, op. cit. 336–7.
- 133 G. W. E. Nickelsburg, *Jewish Literature between the Bible and the Mishnah* (London 1981), 78–9.
- 134 Jubilees 50.12–13.
- 135 Nickelsburg, op. cit. 79; De Vaux, op. cit. (n. 92), 483.
- 136 Jos. *B.J.* 2.391–4.
- 137 M. Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism* (Jerusalem, 1974), i.511.
- 138 Jos. *A.J.* 18.322–3. It could perhaps be argued that Asinaeus was ignorant of Jewish custom in Palestine.
- 139 Jos. *B.J.* 4.99; Titus was Josephus’ patron and will have known if the story was true.
- 140 Frontinus, *Strat.* 2.1.17.
- 141 Jos. *Vita* 161; *B.J.* 2.634.
- 142 Frontinus’ evidence is rarely taken seriously (see, e.g. Stern, op. cit. (n. 137), i.510–11) on the grounds that (1) Titus, not Vespasian, conquered Jerusalem and (2) other sources make no allusion to Sabbath observance as an obstacle to Jewish success in the revolt of A.D. 66–73. But Frontinus does not mention the siege of Jerusalem and the incident to which he refers may have been earlier in the war; the silence of the other sources is explicable if the Jews *did* fight, but fought badly (see below), especially since Frontinus does not himself say that they did not fight, only that they lost; and Frontinus, writing when and where he did, ought to have known.
- 143 Herr, op. cit. (n. 126), 248, 254, with reference to *Tosefta, Erubin* 4 (3). 6 (Lieberman text).
- 144 See Goodman, op. cit. (n. 104), 9, for the proper use of the *Tosefta* for social history.
- 145 Jos. *A.J.* 12.276; cf. I Maccabees 2.40.
- 146 Exodus 31.14; 35.2; Numbers 15.32.6.
- 147 See, e.g. M. E. Stone, *Scriptures, Sects and Visions* (Oxford, 1982).
- 148 J. Neusner, *Rabbinic Traditions about the Pharisees before 70*, 3 parts (Leiden, 1970).
- 149 Jos. *c.Ap.* 1.212, where the issue is presented starkly.
- 150 Jos. *B.J.* 1.146.
- 151 *Sifre to Deuteronomy* 203–4 (ed. Finkelstein); *Tosefta, Erubin* 4 (3), 7 (Lieberman text).
- 152 Jos. *Vita* 12; note that Josephus’ own definition at *A.J.* 14.63–4 contradicts Shammai’s. The suggestion by H. Graetz, *Geschichte der Juden* III 25 (1905), 799, that Jewish fighters in the revolt against Rome relied on Shammai’s dictum to clear their consciences is pure surmise.
- 153 J. Juster, *Les Juifs dans l’Empire romain* (Paris, 1914), ii.265–79 argues that Jewish soldiers were not rare in the Roman period, but see the more cautious approach of J. N. Sevenster, *The Roots of Pagan Anti-Semitism in the Ancient World* (Leiden, 1975), 154–6. Observance of the Sabbath was the reason given by Dolabella for permitting exemptions for Jews from Roman military service (Jos. *A.J.* 14.226), but S. Applebaum, ‘Jews in the Roman army’, in *Roman Frontier*

Studies, 1967: *The Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress held at Tel Aviv* (Tel Aviv, 1971), 181, stresses Jewish objections to the ruler cult and other pagan religious acts required of Roman soldiers.

154 Jos. *B.J.* 2.450, 456, 517; both priests (*B.J.* 2.409–10, 453) and the wider Jerusalem mob (*B.J.* 2.517) broke the Sabbath in this way.

155 The view proposed by Hengel, *op. cit.* (n. 93), 293–6, that the breaking of the Sabbath taboo shows the Jewish Revolt to have been a holy war, founders on the considerable general evidence that the revolt was not inspired by religion. For some secular reasons for the rebellion, see M. D. Goodman, ‘The First Jewish Revolt: social conflict and the problem of debt’. *Journal of Jewish Studies* 33 (1982), 417–27.

156 Jos. *B.J.* 7.260.

157 A. F. Johns, ‘The military strategy of Sabbath attacks on the Jews’, *Vetus Testamentum* 13 (1963), 482–6.

The Hoplite as Citizen: Athenian Military Institutions in Their Social Context

Ronald T. Ridley

The ancient Greek art of war has been extensively studied. The weapons, strategy and tactics of Greek warfare are well known. We have discovered all about the weight of shields, the length of spears, the depth of line. We note the effects of the appearance or absence of light-armed troops or cavalry. We discuss strategic devices such as *epiteichismos* and remark upon the poverty of tactical innovation until the time of Epaminondas. We are all conversant with the notorious vulnerability of the hoplite on his right and the effect of this during movement.

Obviously, the *technical* aspects of the hoplite and his phalanx are now common knowledge. But our concentration has been solely on war as a technique. We have neglected the fundamental point that the Athenian hoplite was a citizen, and that war was a social phenomenon¹. We have forgotten to ask how far the technique was in fact simply a product of the social context. We have forgotten to ask what it was like to be an ordinary – or wealthy and important – citizen called upon to serve in the phalanx. These people were, in fact, as diverse as the tragedians Aischylos and Sophokles, the philosopher Sokrates, and leading politicians such as Perikles or Kleon²; men such as Aristion immortalised by a funerary monument, or symbolic figures such as Dikaiopolis from literature; at least some of the fifty-eight Athenians who died in 447 all over the Aegean, all recorded by name (*IG*, I2, 929), as well as the almost anonymous one hundred and ninety-two who lie under the mound of Marathon.

These are united by the fact that they are all Athenian citizens. Not that a citizen militia is such an extraordinary thing. What was special about Athens, among other things, was the co-existence of the timocratic hoplite with the radical, egalitarian democracy, the enormous burden upon these forces during the almost continuous warfare of the fifth and fourth centuries³, and the confrontation of this citizen militia with professional forces such as Sparta.

Some of the matters taken up here have, of course, been mentioned in foregoing studies, but divorced from their social context. Indeed, I have frequently quoted from such works, either for insightful descriptions of technical matters, or for expressions of opinion. The latter, it will become evident, are extremely important. Our second

problem is one of documentation. On examination, what is usually offered turns out to be an uncritical collation from roughly the sixth to the fourth centuries, combining such things as jokes from Aristophanes, tedious moralising from Xenophon, and careless plunges into the quick-sands of the Platonic dialogues. It has been completely overlooked that we are here dealing with something far from a simple technical matter. We are talking about yet another aspect of *the working of the Athenian democracy*. By now, we should have some idea of the cautions to be observed, given that almost all our sources are hostile. Even Thucydides was a sacked *strategos* ! On the one hand, then, we have sources requiring caution, on the other, a lack of documentation. Perhaps some of the questions we are asking were so commonplace to contemporary writers that no-one bothered to set them out. I have tried to concentrate on the fifth century, the heyday of the Athenian hoplite, but reference to the fourth has been unavoidable ⁴.

The main questions I have set out to discuss are :

- i) what aspects of hoplite warfare were the product of Athenian society ?
- ii) how effective was the Athenian hoplite phalanx ?
- iii) what was demanded of this system of warfare ?
- iv) how was it possible to maintain it ?

The soldier-citizen equation is expressed by the terms of the oath which Athenians took at the age of eighteen when they became citizens. Its terms are essentially military ⁵. It is revealed again by the fact that the Athenian army was organised on the basis of the Kleisthenic tribes (HDT., VI, 111 ; THUC, VI, 98 etc.).

“The polis derived from the people in arms ; it was essentially the state of the citizens. Both facts made the defence of the state the concern of its people. There was no question of compulsory military service ; it was the other way round : the capacity to serve constituted the fully qualified citizen.⁶”

There were, however, interesting exceptions to this rule. In crises, non-citizens of various grades could be called upon to help fight for Athens : metics were used as hoplites against Megara in 431 (THUC, II, 31) and light-armed troops in the Delion campaign 424 (THUC, IV, 90, 94), though normally they served only on garrison duty (II, 13)⁷. And slaves were used to row at Arginusai in 406 (XEN., *H.*, I, 6, 24). There is also the story about the slaves at Marathon, supposedly enfranchised by Miltiades and buried with the Plataians (PAUS., I, 32, 3 ; VII, 15, 7), but they were apparently bearers and attendants ⁸. On the other hand, not every Athenian citizen could be a hoplite, for

there were property qualifications 9.

With the Athenian citizen-soldier, we are at once confronted with a remarkable fact. Athenians were liable for military service for no fewer than forty-two years of their lives, from the age of eighteen to sixty (AP, 53, 4). Admittedly, the last ten were as reserves, but they were indeed on occasion used in the front-line. Contrast even the Roman legionary who became a senior at the age of forty-five. Perhaps the best known example of such service is Sokrates, who served in at least three campaigns: Potidaia 432 (PLATO, *Symp.*, 219 e), Amphipolis (*Apol.*, 28 e), Delion 424 (*Symp.*, 221, *Laches*, 181 a). Since he was born in c. 470, these campaigns occurred in his late thirties and forties. All were notoriously arduous and dangerous 10.

‘There was no question of compulsory military service’. But did every Athenian willingly undertake it ? What were the penalties for failure in any way to do so ? Those who deserted on the field, or evaded service, or were guilty of cowardice¹¹, or threw away their shields (they had after all perhaps been given by the state)¹², were punished with *atimia*, being deprived of personal rights, but not their property. This was in fact the same penalty as imposed on thieves, those who accepted bribes and those who maltreated their parents (ANDOK., *Myst.*, 74, and LYSIAS’ 14th and 15th speeches against Alkibiades, accused of desertion and cowardice)¹³. It is, on the other hand, likely that members of the *boule* and magistrates were exempt from military service during their year of office¹⁴.

Conversely, were there rewards for bravery ? Apparently yes, varying from a modest wreath (AISCH., *FL*, 169) to the much more valuable panoply (PLATO, *Symp.*, 220 e ; PLUT., *Alk.*, 7)¹⁵.

The fact that hoplites were citizens had a number of further interesting results. Citizens were precious. We know that Athens, for example, was able to put eight thousand men into the field for Plataia in 479 (HDT., IX, 28), with perhaps one thousand more at Marathon in 490, but she still had only thirteen thousand hoplites in 431 (THUC, II, 13). Obviously, citizen numbers in the propertied classes had not greatly increased in the intervening half century. And the absolute totals are small.

Thus operations which might prove costly in man-power are to be avoided, as everyone knows, particularly assaults on fortified positions ¹⁶. But as well, a feature of Greek battles, often noted but not explained, comes in here :

“Eine Ausnutzung des Sieges zu möglichst vollständiger Vernichtung des Gegners liegt diesen kleinen Rivalitätskämpfen der Städte noch fern. Man ist zufrieden, im offenen Felde gezeigt zu haben, dass man der Stärkere ist und das Schlachtfeld behauptet hat, so dass

man ein Siegeszeichen aufstellen und den Gegner durch die Bitte um Auslieferung der Gefallenen zum Eingeständnis seiner Unterlegenheit zwingen kann.¹⁷”

Why ever should this be so ? The Greeks were hardly squeamish on other occasions, especially when cities had been captured. The list of massacres and enslavements is too well known to need repeating here ¹⁸. The only explanation seems to be that normal set battles were decided as quickly as possible, without unnecessary loss of life, because any other procedure would have been too disastrous a loss for the citizen population of all states concerned. Where, however, the costly process of a siege had been undertaken, terrible revenge was exacted.

The importance of the hoplite to the state is further demonstrated by the latter’s feeling of loss in the event of his death. The epitaph for the fallen at Potidaia ran

‘This city and Erechtheus’ people are longing for the men, the sons of the Athenians, who died fighting in the front line at Potidaia ; they staked their lives as the price of valour, and brought glory to their country’ (*IG*, I2, 945, trans. Ehrenberg)¹⁹.

State responsibility was demonstrated by the official funeral and burial in the Kerameikos (Thuc, II, 34f), and the state education for war orphans ²⁰. As they had been organised and had fought as tribes (e.g. THUC, VI, 98) so they were buried and commemorated (Thuc, II, 34). Indeed, the casualty lists tell us much about Athenian attitudes to the hoplite. They give only personal names, without patronymic or demotikon. The names are listed in order, first generals (specified as such), then ordinary hoplites, by age, under each tribe ²¹.

Not the least remarkable repercussion of the citizen composition of the army was the restrictions on the power of officers. They were distinguished by plumes and scarlet (ARIST., *Pax*, 1175), but had little of what is normally associated with command in the field. It is well known that the troops at their disposal were assigned by the ekklesia (e.g. THUC, VI, 8). They were completely answerable to the citizen-body (note the fourth century situation, *AP*, 61, 2), and had to send regular reports (THUC, VII, 10). For their powers in the field, we have again only fourth century information : they could arrest, discharge and fine, but generally did not use the last penalty (?) (*AP*). The second penalty is confirmed for the 390’s (LYSIAS, 3, 45). Lysias’ two speeches on military crimes (14, 15) are in Athens before a court-martial with a jury of soldiers, presided over by the generals ²².

In short, the strategos was elected by the ekklesia, was subject to it during his year of office, and might be judged by it at the end of his year. This was normal for Athenian magistrates, but seems

extraordinary to us in the case of a military high-command. More than that, he was essentially an ordinary soldier.

“Ils restent toujours des fantassins, et leur place est toujours au milieu de leurs hoplites, dont ils partagent toutes les fatigues, tous les dangers.²³”.

The generals fought in the ranks and commonly perished²⁴.

It has been wondered how, under these circumstances, campaigns were really possible. How could the generals evolve and carry out an energetic strategy and keep their troops in order ? Despite complaints about lack of discipline (XEN., *Mem.*, III, 5, 19), the Athenian army apparently had the common-sense to see the necessity for Voluntary subordination²⁵.

The second fundamental feature of the Athenian army is that it was non-professional. Hardly any Greek states, save Sparta, possessed standing forces. We know of only one thousand men at Argos (THUC, V, 67), six hundred men at Syracuse (VI, 96) and three hundred men at both Elis and Thebes (II, 25 ; PLUT., *Pel.*, 18). Strangely, Athens had a standing force of cavalry, drawn from the richest families, paid one dr. per day each.

Nowhere has the non-professional nature of the Athenian hoplite been better expressed than by Perikles (Thuc, II, 39).

Where our rivals from their very cradles by a painful discipline seek after manliness, at Athens we live exactly as we please, and yet are just as ready to encounter every legitimate danger ... And yet, if with habits not of labour but of ease, and courage not of art but of nature, we are still willing to encounter danger, we have the double advantage of escaping the experience of hardships in anticipation, and of facing them in the hour of need as fearlessly as those who are never free from them, (trans. Crawley)²⁶.

In the next century, Plato was to find this system quite unworkable for his ideal state (*Rep.*, 374) :

Can we suppose then that while we were at pains to prevent the cobbler from attempting at the same time to be a farmer, a weaver, or a builder instead of just a cobbler, to the end that we might have the cobbler's business well done, and similarly assigned to each and every man one occupation, for which he was fit and naturally adapted and at which he was to work all his days, at leisure from other pursuits and not letting slip the right moments for doing the work well, and that yet we are in doubt whether the right accomplishment of the business of war is not of supreme moment ? Is it so easy that a man cultivating the soil will be at the same time a soldier and one who is practising cobbling or any other trade, though no man in the world could make himself a competent expert at draughts or the dice who did not practise that and nothing else from childhood but treated it as an occasional business ? And are we to believe that a man who takes in hand a shield or any other instrument of

war springs up on that very day a competent combatant in heavy armour or in any other form of warfare – though no other tool will make a man be an artist or an athlete by his taking it in hand, nor will it be of any service to those who have neither acquired the science of it nor sufficiently practised themselves in its use ? (trans. Shorey).

Yet it seems precisely these farmers and tradesmen who were the backbone of the fifth century Athenian hoplite army²⁷.

Now everyone agrees that the non-professional Athenian hoplite made for limitations on tactics.

“Les règles de tactique élaborées par les stratèges d’Athènes sont bien appropriées aux troupes qu’ils commandent. Les Spartiates sont dressés à exécuter les mouvements les plus compliqués avec une précision mécanique, en suivant toujours le chef de file. Rien de pareil n’est possible à une armée formée par le service à court terme.²⁸”

For example, on the march, the baggage train went in the middle ; loads restricted distances covered to about thirty kms a day. In battle, the most reliable men were placed in front and in the rear (XEN., *Mem.*, III, 1, 8).

We can go further. Since the farming class was important in the hoplites, there were interesting results in strategy, too.

“Greek states were nearly always primarily concerned with the protection of the crops on which they depended for livelihood and ultimately for survival. A single hoplite battle at the frontier, fought in the early summer, would usually give a clear-cut result to the campaign, enabling the victors both to exact terms from the defeated, on pain of destroying their crops, and to return and attend to their own harvest. It was fitting that the hoplites, themselves largely drawn from the class of farmers and landowners, should have been the main participants in this game of agricultural poker.²⁹”

Thus sieges were rare. No sizeable Greek city was taken by assault until the late fifth century, mainly because the undertaking was too costly in time for farmers³⁰. Yet there were extremely lengthy campaigns. We hear for example of five months in Thrace (reason unknown) and seven months at Pylos (Arist. *Lys.* 102f). The siege of Potidaia took more than two years (mid 432-winter 430/29) ³¹. Campaigns must, in fact, often have occupied the *three* available seasons. In that case the agricultural work had to be carried on by the soldier’s family. It was only winter which was mostly unsuitable for military operations, not because of the cold, but the rains which made movement impractical.

But the most impressive evidence for this aspect of the Athenian hoplite comes from fifth century painting. The Achilles and Kleophon painters in the middle of the century depicted these Athenians leaving

home for war, especially parting from a wife. The Kleophon stamnos in München is outstanding with its understanding of what lies ahead and yet calm acceptance of it³².

If the hoplite soldier was non-professional, the same was true, even more strangely, of his officers. 'In a Greek city of the archaic and classical ages, the citizen was first of all a soldier, just as the statesman had often to change into a military leader'³³. The Athenian army had, it seems, very few officers. Most importantly, there was no professional non-commissioned officer corps – compare the centurion, backbone of the Roman army ³⁴.

Now it is very common to criticise the *strategoí* at Athens. The office was 'often held by men who were almost military novices', 'generals were often neither trained nor qualified', and were often elected, it is said, for political reasons ³⁵. But it should, by now, be obvious that such judgements are simply repetition of anti-democratic propaganda. Xenophon, as we shall see, has Sokrates deliver long harangues on this subject. And the bigotry of this attitude is notoriously illustrated by Thucydides' grotesque comments on Kleon's election (IV, 28).

It is unlikely that the Athenians were so stupid as to elect men to lead them in battle whom they regarded as incompetent. Each tribe should have been able to provide just one man who had sufficient experience for the job, or at least was able to work in with better-qualified colleagues. Perhaps the tribes were not in fact taken into account in the election – we are very ill-informed. And it was precisely here that the Athenians abandoned the otherwise rigorous application of their egalitarianism in electing, rather than selecting by lot, their commanders. In assessing the efficiency of the Athenian high command, we must beware of selecting a handful of failures and forgetting the years after years that the board carried out its tasks successfully and without fuss or adverse comment. The same approach led us astray regarding the work of the *ekklesia*³⁶.

Perhaps the most concerted attack on the operation of the *stratēgeia* comes in the military dialogues of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (III. 1–5)³⁷. The first concerns the young man who wanted to be general and was sent along to hear a visiting sophist, but learned only about tactics, and that only the arrangement of good and bad troops. One might take the dialogue to illustrate the stupidity of would-be generals, but its purpose is, in fact, as the conclusion shows, to illustrate the charlatanry of the sophists. The second is not so much a dialogue as a harangue, on the importance for the general of looking after his troops, a piece of Homeric exegesis. The third (the only one whose authenticity Xenophon vouches for) induces a young, newly elected *hipparch* to admit he wishes to improve the cavalry, only to find he has no idea how to go about it. As well as quite a few

technical details which ill fit Sokrates' repertoire, the philosopher advises the young man how to gain obedience by being the best horseman and a good speaker, and on the need to increase the cavalry's love of honour. The fourth introduces Nikomachides angry at having failed to be elected *strategos*, defeated by Antisthenes who has never even served as hoplite ! Paradoxically, Sokrates goes on to defend the *oikonomikos*' abilities for his new job. There is an interesting parallel between the new general's previous success as *choregos* by relying on experts and the same procedure in the military sphere. But Sokrates' basic comparison is the household manager and the general, implying the economic basis of the political, and quite obscuring the essential difference that the general is elected but the householder is not³⁸. Finally, in the fifth dialogue, Perikles the younger discusses ways to increase Athens' military efficiency. Sokrates' optimism is in strong contrast with Perikles' pessimism and short-sightedness. Comparisons are made with the Boiotians. In numbers, physique, unity, heroism or patriotism, and an inspiring past, the Athenians seem to have the advantage. Strange, then, that ever since Koroneia (446) and Delion (424) (the latter almost twenty years ago by dramatic date), the Athenians have been afraid of the Thebans. The very mental qualities for which they have just been given credit turn out to need reviving : the desire for virtue, fame and happiness. When Sokrates comes to explain the degeneration of the Athenians he suggests their over-confidence – apparently under Perikles' father. They are disrespectful to elders, unfit, disobedient to rulers, devoted to internal strife. These are interesting vices. Xenophon makes clear what he is getting at : when will the Athenians learn a lesson from the Spartans ? While the cavalry and infantry are quite insubordinate (Sokrates had served as a hoplite), the fleet is disciplined (although earlier it was claimed that sailors are unruly except when afraid of storm or attack), the Areopagos is honourable and just (!). The cause is incompetence of officers : most of the generals are 'improvisers' (*autoschediazousin*). Finally, Sokrates gives Perikles some advice on using young, light-armed Athenians on the frontiers to raid Boeotia.

In all the above, it seems quite clear that there is more Xenophon than Sokrates. The military recommendations are mostly paralleled by the *Kyropaideia* and the *Hipparchichos* ³⁹. Certainly there is little here to illustrate the real working of the fifth century generalship, rather, the old professional's various pet schemes and laconising prejudices.

The third feature of the hoplite army was the timocratic basis of it. The individual soldier had to provide his own equipment, apart from the shield and spear given him by the state. Now the only evidence for

the state contribution is fourth century (AP, 42), and I suggest that this was introduced as a watering-down of the original system where the hoplite provided his complete armour and weapons, when the crucial departure from fifth century practice was introduced – at what date we do not know – of allowing thetes to serve as hoplites. Thus in the classical system, only the citizens with means to arm themselves could be hoplites. There was a property-qualification for service.

In the fifth century, only the top three of the four Solonian classes were eligible. The thetes, though citizens, lacked certain political rights, notably admission to the archonship, and were not of hoplite status. Thucydides comments on their special use as marines in the Sicilian campaign (VI, 43) and Aristophanes in his lost *Banqueters* (frag. 232) apparently paraded the fact that thetes did not serve as hoplites. Thus the Athenian hoplite army was very much a social group, the upper and middle classes [40](#), with political repercussions of the first order, but that is well understood.

The system whereby each hoplite provided his own equipment led to differences in the quality of armour and weapons. Thucydides mentions these (VI, 31), and Sokrates knew the armourer Pistias who charged high prices for the fine fit of his products. Some even had decorated or gilded breast-plates (XEN., *Mem.*, III, 10, 9).

One very important point here has recently been made by Snodgrass^{[41](#)}. It is unlikely on two counts that armour was passed down or around within a family. Each man individually had to have the hoplite rating, and armour was in fact personal, requiring an 'exact fit'. One could add a third reason : more than one member of a family might be called up for service simultaneously.

The equipment of the Greek hoplite is well enough known. It consisted of a cuirass, usually not entirely of metal, but strips attached to a material backing ; a shield about three feet in diameter ; a helmet ; greaves ; a spear seven to eight feet long ; and a sword^{[42](#)}. A very vivid picture of hoplite arms is given by Aristophanes in the *Acharnians*, as Lamachos prepares for war and Dikaiopolis prepares for peace. There is the shield hanging in the fireplace in times of peace (279), but in the famous arming parody (10970, the general packs his knapsack (*gylios*) with paltry rations, takes his plumed helmet, his spear in its case (*elutron*) and his cuirass. His servant will carry blankets for camping tied to the shield. Scenes of hoplites arming are very common on Athenian pottery. We may take as typical the famous Douris cup from Cerveteri (Vienna 3694 = ARV 427.3) showing some seven young men adjusting greaves, elaborate breast-plates with shoulder-pieces, and head-guards to go under their helmets.

Now surely it is most extraordinary that hardly anyone has thought

to investigate the actual costs to the ordinary citizen of these arms. True, ancient sources make little reference to the matter. Aristophanes, as usual, has some joking references to breast-plates costing 1000 drs and helmets costing 50 (*P.*, 1224, 1251), but the armament makers are in anguish at the peace, desperately trying to sell off their wares and presumably exaggerating their quality, although not noticeably lowering the price. Certainly only very rich men could afford these prices. The only other fifth century Athenian evidence comes from the confiscation sale of the property of the Hermokopidai, where a short hurling spear is sold for 2 drs, and a spear without a butt-spike for 1 dr. 4 obols⁴³.

In the field, soldier and state combined to provision the army. The hoplite was expected to bring his own provisions with him for a few days when called up. The standard formula seems to have been 'Come to the camp with three days' rations' (*ARIST.*, *Ach.*, 197, *P.*, 312, *W.*, 243). These seem to have consisted mainly of bread, cheese and onions (*P.*, 367, 528). Kallias jokes about soldiers eating onions to give them courage in battle (*XEN.*, *Symp.*, 4, 9). One recalls Plato's dissatisfaction with this arrangement, and his recommendation for a return by soldiers to the Homeric diet of roast meat, cutting out pastries and sweets (*Rep.*, 404) ! After that, the army was expected to get supplies from friendly cities or take them from the enemy. With distant expeditions, some commissariat was arranged (*Thuc.*, VI, 44), but foraging was still the normal order⁴⁴.

Most significantly, the state provided in the fifth century some sort of pay for hoplites⁴⁵. An attempt has been made to distinguish a food allowance (*sitos*) from pay proper (*misthos*)⁴⁶. Thucydides, who should be our best source, is hardly communicative. The only mention of *sitos* for hoplites is in the Athenian treaty with Argos in 421, three Aeginetan obols per day, the same rate for light-armed troops and archers (V, 47, 6); cf. three obols a day for rowers in 412, called variously *trophe* (VIII, 29) or *misthos* (VIII, 45, 2). But the Athenian hoplites at Potidaia received one drachma per day, title unspecified (III, 17) ; cf. the *misthos* for the sailors in the Sicilian expedition (VI, 8, 31), presumably the same rate for the hoplites who accompanied them.

Some, then, regard a drachma a day as the normal rate of pay for a hoplite⁴⁷. Others think these are more special cases⁴⁸. Others again regard 'maintenance' as additional to the drachma⁴⁹. There seems little hope of agreement here. Suffice to note that although there were timocratic limits on hoplite service, it was recognised increasingly that when they were called away for service, the state should provide for its defenders.

We turn now to our second area of enquiry, the effectiveness of the

soldier we have just been defining. It will be sufficient to look at Thucydides' account of his fifth century performance.

In several places, he has both the Athenians themselves and their antagonists discuss their prospects. Archidamos, for instance, admits that the Spartans feel superior in their infantry and will be able to devastate Attika – not that that will decide much (I, 81). Before the first invasion of Attika, he urged greater caution. There was, it turned out, every reason to expect the Athenians to take the field against them when they saw their lands being ravaged (II, 11). This expectation is later restated (II, 20), although no indication is given of the size of the Peloponnesian army. Further, on news of the fortification of Pylos, the Spartans are depicted as taking the matter very lightly, confident that as soon as they chose to move, the Athenians would immediately evacuate (IV, 5). Perikles, for his part, admits only a numerical superiority of the Spartans on land (I, 143) – rather strange, especially remembering the devastating effects of the great earthquake. In fact, the Athenian response to the Spartan occupation was to send out the cavalry to harass them (III, 1).

Undoubtedly the greatest moment of the Athenian hoplite was Marathon. The Athenians defeated a force many times their number and armed with weapons such as the bow which dealt death beyond the range of the phalanx's essentially close-quarters fighting, and then managed to return to Athens to save it from the Persian fleet and cavalry. The memory of this victory dominated the fifth century, for political as well as military reasons.

In 458, during the naval war with Aigina, to draw off the Athenians, the Peloponnesians landed three hundred hoplites on the island while the Corinthians invaded Megara. The Athenians refused to be drawn, and raised a new army from the 'old and young' under Myronides. The battle was of uncertain issue, but the Athenians set up a trophy. Twelve days later, the Corinthians attempted to do the same thing, were set upon by the Athenians and severely defeated (I, 105–106). Diodoros (XI, 79) makes no mention of the nature of Myronides' troops, but Lysias (II, 48–53) emphasises at some length the age of these men ⁵⁰.

The next year (457) the Peloponnesians intervened in Phokis, then found themselves cut off in Boiotia. They had fifteen hundred Spartan hoplites and ten thousand allies under Nikomedes. The Athenians marched out with their whole levy, plus one thousand Argives and allied contingents, a total of fourteen thousand. The battle of Tanagra produced heavy losses on both sides, but finally the victory went to the Spartans. Yet within two months, the Athenians under Myronides defeated the Boiotians at Oinophyta, thus commanding Boiotia and Phokis (I, 107–108). Diodoros gives the same numbers for the two

sides, and also fails to name the Athenian commander. He has a bitter battle rage into the night, including a treacherous contest over a supply train, but it ends in a tie and a four months' truce. In the next archon year, Myronides wins against a 'Vastly superior' force. Diodoros then goes on to give another account of the same battle (XI, 79, 4–83). Plato also has Tanagra of doubtful outcome, but an Athenian victory at Oinophyta three (*sic*) days later (*Menex.*, 242). Plutarch admits the Athenians were defeated, even fearing a Spartan attack in the spring (*Kim.*, 17). Pausanias supports his statement of a Spartan victory (I, 29, 7) by reference to the golden shield dedicated by them at Olympia in the temple of Zeus (V, 10, 4). Thus a bitter struggle followed shortly by a brilliant Athenian victory seems to have induced some sources to try and conceal the final Spartan victory in the first encounter.

But ten years later, all this was undone. A number of Boiotian cities rose in revolt. Athens sent only one thousand hoplites together with allies under Tolmides. After initial success, capturing Chaironeia, which they apparently thought decisive, the Athenians were attacked on their way home by Orchomenians, Lokrians and Euboians, and defeated (I, 113). Diodoros adds that the Athenians were ambushed with Tolmides among the slain (XII, 6). Plutarch puts a rather different slant on the story, using it as an example of Tolmides' (fatal) rashness against Perikles' caution. He persuaded one thousand of the bravest to volunteer⁵¹, although the total force was much larger (Thucydides' allied contingent?) (*Per.*, 18). What Plutarch does not seem to have realised is that Tolmides must have persuaded the *ekkleisia* to support his plan. The Boiotian general was Sparton (*Ages.*, 19, 2). All the dead were brought back to Athens (PAUS., I, 29, 13), and the Athenians seem to have forgiven the general's mistake, because they set up his statue (I, 27, 6).

In 432, Potidaia revolted from Athens. To her aid came Aristeus with sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light-armed troops from Corinth and the Péloponnèse. The Athenians sent two thousand hoplites and forty ships under Kallias and four other generals to reinforce an earlier expedition of one thousand hoplites and thirty ships under Archestratos and four others. Thus all ten generals were present. The total three thousand hoplites were joined by an unspecified number of allies and six hundred Macedonian cavalry. The Potidaians and Peloponnesians also had Macedonian cavalry. In the engagement, Aristeus and the Corinthians were victorious ⁵² but the rest of his army was defeated. The Athenians lost one hundred and fifty men, including Kallias, their opponents twice that number (I, 57–63), c. June 432. The siege of Potidaia now began.

In the first year of the war (431) the Athenians invaded Megara

with their whole levy, some ten thousand citizens and three thousand meties, commanded by Perikles (II, 31). The vast size of this expedition should explain why the Megarians were unable to oppose it and had to suffer the ravaging of their territory. Such incursions went on until 424.

Two years later, an expedition to Chalkidike was less successful. Two thousand hoplites and two hundred cavalry under Xenophon and two colleagues hoped to gain Spartolos, but she was aided by Olynthos. In a battle, the Athenian hoplites were victorious, but the cavalry and light troops defeated. In a second round, the Chalkidians pressed home this advantage, using the light-armed and cavalry to harass and panic the hoplites. Four hundred and thirty men, together with the three generals, fell (II, 79). This was the first battle in which 'an intelligent use was made of light-armed troops (including the peltasts) in combination with cavalry against a hoplite force'⁵³. The Athenians had some light-armed troops from allies in the area, but not enough.

Just after the Pylos affair, in 425 the Athenians invaded Corinthia. They had two thousand hoplites and two hundred cavalry and allied contingents under Nikias and two colleagues. Leaving half their forces at Kenchreia, the Corinthians with their remaining forces met the Athenians at Solygia. The battle was bitter hand-to-hand fighting, with various routs and recoveries, until the Athenians threw in their cavalry and turned it in their favour (note ARIST., *Kn.*, 5950. Less than fifty Athenians fell, two hundred and twelve Corinthians. The Athenians retired when the other half of the Corinthian army came up, thinking they were Peloponnesian reinforcements (IV, 42–44). Unfortunately, Thucydides does not give us the total of the Corinthian army.

In the various attempts to gain Megara in 424, the Athenians had four thousand six hundred hoplites, six hundred horse and some Plataians and *peripoloi* when Brasidas came to oppose them with six thousand Peloponnesians and Boiotians and some six hundred horse. After an indecisive cavalry action between Boiotians and Athenians (although the latter killed the opposing commander and set up a trophy), both sides delayed. The Athenians knew that the odds were against them and that the gaining of Megara was not worth the risk, while a defeat would destroy the 'flower of their hoplites', so they withdrew (IV, 66, 73). But Brasidas for his part did not attack and allowed the withdrawal.

At Delion, the full Athenian levy was present, including meties and even foreigners, under Hippokrates. The Athenians and Boiotians, under Pagondas, each had seven thousand hoplites. The latter, however, had ten thousand light troops, while most of the Athenians',

many times this number, had started on their way back to Athens, having completed the fortifications. The Boiotians had one thousand horse ; Athenian cavalry is not numbered. The right wings each defeated their opponents. The battle was decided by the appearance of cavalry which routed the Athenian right. Five hundred Boiotians fell, and nearly one thousand Athenians, including Hippokrates (IV, 89–101). It is significant that the difference in the depth of the two armies (Thebans in a deep phalanx of twenty-five ranks, the Athenians in their customary eight) does not seem to have had much effect. Nor does the gross outnumbering of the Athenians and Hippokrates' admitted tactical and strategic incompetence. It was the cavalry which won for the Thebans.

At Mantinea (418), the Athenians fought alongside the Mantineans, Arcadians, and Argives. They were posted on the left. In classic style, again each right wing was victorious. Even after the rout of the allied centre, the Athenians stood their ground, surrounded on three sides by the Spartans and Tegeans, and were saved from annihilation only by their cavalry and Agis' calling away his right to support the left in trouble (V, 66–74) ⁵⁴.

It has been remarked that there were only two set hoplite battles in the Peloponnesian war : Delion and Mantinea⁵⁵. But the above brief summary has attempted to list the main involvements of Athenian hoplites in the fifth century. It is obvious that these troops could hold their own against all comers. Most extraordinary were the victories of the 450's over Corinthians and Boiotians, with bare defeats by full levies of Sparta and her league. The Peloponnesians were defeated at Potidaia in 432, the Corinthians at Solymia in 425. Invasions of the Megarid were frequent, devastating and unopposed. Even Brasidas would not engage the Athenians in 424. They were overwhelmed, on the other hand, by the new styles of hoplite warfare, in the Chalkidike (429), and stood against the Thebans until routed by cavalry, just as they had used this to their own advantage at Solymia. Finally, in the classic engagement at Mantinea, the Athenians gave an 'excellent' account of themselves. Of course, hoplites were used in many other famous engagements in the fifth century, but they were not set battles, for example in Aitolia (III, 95f), Pylos, and Kleon's withdrawal from Amphipolis, and the Athenian retreat in Sicily.

Thus the Athenian hoplites in action, hardly the picture commonly given us by modern analyses. These may fairly be represented by remarks such as the following :

“Sur terre, Athènes était réduite le plus souvent à la défensive en face des hoplites de Sparte et de Thèbes.⁵⁶”

This kind of impression doubtless springs from the greater emphasis

placed on the fleet, perhaps the strategy speeches of Perikles, and bald assertions that Athens was defeated at Delion and Mantinea. That impression is most misleading.

These accounts of the effectiveness of the hoplite phalanx drawn from citizens of a certain property-rating and with limitations of non-professionalism, even against states with a professional army or at least a much higher reputation for land-warfare than the Athenians, now raise the question how Athens was able to train and maintain such forces. But first we must ask more precisely what exactly was demanded of a hoplite in battle.

We have little in the way of ancient references. Euripides, *Herk.*, 188f⁵⁷ is not of much use, because although it is rightly pointed out that a hoplite's life depends on the courage of his comrades, the main point of the context is that the hoplite is a slave of his weapons, and if his spear is broken he is defenceless, hence the value of the bow – which the Athenian hoplite, of course, never had. But he did have a sword, which is exactly what he did use when his spear was gone.

Isokrates, *Panath.*, 1 16 ⁵⁸ is similarly unhelpful, because the author is making the standard conservative contrast between a land-power which relies on order (*ieutaxia*), restraint (*sophrosyne*) and obedience (*peitharchia*) and a sea-power which relies on men 'who have lost their possessions and are accustomed to derive their livelihood from the possessions of others'.

In Plato, there is some exaggerated stress on the need for mathematics and geometry, but this is in fact for officers (*Rep.*, 522, 526). There is, however, the interesting discussion of fighting in armour in the *Laches*. Nikias declares that

In actual battle, when you have to fight in line with a number of others, such an acquirement will be of some use, and will be of the greatest service whenever the ranks are broken and you have to fight singly, either in pursuit, when you are attacking someone who is defending himself, or in flight, when you have to defend yourself against an assailant. (182, trans. Jowett).

Laches replies that it is strange that teachers of this art never visit Sparta. Whether hoplomachy was learnt, in fact, by Athenian hoplites is immaterial here. The passage is yet another illustration of the common failure by modern discussions to understand the conventions of the Platonic dialogue. The passage here has many interesting overtones. It is yet another attack on sophists, and also recalls Sokrates' conduct on the retreat at Delion. But its basic purpose is simply to act as an appropriate device by Plato to introduce an analysis of *bravery*. It is in no way to be taken as evidence for Athenian practices ⁵⁹.

There is a more individual note in the *Laws* :

To be sure, bodily agility (*somatos oxytes*) – quickness of hand as well as foot – is a first-rate point in the soldier's equipment ; fleetness of foot has its use in flight and pursuit, and readiness of hand in the close stand-up fighting which calls for so much stocky strength (832e, trans. Taylor).

No one would deny the accuracy of these observations.

Xenophon, finally, ought to have known what was required of a hoplite, if anyone did. Yet he is inclined to be too severe as a professional and a philo-laconian. He lists the following in the training of Cyrus' troops :

... that he show himself obedient to his officers, ready for hardship, eager for danger but subject to good discipline, familiar with the duties required of a soldier, neat in the care of his equipment, and ambitious about all matters (*Kyr.*, II, 1, 22, trans. Miller).

Not much meat here.

What can modern scholars add ? It is not uncommon to pretend that the phalanx's tasks were crude. Grundy, for example, although he had notoriously worn hoplite's equipment himself, stressed only solidity and weight as the basic requirements of the formation, and noted the soldier's concern with defensive armour at the cost of mobility⁶⁰, although a little further on he admitted the difficulty of maintaining the line during advance.

More insightful evaluations have, however, been offered.

"Hoplite warfare required a steady nerve, and indeed, it is doubtful whether any other part-time, citizen army has ever been set, as a matter of course, a more exacting task.⁶¹".

Attention has been called to the need for skilful fighting and continuity in the front line, support from those behind, ability to withstand the initial charge, and total cooperation.

"No form of combat could so plainly exhibit the community solidarity that was the essence of the Greek state.⁶²"

This paper began with criticism of the technical approach to understanding Greek warfare. Yet, despite this, we hardly ever ask what it was like, or how difficult it was, to wield a spear 2.25 m long, or a double-edged, cut-and-thrust sword, or to fight in a depth of eight to twelve ranks. Or how difficult it was to keep close enough to the next man to be protected, but not so close as to hinder him. It is often said that Greek armour was very heavy, much more so than modern. We certainly can trace the stages in the lessening of weight for the cuirass, for example. But how heavy was Greek armour ? Hardly anyone has bothered to try and find out. Thirty-five kilos is one estimate ⁶³. Xenophon certainly alludes to the weight of arms (*Kyr.*, II,

3, 14), and hoplites were glad to have an attendant to carry their shield.

We come to the final and crucial question. How did the Athenians acquire and maintain the great skills required for hoplite warfare⁶⁴ ? What was the peace-time position of the army ? The question has rarely been considered, and if it has, has been summarily dismissed. An Athenian

“learned his drill between the ages of eighteen and twenty, including all the simple (sic) forming of line, wheeling, forming column, hollow square and the like.⁶⁵”

“With one exception of Sparta, the polis gave insufficient attention to military training.⁶⁶”

“The line of hoplites is the alternation of the defensive shield and the attacking spear, with which each man strikes, usually overarm in an orderly and yet skilful way. [!] This skill is acquired by early training with perhaps some practice – the evidence for this is slight – when occasion serves. It is hard to conceive of a method of warfare that, in peace, made a more limited call on the time and effort of most citizens of most communities.⁶⁷”

Only a handful of scholars have realised that there must be something more involved.

“Pour les hommes faits qui ont dépassé l’âge de l’éphébie, la gymnastique constitue aussi le meilleur moyen de se garder en forme et de s’entraîner entre deux campagnes, et il est certain qu’au Ve siècle la plupart des Athéniens de tout âge poursuivaient cet entraînement qui les tenait toujours prêts à endurer les fatigues militaires ...⁶⁸” “It is hard to see how Greek armies could survive at all without some degree of peacetime practice, and one would suppose that such training in common would be an important element for the general social cohesion of the hoplite class.⁶⁹”

Now the most obvious answer, at least to begin with, to the problem of training for the Athenian hoplite is the *ephebia*. This, however, is the subject of one of the longest-standing controversies in Greek history. The evidence for this training is said to be not earlier than the late fourth century. The argument is between those who accept this stand and regard the argument from silence as definitive, and those who find it hard to believe there was no basic training in the fifth century⁷⁰. I do not intend to go into this question more than to list the main evidence, which is essential for our present purposes.

The most important description is *AP* 42. At the time of their registration as citizens at the age of eighteen, young Athenians also began their military service. Those of each tribe had an *epimeletes*, a man of more than forty years, elected by the people, and the whole

body had a *kosmetes*, as well as two instructors (*paidotrai bai, didaskaloi*), who taught drill and weapons use. At this stage, the state paid a total often obols per man per day for rations and other needs. At the end of the first year, after a drill display in the theatre before the people, the cadets were invested with shield and spear by the state, and served then their second year on patrols and on the frontier.

Now there are undoubtedly fourth century features here. Most obvious is the fact that all citizens are included in the system, whereas in the fifth century only the hoplites and cavalry were on the roll (Thuc, VI, 43, 2 ; Xen., *H.*, II, 3, 20).

Unfortunately, there is no epigraphical evidence before the late fourth century (*IG* II2 1156, 1189), although on the other hand, there is nothing here proving that this was the very origin of the *ephebia*, as is commonly claimed. But we do have the oath taken by the young men :

‘I will not dishonour the sacred arms I carry ; I will not abandon my comrades in battle ; I will fight to defend the state sanctuaries, and will hand on to posterity a country not diminished but greater and more powerful, to the best of my ability and with everyone’s help. I will obey the magistrates, the established laws and those which may be duly instituted. If anyone tries to overthrow them, I will prevent him with all my strength and everyone’s help. I will honour the ancestral cults. As witnesses I call on Aglauros, Hestia, Enyo, Enyalios, Ares and Athena Areia, Zeus, Thallo, Auxo, Hegemone, Herakles, the Boundaries of my country, the Wheats, Barlies, Vines, Olivetrees and Figtrees’⁷¹.

The inscription is from Acharnai, late fourth century, but Robert pointed out its obviously much earlier origins in the witnessing deities. And Pelekides noted the important clause in the oath about supporting the constitution, and suggested this may date it to one of the great upheavals of the late sixth or fifth centuries (Kleisthenes, Ephialtes, or the restoration of democracy in 403).

What of literary evidence ? For the fifth century, there is at least the interesting reference in a scholiast on ARIST., *Kn.*, 580 that Kineas and Phrinos tried to change the ways of the youth by passing a law that they were no longer to live luxuriously or wear long hair. Certainly, then, there were attempts to subject young men to control, and this might include two years’ military training. But of far greater importance are the *peripoloi* (guards). Thucydides mentions them but twice (IV, 67, 2 ; VIII, 92, 2) at Megara 424, and in the assassination of Phrynikos, 411, without any indication as to their identity. Similarly, Arist. 5., 1177 gives no help ; the *hippotoxotai* mentioned next were citizens though⁷². Eupolis (frag. 341) mentions their going off to forts. Xenophon connects them with the cavalry as a guard for the mines, and clearly means they are citizens, linked with fort

garrisons (*Poroi*, IV, 47, 52). Undoubtedly, the vital clue lies in Aischines (2, 167) who served as *peripolos* of the country for two years when he was *ephebos*.

In addition there are the *neotatoi*, who fought the Corinthians in 457 (Thuc, I, 105, 4), and are listed by Perikles in his review of Athenian resources, associated with the defence of the walls and with garrisons (II, 13, 7). Now these young men are universally recognised to be aged between eighteen and twenty, obviously just beginning their military service. That they were kept apart from the regular hoplites can only mean that they were not yet fully trained, and yet in emergencies they could take the field. How significant that we find them engaged in the duties later characteristic of the *ephebia*.

Aischines refers, as we have just noted, to ephebic service in the 370's. He actually uses the term *synepheboi* of his comrades. Considerable pains are gone to to destroy this evidence. For example it 'merely suggests the possibility that the police service performed by mercenaries in the fifth century may have been entrusted now, under economic pressure, to the lads eighteen and nineteen years of age'. *Synepheboi* 'signifies nothing, for this term, like that of *ephebi* was employed non-technically before the rise of the *ephebia*'⁷³. Obviously with such criteria for evaluating evidence, nothing can ever be established.

Xenophon's comments in the *Memorabilia*, already alluded to, have been taken to be relevant here. Sokrates, it will be remembered, bemoaning Athens' military inefficiency to Perikles the younger, suggests that young soldiers be lightly equipped and occupy the mountains on the Boiotian frontier, both to harass the enemy and defend against invasion (III, 5, 25–27). Is Sokrates' suggestion incompatible with the existence of the ephebic system ? It seems to have been overlooked that those young men were not lightly armed, nor did their duties include raids into Boiotia⁷⁴.

The 'Persian' education system is described in the *Kyropaideia*. Here there is a discussion of the life of the *epheboi* (I, 2, 9f). The transition from *pais* to *ephebos* is at the age of sixteen or seventeen. For the next ten years these youths (!) guard the government buildings at night, except those who are married, who may not absent themselves too often ! In the day half the garrison accompanies the king whenever he goes hunting, which activity is thought excellent training for war. The men learn to live off what they can catch. Those who remain behind practise weapons, or are sent to arrest criminals or hunt down robbers. Does all this presuppose or contradict the Athenian *ephebia* ? In truth, it recalls Sparta, a combination of the period eighteen to thirty, when the men had to mess together and could not live with their wives, with the earlier training in hardiness and self-reliance

imposed on boys, with predilection for hunting thrown in as well !

Plato has been invoked for and against the ephebia's existence in his time. The crucial reference is *Laws* 706. He outlines the system for guarding the country. It is divided into twelve sections, one for each tribe (is he talking then of Attika ?) Each tribe selects five *agronomoi* or *phourarchoi* or *archontes* (he does not give these as official names, but merely to indicate their duties) ; generally they are called 'The Five'. Each of these selects twelve young men aged twenty-five to thirty (are these Athenian *epheboi* ?) to serve under him, hence called simply 'The Sixty'. The duties of the young men are the building of defences, roads, water-supplies, gymnasia. Their officers act as a local court, sometimes with the aid of the young men (Athenian *epheboi* again ?). During their two years' service, the officers and men (here he calls the latter *agronomoi*) must mess together, partaking of coarse rations, serve together in the day, sleep together at night. In fact, their lives must be entirely self-sufficient. It is now that Plato finds yet another name for this service : the highly significant *kryptoi*. Surely his inspiration is by now obvious.

Here there is a sharp dichotomy between modern commentators, though : those who see the Athenian *ephebia* inspiring Plato's suggestions, and those who believe it cannot exist because he does not even mention that precise term. The solution is clear – and neither of these. His model, as far as he has one, is Sparta.

It is obvious that I believe there is enough evidence for some kind of ephebic training in the fifth century. Common-sense is enough to indicate, even in the face of a total silence by our sources, that no Athenian could be expected at the age of eighteen, on becoming a citizen, to be able without further ado to take his place in the phalanx and to carry on this demanding and dangerous fighting for another forty-odd years. But the evidence does exist. Whether the training system was exactly the same as outlined by Aristotle is something we cannot be sure about.

But what of the Athenian who had completed his ephebic training and faced his further incredible forty years of military service ? First the negative evidence – or what is often thought to be that. The key passage against Athenian military training, often quoted, is Xen., *Mem.*, III, 12. The young Epigenes is being berated for his bad physical condition.

Do you count the life and death struggle with their enemies upon which it may be the Athenians will enter (!) but a small thing ? Why, many, thanks to their bad condition, lose their lives in the perils of war or save it disgracefully : many, just for this same cause, are taken prisoners, and then pass either the rest of their days, perhaps in slavery of the hardest kind, or, after meeting with cruel sufferings and paying, sometimes more

than they have, live on, destitute and in misery. Many again, by their bodily weakness earn infamy, being thought cowards.

The military connections of fitness are prominently stated, and Sokrates could certainly speak from first-hand experience. Then comes the crucial phrase :

ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἀσκεῖ δημοσίᾳ τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον. What does this mean ? Consultation of standard versions reveals : ‘the city does not require warlike exercises publicly’ (Watson), ‘our city does not practise military training in public’ (Dakyns), ‘military training is not recognised by the state’ (Marchant), ‘Our country does not conduct military training at the public expense’ (Tredennick). At least three different interpretations. It seems unlikely, at any rate, that Sokrates is referring to the *ephebia*. Although Epigenes is ‘young’, Sokrates is referring to fitness throughout life and for real battles, not just garrison training for two years in the late teens. And what Xenophon is getting at is not that Athenians did not maintain any military fitness in a state connection ; rather, he is once more comparing Athens to Sparta. ‘That *conservative circles* (my italics) in Athens cherished the view that the democracy neglected physical training is unquestionable. The conservative upper classes liked to refer to the hard training of the Spartans as the ideal education of youth’⁷⁵.

On the other hand, Xenophon’s military treatises are full of references to weapons and tactical training. But there is no evidence that the *Kyropaideia* or the *Anabasis* are based on Athenian practice. To the contrary, the former seems based on the Spartans and the latter illustrates fourth century mercenary service⁷⁶.

Plato’s key comments must also be examined here, with the customary caveats.

Its members must train themselves for warfare, not in actual time of war, but during the life of peace. Hence the wise state will be under arms not less than one day in each month, and as many more as its magistrates may think good, without regard to stress of weather, cold or hot⁷⁷ ; men, women and children will take the field, in one body when the magistrates so ordain, at other times in sections. They must devise a round of noble sports, with their accompanying sacrifices, so as to provide festal combats which shall reproduce real warfare with all possible truth to life. On these occasions, there should always be a distribution of prizes and rewards for merit...

Should the legislator not require drill on a small scale, not involving the use of heavy arms, to be performed, if possible, daily, directing all physical training, whether in combined groups or otherwise, to that end, and exercises of another kind, major and minor, to be held at least once a month, in which the citizens throughout our territories will contend with one another in the occupation of military positions and the laying of ambushes, and imitate all branches of warfare by very real fighting with

gloves and missiles closely modelled on the genuine articles ? These weapons should be comparatively dangerous, that the sport may not be wholly without its perils, but give occasion for alarms, and thus serve, in its way, to discriminate a man of courage from a coward. Thus it will enable the legislator to train the whole community to lifelong efficient service in the real conflict, by a right apportionment of marks of distinction and discredit, and if a life should happen to be lost in this fashion, the homicide will be regarded as involuntary... (!) (*Laws* 829f, trans. Taylor).

Plato goes on to say that ‘such contests between opposing teams are nowhere to be found in our existing societies, except perhaps on the smallest scale’. The reasons he offers are two : general selfishness and laziness, and the fear of the political party in control in each state to train its subjects in arms. These reasons did not, as far as I can see, apply in fifth century Athens. But it was no wonder that any democratic society would not undertake the highly dangerous ‘war-games’ proposed by Plato, not to mention their time consumption, which would make them possible, significantly, only for Sparta’s professional warriors.

Xenophon and Plato are not, then, valid evidence against military training in Athens. But when we come, on the other hand, to seek positive evidence it is almost non-existent.

Aristophanes in the *Peace* has the chorus (Trygaios’ daughters !) lamenting the toils of war (353f)

Long enough we’ve undergone
Toils and sorrows many a one,
Worn and spent and sick at heart,
From Lykeion to Lykeion, trudging on with shield and spear (353–6)

There is a further tantalising reference in the scholiast on 1.347 of the same play to the fact that ‘those who have been training themselves for war with exercises and labours always sleep on the ground’. He goes on to refer to Eupolis’ *Taxiarchoi*. Commentators on 11.353f universally do not notice the significance of the passage but are distracted by a scholiast’s information that the phrase ‘with shield and spear’ was lifted from another playwright. Finally, Xenophon *Lak. Pol.* 11.7 states that Greek hoplites, save Spartans, found it very difficult to fight when the line became confused and someone strange was alongside. There is much the same in *Kyr.* II, 1, 27. This was picked up very insightfully by Andrewes [78](#) to suggest that the Athenians did train together on a local basis, say the *trittys*.

This is all the literary evidence I can glean. Perhaps there is also something from pottery. E. Gardiner [79](#) mentions a red-figure kylix (BM E22 = ARV 104.2) showing ‘four hoplites running in a very

precise and regular order and holding spears in their right hand as if about to throw them'. (Beazley says coyly only 'warriors'). 'It is hardly a variety of the armed race, because of the danger of running with spears, although the other side of the vase shows such a race. The regularity of the runners is much more appropriate to some purely military exercise, such as a charge Gardiner also refers to the vase Bologna 191 (= ARV 567.7) but this seems indeed a *hoplitodromos*.

This is the direct evidence for hoplite training – surprisingly little. Indirect evidence is, however, I believe, abundant. It will be remembered that Flacelière rightly pointed to athletic training as the means of maintaining at least bodily fitness. But if one consults the standard works on this subject, one will find hardly a mention of its military connections ⁸⁰.

There is but one significant passage in C. Forbes :

"At Athens the greatest furore over physical education was in the sixth century and the first half of the fifth. After the Persian wars had been fought, the Greeks realised what a part physical fitness had played in winning this momentous conquest for western civilisation and their ardour for the exercises of the gymnasium and palaestra knew no bounds. In the latter half of the fifth century, however, there are distinct signs of a falling off in interest.⁸¹"

There are chapters on athletics and religion, athletics and art, athletics and education in E. N. Gardiner's standard work, but not one on athletics and war. He says only :

"From the day that the Greek boy went to school about the age of seven, he spent a considerable portion of each day in the palaestra and gymnasium exercising himself under trained supervision, and he continued to do so until he reached manhood and often indeed much longer.⁸²"

The last phrase is intriguing in its vagueness.

More recently, the late H. Harris has written two books on this subject. Commenting on various events in the Greek athletic programme, he remarks on two appropriate to our purpose :

"The hoplite race or race in armour over four hundred yards was a reminder that all athletics was in origin preparation for war." "Of all events of the programme, the javelin retained the closest link with training for war.⁸³"

One might find it strange to see such stress placed on military *origins* of athletics. Since war was endemic to the Greeks, surely athletics continued to have vital importance for military training. And the javelin is a strange weapon for the basic Greek soldier, the hoplite, with his shield and spear. I suppose learning to throw it accurately would be some kind of weapons training, but it was the arm of the

light-armed troops and cavalry.

It is, then, refreshing to find just one scholar who gives military considerations their due in athletics. This is J. Delorme ⁸⁴ who traces the development of sport from Homeric times, when it was the privilege of the nobles, who indulged in competitions, not training or physical education. The earliest reference to the latter seems to be Theognis, *Eleg.*, 1335–5 Bergk, in the mid sixth century.

Delorme asks, how are we to account for this new development ? It has been claimed that it was under the influence of the new great national festivals. But the only one of any antiquity was the Olympics. Athletics were introduced at the Pythian Games only c. 660, and the Isthmian and Nemean Games began c. 580–570. They are rather the result than the cause of the spread of physical education, as one should logically have expected. And we know from the lists of victors that the competitors were mainly aristocratic, as they had been in Homer's sports.

Rather, the main change introduced at this time was hoplite tactics. Here, Delorme suggests, is the reason for the sudden growth of athletics. The existence of gymnasia gave each man now liable for service an opportunity to equip himself physically in the way that best suited the other demands of his everyday life. The system of training could be practised individually, but for a collective purpose. And significantly, just as the 'hoplite revolution' brought well known political changes, so here was an interesting social change. The newly important 'middle classes' took up the athletics which had previously been reserved for the aristocracy.

When we turn to examine our evidence for Athenian fifth century physical exercise, it must be noted that it falls under a variety of headings. Such exercise was from the later part of the century a professional pursuit, a part of education, a very common way of maintaining simple health, and of course, finally, a serious preparation for war⁸⁵.

With the first we are not at all concerned here, except to note that such professionals were mostly viewed unfavourably, as examples of disproportionate development (XEN., *Symp.*, 2, 17), always asleep and endangering their health (PLATO, *Rep.*, 404). But the most interesting attack comes from Euripides, in a fragment of his lost *Autolykos* (284 Nauck, ap. ATHEN., X, 413). 'There are a thousand evils in Greece, but none worse than the race of athletes'. Why ? They are 'slaves to their jaws' and unable to bear poverty and misfortune when it strikes them down from the heights. But worst of all, they are useless in war. What good is the wrestler or runner or discus-thrower or boxer in battle ? Can he fight the enemy with his discus or throw a punch

through a line of shields ?

The second category is of great importance. Yet it is the standard view that physical training ceased to play any important part in the Athenian education system in the early fifth century, whereas it had occupied a 'place of honour' in the 'old'⁸⁶. What evidence is offered for this kind of generalisation ? Why, the debate between Right and Wrong Logic in Aristophanes' *Clouds* 934f ! The 'evidence' of the comedian is as treacherous as ever.

"Criticism of effeminacy of the rich Attic youth was very frequent. Warm baths, excessive care of the body, the use of perfumed ointments and the like, also the idle habit of hanging about in the market instead of going to the palaestra – all these came in for unceasing attacks.⁸⁷"

In short, the social bias of this criticism has been overlooked. As well, the obscene and travesty elements have been disregarded in this contest, although we all reject the travesty of Sokrates in the same play. Thirdly, the inspiration of the attack is revealed in complaints that boys no longer go about in the snow without a coat. Now where were boys trained to innure themselves to precisely this inconvenience in precisely this way ⁸⁸ ?

Some⁸⁹ even want to use *Frogs* 1069f as evidence, yet another 'contest' scene. Here, of course, it is not the sophists who have caused the decline in fitness, but Euripides : the wrestling schools are deserted of young men, and there is not one decent athlete left in the city (if you watch the tail-end of the Panathenaic races).

Not that that exhausts the suggestions for blame :

That is why the young spend their time not in the gymnasia but in court and older men fight while younger men make speeches : they use Alkibiades as their example ... (ANDOK., 4, 22).

The Old Oligarch as well, as might be expected, supports the claim that Athenians have abandoned the 'old' education. They have 'destroyed respect for occupation with sport and music'. Why ? Because they are unable themselves to carry on these occupations. Of course, where it is just a matter of their enjoyment while others pay, as in the choregia, gymnasiarchia and trierarchia, that is another matter (1, 13). This is obviously part of the author's sarcastic invective against the democracy. It is moreover somewhat at variance with what he says later about wide-spread public devotion to sports at Athens ⁹⁰.

Against this, most important and mostly overlooked, Protagoras explains the nature of Athenian education to Sokrates. The dramatic date is c. 435 ⁹¹. He says that young Athenians of 'good' parents go to

school to learn literature and music. As well, they are sent to a trainer, 'so that a good mind may have a good body to serve it, and no-one be forced by physical weakness to play the coward in war and other ordeals'. The children of the wealthy, naturally, start this education earliest and finish it latest (*Prot.*, 325–6).

Precious evidence for athletics in education is afforded by vase-painting. Athletic scenes were favourites with artists of the late sixth and early fifth centuries. Indeed, these constitute the largest single class of everyday life scenes in archaic red-figure⁹². Examples are Andokides' amphora (Berlin) showing wrestling, Phintias' amphora (Louvre) of youths with discus and javelins, Euphronios' krater (Berlin) showing young men anointing and being instructed in javelin-throwing, and Kleophrades' krater again illustrating discus and javelin throwing⁹³. Yet these themes continued as favourites with almost all the good red-figure painters through the mid fifth century (Penthesilea painter) to its end (Shuvalov painter), and even into the fourth (Meleager painter)⁹⁴. In some of the earlier black-figure vases, the athletes are bearded men, but in red-figure they are almost invariably of ephebic age. In many cases the youths are fully clad, engaged in conversation⁹⁵. Does this mean exercises were no longer really performed ? Or rather does it not illustrate the importance of the palaistra as a social, as well as an exercise, centre ? Or is a change in artistic taste involved ?

For the third category, maintenance of health by athletics, we have ample reference. There are several interesting passages in Aristophanes. The war situation occupies his attention almost entirely. Significant, then, that peace is associated with a *return* to exercise, but of a more enjoyable kind. The chorus of knights asks nothing more than that when they have finished fighting and when peace sets them free from the toils of war, they shall not be begrudged their long hair and their strigil (*Kn.*, 579–80). This undoubtedly refers to gymnastics. Similarly, Trygaios celebrates the return of peace with an *agon* – boxing, wrestling, the pankration, and races (*P.*, 8950. Of course, the whole passage is a double-entendre but the references are both sexual and to actual festivals.

The Old Oligarch, contradicting his assertions about education above, later claims that although a few rich people have gymnasia and baths of their own, the people builds for its own use many palaistrai and baths (2, 10). We can point to the Akademy, the Lykeion and the Kynosarges as examples.

There is a wealth of Sokratic reference to this kind of exercise. The philosopher himself many times stresses the value of gymnastics as a companion to medicine in the care of the body (*Gorg.*, 450 a, 464 b, *Soph.*, 229 e). His own interest in physical fitness was notorious : he

exercised to work off normal food intake (XEN., *Mem.*, I, 2, 4) and wanted to learn dancing to keep his body well proportioned (XEN., *Symp.*, 2, 15f.). So many Sokratic dialogues take place in gymnasia, and Sokrates and his friends come to dinner after such exercise (*ibid.*, 1, 7). Plato refers to old men who 'though wrinkled and unpleasant to look at, still persist in exercising' (*Rep.*, 452 b).

But athletics and military training ? The fundamental study of Delorme has already been referred to, suggesting that the very institution of physical education and the building of public gymnasia began as a result of the introduction of hoplite tactics. Our ancient sources for this connection are limited, but direct. Aristophanes *Peace*, 356 and Plato, *Prot.*, 325f have already been cited. In addition, all the lexicographers mention the Lykeion as a military centre :

A place whose construction was supervised by Perikles. They held there military reviews and meetings (HESYCHIOS, followed by PHOTIOS).

A gymnasium at Athens where it seems they exercised before war. For before they set out on campaign, they exercised under arms at the Lykeion, near the city. There also military men displayed their prowess (*Suidas*).

Delorme stresses the continuation of this tradition in a wealth of late epigraphical evidence⁹⁶.

There is, in addition, one special athletic event which had to do precisely with hoplites, the *hoplitodromos*, or race in armour⁹⁷. This race was a recognised feature of Greek festivals and is commonly represented on red-figure cups : by the Antiphon painter, from Tarquinia (Berlin 2307 = ARV 341.77), showing six men in helmets and with shields in various attitudes ; by the pro-Panaitios painter, from Vulci (Paris Cab. Med. 523 = ARV 316.4), five men with an official, wearing helmets, and greaves and carrying shields and going in different directions ; by the Tainter of the Paris Gigantomachy' (ARV 412.28), showing four hoplites in various attitudes (one with his shield on the ground) ; the Poseidon painter (München 2613 = ARV 136.3), showing five men running in different directions, some with helmet and shield, some with helmet only, one naked ; by the Dokimasia painter, from Vulci (BM E818 = ARV 412.10), with an official watching two men running, one with greaves and shield and holding a helmet, the other having placed his shield down by a pillar.

This running event appeared first at Olympia in 520 (PAUS., V, 8, 10). Our earliest literary evidence is Aristophanes, *Birds*, 291. Plato, *Laws*, 833 suggested for his ideal state races in arms varying from one furlong to four miles. Pausanias preserves some valuable notes, that the greaves were gradually dropped from the necessary equipment (VI, 10, 4), and that twenty-five shields were kept at Olympia for the

race (V, 12, 8)- is that the size of the field ?

It is common to place this race in the 'variety' section of the games. Gardiner is apparently influenced by Aristophanes (*loc. cit.*) who makes fun of the crests of the birds, which reminds him of the *diaulos*. Apart from that, twenty-five runners is thought to be a large field, and its being the last event on the programme is thought to indicate that it was 'Of a less serious character' than what went before, by some modern analogy. The vase paintings certainly indicate its popularity, but in no way suggest any lack of seriousness.

"The combination of a purely military exercise with preparations for the armed race' (BM E22) 'suggests that the latter, as we might have expected, formed a regular part of the hoplite's training.⁹⁸".

But it will be remembered that all this maintenance of physical fitness through athletics and gymnastics, although obviously vital for the man liable for hoplite service, was essentially individual. Yet the phalanx was a unit, where training for movement in combination with others was crucial. Again we have very suggestive evidence. I refer to the 'Pyrrhic dance'⁹⁹. It has been suggested that this 'war dance' began as a fertility rite in early spring. Certainly this is the point of the famous dancing Koretai at Ephesos, celebrating the birth of Artemis (STRABO, X, 466 ; XIV, 640). As well, the apotropaic value of noise was well known in the classical world : during eclipses (TAC, *Ann.*, I, 28), at death (HDT., VI, 58), and after victory to propitiate the dead (XEN., *Anab.*, V, 4, 17). But these dances are to be distinguished from the war dance proper, a preparation for battle. The origin of the name here will be a diminutive of *pyr*, fire, i.e. it is the 'red' or 'blood' dance.

We are fortunate to have a recent, exhaustive and systematic study of the many ceramic representations by Pousat¹⁰⁰, who clearly distinguishes two basic forms, the *enoplios* and the Pyrrhic proper. The former shows three or more warriors, clothed, with a flute-player. The warriors are always on one side of the flautist. In several cases, part of a funeral procession is shown. In the second category, one or more warriors, this time naked but armed as hoplites, dance on either side of the flautist. Sometimes the setting is indicated as a gymnasium by clothes on a chair. The main points of interest are that the dancers here are never shown confronting each other – they move in the same direction or away from each other – and sometimes there is only one warrior and a flautist. Originally, at least, the pyrrhic was an individual dance, it seems. Both the *enoplios* and Pyrrhic vases are dated between c 520 and 460.

Far more information is provided by the same theme with women participants. These extend mostly over the latter half of the fifth

century, thus carrying on where the male variety leaves off. This is explained, suggests Fousat, by a simple change in taste in the classical style. The importance of the women dancers is that sometimes they are shown in a banquet setting, sometimes in what seems to be a dancing-school or *gynaikion*, sometimes in connection with the Artemis cult.

Pousat has performed a most valuable service in collecting all this ceramic evidence and classifying it so clearly. He stresses that these dances were obviously most important in both public and private life at Athens, but leaves it, rather lamely, at that. Let us attempt to take it from there.

Such armed participation is well known at the Panathenaia (THUC, VI, 56). Lysias mentions a 'chorus of beardless pyrrhic dancers' at the Little Panathenaia (21, 4) and Isaïos the liturgy of acting as choregos of such a group, just as in tragedy (5, 36). Indeed, Demosthenes complains, when abusing the Athenians for inactivity against Philip, that Athenian infantry- and cavalry-officers are used only to help the *hieropoioi* organise festivals (4, 26), which clearly refers to the participation of armed contingents. As well as these literary references we have also the fourth century relief on the base of a pedestal (Acropolis Museum, no. 1338). It shows eight pyrrhic dancers in two rows of four with their *choregos*, whose statue surmounted the base. They advance, all in step, towards the right, holding shields and perhaps some other equipment in their clenched right hands. Plato gives some more technical details :

(The pyrrhiche) represents modes of eluding all kinds of blows and shots by swervings and duckings and side-leaps upward or crouching ; and also the opposite kinds of motion, which leads to active postures of offence, when it strives to represent the movements involved in shooting with bows and darts, and blows of every description (*Laws*, 816 A, trans. Bury).

The most extended description of various armed dances comes in Xen., *Anab.*, VI, 1, 5f : Thracians performing acrobatics and mock fighting, Ainiānes and Magnesians enacting the 'sower's dance' again to the flute, a Mysian with two shields who could make it seem two men were attacking him, or that he were two men fighting each other, as well as the 'Persian dance' Arcadians marching as in the war dance or religious processions, and finally a girl who did the Pyrrhic.

But was this dance really of some military significance ? Definitely yes. As early as Homer, Aeneas found Meriones hard to pin down because of such skills :

Meriones, though you are a dancer, my spear might have stopped you now and for all time, if only I could have hit you (*Il.*, XVI, 617).

Neoptolemos, attempting to avoid death at Delphi, exhibits a ‘terrible pyrrhic’ (EURIP., *Androm.*, 1129f). Most significantly, Sokrates in the poems he composed in prison (cf. PLATO, *Phaedo*, 60) declared that those best at the dance were best in war (ATHEN., XIV, 628). The Athenians agreed, to judge by a pleasant tale told by Aelian (*Nat. hist.*, III, 8) :

Phrynikos (the tragic poet) was elected general by the Athenians, not because of his seriousness, or respect for his family, or because he was rich (!) ; for often people were admired at Athens for these things and preferred to others. Rather, in the pyrrhics in some tragedy, he executed suitable and warlike music so that he won over the theatre and conquered those present and was instantly chosen to command. They trusted he would be a good and dutiful military leader, because he had performed dramatic songs and verses not unbecoming men under arms.

The incident is apparently dated c. 460. How Phrynikos was ‘instantly’ elected is not clear, but the passage shows that mature men took part in the pyrrhic, as we know from other sources.

Thus it is not surprising that Plato did not fail to include such martial exercises in his new state. Children in religious processions are always to be armed and horsed, dancing and marching in quick and slow time (*Laws*, 796 c). In sum, suggests Séchan,

“la pyrrhique, au V^e siècle, était une danse proprement militaire et éducative, un pas d’armes orchestrique dont la fonction était de développer physiquement la jeunesse et de l’entraîner au combat.¹⁰¹”

But this is far too restrictive, since we have seen that grown men took part. Originating apparently as an individual dance, in the fifth century, the pyrrhic was practised especially by choruses, and constituted therefore a significant training for, or exhibition of, movement in groups under arms.

What I hope to have done in this study is place the Athenian hoplite back where he belongs, in the society which produced him, and try to understand him in that context, not as an example of ‘antike Kriegskunst’. I hope to have shown that the common estimate of his prowess is unfair and that the tasks demanded of him were considerable. And yet, when we come to ask the most important question of all, how was he trained and maintained as a trained man through his long service, a question that has seldom occurred to modern scholars, we find a puzzling lack of direct evidence. It must be that the question was too obvious to classical sources and so did not need explanation. Yet, if we look carefully, enough evidence is there to show that the Athenian hoplite did not, as some moderns foolishly imply, simply don his father’s old breast-plate and pick up his rusty shield from the chimney and march out to fight the Boiotians or

Corinthians. By constant attention to his physical fitness, and by some regular training, probably on a local level, he kept himself in readiness.

One may end with a paradox. Athens was one of the leading imperialist states of the Greek world, imposing her will ruthlessly, when she became strong enough, on all who dared oppose her. Yet Athens was not a militaristic society, and her literature is full of the tragedy and futility of war (AISCH., *Agam.*, 437f, above all, EURIP., *Troad.*, 365f, *Helen*, 1151f, *Andr.*, 611f), its stupidity and inconvenience (Arist., especially the *Acharnians* and *Peace*) 102, not to mention its brutalisation (THUC, III, 82). Strange, then, that the greatest imperialist of them all has left one of the most moving lines. Surveying the Athenian dead as Athens imposed her will on her one-time free ally Samos, Perikles declared that 'the spring had gone out of the year' (ARIST., *Rhet.*, I, 7, 34)*.

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1 Even that most vivid and human document, vase painting, is used primarily for technical purposes : 'the vase pictures are a good source of information about armour and weapons' (J. BOARDMAN, *Athenian black-figure vases*, 1974, 207).

2 Aischylos fought at Marathon ; his brother died there. Sophokles was stratos twice (440, and later). Neither Euripides nor Aristophanes is recorded as serving. On Sokrates, v. below. Perikles held the generalship continuously 441–429.

3 War for the Greeks, we have been told, was 'not an everyday business' (ADCOCK, *Greek and Macedonian art of war*, 1962, 10). To the contrary, from the Persian wars to the battle of Chaironeia, Athens was at war two years out of three, and had not a decade of continuous peace (F. CHAMOUX, *Civilisation of Greece*, 1965, 162).

4 Notably Sokratic material, whose dramatic date is supposedly fifth.

5 V. below, p. 532.

6 V. EHRENBERG, *The Greek state*, 1960, 80. One might therefore be somewhat puzzled to read that 'when Athens was, so to speak, in the front line, it annoyed people to see men in full armour striding about the market place' (EHRENBERG, *People of Aristophanes*, 19512, 302). The evidence is *Lys.*, 555f!

7 Meties were also used in an emergency in the fleet, 428 (THUC, III, 16).

8 So A. BURN, *Persia and the Greeks*, 1962, 242. Slaves were used, perhaps extensively, as non-combatants, especially batmen (cooking, carrying armour and baggage), acting as runners and attendants for officers, guides and medical orderlies. V. ARIST., *Ach.*, 1097f ; THUC, IV, 101, *skeuophoroi* ; VII, 13, *therapontes* ; VII, 75, infantry and cavalry had to carry their own victuals for want of *akolouthoi*. V. Rachel SARGENT, *The use of slaves by Athenians in warfare*, in *CP*, 22 (1927), 201f, 264f. However, the *hyperetai* mentioned in THUC, III, 17 seem not to have been slaves, contrary to common assumption, since they were paid at the

same rate as hoplites. So they were probably free men, *thetes* (JONES, *Athenian democracy*, 1957, 12).

9 V. below, p. 519.

10 Cf. GLOTZ, *HG*, II, 342, Sokrates served in three campaigns, 'et c'est tout'! KROMAYER-VEITH, *Heerwesen u. Kriegführung der Griechen u. Römer*, 1928, 48 : 'Sokrates hat zwischen seinem 40. u. 50. Lebensjahr nicht weniger als viermal im Feld gestanden'. Note, concerning Ampipholis, that by Plato's order, this is not the 422 campaign, but some earlier one. Sokrates himself is made to remark (XEN., *Mem.*, I, 6, 9) how useful his physical endurance training is for soldiering.

11 EHRENBURG, *PA*, 303 takes the comedians' abuse of cowardice all too seriously. Note that the joker Philippos (XEN., *Symp.*, 2, 14) also abuses Peisander. Significant, then, that 'no one laughed about this joke conceived in the spirit of popular comedy' (L. STRAUSS, *Xenophon's Socrates*, 1972, 147).

12 V. below, p. 519.

13 Cf. PLATO : *atimia* for cowardice or absence from duty, a fine for throwing away shields (*Laws*, 943 f), such people to be reduced to artisan or farmer class in his new state (*Rep.*, 468).

14 KROMAYER-VEITH, 48.

15 G. GILBERT, *Constitutional antiquities*, 1895, 318; GLOTZ, 351. Why does BONNER, *Athenian democracy*, 1933, 94 deny this ?

16 GOMME, I, 17.

17 KROMAYER-VEITH, 85.

18 See the excellent discussion, CHAMOUX, 161f.

19 Ehrenberg here rightly stresses that the losses are related to the state, not the individual. But Perikles addresses the relatives of the dead at some length (THUC, II, 44–45). It is strange, though, that Thuc. hardly ever gives figures for casualties (II, 58, 79 ; HI, 28, 52f ; IV, 44, 101 ; V, 10–11). Nor does Aristophanes refer to losses, but comedy is another matter.

20 THUC., II, 46 ; LYSIAS, 2, 75–76 ; PLATO, *Menex.*, 248 Df ; DEM., 60, 32 ; AISCH., 3, 154.

21 Gertrude SMITH, *Athenian casualty lists*, in *CP*, 14 (1913), 351f, which treats much more than these lists.

22 Note the case of execution by the general Lamachos (LYS., 13, 67), adduced by Gilbert, 318, in fact refers to the crucifixion of slaves.

23 GLOTZ, II, 349.

24 Note the two generals of the one tribe (Erechtheus) who perished in 460/459, and the four out of ten in 430/429. Indeed, when Athens suffered defeat, the general(s) usually perished : Hippokrates at Delion, Kleon at Amphipolis, Nikostratos and Laches at Mantinea.

25 KROMAYER-VEITH, 56.

26 Characterised as 'sophisms' by GLOTZ, II, 341.

27 It might be noted that it is not fourth century military specialisation, as commonly stated, nor 'laconising' (Adam), that produces Plato's view here, but the simple logic of his belief in the division of labour.

28 GLOTZ, II, 350.

29 SNODGRASS, *Arms and armour of the Greeks*, 1967, 62. So ADCOCK, 7, GOMME, I, 11, all following GRUNDY, *Thucydides and the history of his age*, 1948, I, 248, 257.

30 ADCOCK, 58 ; GOMME, I, 18.

31 THUC, I, 56f; II, 70, with GOMME, I, 420f.

32 “In the nobility and beauty, in the refined humanity as well as in the almost dreamy tranquillity, this picture is a precious reflection of the art of the Parthenon period. The warrior and his young wife radiate a humanity which is conscious of its fate” [P. ARIAS, *History of Greek vase-painting*, pis 186–7 (from Eretria), 193–5 (from Vulci)].

33 CHAMOUX, 163.

34 ADCOCK, 8.

35 SNODGRASS, 62 ; EHRENBURG, GS, 82, citing Sophokles and Thucydides ; GOMME, I, 22 – his examples are Perikles, Nikias and Kleon. But he goes on to admit that they were usually elected for military competence. For a more rational view, C. FORNARA, *The Athenian board of generals*, 1971, 39.

36 JONES, 132.

37 The date of these dialogues cannot be satisfactorily determined : He ‘probably wrote the major part of the *Memoirs* at least ten to fifteen years after his last contact with Socrates’ (Tredennick, trans. 16) cf. written ‘about a quarter of a century after Socrates was put to death’ (J. ANDERSON, *Xenophon*, 1974, 20). Common attempts are made to date book III c. 370 from III, 5, claiming the situation suits Thebes’ pretensions after Leuktra, but others, by comparison with ISOK., *Areop.* take it as late as 355. But one dialogue does not date the whole book. Since Perikles has just been elected strategos, the dramatic date of III, 5 is 406. Ironical that this man discusses improving Athens’ military position, when he was put to death the same year for incompetence.

38 L. STRAUSS, 63.

39 For a full discussion, A. DELATTE, *Le troisième livre des souvenirs socratiques de Xénophon*, 1933.

40 ADCOCK, 5 etc.

41 SNODGRASS, 59.

42 Especially *ibid.*, chap. 3.

43 W. PRITCHETT, *The aitic stelai*, in *Hesp.*, 22 (1953), 225f, 25 (1956), 178f, esp. 307. Pritchett concludes that weapons were ‘not cheap’.

44 GOMME, I, 16.

45 Introduced ‘nicht lange nach Gründung des Seereichs’ (KROMAYER-VEITH, 49).

46 E.g. GLOTZ, *HG*, 345f, but the documentation is chaotic, including references to jurors’ pay and jokes about Thracian targeteers.

47 JONES, 12.

48 GOMME, II, 275, although I am not sure what he meant by calling the Potidaia rate special (2 drs a pay, but for two men). And what is special about the Sicilian fleet – that it is such a distant expedition, or that Thucydides again specifies the pay ?

49 KROMAYER-VEITH, 49.

50 Surely there is no need to take *AP*, 26, 1 – inexperienced generals losing two or three thousand men – as referring to this campaign (GOMME, I, 310). There have been attempts to make the ‘young and old’ only reinforcements for a more regular force (notably BELOCH, *Griechische Aufgebote*, in *Klio* 5 (1905), 341–374 at p. 363.

51 “His [Plutarch’s] foolish story” (GOMME, I, 338).

52 *Ibid.*, I, 219 : on the left?

53 *Ibid.*, II, 213.

54 On the difficult question of numbers, cf. GOMME, IV, 110f.

55 A. ANDREWES, *The Greeks*, 1967, 152.

56 R. FLACELIÈRE, *La vie quotidienne en Grèce*, 1959, 300.

57 Adduced by ADCOCK, 4. He was quite unaware of the illuminating commentary on the passage by Parmentier (Budé ed., vol. 3, 1924, 1 If), stressing the naturalness of a discussion of the bow as Hercules’ favourite weapon. The Greeks scorned it as Oriental (e.g. HOMER, *Il.*, XI, 385, Diomedes’ abuse of Paris ; HDT., V, 97, the Persians will be easy to beat since they do not fight with shield and spear). Yet the debate about the relative strengths of hoplite and bowman had already been presented, a generation earlier (SOPH., *Ajax*, 1120f) ! There is certainly no firm terminus for Euripides’ play by connection with the bowmen of Sphakteria (THUC, IV, 32) or events at Delion. One would, Parmentier cogently suggests, expect tactics to be discussed throughout a conflict as long and costly as the Peloponnesian war.

58 Cited by VIDAL-NAQUET, *La tradition de l’hoplite athénien*, in *Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne*, 1968, 116.

59 E.g., evidence for the somewhat condescending attitude of the classical Athenian to hoplite training’ (SNOGRASS, 61); ‘Sorry generals they must have been to have debated the value of training in hoplomachy for war !’ (REINMUTH, in *TAPA*, 83 [1952], 46). We know virtually nothing about *hoplomachia*. Everyone recognises an instance in *Il.*, XXIII, 811, the dual between Ajax and Diomedes for Sarpedon’s arms. The only classical reference before Plato is HDT., VI, 92 : Eurybates, commander of the Argive volunteers in Aigina in the 480’s, was expert at *monomachia* (apparently the same kind of thing). Xenophon knows both the abstract *hoplomachia* (*Anab.*, II, 1, 7) and the *hoplomachos* (*Lak. Pol.*, 11, 8). There are late inscriptions (e.g. *IG*, II-III, 957, col. 2, 47f, 2nd. cent. BC), which refer to this contest with shield and spear. Otherwise the fullest discussion is by ATHENAIOS, 154D-F who quotes liberally from various authors : Ephoros, the fourth century historian, claimed *hoplomachia* was invented at Mantinea by Demeas ; Hermippos, the third cent. biographer, agreed about the Mantineans, but named the individual as Demonax. Neither is further known. The comedians took up the theme : Aristophanes’ *Phoenician Women* referred to the sons of Oidipos engaging in *monomachia*; Poseidippos (third cent.) in his *Pimp* suggested sailors were more to be pitied than *monomachountes*.

60 GRUNDY, I, 267.

61 SNOGRASS, 56–57.

62 ADCOCK, 4.

63 GLOTZ, II, 347.

64 And as if all this were not enough, hoplites sometimes were called upon to serve as rowers in the fleet (e.g. THUC, III, 18).

65 T. TUCKER, *Life in ancient Athens*, 1907, 127.

66 V. EHRENBERG, *GS*, 81.

67 ADCOCK, 4. For the ‘slight evidence’ a footnote refers to the rareness of standing armies in Greece, and AENEAS TACITUS, 16, 7 (?). This description of hoplite tactics is hardly in keeping with the more sophisticated demands noted by Adcock himself immediately following (above, p. 529).

68 FLACELIÈRE, 303.

69 A. ANDREWES, 150.

70 The main opponent of the fifth century ephebia was WILAMOWITZ, *Aristoteles u. Athen*, 1893. For a most useful summary of earlier arguments, v. C. FORBES, *Greek physical education*, 1929, 109f. The most recent study, C. PELEKIDES, *Histoire de l'éphébie attique*, 1962, has swung back to support for the fifth century origins.

71 Published by L. ROBERT, *Études épigraphiques et philologiques*, 1938, 302.

72 GOMME, II, 40.

73 FORBES, 122, 124.

74 For *Mem.*, III, 12, v. below, p. 535.

75 H. FRISCH, *Constitution of the Athenians*, 213.

76 Cf. J. ANDERSON, *Military theory and practice in the age of Xenophon*, 1970, esp. chaps. 5–6.

77 Cf. Alexander's generals who carried huge *marquées* on campaign for training in bad weather (ATHEN., 12, 539C).

78 *Op. cit.* (n. 55), 150.

79 *Notes on the Greek foot race*, in *JHS*, 23 (1903), 261–91, at 288.

80 I should not be thought to omit acquaintance with F. WRIGHT, *Greek athletics*, 1925, who does have a chapter (2), Gymnastics and military training. It is in fact pathetic, considering its appearance so shortly after the First world war. War is characterised as 'an exciting but somewhat dangerous diversion' (43), the 'great business and the great sport of life' (47, 56). 'Then came the moment for which the Greek's whole life was one long preparation (!) : swaying, struggling, heaving, with every muscle tense and every limb engaged, the opposing masses strove to hurl one another back. All the tricks of the wrestling school and the boxing match were designed for use in this hour...' (57). Whatever became of spears and swords and shields ??

81 FORBES, 85. Most of his discussion is absorbed in rejecting the existence of the fifth century ephebia. No documentation is offered for the early ardour. For the falling off, ARIST., *Cl.*, 1002f, *F.*, 1069f, OLD OLIGARCH, 1, 13 (cf. below, 541), XEN., *Mem.*, III, 5, 15 (above, 518).

82 *Athletics of the ancient world*, 1930, 72.

83 *Sport in Greece and Rome*, 1974, 33, 36. Similar statements in his earlier *Greek athletes and athletics*, 1964, 74, 92.

84 *Gymnasion*, 1960, 19f.

85 JÜTHNER, in *RE*, VII, 2048f, makes this important and often neglected point, but knows only the first three categories !

86 H. MARROU, *History of education in antiquity*. 1956, 64f., cf. F. BECK, *Greek education 450–350*, 1964, who suggests that sport was supreme in education until c. 450, but yielded its primacy to letters and music by 350 – a much longer transition (p. 130). The evidence is held over until p. 141 : the pressure of higher intellectual studies such as provided by the Sophists, Sokrates and the Akademy.

87 EHRENBERG, *PA*, 243, citing *Kn.*, 1375f, *Cl.*, 837f, 991, 1002f. 1044f, 1053f, frag. 435.

88 Cf. XEN., above, p. 535.

89 JÜTHNER, in *RE*, VII, 2053 ; FORBES, *Athletes*, 85.

90 Below, p. 543.

91 TAYLOR, *Plato*, 235f.

92 BOARDMAN, *op. cit.*; (n. 1), 220.

93 P. ARIAS, *History of Greek vase-painting*, pls. 87, 90, 112, 119–121.

94 *Ibid.*, via index, cf. F. BECK, *Album of Greek education*, 1975 : preparation scenes, late 6th-mid 5th cents, ills 141–4 ; exercises with trainers, late 6th-early 5th, ills 145–7, 149–50, 154–5 ; scraping, oiling and washing, mostly late 6th-late 5th, ills. 157–161, 163–168.

95 E.g. BECK, ills. 151–2, from the 460's.

96 Pp. 275–6 ; also C. FORBES, *Expanded uses of the Greek gymnasium*, in *CP*, 40 (1945), 32–42 at 37f.

97 *Art. cit.*, (n. 79), 280f.

98 *Ibid.*, 288.

99 The most recent study seems to be L. SÉCHAN, *La danse grecque antique*, 1930, chap. 4. Cf. also L. EMMANUEL, *La danse grecque* 1896, 261 f ; K. LATTE, *De saltationi-bus graecorum*, 1913.

100 *Danse armée dans la céramique attique*, in *BCH*, 92 (1968), 550–615.

101 SÉCHAN, 92. Yet he knows men took part, and believes *epheboi* were brought into the pyrrhic only in the fourth century (97).

102 'There is an unsolved discrepancy in Aristophanes' attitude. At one and the same time he deplores the decline of soldierly virtues and fights the war-mongers' (EHRENBERG, *PA*, 305). Surely the latter element is, as Ehrenberg himself shows, dominant. Aristophanes is thought strange for stressing only the 'material advantages and enjoyments of peace' (308) – what else would his audience more quickly understand ? cf. 'the bellicose demos ... was also largely influenced by the idea of material advantage' (314) !

* I should like to thank Prof. D. Trendall for help in tracking down the pottery evidence, and Mr. P. Connor for verifying the Acropolis relief.

Warfare and Agriculture: The Economic Impact of Devastation in Classical Greece

James A. Thome

WARFARE AND AGRICULTURE were near universal experiences in classical Greece, and they have naturally been much studied, both separately and in their interactions. A perennial area of interaction was the attack by hostile military forces on the land itself, “ravaging” or “devastation,” in which crops, livestock, buildings, and equipment were destroyed or plundered. The debate over the extent of the damage caused in ravaging attacks has now for some time been regarded as settled, in favour of the school which sees devastation as minimally damaging. This is an area central to understanding the strategy of the Peloponnesian War, and has a wider relevance in relation to other ancient warfare topics,¹ and to warfare as a whole. Therefore if the current academic consensus on devastation is unfounded, it ought to be challenged. To do so is the purpose of this paper.

There is *prima facie* evidence that sustained devastation could cause food shortage to such an extent that it could be used as a coercive instrument.² Hence this view had general currency amongst Thucydidean scholars in the beginning and middle of the last century.³ But an opposing school of thought, sceptical of devastation’s economic effect, has also been present since at least as far back as the nineteenth century.⁴ This school has found much favour since the 1980s. Its adherents have argued that the destruction of ancient agriculture was too labour-intensive to be practised on a scale that would cause a typical community real hardship. Prominent amongst these sceptics is Victor Hanson, whose *Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece*⁵ is a most important contribution to the debate, thoroughly researched and clearly argued. But its argument contains several flaws that force him to conclude that meaningful economic damage was not typically achievable. The question that arises out of this conclusion is, Why, if not as an economic attack, was devastation practised again and again? Foxhall’s suggestion⁶ that it could be used selectively to sow dissent has support in the sources,⁷ but is surely insufficient motive on its own (even according to Hanson: 208–209). Hanson himself has continued to maintain that devastation was a “catalyst for hoplite battle,” essentially an intolerable affront to a city’s pride, and part of the “extensive rituals of classical hoplite

warfare.”⁸ This explanation I will term the “provocation theory.” Ober has broadly agreed with Hanson, noting how the policy of Pericles marked a watershed after which the “agonal system” (Ober’s term: the competitive framework within which to be ravaged by other Greeks—barbarians did not count—was a dishonour on a city that only battle could wipe out) started to break down.⁹ The provocation theory of devastation, and the view that damage inflicted was light, is now the accepted wisdom, as witness a recent introductory work on classical Greece.¹⁰

This article is a reassessment; I argue that in fact ravaging was a viable instrument of economic coercion in most instances of classical Greek warfare. If one accepts that devastation was worthwhile purely for the economic damage it caused, the otherwise awkward question Why devastate? is answered.¹¹ I will follow the three-part plan of Hanson’s *Warfare and Agriculture*: the first two parts deal with “the attack on agriculture” and “the defence of agriculture.” In the third part, whereas Hanson used the devastation of Attica as a case study, I urge that the case of Attica is almost certainly the most misleading one available.

I.1 The attack on agriculture: Techniques

Greek agriculture consisted mainly of the cultivation of the “Mediterranean triad” of cereals, olives, and vines. Hanson holds that cereals can be efficiently destroyed under the right conditions (of which more below), whereas olives and vines are prohibitively labour-intensive to destroy on a large scale, and in any case tend to recover vigorously (49–71). Thus two of the three main elements of Greek agriculture were very difficult to attack under ancient conditions, and Hanson’s second chapter is full of the problems of so doing. But this analysis is only partial, and turns out to be misleading, as it does not reckon the relative importance of each element. In fact, cereal production was the single most important activity in the rural economy, in terms of meeting dietary requirements. From a survey of the literary evidence for the ancient diet, and comparison with modern agrarian populations in the Mediterranean, Foxhall and Forbes have deduced that cereals contributed 70–75 per cent of required calories.¹² Therefore to subsistence farmers, a loss of even half the year’s cereals would be as serious as the complete elimination of the year’s olive and vine products.

As well as being overwhelmingly the most important element, cereals were, even according to Hanson, the easiest to destroy. It is an error, in other words, to invest the rural economy with the toughness of vines and olives when these were relatively minor components. We

may speculate that some communities were able to minimise their vulnerability by focussing on the production of resilient cash crops like vines, and being net importers of grain. However we should still note that this implies that somewhere else (albeit perhaps very far off) there were net grain exporters who were correspondingly more vulnerable to devastation.

The key issue is whether an enemy army could substantially destroy the year's grain harvest, either in the fields or once it had been gathered. There were three possible techniques for destroying grain in the fields: cutting, trampling, and burning; but the sources seldom specify which was used in particular instances.¹³ Cutting was almost as labour-intensive as harvesting itself, or perhaps more so if the devastators did not have the appropriate tools. They would have to disperse through the fields, whilst substantial detachments remained under arms, against the danger of enemy patrols or sudden sorties. Nonetheless it was practised, probably not so much for its destructive effect, but, since armies sought to live off the land whenever possible, as a means of procuring rations¹⁴ (and this fact allows some quantification of the damage inflicted, see 248–250 below). Trampling, likewise, demanded substantial labour and dispersion on the part of the devastators, though it is also attested: Cleomenes had his men drag planks across grainfields, and Alexander's troops used spears in the same way.¹⁵ The advantage of cutting and trampling was that, though laborious, they could be used on green crops, unlike potentially the most efficient method, burning. This required very little labour and was, of course, extremely destructive. So much so, that serious collateral damage was possible, as when Alyattes of Lydia inadvertently burnt down the temple of Athene at Assesus whilst destroying grain (Hdt. 1.19). The limitation of burning was that it could only be achieved in a short window between the ripening of the crop and the harvest. (Hanson's experiments [219] have confirmed that green grain is incombustible.) Harvesters would start work immediately the grain was ripe, especially if invasion was imminent. Therefore in Greece, the window of opportunity for burning occurred from mid-May to mid-June depending on local climatic conditions (Hanson 50–51).

Just as Hanson does not give a proportional weighting to the component crops of his "agricultural triad," neither does he weigh the components of the grain-destroying triad: trampling, cutting, and burning. If they are assumed to have been practised equally, then devastation would have been laborious indeed. However, since burning was the most effective technique, it is not unreasonable to assume it was employed whenever possible. Summer was the principal land campaigning season, and this increased the chance of troops

being in enemy territory during the “burning-window.” Furthermore, for naval expeditions, the opening of the sailing season around 27th May coincided conveniently with the ripening of the grain.¹⁶

The narrow optimum window for devastation was around harvest time, because burning could be used. This is sometimes cited in disparaging devastation’s viability (Hanson 52), especially as it is when farmer-soldiers would want to be on their own land.¹⁷ But the fact is that, when the sources are specific as to when devastation took place, it was often exactly at that time of year, and we ought to assume that burning was used. For example, the series of five invasions of Attica started by Archidamus took place: “at mid-summer when the grain was ripe” in 431; “at the beginning of summer” in 430; “at the time the grain was ripe” in 428; “summer” in 427; “before the grain was fully ripe” in 425, presumably in anticipation.¹⁸ The ravaging cruise undertaken by Carcinus’ Athenian fleet was simultaneous to the 431 invasion (Thuc. 2.23), and Pericles’ cruise the next year took place, again, whilst the Peloponnesians were in Attica (2.56). For an earlier example, the eleven annual invasions of Miletus by the Lydians all took place “when the grain was ripe,” with fire specified as the technique of destruction (Hdt. 1.19).

Thucydides’ comments on Archidamus’ first invasion of Attica confirm that we ought to assume cereals were burnt in summer devastation operations, even if the source does not mention it (and usually they do not). Although burning is not explicitly mentioned, we can certainly deduce that it was used:

But when they saw the army at Acharnae, only seven miles from Athens, they could no longer put up with the situation. Their land was being laid waste before their very eyes—a thing that the young men had never seen happen and the old men had seen only at the time of the Persian invasion (2.21).

Enemy soldiers could not, from the city, have been seen cutting and trampling crops seven miles away. Therefore, if the majority of the Athenians, not just a few who had been on patrols, had seen the devastation with their “very eyes,” palls of smoke are what, to their consternation, they saw—a scene that anyone who knows Athens, Acharnae, and their environs, will vividly imagine.

The destruction of harvested grain must also be considered. Concentrated on the threshing floor or in granaries, then left behind by a fleeing populace, it would have spared attackers the trouble of spreading out across the fields. It could be attacked with fire or water. Since the Athenians burnt grain in Sicily in spring 414 (Thuc. 6.94), when the crop in the field would still have been green, as Hanson points out (51), this must have been stored grain, which is highly

flammable.

Water could be used as a destructive agent. It was a problem in grain storage, even acting on its own. A third-century Euboean inscription instructs the granary overseer to

inspect the wheat granaries as follows: during the six months of summer after each rainstorm; during the winter months, every ten days. And if there has been any seepage of water into the wheat stores, then they are to make repairs immediately.¹⁹

Having broken into the granary, ravagers could administer water themselves, or leave the elements to do the job.²⁰ Harvested grain was at least as vulnerable as it could be in the field, if it could be accessed. The question of security at the farm will be discussed below.

One further method of disrupting cereal production was available to devastators. Rather than destroying crops once they had matured, the harvest could be denied by simply occupying the land at sowing time. Agesilaus was advised to do this in Acarnania, but demurred, apparently preferring to have something to devastate the next year. His reluctance to “kill the hostage,”²¹ i.e. the Acarnanians’ cereals, surely indicates the effectiveness of this technique. No physical destruction was required, merely a force large enough to protect itself, and sufficiently frightening to keep the rural population off of the fields.

Invading troops would find houses and the tools and property they contained obvious targets for destruction, and this could be achieved quite easily by fire.²² Devastators might, however, prefer to take items away with them. The Thebans did so during the Decelean occupation; living close by, they even carried off the tiles and timbers of the houses. Much of this property was third-hand by the time the Thebans got it, also having come into Athenian hands by way of plunder (*Hell.Oxy.* 12.5).

I.2 The attack on agriculture: Conduct of ravaging operations

The techniques of destruction have thus far been considered in the abstract. The following discussion will put them into their operational context. All ravaging operations can be categorised as one of three types: “general invasion,” in which an overwhelming force invaded a territory; “amphibious raiding,” in which relatively small forces of ravagers went ashore for short periods at distantly separate points to devastate a littoral; and “fortified occupation,” or *epiteichismos*, in which a fortified post was set up, from which (again, in relatively small numbers) troops could sortie and ravage the surrounding area

on a permanent, or at least an open-ended, basis.

General invasion

The overwhelming strength of invasion forces cowed defenders, and thus gave the invaders freedom to devastate. It is of course impossible that Xerxes' army in Greece was as huge as Herodotus claims, but it was certainly large enough to rule out a preclusive Hellenic defence north of the Isthmus.²³ And so the Athenian, Thespian, and Plataean countrysides were torched (Hdt. 8.50). Similarly, the Athenians thought it wiser not to meet any of the 431–425 B.C. invasions head-on.

General invasions occurred within a single season, usually summer. On the rare occasions we are given a specific period, about thirty days seems to be the norm. Of the 431–425 invasions of Attica, the second was the longest, at forty days; the last was fifteen days, which was considered “very short” (Thuc. 2.57, 4.6). Sitalces' devastation in Macedonia and Chalcidice in winter 429/8 is also said to have lasted thirty days (2.101).

Surprise would have been difficult to achieve, as a large army would approach much more slowly than messengers or spies bringing early warning,²⁴ and an allied force would take days to muster, even before it set out. This would give vital time for the rural population to evacuate their property from the countryside. In 431, for example, Pericles realised the Peloponnesian invasion was coming while the enemy “were either still mustering at the Isthmus or on their march,” and on this occasion a particularly thorough evacuation was effected.²⁵ On the other hand, the experience of Plataea in the same year shows a surprise was still possible, if a nearby attacker sent ahead a small, fast-moving advance guard.²⁶

The capacity of a general invasion to eliminate, to all intents and purposes, the grain harvest of an invaded territory is demonstrable. In the invasions of the Archidamian war the Peloponnesians planned to feed themselves on the harvest of Attica. Since the Athenians controlled the surrounding waters, and to transport food supplies any great distance overland is not operationally viable,²⁷ local procurement was the only option. This is confirmed by the 425 invasion, which lasted only fifteen days: the invaders went home, because it was too early to harvest the grain.²⁸ And since in the other invasions they mostly stayed until their supplies were running out,²⁹ it can be inferred that they left such sparse remnants of the harvest as were not practicable for them to forage—thus the harvest can be seen effectively to have been destroyed. In fact, the amount of Attic grain that the Spartans and their allies must have eaten can be calculated. If

we assume, extremely generously, that they arrived with ten days supplies,³⁰ then during a thirty-day occupation of Attica, they would still have to find twenty days' rations by foraging. If their daily ration was two *choinices* (certainly a bottom range estimate),³¹ their army of 30,000 hoplites³² (along with the same number of attendants and followers)³³ would have had to procure 3.6 million *choinices*, or 75,000 *medimnoi*.³⁴ In the forty-day invasion of 430, with at least thirty days' rations to forage for, the figure would have been over 110,000 *medimnoi*. Because of her peculiar wealth and imperial power, Athens could withstand this for a time (see 249–250 below), but for most cities the inroads of even much smaller armies were clearly a very serious problem.

Amphibious devastation³⁵

At the same time as Archidamus was first invading Attica, around harvest 431, an Athenian fleet of 100 ships set out carrying a force of 1000 hoplites and 400 archers. It was later reinforced by 50 allied ships, with perhaps a proportionate number of troops. This fleet cruised around the Peloponnese, putting troops ashore on numerous raids:

After doing damage at various places, they landed in Spartan territory at Methone and made an attack on the fortifications there, which were weak and had been left without a garrison. However, Brasidas ... happened to be in this district with a special detachment of men. When he realised what was happening, he came to the support of the defenders [and forced the Athenians to abandon the operation] ... After this the Athenians set sail and continued their voyage around the coast. They landed at Pheia, in Elis, and spent two days in laying waste the land ... They then put to sea again, abandoning Pheia, since by this time the main army of the Eleans had come up to resist them. The Athenians continued their cruise, laying waste to other places as they went (Thuc. 2.25).

This first Athenian expedition is a good example of the type, whose main characteristics were unpredictability, the relatively small numbers of raiders involved,³⁶ and short duration of each foray ashore, frequently terminated by the arrival of reserves from inland.

Predicting where raiders would strike was difficult, if not practically impossible, owing to the superior speed and radius of action of naval forces. Recent work on triremes suggests that passages of fifty nautical miles in twelve hours are possible.³⁷ Admittedly, this would require favourable sailing conditions, but fleets devastating an extensive littoral were not tied down to specific targets; they could devastate wherever the best winds took them. Furthermore, even relatively short hops across gulfs or between islands could totally

wrong-foot a defender tied to the land. Amphibious devastation was therefore difficult to counter: although a wide area would be threatened, the devastators would go on to strike only a few places. General evacuation would be an overreaction, wasteful of time and labour. On the other hand, once the fleet was in sight, local evacuation would be hasty, and leave a lot of property behind. Land-based defenders would also find it very difficult to use their military resources. If they concentrated forces in one place, the raiders would exploit their superior mobility to strike elsewhere; conversely, detachments strung out along the coast would be spread so thin that raiding forces of a few thousand would confidently take them on.³⁸ Finally, as long as the raiders controlled the sea they could decide when to fight and when to retreat with impunity, as in Carcinus' voyage.

The dynamics of this situation, if not already known, came to be well understood during the Peloponnesian War. Consider the vexation caused to the Spartans by amphibious devastation, and the best response they could devise,

committed as they were on every side to a form of warfare where mobility was what counted and attacks were difficult to guard against. Thus they raised a force of 400 cavalry and a force of archers ... they were faced with something outside the scope of their existing organisation, namely a war fought on the seas and against Athenians (Thuc. 4.55).

The Old Oligarch sums up the situation more generally:

Again, a sea power can ravage the lands of those more powerful than itself, something a land power cannot always do. For they can sail along until they reach a place where there is no enemy, or only a few, and if the enemy approach, can embark and sail away. In this way, it is less likely to get into difficulties than a land army (2.4).

In comparison with general invasions, amphibious raids were of short duration and involved small numbers of troops. Nevertheless, because their unpredictability and sudden onset largely precluded the effective removal of property, they could cause disproportionate damage. Furthermore, although each raid was short, several would be mounted on each voyage.³⁹ What most speaks against Hanson's provocation theory of devastation is the frequent occurrence of these raids in which contact with enemy troops was strenuously avoided. The aim clearly was to harm agriculture, and *avoid* decisive combat, although weak and isolated enemy posts might be set upon. Ober's agonal system might just accommodate amphibious raiding, if one argued that the Athenians were able to wipe out the dishonour of their territory having been devastated by retaliation in kind, rather than

hoplite battle.

*Fortified occupation (epiteichistnos)*⁴⁰

The Spartan fort at Decelea is the example of fortified occupation for which we have the most evidence. It was established in the 413 invasion, and a contingent remained there until the end of the war, ravaging Athenian territory unremittingly. Decelea was more serious than the pre-Pylos invasions, and very damaging indeed, Attica being made largely inaccessible:

The occupation of Decelea, resulting, as it did, in so much devastation of property and loss of manpower, was one of the chief reasons for the decline of Athenian power. The previous invasions had not lasted for long and had not prevented the Athenians from enjoying the use of their land for the rest of the time; now, however, the enemy were on top of them throughout the year ... The Athenians therefore suffered great losses. They were deprived of the whole of their country; more than 20,000 slaves, the majority of whom were skilled workmen, deserted, and all the sheep and farm animals were lost.⁴¹

A fortified post gave ravagers a safe retreat, akin to the ships of amphibious raiders. This meant that a relatively small number could operate in safety. In turn, this manpower economy allowed Decelea, for example, to be manned all year round “with garrisons from the various cities relieving each other at fixed intervals” (Thuc. 7.27). Like amphibious raiding, fortified occupation was a pervasive threat, but in time rather than space, perennial rather than ubiquitous. Importantly, the sowing of cereals could be prevented.

Decelea may be the oftenest cited example, but fortified occupation seems to have been an Athenian innovation, long before Alcibiades suggested it to Agis. Other incidences conforming to the type are the forts at Pylos (occupied 425–409: Diod. 13.64, Thuc. 5.56), at the end of the Laconian peninsula opposite Cythera (occupied 413–411: Thuc. 7.26, 8.4)), and at Delphinium on Chios (established in 412 and certainly still there in summer 411: 8.38–40, 62–63). Each of these is a long-term establishment to which slaves deserted and from which raids were launched (Thuc. 514). Whilst we are told relatively little of the harm done by the garrisons at Pylos and in Laconia, we should hardly imagine that they were any more tender than Agis’ force at Decelea. The Corcyrean exiles fortified on Mt Istone (427–425) are said to have caused a “serious famine” in the city, although they were just 600 in strength (3.85, 4.2, 4.46.). Chios lacked the external resources available to Athens, and its experience is indicative of a more typical community’s vulnerability to fortified occupation. Its countryside had been “extremely well stocked, and had had no damage done to it since the time of the Persian wars” (8.24), but barred from its fields by the fort at Delphinium, and blockaded at sea

by an Athenian fleet, the people were reduced to starvation (8.56).

The attack on agriculture can be summarised as follows: cereals were by far the most important element in the rural economy, and of all the techniques for destroying them the most efficient were burning the ripe crop and the prevention of sowing. Burning was restricted to a month-long window, but this conveniently coincided with the usual campaigning and sailing season. General invasions were ponderous operations, and easy to see coming, but they demanded complete evacuation of the population and whatever property the invaded party wanted to save. Amphibious raids were hardest to guard against, and must often have caught people and their property outside the safety of fortifications—presenting a security problem much akin to piracy. Fortified occupations, maintained year on year, are recorded as doing the worst damage to communities, and were probably less manpower-intensive than seasonal general invasions.

II The defence of agriculture

The measures available to limit the damaging effects of devastation must now be considered. Low-level threats from raiding could be partially countered by strong buildings on the farm. In the face of general invasion, however, comprehensive evacuation was the only response. This was a lengthy process, as will be seen, so delaying actions by military forces were a complementary operation. Finally, any devastator could be harassed; this would stop him from dispersing safely, and tie up manpower that could otherwise be involved in ravaging.

Farm towers

Farm towers of stout stone construction were a common enough feature of the Greek countryside, as is now well established. They were used for storage, and allowed the household to withstand low-level threats like peace-time brigandage.⁴² When the threat was from amphibious raiding or fortified occupation, farmers with towers could have gone on working the fields, ready to beat a hasty retreat and wait for friendly reinforcements. In these circumstances, farm towers were conceivably quite defensible.

In time of general invasion it is unlikely that even the most intrepid householder would risk capture and (at best) enslavement in an attempt to defend his tower. Unmanned they would quickly have been entered; Hanson overstates the difficulties (75):

The only possible way to do this would be to pry out key stones in the lower wall with picks or shovels, and so undermine the whole building ...

with the danger to the attacker from falling blocks.

Surely an easier route for an unopposed intruder would be via a ladder to smash through the top, whether this was a tiled roof or planked floor level. To be of any use, the towers presumably had some kind of door: this might also have been a point of attack. Furthermore, and regardless of property inside, damage to towers would have been an end in itself.

Evacuation of movable property

Livestock and other movable property could be protected from plunder or destruction by evacuating them to places of refuge—forts, fortified towns, islands⁴³—along with the rural population. Livestock must be considered separately from inanimate property, because of crucial differences: livestock would move on its own, but needed to be fed, whereas property would not and did not.

Numerous references to evacuation⁴⁴ have encouraged a view of it as strongly countering devastation,⁴⁵ but the logistical implications for individual households have not been considered in enough detail. A brief attempt to do so will be made here, followed by a consideration of measures that were taken to win time for as full an evacuation as possible.

Estimation of the weight of all the movable property on the farm would be an interesting and essential element of a full logistical study of rural evacuation. Here it will suffice to consider just one bulky item, in order to demonstrate that comprehensive evacuation would be a lengthy operation, running into days or weeks. The item to be considered is the grain reserve stored at the farm, which is thought to have been considerable. Gallant cites comparative evidence from modern India, Africa, and Guatemala, and medieval England, which consistently shows that peasants seek to have 12–18 months' food in store. A law at Selymbria supports the conclusion that this was also the practice in ancient Greece: "private persons should hand over their grain to the state at a fixed price, keeping for themselves only one year's supply,"⁴⁶ The weight of the grain component of this twelve-month supply has been estimated, in the case of a hypothetical six-member ancient household, as 1419 kg.⁴⁷

Carrying capacity, in the logistical rather than ecological sense, has mainly been studied in the military context. Roman legionaries are thought to have routinely marched fifteen miles per day with kit weighing 68% of mean bodyweight.⁴⁸ There is little reason to suppose that those involved in agricultural labour were physically less fit than the Roman army. The Romans did march farther and with greater burdens on an emergency basis, but they had the advantage of

Evacuation of livestock⁵³

Livestock are conveniently self-transporting, but the animals must be fed regularly if they are not to deteriorate rapidly. Pasture within city walls would be negligible, so urban evacuation presupposes the import of fodder and forage. For the larger animals, at least, the logistics of bringing in enough food would have been considerable: the ancient ox required 6.8 kg. of hay and 11 kg. of mash per day (Cato Agr. 30), or a total of 534 kg. per animal per month. This would be a considerable burden during, for example, the 431–425 invasions of Attica, the longest of which was forty days. The logistics of feeding livestock shut up within city walls may not have been prohibitive, but given all the other logistical problems, different solutions must have been sought.⁵⁴ One possibility is driving stock not to the city, but to extra-mural areas suitable for grazing, yet not easily accessible to the enemy. The Athenians did so at the outbreak of war in 431: “Their sheep and cattle they sent across to Euboea and the islands off the coast” (Thuc. 2.14). Agesilaus’ campaigns furnish further examples. In 390, the Corinthians evacuated their cattle firstly to Piraeum, and then to the Heraeum (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.1–6.). The next year, the Acarnanians took similar steps: “all their cattle were driven into the interior so as to be out of reach of the army” (4.6.4–6). In both cases, the eventual capture of the cattle shows that extra-mural evacuation bore no guarantee of safety.

In summary, modern scholars speak more easily of evacuation than ancient farmers achieved it:⁵⁵ the massive logistical difficulties, even when the enemy were not able to appear or move suddenly, explain how evacuation could fail, or be only partially successful. Mnasippus’ troops, on the plunder of Corcyra, “got such a taste for luxurious living that they would drink no wine unless it had a fine bouquet” (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.6.). In 431 the Thebans caught the Plataeans with “both men and property still out in the fields.” Thucydides explains that this was “since the attack had been made in peacetime and was quite unexpected” (2.5), but these circumstances can not have been unique. Even in ancient military theory, devastators were expected to become encumbered with booty, and thus vulnerable to counter-attacks (Aen. *Tact* 16.1–16.).

Delay and harassment

Time for evacuation would always have been short, as even when there was adequate warning, there would have been a reluctance to interrupt agricultural activity until the last possible moment.⁵⁶ Delaying operations would slow the enemy’s progress into friendly territory, thus allowing evacuees to get in as much property as

possible. Aeneas Tacticus describes both the selection of a force to fight the enemy on his approach (1.1–4) and the tactics they should employ (16.16–22). A third-century Athenian decree describes how, in the face of invasion, Kallias “marched his troops into the countryside and made every effort to protect the harvest of the grain so that as much grain as possible could be brought into the city.”⁵⁷ The cavalry force the Peloponnesians defeated immediately before entering the plain of Athens in 431 should be seen in these terms (Thuc. 2.19), and whatever else Leonidas intended or achieved at Thermopylae, he gained the Greeks extra days for their evacuation.

Once a devastator had settled down to work, an active defender would hamper him with frequent sorties. Aeneas Tacticus (16.1–16) describes how this should be done, emphasising the need to allow the enemy to become involved with ravaging before striking. Dispersed across the landscape, encumbered with loot and quite possibly drunk, invaders would then be at their most vulnerable. This is perhaps a little optimistic, as it seems when compared with Thucydides’ gritty picture of the Athenian sorties against Decelea (7.27):

As the cavalry rode out to Decelea every day to make attacks on the enemy or to patrol the country, the horses were lamed on the rough ground and by the continuous hard work to which they were put, or else were wounded by the enemy.

Sorties were tough and dangerous, but their threat would have hampered the invaders. They would be made reluctant to disperse fully, for optimum devastation (and of course foraging), and would have been obliged to divert troops from ravaging to security duties.⁵⁸

Delay and evacuation were complementary, but because farmers and soldiers were one and the same this presented the community with a manpower dilemma: the more men delaying the enemy, the more time they could win, but the more men harvesting and evacuating, the quicker it would be done. Fieldworks like the Dema wall,⁵⁹ astride the primary western entrance to the Athenian plain, could help to solve this problem; a much smaller force than otherwise possible could fight a delaying action here, freeing up manpower to evacuate the countryside.

III The devastation of Attica in the Peloponnesian War

During the Peloponnesian War, Attica was devastated using both the land-based types of operation outlined above. She suffered five general invasions during 431–425, and then a fortified occupation based at Decelea during 413–404. From Thucydides to the present

day, it has unanimously been agreed that the fort at Decelea caused more damage to Attica's rural economy than did the earlier invasions. However, scholars who disparage the effectiveness of devastation have gone so far as to maintain that the early invasions hardly interfered with agriculture at all.⁶⁰ It is my purpose in this final section to show that the invasions of 431–425 did have significant economic consequences for Athens.

Table 2 Minimum cost of the Attic grain eaten by enemy

Invasion (year)	Days	Cost (talents)
430	430	30,600 (im.)
429	429	30,600 (im.)
428	428	30,600 (im.)
427	427	30,600 (im.)
426	426	30,600 (im.)
425	425	30,600 (im.)
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harder to quantify. The two pieces of evidence for the grain yield of ancient Attica⁶² are an inscription that states the proportion of the harvest to be dedicated at Eleusis, and another which gives the amount which actually was in 329/8.⁶³ Assuming the proportion did not change, it can be calculated that the harvest for 329/8 came to 363,400 *medimnoi* of barley, and 39,112 of wheat, a total of just over 400,000 *medimnoi*. Ober (24) points out that because of the drought and crop failures that are thought to have occurred in 329/8, as well as under-contributions, this ought to be considered very much as a minimum figure. Even a harvest on this scale would have had a cash value of around 200 talents. It is not possible to discover with any accuracy how much of this might have been destroyed by devastators. However, as argued above, with the use of burning it was probably substantial, a contention supported by the fact that the Peloponnesian invaders are said to have left only whenever their supply situation dictated, *i.e.* when the remaining grain in the Athenian countryside was so sparse as to preclude further foraging. The loss of a half or even a quarter of a harvest worth 200 talents (a minimum figure) would certainly have been very tangible to Athenians. Hanson has argued (177) that because the processes of ancient agriculture were labour-not capital-intensive, they could recover within a few seasons of the population returning to the land. This is doubtless true, but as shown above, recovery or no recovery, the substantial destruction of even one cereal harvest was a severe (by any definition) blow to the rural economy, of which agricultural processes were only a part.

Athens absorbed the damage of the Archidamian invasions, and indeed the Decelean occupation, by virtue of her enormous wealth, and her access to imports.⁶⁴ But Thucydides tells us this had been a surprise to contemporaries. The rapid collapse that they anticipated presumably speaks for the effect of ravaging on more typical communities:

at the beginning of the war some thought that, if the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, Athens might survive for a year, and while others put the figure at two or three years, no one imagined she could last for more than that (7.28).

Here Thucydides is apparently contradicting his own words from Book One, where he has had Archidamus warn his countrymen of exactly that likelihood (1.81):

Athens controls plenty of land outside Attica and can import what she wants by sea ... we must not bolster ourselves up with the false hope that if we devastate their land, the war will soon be over ... the Athenians have too much pride to become the slaves of their own land.

But Archidamus' speech has too much exact foresight to be genuine.

Thucydides is not reporting what Archidamus said, but rather using a speech to elucidate what, with the benefit of hindsight, was the central strategic problem for the Spartans. To realise this is to resolve the apparent contradiction.

So long as Athens had both wealth and access to supplies from the Black Sea region, she could weather the devastation of her immediately adjacent territory. This was graphically demonstrated to the Spartan king Agis during the Deceleian occupation. He was ravaging Attica, yet he could see with his own eyes the grain ships coming constantly into the Piraeus (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.35). Lysander's victory at Aegospotami and seizure of the Bosphorus meant an end to Pontic grain supplies, and famine for Athens. Lysander well understood this, as is shown by his decision to send the captured Athenians home—he granted them safe passage there, and nowhere else (2.2.2)—thus swelling the number of hungry bellies in the city. The result was Athenian capitulation, revolt in the empire, and the humiliating destruction of the Long Walls. But that was 405. In 431, the naval balance had not allowed the Peloponnesians even to defend their own coastline, let alone win major sea-battles at the far end of the Aegean. At that time, as demonstrated above, the devastation of Attica allowed Sparta to apply such economic pressure as was possible. The Athenians did not starve, but only because they could buy grain; the attack on their crops became, effectively, an attack on their current account.

IV Conclusion

It is time to rehabilitate the view of devastation as a formidable threat to the survival of victim cities. Gomme was right:⁶⁵ the grain harvest was worth fighting for, and if the defenders lost, they would seek terms. Cereals were not only the staple of the ancient diet, they were also highly vulnerable under the prevailing conditions of Greek warfare, *i.e.* the summer campaign. Vines and trees were often hacked about, in sheer wantonness, no doubt, whilst vandalised farmhouses literally brought the insult home, but these violations need not figure too largely in any economic assessment. The mainstay of effective devastation was the attack on wheat and barley.

Athens' experience during the Peloponnesian War furnishes a good deal of useful evidence for the detail of ravaging, and especially its operational context. However, arguments based on Athens' ability to endure devastation can be misleading, since she was a city independent of her *chora* to a unique extent. For several years the Spartans and their allies in Attica ate forty or fifty talents worth of grain. Even if they were such congenial guests as not to damage a

single stalk more, what other city than Athens could have borne it for so long? Xenophon's brief description of little Phlius' troubles seems a more representative account of the experience of the ravaged.⁶⁶

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1 The devastation of Italy in the Second Punic War, for example, has been much discussed. A. J. Toynbee, *Hannibal's Legacy: the Hannibalic War's Effects on Roman Life* (London 1965), argued that the economic effects of devastation in the third century B.C. were so severe as to persist until modern times. P. A. Brunt, *Italian Manpower, 225 B.C.–A.D. 14* (Oxford 1971), was sceptical, arguing that even the contemporary effect was not as bad as the sources pretend. T. J. Cornell, "The Effects of the Hannibalic War on Italy," in T. J. Cornell, B. Rankov, and P. Sabin, edd., *The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal* (London 1996) 97–117, considers the views of both Toynbee and Brunt; he shows that Toynbee's more far-fetched claims must be discarded, but nonetheless concludes that the devastation of southern Italy had profound economic impact.

2 E.g. Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.1: in the early 360s Thebes' allies were ravaging Phlius, attempting to make her abandon her alliance with Sparta; the city was "in great difficulties and suffering from a shortage of food" (transl. Warner). Xenophon may or may not have been biased towards Sparta's allies, but nonetheless his audience had experienced many years of war, and it is unlikely that he would have presented a phenomenon if it were incredible: the important point is not whether Phlius was in difficulties due to devastation but that fourth-century Greeks could be expected to believe it.

3 E.g. G. B. Grundy, *Thucydides and the History of his Age* 2 I (Oxford 1948) 82; A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* I (Oxford 1945) 10–12.

4 E.g. H. Delbrück, *Die Strategie des Perikles* (Berlin 1890) 110–111: "It takes time and trouble to destroy grainfields, trees, and vineyards."

5 V. D. Hanson, *Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece*,² (Berkeley 1998: hereafter HANSON). The second edition contains Hanson's response (at 201–251) to the literature that appeared in the decade-and-a-half following the appearance of the first (1982).

6 L. Foxhall, "Farming and Fighting in Ancient Greece," in G. Shipley and J. Rich, edd., *Warfare and Society in the Greek World* (London 1993) 142–143.

7 E.g. in 431 the Spartans ravaged the land of the Acharnians "with their 3000 hoplites ... an important element in the state" (Thuc. 2.20, transl. Warner), and in the same year Pericles had feared that his estate would be spared, to obvious invidious effect (2.13). (Pericles' fears also at Plut. *Per.* 33.2; Plutarch tells a very similar story about Fabius, *Fab.* 7.2–3.) The Old Oligarch (2.14) says that the rich and the farmers" of Athens were always more likely to want to appease the enemy.

8 Hanson 180; also his *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece* (London 1989) 34.

9 J. Ober, *Fortress Attica: The Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier, 404–322 B.c.* (Leiden 1985: hereafter OBER) 34–37.

10 H. van Wees, "The City at War," in R. Osborne, ed., *Classical Greece, 500–323 B.C.* (Oxford 2000) 96–98. An exception, however, is J. M. Bryant, "Military

11 Note however that I do not argue that severe agricultural devastation on its own explains why hoplite battles occurred. There are other strategic and cultural issues: see for example E. Will, “La territoire, la ville et la polior-cétique grecque,” *RHist* 253 (1975) 297–318.

12 L. Foxhall and H. A. Forbes, “Σιτομετρεία: The Role of Grain as a Staple Food in Classical Antiquity,” *Chiron* 12 (1982) 74.

13 As Hanson points out, 49–50.

14 Thuc. 6.7 details an operation in which Spartan ravagers actually carried off grain in carts.

15 piut. *Cleom.* 26.1; Arr. *Anab.* 1.4.1–2.

16 L. Casson, *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World* (London 1995) 270–273, citing Vegetius 4.39 (“from the 6th day before the kalends of June, until the rising of Arcturus, that is the 18th before the kalends of October, is believed to be the safe period for navigation”); 270 n.3 lists the exceptional winter voyages recorded by Thucydides.

17 Thuc. 3.15: “They decided on the invasion of Attica ... the other allies were slow in coming in, since they were busy in harvesting their corn.”

18 Thuc. 2.19, 2.47, 3.1, 3.26, and 4.2.

19 M. B. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings II* (Athens 1996) no. 13.

20 Polyæn. *Stmt.* 5.1.3 contains Phalaris’ stratagem: bribe the enemy granary wardens to sabotage the granary roofs.

21 Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.13. Cf. the words put into Archidamus’ mouth at Thuc. 1.82, “you must think of their land as though it was a hostage in your possession, and all the more valuable the better it is looked after.”

22 D. H. Gordon, “Fire and the Sword: The Technique of Destruction,” *Antiquity* 27 (1953) 149–152.

23 Whatever Leonidas intended, what he in fact achieved at Thermopylae was a delaying action (see 247 below). There was also the plan to defend Tempe (Hdt. 7.173), to where the Greeks actually deployed. In the end, though, second thoughts prevailed.

24 Armies marching at fifteen miles per day would clearly be outstripped by lone messengers, who could take advantage of fast ships, or at least travel on horseback: consider the man who set out from Euboea to take a warning to Mytilene; he took two days (Thuc. 3.3).

25 This time “even the wood-work on the houses themselves” was evacuated (Thuc. 2.14). The same thoroughness was not achieved before Agis’ 413 invasion (*Hell.Oxy.* 12.4).

26 The Plataeans were caught with “men and property still out in the fields, as the attack had been made in peacetime, and was quite unexpected” (Thuc. 2.5).

27 D. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley 1978: hereafter ENGELS) 20.

28 Thuc. 4.6. This does not imply that the Spartans arrived with enough rations for fifteen days. They must have captured some stored supplies in Attica, regardless of the state of the harvest.

29 Thuc. 2.23, 3.1, 3.26, 4.6.

30 This figure is, in fact, just on the impossible side of generous: Engels 18–22, cf. H. Delbrück, *History of the Art of War I* (Westport 1975) 425.

31 Engels 125; the figure of 4 1/2 *choinices* agreed for the Spartans on Sphacteria (Thuc. 4.16) is high, and seems to represent an attempt to stockpile.

32 The estimate of J. Beloch, *Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt* (Leipzig 1886) 152. Other estimates—compiled in D. Kagan, *The Archidamian War* (Ithaca 1974) 19 n.8—either concur or in a few cases raise the figure. An isolated downward figure is Beloch's own subsequent revision, to 25,000 ("Griechische Aufgebote II," *Klio* 6 [1906] 77).

33 A figure of one follower per hoplite ought to be used as the average for the invasions of Attica. Certainly Herodotus' seven helots per Spartiate (Hdt. 9.10, 9.29) ought not to be applied generally, if at all, although if a segment of the army was thus attended, it would bring the average right up. Lazenby, noting Hdt. 7.229 and Thuc. 4.8, concurs that "there is reason to believe that every Spartan hoplite on campaign was accompanied by such a batman, usually a helot": J. F. Lazenby, *The Spartan Army* (Warminster 1985) 30. The Macedonian army under Phillip and Alexander, with a ratio of one servant to every four soldiers, is considered an example of ultra-streamlining (Engels 12).

34 At two *choinices* per man per day, for 60,000 men for twenty days.

35 H. D. Westlake, "Seaborne Raids in Periclean Strategy," *CQ* 39 (1945) 75–84, concludes, "there remains the view that devastation ... which was the chief achievement of these operations, was also their chief object."

36 Carcinus had 1400. In Thucydides we have other marine contingents numbering a few thousand, e.g., Pericles with 4300 (Thuc. 2.56); Spartan Cnemus with 1000 (2.66); Nicias with 2000 (3.91), then 2000-plus (4.53–56), then 2600-plus (4.129); Charicles with 1200 (7.20); Diitrephes with 1300 (7.29). Thucydides explicitly states that each of these carried out devastation.

37 J. F. Coates, *The Trireme Trials 1988: Report on the Anglo-Hellenic Sea Trials of Olympias* (Oxford 1990) 38. Casson (*supra* n.16) 281–296 presents evidence that support this conclusion.

38 When the locals tried to oppose Cleopompus' devastation of Locris, he defeated them at Alope (Thuc. 2.26). Nicias' raiding force also defeated the Cytherians (4.54).

39 E.g. Thuc. 2.23–25, 2.56, 3.91, 4.53–56, 6.105.

40 For a wider discussion of this phenomenon see H. D. Westlake, "The Progress of *Epiteichismos*," *CQ* N.S. 33 (1983) 12–24.

41 Thuc. 7.27. Thebans bought the slaves and other property at a low price (*Hell.Oxy.* 12.4).

42 W. K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War V* (Berkeley 1991) 352–358.

43 E.g. Euboea (Thuc. 2.14), Salamis (Hdt. 8.40).

44 For a catalogue see Pritchett (*supra* n.42) 348–352. These instances are more fully discussed by H. Müller, "φουγῆς ἔνεκεν," *Chiron* 5 (1975) 129–156.

45 Hanson (104) cites Hdt. 5.34 and Thuc 5.115; but only the intent can be inferred from these passages, not the degree of success. Xen. *An.* 4.7.1, 4.7.17 are also cited, but it does not seem safe to deduce practice in Greece from the habits of the barbarian Taochi.

46 T. W. Gallant, *Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece* (Stanford 1991) 94–95. The Selymbrian law is from [Arist] *Oec.* 1348b33–1349a2.

47 Foxhall/Forbes (*supra* n.12) 49 n.26. The family, based on World Health Organisation data, consisted of six members: (1) Female 60–69 yrs, 52 kg.; (2) Male 20–39 yrs, 62 kg.; (3) Female 20–39 yrs, 52 kg.; (4) male child 13–15 yrs; (5) female child 10–12 yrs; (6) child 7–9 yrs. For the purposes of the present study, the children’s weights are estimated as 50, 35, and 20 kg.

48 J. Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War* (Cologne 1999). This is based on Roth’s average soldier weighing 66 kg. (10–12) and the reconstruction of legionary burden as 45 kg. (73–77).

49 Engels 14; Roth (*supra* n.48) 205–206.

50 Roth (*supra* n.48) 211–212.

51 S. Hodkinson, “Animal Husbandry in the Greek Polis,” in C. R. Whittaker, ed., *Pastoral Economies in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge 1988) 39–40. Modern assessments that holdings under 5 ha. could not be worked effectively with oxen are backed up by Hesiod’s reference to small farmers without the animals (*Op.* 405).

52 E.g. for those at the north of the Athenian plain, the forts at Phyle and Aphidna were only half as distant as Athens. Both are reasonably capacious. Phyle (dated to IV B.C.) has a circuit of 260 m., whilst Aphidna (dating unresolved) has a circuit of 300 m. See M. Munn, *The Defence of Attica* (Oxford 1993) 9–10.

53 Livestock were often taken as booty: see Pritchett (*supra* n.42) 198–203.

54 Aeneas Tacticus advises against the introduction of livestock (10.1): “One must also notify those citizens who own cattle or slaves to place them in safety among neighbours, since they cannot bring them into the city.”

55 E.g. Hanson 51: “invaders would have to arrive right around mid- or late May, when the grain was just becoming combustible, but had not yet been harvested and stored behind strong walls.” Because of the logistical difficulties of evacuation, the window was perhaps not quite so narrow.

56 E.g. the Euboeans threatened by Xerxes in 480 (Hdt. 8.20).

57 T. L. Shear, *Kallias of Sphettos and the Revolt of Athens in 286 B.C.* (Princeton 1978) 5.

58 The essence of Xenophon’s (*Mag. eq.* 4.17, 7.7–10) tactics for cavalry operating against an invader implies this. His cavalry commander was to watch for any blunder by which the enemy might expose a small detachment, e.g. by foraging. Then he was to strike his isolated opponents suddenly, and to make off before hostile reinforcements could arrive.

59 See Munn (*supra* n.52) *passim*.

60 E.g. Hanson 152–153. According to Hanson, the only “severe” effect on the Athenians of the Archidamian invasions was the plague.

61 And, on a smaller scale, the Athenian fleets devastating the Péloponnèse were also eating at enemy expense.

62 As cited by Ober 23.

63 IG I3 78 (late V) and II2 1672.263–299.

64 P. Harding, “Athenian Defensive Strategy in the Fourth Century,” *Phoenix* 42 (1988) 61–71 (a response to Ober’s *Fortress Attica*). P. Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World* (Cambridge 1988) 87–164, “Food Supply and Food Crisis in Athens, c.600–322 BC,” concerns itself a good deal with Athenian dependence on imports.

65 Gomme (*supra* n.3) 10–12.

⁶⁶ I am indebted to Professor Tim Cornell and Dr Stephen Hodgkinson who showed their usual generosity with advice and suggestions as I researched and wrote this article, and also to Dr Stephen Todd who commented on the draft version. Any errors that have subsequently appeared are entirely mine.

J.L. Myres

Without attempting to rewrite at large the history of the relations between Athens and Aegina after the Athenian victory over Chalcis and Thebes, I submit an examination of the phrase ἀκήρυκτος πόλεμος which Herodotus uses in describing them.

The word ἀκήρυκτος is not a common one, but in the tragedians it simply means 'unannounced', the context indicating who or what was not announced, and why (Soph. *Track.* 45, Eur. *Her.* 89). The only other fifth-century passages stand close together in Thucydides, and their meaning also is quite clear. In i. 146, when relations between Athenians and their neighbours were becoming strained, παρ' ἀλλήλους ἐφοίτων ἀκηρύκτως μὲν, ἀνυ-πόπτως δ' οὐ: people still crossed the frontier without the protection of an official κήρυξ, though their motives were suspected. In ii. 1 the tension is greater; οὔτε ἐπεμείγνυντο ἔτι ἀκηρυκεῖ παρ' ἀλλήλους : informal intercourse had now ceased, and if you wanted to cross the frontier you had to have a safe-conduct and escort.

From the early fourth century, however, there is a divergence of usage. Aeschines, 3. 230, has ἀστεφάνωτοι καὶ ἀκήρυκτοι in the tragedians' sense. Appian, *Mithr.* 104, revives Thucydides' use : τὸ ἀκήρυκτον της ὁδοῦ δεδιότες ἔφευγον ὀπίσω: they felt themselves to be in enemy country, and would not advance farther without safe-conduct or formal introduction.

But Xenophon, *Anabasis*, iii. 3. 5, introduces another use : after an enemy envoy, coming under safe-conduct, had behaved treacherously, it was agreed

δόγμα ποιήσασθαι τὸν πόλεμον ἀκήρυ-

κτον εἶναι ἔστ' ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ εἶεν: :there was to be no attempt at intercourse with the enemy. Plutarch, *Pericles* 20, may be using an early source for a fifth-century episode, when he writes ἀκήρυκτος ἐχθρά for an 'unappeasable' not an 'unannounced' feud; but more probably he is following fourth-century usage as in

Aeschines. 2. 37 ἐξ ὧν
οὐκ εἰρήνην γένοιτ' ἂν ἐκ πολέμου, ἀλλ'
ἐξ εἰρήνης πόλεμος ἀκήρυκτος,
ἀσπόνδους καὶ ἀκηρύκτους τοὺς πολέμους

ποιήσετε: cf. Dem. 18. 262 ἦν γὰρ ἄσπονδος
καὶ ἀκήρυκτος ὑμῖν πρὸς τοὺς θεατὰς πόλεμος.

Later Dio Cassius (1. 7) writes ἀκηρυκεῖ πολεμεῖν for war to a finish, without amenities.

There remains Plato, *Laws*, 626 a,
ἦν γὰρ καλοῦσιν οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων
εἰρήνην, τοῦτ' εἶναι μόνον ὄνομα, τῷ δ'
ἔργῳ πάσαις πρὸς πάσας τὰς πόλεις ἀεὶ
πόλεμον ἀκήρυκτον κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, which may
mean *either* eternal war without formal beginning or end, *or* relentless
war, as in other fourth-century passages.

This is the evidence on which to interpret ἀκήρυκτος πόλεμος in
Herodotus ; it must mean *either* ‘relentless’ as in the fourth-century
writers, *or* ‘unannounced’, i.e. ‘without formal declaration’, as in the
tragedians and Thucydides. ‘Relentless’ the hostilities between
Athens and Aegina certainly were; but is that what Herodotus means?
In his narrative the Thebans were trying to draw Aegina into their war
with Athens. They began with an interpretation of an oracle of which

Herodotus quotes a tag: τῶν ἄγχιστα δέεσθαι Aegina did not wish
to be openly involved, but ‘sent the Aeacidae’, who were as little use
as the ‘Ark of the Covenant’ against the Philistines. The Thebans
returned these fetishes (or relics) and asked for live troops. Aegina still
refrained from open rupture with Athens; but there was ἀκήρυκτος
πόλεμος. This can only mean that ‘without formal declaration’ there
was raiding and reprisal, which is exactly what Herodotus goes on to
describe. What it Cannot in any case mean is what E. M. Walker said it
meant (CA .H.iv. 254fi.) : open official war by Athens on Aegina
(according to him some twenty years later) for conduct so gross that
no formal declaration of war was ever delivered to Aegina.

J. L. Myres.

Oxford.

Crossing Greek Frontiers Under Arms

by D.J. Mosley
(*Sheffield*).

In 424 the Spartan general Brasidas set out for Thrace with seventeen hundred heavy infantry. After his arrival at Heraclea in Trachis he sent on a request to his friends at Pharsalus to escort him and his army through the country. Accordingly at Melitia several important Thessalians, including Strophacus the Chalcidian *prowenos* and Mcondas of Larissa, a friend of Per-diccas, met and accompanied his march. For, wrote Thucydides, to pass through Thessaly under arms and unescorted presented difficulties and throughout Greece to pass through neighbouring territory without permission was a matter for suspicion (1). Gomme, in his commentary on that passage in Thucydides, asked for what class of reader was it written that it was not usual to march through the territory of any Greek state without its consent and that such conduct would everywhere arouse suspicion. He went on to ask of what country outside Greece was it not true(2). The point was taken up in a review of Gomme's work by Larsen (3), who suggested that instead of implying that the statement in Thucydides is stupid it would be well to realize that the Greek point of view may have been entirely different from ours. Of that he finds an indication in the arguments of Brasidas as they are presented by Thucydides. For Brasidas claimed to be unaware of any hostility between Thessaly and Sparta to justify refusal of a passage, implying that a refusal of passage would be an act of hostility. Furthermore, as evidence of the move away from the old habit of readily granting free passage. Larsen cites a provision of the treaty made in 420 between Athens. Argos. Mantinea and Elis. By that provision all the contracting parties bound themselves to refuse passage by land and by sea to any force proceeding under arms with hostile intent unless all parties unanimously consented (4).

As with most matters which relate to what we regard as International Law we cannot expect to find precise views stated by any ancient Greek authority. Furthermore, it is possible to collect quotations which indicate apparently strange conceptions of territorial sovereignty. The Athenians, for example, were supposed to have considered "wheat, barley, olive and the vine in other words all fertile territory, as the natural bounds of Attica (5), while Sparta was said to consider as her own whatever she touched with the spear (6). A

glance at a map is sufficient to demonstrate that the frontiers of many of the ancient Greek communities were not marked by natural physical boundaries (7), and even where such natural boundaries were lacking it was not the general practice to build and maintain extensive frontier works. For to maintain such defences was beyond the means of most communities. Chains of forts were not unknown, for a series of posts was located along the north-western sector of Attica approximating to the frontier with Boeotia. The function of those posts, however, was not so much to preserve the frontier as to defend the roads running from Attica to Boeotia(8). The strategy of ancient Greek warfare was not influenced to any great extent, at least in the fifth century B.C., by the habit of manning and preserving the integrity of frontier lines (9).

In view of such considerations it is easy to understand that the Greek communities did not labour under what W.S. Churchill described as a “ Maginot “ or “ Siegfried “ mentality and that consequently their attitudes to territorial rights and sovereignty were different from those to be observed in later ages. The demarcation of boundaries between communities was nothing new in the fifth century and it was not a habit confined to the Greeks, for it was said that from earliest times a boundary pillar had been set up at the Isthmus of Corinth to divide Ionians from Peloponnesians (10) and King Croesus in the sixth century had set up a pillar to mark the boundary of Phrygia and Lydia (11). Claims to, and recognition of, territorial rights and sovereignty were made and established in both private and inter-state spheres (12). From Homeric times it had been recognised that disputes over the possession of land were a matter for legal process. Disputes over land between states provided justifiable grounds for a resort to inter-state arbitration or to war. In some cases frontiers were respected by parties who were not only in dispute over territory but also engaged in war. In 424, for example, after the Athenians had retreated, from the Boeotian border into the territory of Oropus, whose possession was long disputed by Athens and Boeotia, ten out of the eleven Boeotarchs advised that the Boeotians call off their action (13). Then in 420 the Argives made proposals to the Spartans that Cynuria, disputed territory on their frontiers, should be the subject of arbitration. After the rejection of that proposal Argive envoys obtained as a concession that although there should be a truce for fifty years either side should be permitted to issue a challenge to decide the dispute in a battle but that both sides should refrain from pursuit across the frontier of Argos or Sparta (14).

Greece was so fragmented that it was difficult to move far in any direction without encountering the frontier of a state. Even where geography permitted a journey to be made by sea it was not always

easy or possible to proceed by sea. As far as individuals were concerned in time of peace it was an easy matter to proceed across land frontiers without undue formality. Certainly there was no widespread system of passport control. In very early times it was decreed by the Delphic Amphictyony that transit without charge should be granted through the territory of member states to Delphi (15). In 423 the Athenians managed to persuade the Spartans to prevail upon the Boeotians and Phocians to maintain traditional rights of access to Delphi at the time of the One Year Truce (16) and again in the Peace of Micias free passage was guaranteed by land and by sea both to public and private parties to attend ceremonies according to their national customs (17).

Since free rights of access could be assumed both for private and public parties except when war existed between the states concerned and since a refusal of access could not always be countered by taking an alternative route it can be seen that it was a matter for sensitive judgement to determine whether to make or refuse a formal request for passage. On many occasions diplomatic or military necessities would prevail over niceties of etiquette or notions of custom. Certainly Greek writers seemed to take a passing interest in such matters even where they were not of crucial importance to the narrative of events. Herodotus, for example, notes several instances concerning non-Greek communities. Cambyses of Persia was advised by Phanes to request a safe conduct for his army from the King of Arabia (18), who proceeded to grant a passage, without which it would have been impossible to penetrate into Egypt (19). The Greek city of Cyrene was supposed to have granted a passage to the Persians on their way to attack Barca and to have supplied provisions at their request (20). At the time of the Persian invasions of Greece the Thessalian leaders were sympathetic to the Persians and Thorax of Larissa helped to escort Xerxes in his flight and gave Mardonius a passage into Greece (21). In the early years of the fourth century King Agesilaus of Sparta on his Asian campaigns halted to ask permission to cross the frontiers of Mysia (22) and Paphlagonia (23), which he gained although the Mysians attacked his rear.

It was consistent with etiquette and prudence to make a formal request before proceeding with an armed force through alien territory, even if only to allay fear and suspicion and to secure favourable conditions. When Cimon was returning with the Athenian force which had been despatched to help the Spartans against the helots and Messenians he passed through the Isthmus of Corinth. He had neglected, however, to ask for a passage and so Lachartus complained that he had not observed the simple courtesy of knocking on the door and waiting to be admitted: to that complaint Cimon replied that the

Corinthians had rather smashed down than knocked on the doors of Megara (24).

The practices of the Ten Thousand were not always consistent. For in 401 they entered the territory of the Macrones and then subsequently made a truce with the inhabitants (25), but they were more circumspect in approaching the territory of the Mossynoeci. When the force approached the Mossynoeci, Timesitheus of Trebizond, the *proxenos* of the Mossynoeci, was sent on ahead to ask whether they would proceed as through friendly or enemy territory (26). In that phrase Xenophon appears to preserve the formula according to which such requests were made, for similar phrases are found elsewhere. According to Plutarch King Agesilaus during his withdrawal from Asia Minor sent on a request as to whether he would be proceeding as through friendly or enemy territory from each of the communities which he encountered (27). An echo of such a phrase is to be found in the account of the Ten Thousand presented by Diodorus Siculus. For he reports that in 401 they made arrangements with the satrap Tiribazus and then passed through his territory as friends (28).

In the wording of the requests for passage it may be significant that there is posed not so much a request for permission to proceed as a question as to whether the applicants would proceed as friends or enemies. Furthermore what amounted to a request for passage need not be met with a blank refusal so much as with a diplomatic statement that the passage of a force would not meet the willing consent of the party concerned. A reply of that nature was given by Croton to the Athenians in 413. whereupon the Athenian force proceeded by sea (29). Such formulas would allow flexibility and satisfy both the honour and other diplomatic obligations of the parties concerned in a variety of circumstances without incurring unnecessary risks of violence.

The formulas imply too that although politeness and etiquette suggested that a formal request was desirable, the onus of persuasion and argument lay not so much with the party which made the request as with the party which wished to refuse to grant it. Little, except time, was lost in any case by making a request. When King Agesilaus wanted a passage through Mace-don the Macedonian king offered to consider his request, but finally yielded through fear since the Spartan forces were about to march on regardless (30). In 426, when a Peloponnesian force was bound for Naupactus, Eurylochus sent on a herald to the Ozolian Locrians, through whose territory he was due to pass. He was intent on passing through in any event and his Amphissaeon friends saw that he was provided with hostages as a guarantee (31).

In view of the military needs of the Greeks and their considerable

dependence upon communication by land it would have been impossibly difficult for a state to devise flexible strategy and make all the requisite official requests for passage before despatching a force to any particular destination. The point can be well illustrated by the movement of Athenian cavalry in 362 at the time of the Mantinean campaign. The cavalry set out one day from Eleusis and ate in the evening at the Isthmus. Then without breakfast they set out and passed through Cleonae before arriving at Mantinea (32). In a discussion of how the Thessalian cavalry reached Athens to help against the Peloponnesians in 431 Larsen finds it entirely probable that they passed through Thermopylae, Phocis and Boeotia, through the territory of states which supplied forces to the opposing side. He remarks that the extent to which armed forces crossed territories of other states is surprising and scarcely to be realized except through the study of many wars and campaigns (33).

On consenting to the passage of an alien armed force a state did not imply its support for one side or another in a conflict and such consent was entirely compatible with neutrality. There was always some risk involved in admitting an armed force, as the Byzantines found out when they admitted men of the Ten Thousand who were in desperate straits and likely to indulge in wholesale looting (34). Commercially it was possible for a community to benefit from granting rights of passage, for consumable supplies had to be obtained en route. Anaxibius, in diverting men of the Ten Thousand from Byzantium, assured them that supplies were readily available in the Thracian villages (35) and on several occasions the Ten Thousand had local markets made available to them(36). Conversely in 388 Dionysius, Tyrant of Syracuse, took his stand against Khegium on the point that when an army was on the move it was a hostile act to deny it facilities for provisioning (37). No payment was made otherwise for simple passage. On one occasion King Agesilaus aroused admiration for marching without formality through the territory of the Tralles, to whom even Xerxes had made payment for passage(38).

As we have seen, acquiescence in allowing the passage of troops was consistent with non-belligerence and neutrality, and it did not provide grounds for retaliation. For what was allowed for one party would be allowable to another. It was also compatible with at least an indirectly hostile relationship, as was argued in the case of the movement of the Thessalian cavalry in 431. What did cause complication was a situation in which most communities either locally or over a wide area either were involved or likely to be involved in a conflict. Under such circumstances a state might decline to allow the passage of even a nominally friendly force for fear of the consequences.

One of the most difficult dilemmas was that which faced the Thebans before the battle of Chaeronea. Philip of Macedón, with whom they were nominally still in alliance, requested that they should either join in with him against Athens or, failing that, allow him to pass through their territory (39). Apart from the threats of Philip, the Thebans, in terms of theoretical obligations, were on untenable grounds in refusing both requests. The Athenians for their part appealed to the Theban populace over the heads of the Boeotarchs either for an alliance against Philip or for a passage for their forces(40). In neither case could the Thebans prevent Boeotia from becoming the actual battle-ground in the confrontation of the powers.

In declining to allow passage a state would naturally have regard to the possible consequences and to the options which the petitioner had. In 413 although the Athenians were permitted to put in at several points in southern Italy Crotón declined to agree to a passage, but the consequences were not serious as the Athenians could proceed easily with their naval transport(41). In the Athenian campaign in Sicily Agrigentum refused to grant a passage for Syracusan re-inforcements, which were then bound to pass through Sicel territory. The Athenian general Nicias then asked the Sicels to bar their way through (42).

It was at times when there was an undue polarization of powers in a conflict and when there was a likelihood that neutrality would not be respected that such matters would cause most alarm and difficulty. In their agreement made in 420 the Athenians, Argives, Eleans and Mantineans swore that they would not allow the passage of any armed force by land or by sea through the territory of themselves or their allies except by common consent (43). A clause of such general application would be difficult to maintain over any period. Certainly few armed forces possessing power and resolution would wait sufficiently long for four states to concert their diplomatic answer to a request which was urgent for immediate tactical or strategic considerations. The rigid clause in the treaty of 420 does not seem to have set a precedent for wide imitation, for there were other flexible and more satisfactory guarantees of assistance and protection which could be given.

Soon after the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War the Athenians had occasion to consider the matter of crossing frontiers for both peaceful and warlike purposes. For in 430 they passed a decree bidding Perdiccas of Macedón not to restrict the passage of Methoneans trading in the interior and equally directing him not to conduct an army through Methonean territory without the consent of Methone (44).

¹ Thuc. 4,78,2. The tense of the verb **καθειστήκει** is a cause of difficulty in translation and interpretation of the text.

- 2 A.W. Gomme, *Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. III (Oxford 1956) 542.
- 3 J.A.O. Larsen, CP 53 (1958) 124-5, reviewing Gomme, *HCT* vols. II-III.
- 4 Thuc. 5,47,5; IG I2 86 (= Tod *GHI* 72 = Bengtson, *Staatsverträge* ii, i9a).
- 5 Plut. *Ale.* 15,4 in the oath of the young warriors. Cf. Cic *Rep.* 3,9,15,
- 6 Plut. *Ap. Lac.* 210 E.
- 7 V. Martin, *La Vie Internationale dans la Grèce des Cités* (Paris 1940) 30 f.
- 8 L. Chandler, *The North-West Frontier of Attica*, JHS 46 (1926) 1-21.
- 9 F.E. Adcock, *The Greek and Macedonian Art of War* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1957) 68-9.
- 10 Strabo, 3,5,5 ; cf. *id.* 9,1,6.
- 11 Hdt. 7,30.
- 12 G.M. Ténékides, *La Notion Juridique d'Indépendance et la Tradition Hellénique* (Athens 1954) 167-70.
- 13 Thuc. 4,91.
- 14 *id.* 5,41,
- 15 Strabo, 9,3,4.
- 16 Thuc. 4,118,1
- 17 *id.* 5,18,1.
- 18 Hdt. 3,4.
- 19 *id.* 3,88.
- 20 *id.* 4,203.
- 21 *id.* 9,1.
- 22 *Hell. Ox.* 16,2.
- 23 *id.* 17,1.
- 24 Plut. *Cim.* 17,1.
- 25 Diod. Sic. 14,29,5.
- 26 Xen. *An.* 5,4,2.

πότερον ὥς διὰ φιλίας ἢ διὰ πολεμίας πορεύσονται
τῆς χώρας.

- 27 Plut. *Ages.* 16,1.

πότερον ὥς φιλίαν ἢ ὥς πολεμίαν διαπορεύηται τὴν
χώραν.

- 28 Diod. Sic. 14,27,7.
- 29 Thuc. 7,35,2.

οὐκ ἂν σφίσι βουλομένοις εἶναι διὰ τῆς γῆς σφῶν τὸν
στρατὸν ἰέναι.

- 30 Plut. *Ages.* 16,2.
- 31 Thuc. 3,101.
- 32 Xen. *Hell.* 7,5,9.
- 33 J. A. O. Larsen [CP 1958] *op. cit.* 123 on Thuc. 2,22,3.
- 34 Xen. *An.* 7,1,1 f.

³⁵ id. 7,1,13.

³⁶ id. 1,1,24; 1,2,18 (cf. 14); 1,5,10; 1,5,6 (cf. 1,3,14). Refs. collected in J. Roy, *The Mercenaries of Cyrus*, *Historia* 16 (1967) 311 n. 94.

³⁷ Diod. Sic. 14,27,7.

³⁸ Plut. Ages. 16,1.

³⁹ Dem. 18,213.

⁴⁰ Aeschin. 3,151.

⁴¹ Thuc. 7,35,2.

⁴² id. 7,33,2.

⁴³ See n. 4 *supra*.

⁴⁴ IG I² 57. For another document of the same period conceivably, but probably not, referring to frontiers and enemy passage see the restorations of Köhler and Kirchner for 1. 10 of IG I² 87 (the treaty concluded between Athens and Halieis in 424/3).

Part III

Classical Hoplite Battle

The General as Hoplite

Everett L. Wheeler

In the first confrontation of legion and phalanx King Pyrrhus of Epirus faced the Romans at Heracleia in 280 bc. The Epirote initiated contact by personally leading a cavalry charge. His gleaming, highly decorated armor immediately marked the king in a display of valor equal to his reputation. ‘Most of all,’ Plutarch says,

while offering his prowess and physical presence to the contest and stoutly fending off opponents, he did not blur his power of calculation nor even lose his presence of mind. Rather he managed the battle, as though viewing it from afar, running from one spot to another and bolstering those seeming to be overpowered.¹

Pyrrhus’ penchant for heroics typified his career, a striving to equal the fame of his alleged ancestor Achilles, who from at least the late sixth century bc, if not from Homer’s own time, symbolized the ideal warrior.² Yet Plutarch’s description goes beyond the Achilles model in painting Pyrrhus as the ideal general: conspicuous armor, physical prowess in combat, but also the bolsterer of morale and the battlefield manager (cf. Polyb. 10.13.1-5). Pyrrhus showed mastery of the dual functions of generalship which had evolved from Homer’s period through the fourth century – leadership in its most literal sense, the physical act of leading; and command, incorporating administration, management, analysis of situations, and oral directives, chiefly mental and verbal properties.³

The role of the general in the hoplite battle experience of Classical Greece is significant for the evolution of generalship – the transition from warrior chief to the general of Pyrrhus’ mode. Scipio Africanus’ reported quip that his mother produced a commander (*imperator*) not a warrior (*bellator*) illustrates the distinction, as does Iphicrates’ remark that he was not a cavalryman, a hoplite, an archer, or a peltast, but one who knew how to command all these. Yet from a broader historical perspective many senior commanders continued to lead from the front until the second half of the seventeenth century, and Frederick the Great can be cited as the first general not to wear armor.⁴

The transition from warrior to general, however, far from being a minor military phenomenon, directly reflects the political, social, and economic developments converting a pre-state (‘primitive’) society to a state. Modifications in the nature and composition of armed forces

corresponded to shifts in the relationship of armies to sovereign authority. The emergence of phalanx warfare among the Greeks did not alter invariable command functions, nor did major technological innovations revise the means of command. But improvements in military organization and, especially from the fifth century on, the growing complexities of war and coordination of diversified arms (e.g. the new significance of light infantry and cavalry) multiplied the need for command. Sophistication necessitated more supervision.⁵

Hyperbole about a dramatic shift to phalanx warfare (denied by some: see p. 127) demands caution. No one wiped the old slate of warrior values clean, but rather (as often) the new style accommodated remnants of the old. The chieftains of war bands investing Troy in the *Iliad* espoused a code of honor, whereby each strove to prove himself the best (*aristos*) in a display of martial excellence (*arete*). Valor in battle validated leadership of the group, and *arete* directly related to a warrior's *Risikobereitschaft*.⁶ In this society respect among one's peers mattered, as did the glory (*kleos*) of an individual passed to future generations. Skill in combat proved a man's *arete* death in battle assured *kleos* and fit the noble ideal (*kalon*). Thus a long life and peaceful death rated disdain in comparison to a short life made glorious by a noble death, which could even obliterate a previous existence of mediocrity. Needless to say, the Homeric warrior chief risked his life in the forefront of battle.⁷

The warrior code of the *Iliad* defined the Greek heroic ethos: an aristocracy of warrior princes in competition with each other for personal honor and eternal fame – both won in battle with great personal danger and without higher political goals. In apparent contrast, the hoplite phalanx emerged as the military representative of the polis. This mass infantry formation of files usually eight deep expanded the warrior function from the aristocracy to the middle class and by the fourth century at times also to the lower classes, integrating aristocrats and shopkeepers, urban dwellers and farmers, the phalanx became (from one viewpoint) a conglomerate of 'interchangeable parts/ in which all put aside personal distinction for the common good of the state. Here was military democracy in action.⁸

The phalanx, however, brought with it a contradiction: although in appearance and practice it seemed a rejection of the earlier style of warfare (the masses, democracy, common good of the state vs individual heroes, aristocracy, an individual's *arete*), the ideology of the hoplite remained the heroic ethos of Homer. The Spartan poet Tyrtaeus (ca 650 bc) preached a transvaluation of Homeric *arete*, making death in the phalanx a hero's sacrifice which the polis would compensate with eternal fame.⁹ Accordingly, the language of Athenian

epitaphioi in the fifth and fourth centuries couched praise of the fallen in the epic glory of the individual hero, anchored in the aristocratic tradition but extending elite honors anonymously to all the slain. In such speeches Athens, the city of *arete*, became Achilles.¹⁰ But this transvaluation of the heroic ethos did not constitute the only source of Homeric warrior values. Homer remained the basic text of aristocratic education, which the middle class also pursued, and presented numerous examples of heroic action as paradigms for emulation.¹¹ Even the 'new' education of fifth-century sophists exploited Homer as an encyclopedia of all knowledge, including military affairs. From this sophistic use of Homer arose in later periods a genre of Homeric *Táctica*, military handbooks deriving the authority of their advice and recommendations from Homeric citations.¹² The phalanx represented equality of risk, required coordinated group action, and functioned for the state; but in battle individual hoplites raised on a diet of Homer no doubt balanced fear with ideals of heroic glory when they sang the paean.¹³

In the transition from warrior chief to Hellenistic general, the Homeric hero of the forefront initially blended into the anonymous mass of equals in the phalanx, although retaining many of the old warrior values. In the fifth and especially the fourth centuries, however, the commander began to re-emerge, as the changing nature of Greek warfare demanded generals with cerebral skills as well as physical prowess. The final stage of the transition would come in the Hellenistic and Roman periods when the complexities of military organization produced a well-defined hierarchy of command (anticipated to some extent in Classical Sparta).¹⁴ The roles of general (*strategos*) and the rank and file (*stratiotai*) became distinct (cf. already Xen., *Anab.* 5.17: 401 bc). Physical leadership in battle, often still attested (e.g. Pyrrhus at Heracleia), mattered less than the commander's presence (even if in the rear) and the functions of command. A general's personal daring could merit scorn – a sign of irresponsibility.

But apart from a commander's tactical and strategic functions, what were a general's duties? In a recent study of command Keegan discerns five basic categories: kinship – creation of a bond between commander and commanded; prescription – direct verbal contact between the general and his men; sanctions – a system of rewards and punishment; the imperative of action – strategic preparation and intelligence; and the imperative of example – the physical presence of the commander in battle and the sharing of risk. Any reader of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* would recognize these categories in Cyrus' activities and admonitions. From another perspective the essence of command lies in the general's symbolizing authority in a way to

motivate potentially indifferent or hostile soldiers and to counter psychological and real distance between the commander and the commanded – a view not significantly different from Xenophon’s favorite doctrine of willing obedience.¹⁵

As the concern of this volume is the hoplite battle experience, we must restrict discussion chiefly to Keegan’s fifth category, the imperative of example, for which Keegan offers three types of command style: generals who *always*, *sometimes*, or *never* enter battle. From this perspective the transition from Homeric warrior to phalanx commander to Hellenistic/Roman strategos represents a change from ‘always’ to ‘sometimes.’ The category of ‘never’ had but rare application in antiquity.

The problem is to determine when the shift from ‘always’ to ‘sometimes’ occurred. *Opinio communis* would date this change generally after 338 bc when distinct functions of strategos and stratiotes had evolved. The Homeric warrior converted to phalanx commander retained his role of physical leader in battle and stationed himself in the front ranks of the phalanx. Indeed, given the limited tactical maneuverability of the phalanx once battle was decided upon and the army was deployed as desired, the commander could do little to influence the outcome of battle and thus took his place in the ranks to aid the physical effort of combat. In this view the high fatality rates of generals and the types of wounds received confirm the commander’s station in the front ranks.¹⁶

The *opinio communis*, however, would benefit from a healthy dose of criticism, for which the foregoing may serve as prolegomena. The transition from Homeric warrior to strategos, in which the age of the Classical hoplite phalanx plays the central role, merits a more nuanced interpretation. Was the phalanx really so democratic in composition and operation, or did distinctions exist between commanders and commanded? Where did the general stand in the phalanx? Did he *always* participate in combat? My purpose is not to discredit the scenario of the *opinio communis* for phalanx battle but to demonstrate its weaknesses: how much of it rests on unequivocal evidence and how much is logical inference or conjecture?

Alexander the Great’s exploits only marginally enter consideration, since he fought in the Macedonian tradition of cavalry as the predominant arm, and Philip II’s reforms consolidating nearly two centuries of Greek military developments marked a new departure. Alexander’s fondness for personal combat, his *to philokindynon* (Lucian, *Dial. Mort.* 12.5), would represent not a progression toward the battle manager but an anomaly, a retrogression to the warrior chief, prompted both by the demands of Macedonian kingship for strong personal leadership and by Alexander’s own Homeric fixation

with Achilles.¹⁷

Any assessment of the general's role in hoplite battle, however, immediately hits the stonewall of unyielding sources. Only Thucydides and Xenophon offer contemporary accounts by men of military experience, to be supplemented by secondary material in Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch, and others. No detailed account of a hoplite battle between rival phalanges exists before Thucydides' narrative of the Peloponnesian War,¹⁸ and there is room to query both the frequency of formal pitched battles between Greek phalanges in the sixth and certainly the seventh centuries, and the number of the ritualistic aspects of hoplite battles, set within the prescribed but unwritten rules of war for the Greek in-group, which derive from romanticized notions about the Archaic Period of Panhellenists of the fourth century.¹⁹ Even when details about pitched battles become more available in Xenophon and other sources for the fourth century, references to the battle role of generals or other officers are episodic at best. Furthermore, the contemporary sources largely derive from a period when Greek warfare underwent drastic changes and professionalism has already begun to infiltrate the phalanx, as seen in the rise of career officers, the use of mercenaries, and the establishment of elite units (*epilektoi*), often trained by professional drillmasters (*hoplomachoi*).²⁰ Thus the scanty and scattered sources complicate the task of disentangling a clear view of the general from the phalanx's 'interchangeable parts,' and the search for a 'typical' hoplite battle in its "pure form" unadulterated by changing historical conditions is illusory. Only a composite picture is possible.

I

Given these caveats, examination of the general as hoplite should begin with the tradition of the warrior chief's combat leadership and the emergence of Greek massed infantry in phalanx formation.²¹ Prestate warfare (also called primitive warfare or submilitary combat) constituted an expansion of animal-hunting techniques to the human species – a connection still stressed by Xenophon and Plato.²² War bands, in many cases representatives of a kin group, assembled with little obligation for individuals to participate, to remain in the venture once begun, or to obey orders from some chief, often only another warrior venerated for past success but without authority to discipline or to ensure obedience to commands. Apart from group motives for combat, such as tension release, revenge, or other causes (normally not economic), the individual saw war as a means of personal glory, recognition, and prestige – drives leading to tactical confusion and incompetence, as each fought for his own distinction. The venerated

warrior who led the group could be marked by some token of authority, such as a special head-dress like that of the chief of a band seen in a Neolithic cave painting.²³

To no surprise, many of these primitive' traits correspond to the warfare of the *Iliad* which, despite some Mycenaean heirlooms, surely reflects the combat characteristics of a pre-state society. Nestor urges organization of the war bands by tribes and phratries (i.e. real or mythical kin groups), a principle the Rhodians already followed,²⁴ and the Achaeans delight in ambush, a key feature of pre-state warfare.²⁵ A drive for *arete* and individual distinction motivates both the primitive and the Homeric warrior, who participates in or shirks battle at his own discretion, and even in combat jumps forward as a *promachos* or retreats to the war band without a sense for discipline or coordinated group action.²⁶ Particularly apt is comparison with Tacitus' description of German war chieftains who, without authority to punish, lead their war bands primarily by their own example of courage, even charging out in front of their group in battle.²⁷ Both the Homeric and the Germanic heroic societies display an egalitarianism among those who enjoy the privileges of the warrior function and offer an equal opportunity to all these to display their *arete/virtus*. Valor and social privileges are reciprocal.²⁸ An Homeric warrior may be *aristos* in counsel, physical form, or other respects, but excellence in combat rather than command skills or strategy was what counted most.²⁹

The Homeric warrior chiefs tactical function, however, tied to interpretation of the term *promachos*, is not entirely clear, for the issue involves the thorny problems of the hoplite phalanx's date of origin and the possibility of the hoplite phalanx in some form in Homer and Tyrtaeus, not to mention the need to distinguish military *Realien* from the selection of events for dramatic emphasis in Homeric epic. A full discussion of these matters lies beyond the scope of this chapter, but a few observations are pertinent.

Mass combat, certainly evident in the *Iliad*, does not necessarily indicate use of a phalanx in the sense of a mass infantry formation many ranks deep, composed of distinct subunits and obedient to definite commands and coordinated movement. Three schools of thought on the phalanx in Homer have emerged in recent years. Pritchett has revived the view of totally organized, disciplined armies at Troy with arguments based on analogies with ancient Near Eastern warfare and the accuracy of Homeric commentators. Accordingly, the *promachoi*, whose duels in *monomachia* the poet emphasizes, represent a forward echelon (company or battalion) from the main body, but mass combat decides the battles.³⁰ Latacz (1977) presents an intermediate position, whereby a phalanx of massed organized units

(continuity of rows) exists, but a formation not identical to the Classical Greek phalanx. *promachoi* constitute the first rank of this phalanx and their skirmishing and duels are preliminary to mass combat to decide the battle. Third, Van Wees rejects use of any sort of phalanx: Homer describes only chieftains (*basileis*) and their personal bands of *hetairoi*, who occasionally mass into unorganized dense throngs under conditions of battle.³¹

Although all three schools can be faulted in details, Latacz's view of a proto-phalanx (but not necessarily his scenario of Homeric battle) and Van Wees' notion of chieftains with their retinues correspond more closely to the stage of political and social development in the Greek world ca 750-700 bc than Pritchett's disciplined, organized armies, which assume a more advanced degree of state organization than sources for this period attest. Formations which lack control and evaporate immediately in battle, and chieftains who fight or shirk battle at their own whim resemble submilitary combat.³² Denial of mass combat, however, is too extreme.³³ Moreover, all mass infantry formations do not signify a phalanx in its classical Greek sense: a single attack column of six files, each eleven men deep, as seen on the Sumerian Stele of the Vultures (third millennium) need not indicate a phalanx, as Pritchett (*War*4.8) presumes, nor does it fit the classical definition of a phalanx – a formation broader than it is deep (cf. n. 21 *supra*). Caesar refers to Helvetian and German formations as a phalanx, a term which Latin authors equated with the German *cuneus*, although the organizational structure of this formation (if it had one) is not precisely known.³⁴ By analogy with German practice, a proto-phalanx and retinues of individual leaders need not be contradictory (cf. Tac, *Ger.* 6.4).

Although concrete Homeric meanings for the terms *stix*, *phalanx*, *pyrgos*, and *oulamos* are probably beyond our knowledge, and certainly it has been too tempting to define them rigidly as fixed tactical/organizational units,³⁵ Homer does offer insight to rudimentary progress in Greek warfare. Apart from the *Iliads* problematic Catalogue of Ships, Nestor's advice to organize by tribes and phratries (*Il.* 2.362), Hector's division of the Trojan attack on the Achaean ships into five groups under subordinate chiefs (*hegemones*: *Il.* 12.86-7), and Achilles' distribution of the Myrmidons into five units likewise under *hegemones*, apparently subordinate to two *promachoi* (*Il.* 16.168-219) indicate a concern for organization, even if that organization is not maintained in combat. In the latter two cases the need to share the leadership of larger forces is also apparent. Such concerns surpassing the elementary chieftain – *hetairoi* model, it can be argued, may demonstrate the initial stage of progress from submilitary to military combat and the beginning of the transition to the classical phalanx.

Some change in the function of the war-band leader can also be discerned. In most cases the *basileis* arrange their forces before battle, exhort them, and physically lead. Comparison with Germanic practice shows that they may dash forward from the group (hence the term *promachos*), for they lead by example, which their *hetairoi* seek to emulate.³⁶ Personal exposure justified societal privileges, usually hereditary for Homeric chieftains, although *promachos* was not a title and the *basileis* did not yet have the monopoly on *arete* which Pindar claimed for the aristocracy of his day.³⁷ The retinues of chieftains probably consisted of both young nobles and men of lesser birth, who (by analogy with German practice) could win ennoblement through valor on the battlefield.³⁸

Certainly fighting skill and bravado constituted the warrior chieftain's two most important functions in battle, but Hector offers at least one hint that larger considerations were beginning to enter the picture when, conspicuous in his shining armor during the initial Trojan attack on the Achaean ships, he is everywhere at once, now gleaming in the front ranks, then encouraging men in the rear. After Agamemnon drove the Trojans back to the Scaean Gate, Hector rallies the Trojans and leads the counter-attack to the ditch of the Achaean camp, where he reorganizes the Trojans into five assault divisions and is the first to enter the enemy camp.³⁹ This is not the behavior of a warrior chieftain but of a commander whose acts resemble those of Pyrrhus at Heracleia in his role as battle manager (cf. Pint., *Pyrrh.* 16.7-8). Indeed Hector, although like his peers covetous of personal honor, also fights for his family and his city, thus anticipating Tyrtaeus' transvaluation of the heroic warrior code for a political goal – the defense of his country.⁴⁰

After Homer, details of the transition from warrior chieftain and *promachos* to phalanx commander are almost totally lost in the scanty primary sources for the seventh and sixth centuries – mainly fragments of poets, whose military information (although often firsthand) is subject to dispute. The material evidence of archaeology takes up some of the slack. Between ca 725 and ca 675 bc the elements of the hoplite panoply began to appear, most significantly the *hoplon*, a heavy shield ca 3 ft (almost a metre) in diameter, carried on the left arm by an armband and a hand grip and offering full protection only to the left side of the body. In open duels between individuals and particularly in retreat the *hoplon* provided less protection, but a closely spaced rank of men each covering his colleague's exposed right side (cf. Thuc. 5.71.1) presented a formidable obstacle.⁴¹ Between ca 675 and ca 650 bc vase paintings begin to show rows of hoplites in combat, which some interpret as evidence for a true phalanx in action. Yet debate rages over a chicken-

or-the-egg' problem: did hoplite armor perfect a formation already in use, did it immediately create a new style of battle, or was the phalanx the outcome of experimentation over time with a new type of armament?⁴² If, as argued above, a proto-phalanx can be discerned in Homer and elements of a transition from pre-state to state warfare also appear, continuation of the process in the seventh century would be expected. Tyrtaeus, however, a most fragmentary but crucial primary source containing detailed combat data, scarcely confirms the view of a fully developed phalanx in the vase paintings.

Some doubt the presence of the true hoplite phalanx in Tyrtaeus (fl. probably ca 650 bc), but also in Callinus (fl. 700-650 bc), Mimnermus (fl. end of seventh century), and even Alcaeus (ca 620 to after 580 bc).⁴³ Certainly new elements appear: heavy infantry (*panoploi*) and light infantry without armor (*gymnetes*) have distinct functions. The latter skirmish with missiles under the protection of the fully armored or run forward from the main body of the *panoploi*, which seems reserved for close combat.⁴⁴ Furthermore, Tyrtaeus repeatedly emphasizes unified effort and maintaining formation; *promachos* now means a 'Tighter in close combat,' not one in advance of the main body.⁴⁵ The fragments strongly imply a learning process, a lesson from Tyrtaeus the alleged schoolmaster' (cf. Paus. 4.15.6; schol. in PL, *Leg.* 1.629A) – not just for inexperienced youth, but development of a new method of battle for all.

Tyrtaeus' *panoploi*, however, lack unified armament: some carry a full-body shield and others a smaller one, a diversity of equipment which corresponds to that in battle scenes on Late Geometric vases and which does not *per se* negate use of a phalanx.⁴⁶ More serious is fr. 11.35-8, where the most natural interpretation of the Greek indicates that the *gymnetes* are integrated alongside the hoplites, not deployed separately on the flanks or behind the heavy infantry.⁴⁷ Indeed, decisive against a fully developed phalanx in the seventh century is the total absence in both Tyrtaeus and the vase paintings of mutual support between men in files and any indication of the *othismos* - the great shoving match of the classical hoplite battle.⁴⁸ Tyrtaeus' references to shield-to-shield combat (e.g. 11.11-14, 29-34; 19.18-21 West) give no hint of mutual support within files. Likewise, the best representation of the phalanx' among the vase paintings, the Chigi vase of ca 650 bc or later, shows only a succession of parallel ranks with remarkable distance between them.⁴⁹

Tyrtaeus' fragments, in comparison to Homeric battle, reveal a definite shift toward mass formation, close order of ranks (but not necessarily files), and a more sophisticated organization, but the classical hoplite phalanx has not yet evolved in the seventh century. With the spread of hoplite equipment throughout the Greek world and

the re-emergence of the state, available manpower perhaps also increased, as the warrior function was extended beyond the aristocracy – that is, if theories of a connection between the rise of tyrants and the phalanx have any validity.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the rate of progress in military development need not have been identical or even consistent in all areas. Fragments of Archiiochus (680-640 bc) and Alcaeus indicate perhaps a more fluid, open style of warfare in the Aegean area than that of Tyrtaeus in the Peloponnese, and one which preserved the Homeric warrior's tenet that success in combat measured prestige and fame regardless of the means employed (Schwertfeger 1982: 262-4, 273-80). Even for the sixth century the occurrence of general mobilization by poleis for major battles can be questioned (Connor 1988: 6-7).

In contrast, Tyrtaeus' transvaluation of the heroic ethos emphasized another aspect of the Homeric warrior, the noble death in battle (esp. fr. 10 West), and had a more significant influence on the ethos of the hoplite and his commanding officer. The 'Spartan imperative' 'to conquer or die' could, at least by the late fourth century, be traced to Tyrtaeus.⁵¹ A general's desire for a heroic death would be by no means limited to Spartans in the age of the hoplite phalanx.

During the phalanx's continued evolution in the seventh century specific references to the combat role of commanders vanish in the poverty of the contemporary sources. Logic dictates, however, that if the Homeric *promachos*, now in hoplite armor, yielded advanced skirmishing to the *gymnetes* and reserved himself for close combat, the place of distinction became the front rank of the ordered mass formation in Tyrtaeus. Social as well as military considerations shaped this development, for not only did this formation offer maximum benefit from the *hoplon*, but also the extended single line (however deep) permitted more participants to share simultaneously in the opportunity to display their *arete* and win glory than a line of individual units with intervals between them. Analogy with the Roman phalanx of the Servian constitution would also indicate placement in files according to birth and/or wealth, i.e. ability to equip oneself, with the richest and the hereditary aristocracy in the front rank.⁵² In fact the names of some special units (*epilektoi*) in phalanges of the Classical Period, such as the *Heniochoi* and *Parabatai* (Charioteers and Chariot-fighters) at Thebes (a city known for its archaism) and units or social classes called *Hippeis* (cavalrymen but fighting as hoplites) at Sparta and Athens, could represent a tradition linked to the earliest days of the transitional phalanx, although membership in such units/classes in the fifth and fourth centuries was no longer a hereditary privilege.⁵³

Nevertheless, placement of aristocrats in the first rank of the

phalanx does not necessarily solve the problem of where the phalanx commander stood or what he did. Tyrtaeus and other archaic poets write from the perspective of the individual soldier and offer little explicitly about commanders. A later tradition making Tyrtaeus a general in the Second Messenian War lacks credibility, since Spartan armies before the fifth century always served under one of the two Spartan kings or a royal relative.⁵⁴

Tyrtaeus' only direct reference to a commander, the lacunose fr. 19.11 West laconically states: 'we shall obey (our) leader(s)' (*peisometh' hegem[o]*). Tyrtaeus may refer (depending on whether *hegemon* is restored in the singular or plural) to one or both Spartan kings, occasionally called *hegemones*,⁵⁵ but their place in the first rank of the phalanx is not so definite as often assumed (see pp. 147-52). Restoration in the plural could alternatively indicate the file leaders (*protostatai*), who could be termed *archontes* (Xen., *Lac. Resp.* 11.5, cf. Thuc. 5.66.4). The latter view, of course, assumes (contrary to Tyrtaeus' evidence) both the existence of files and some form of the Spartan organization seen in Thucydides and Xenophon. Yet Spartan mobilization by *obai* and tribes, most probable in Tyrtaeus' day, in no way proves a fully developed phalanx in use.⁵⁶ Tyrtaeus' *hegem[o]* is probably best taken as a reference to the Spartan king(s) and could signify another innovation – a definite command system quite unlike the Homeric *basileis* and their *hetairoi*, for Tyrtaeus' *hegemon* seems to require obedience.

A contemporary of Tyrtaeus offers a parallel development from his mercenary experience in the north Aegean. Archilochus (fr. 114 West) states his preference for the 'down-to-earth' commander lacking pretensions and capable of empathy with his men, rather than the conceited officer fastidious about his personal appearance. From the standpoint of military literature Archilochus' contrast gives a prototype of the *miles gloriosus* and the first attempt to define the ideal general, here seen as the commander establishing kinship with his men – bridging the gap between commander and commanded (cf. Hanson 1989: 110-11). This fragment first attests the term 'strategos,' which then vanishes until Aeschylus about 150 years later (*LSJ*⁹ s.v.), although (less strictly) the word certainly became prominent in the late sixth century bc, the period of Cleisthenes' reforms at Athens. Indeed nothing guarantees that *strategos* in Archilochus denotes a general,' i.e. the highest ranking officer, rather than simply a commander of unspecified rank. Terminology for officers no doubt evolved over the centuries (cf. the terms *stratelates* and *anax*: Eur., *Supp.* 162, 688).

The novelty of the term 'strategos' requires examination, for which an anchor derives from the Athenian reform of 501/500 bc, creating a

board of ten strategoi as tribal commanders, elected one from each Cleisthenic tribe.⁵⁷ This innovation should be viewed against the background of Greek constitutional development in the Archaic Period when, as the polis developed from monarchy, military command became institutionalized in civic magistrates, and only Sparta retained hereditary kings, a peculiar collégial monarchy with limited domestic powers but full command of field armies.

In the seventh century a magistrate called the polemarch first appears at Corinth, Sicyon, Athens, and probably also Sparta. The title implies military command and (except at Sparta) seems to indicate delegation of a king's military functions to a non-royal magistrate. Aristotle attributes the establishment of the post at Athens to the effeminacy of kings. Thus (in the Athenian tradition) Ion, the mythical eponymous founder of the Ionians and their customary four tribes, was summoned to become *stratarches* (polemarch). Although perhaps originally an *ad hoc* post, the pole-march became one of the annually selected nine archons by the second half of the seventh century.⁵⁸ In contrast, the Spartan polemarch remained strictly a military commander (eventually numbering six -each in command of a *mora*), the second level of field command, closely associated with the kings, and serving in the council of war.⁵⁹ Sources drawing upon Ephorus assert that Cypselus at Corinth (ca 657–625bc) and Cleisthenes at Sicyon (ca 600–570 bc) were pole-marchs before becoming tyrants – hence theories of a connection between tyrants and the phalanx – although no evidence of their military activity as polemarchs is known.⁶⁰

Anachronistic and imprecise language in Herodotus and Aristotle impedes tracing the relationship between the office of polemarch and the term strategos at Athens between the seventh century and the polemarch's replacement in the top military command by the board of strategoi in the reforms of 487/6 bc.⁶¹ Some believe the pre-Cleisthenic army consisted of contingents from the four tribes, each commanded by a strategos subordinate to the polemarch. These tribal leaders, probably not elected and imprecisely called phylarchs in Herodotus (5.69.2), were most likely tribal kings (*phylobasileis*).⁶² To deny, however, that an Athenian army scarcely if ever mobilized before Cleisthenes' reforms seems, despite Peisistratid reliance on mercenaries, too extreme and renders the 'new' but inexperienced Athenian army's twin victories of ca. 506 bc over the Boeotians and Chalcidians too accidental.⁶³ Peisistratus' need to disarm the Athenian people, particularly those of the *asty*, points (contrary to Frost's (1984) arguments) in a different direction, and emphasizes the slow mobilization of the rural population which Cleisthenes' reforms attempted to correct.⁶⁴

Certainty about the Cleisthenic title of the ten new tribal leaders (whether phylarch as Hdt. 5.69.2 or strategos as Arist., *Ath. Pol.* 22.2) is elusive, but Callimachus the polemarch still functioned as commander of the Athenian army at Marathon in 490 bc, where in the tradition of the king's military function he held the place of honor on the right flank.⁶⁵ Before the reforms of 487/6 bc the strategoi served as tribal commanders and consulted with the polemarch (cf. Hdt. 6.109-10). Taxiarchs, first attested in Aeschylus, were then created to replace the strategoi when they took over the polemarch's military function and *taxis* replaced *phyle* as the designation for the tribal contingents of hoplites. The existence of both taxiarchs and strategoi before 487/6 bc would involve an unnecessary duplication of function.⁶⁶

Why did the term 'strategos' not attested since Archilochus become the name of the new Cleisthenic tribal commanders? A theory that strategos signified an *ad hoc* commander for campaigns outside Attica is attractive, but lacks detailed support: an Athenian strategos in the First Sacred War is as mythical as the war itself, and Peisistratus' *strategie* in the capture of Megarian Nisaea before 561/60 bc must surely be an anachronism for the post of polemarch.⁶⁷ Terminology for commanders was certainly in flux, if *stratarches* really was the original term for polemarch (Hdt. 8.44.2, cf. Arist., *Ath. Pol.* 3.2), and Archilochus (fr. 114 West), the only secure occurrence of strategos before the fifth century bc, probably refers to the commander of a mercenary band. Furthermore, if Cleisthenes' reforms aimed to eliminate aristocratic influence in Athenian government,⁶⁸ it is plausible that strategos was chosen to designate the ten new tribal commanders because this relatively obscure term lacked aristocratic taint.⁶⁹

Emergence of the strategoi as a new civic magistracy at Athens in the late sixth and early fifth centuries corresponds to the date of the earliest attestations of the term 'hoplite' (Snodgrass 1964b:204). The twin subjects of this paper have at last achieved their initial union. Despite the absence of detailed accounts for pitched battles in the sixth century, a fully developed Athenian phalanx faced the Persians at Marathon with no hint in Herodotus (6.111-14, cf. 7.9)3-1-2) that the formation was new. But the date of the Athenian phalanx's initial appearance should be queried.

Certainty on the matter is not possible. Reorganization of the Athenian army in Cleisthenes' reforms may have perfected use of this formation, although the *Zeugitai* class at Athens, if indeed a term for middle-class hoplites, dates at latest from Solon's reforms in the early sixth century, and the *Zeugitai* possibly existed earlier.⁷⁰ Components of the army at Marathon were still *phylai* (not yet *taxeis*), and subtribal

units, such as the *lochos* (under a *lochagos*) are first attested at Plataea. Plato, however, knew the term *trittarches*, a subtribal officer who, like the term *trittyes*, could antedate Cleisthenes.⁷¹ Despite the infrequency of references to subtribal units in the Athenian army, both the Cleisthenic and old Ionian tribes were too large to be the sole unit of military organization, and kin groups, the basis of the pre-Soionian constitution, must have also shaped army organization at some point, although as seen in Homer and Tyrtaeus, existence of subunits does not guarantee use of a true phalanx of the Classical Period.⁷² Perhaps the best evidence comes from law, in which the state institutionalizes practice. Athenian military law on desertion, thought to derive from Solon, defined cowardice as refusal to serve (*astrateia*) and abandonment of one's rank in battle (*lipotaxia*). Punishment of desertion, which in the phalanx could prove disastrous for the whole army, must surely imply the fully developed phalanx in use. Unfortunately, Athenians of the late fifth and fourth centuries were inclined to attribute inaccurately all sorts of laws to Solon, but a law on desertion would fit the context of Cleisthenic military reforms.⁷³ At latest, the Cleisthenic Athenian army probably deployed as a classical phalanx.

Thus Marathon, the earliest Greek battle for which a reconstruction can be attempted (cf. n. 18 *supra*), affords the first opportunity to study the general as hoplite in the classical phalanx. Herodotus' tactical account provides no explicit reference to the role of the commanders until after the rout of the Persians, when Callimachus the polemarch met a heroic death proving his *arete* in the assault on the Persian ships (perhaps an indication that he personally led the charge), and Stesilaus, one of the strategoi, also perished in this stage of the battle.⁷⁴ Both died, however, in the *melée* after the enemy's rout when the phalanx often had lost its pristine order of ranks (Pl., *Lach.* 182A-B). Of course Herodotus' language may be no more than a rhetorical eulogy of Callimachus, devoid of significance for where the polemarch/strategos stood in the phalanx. Parallels from later battles suggest that generals often were wounded or killed in the rout stage of a hoplite battle – therefore no support for a view that the commander *always* stood in the front rank.⁷⁵ Furthermore, despite the apparent double envelopment of the Persians who broke the Athenian center, the tradition on Marathon provides no hint that Callimachus, Miltiades, or anyone else in the role of battle manager planned this maneuver. Except for occasional heroics, the Homeric warrior would seem to have faded into the anonymity of the democratic phalanx.

II

The age of the fully developed hoplite phalanx extends to the battle of Chaeronea (338 bc). So far this study has traced chronologically the development of the phalanx and the combat role of its commander from a period of pre-state warrior chieftains in Homer to the institutionalized positions of Spartan king and Athenian strategos. The relative abundance of evidence for the fifth and fourth centuries now necessitates a more analytical approach to the transition from phalanx commander to the Hellenistic/Roman battle manager -essentially a change of emphasis from the warrior's physical leadership to the verbal and mental requirements of a commanding general. Although the term strategos rapidly spread throughout the Greek world in the fifth century,⁷⁶ the available primary sources (predominantly Athenian) permit a glance at the social and intellectual milieu of the transition at Athens, which probably applied in varying degrees to many other *poleis* of the fifth and fourth centuries.

It is important to emphasize the newness of the concept of the strategos. Initially the people's election of these magistrates mattered little, as aristocrats continued to dominate the strategic board (Themistocles being the only notable exception) until the death of Pericles. The generals as individuals continued to receive the lion's share of glory for military success from the Persian wars to the end of Cimon's ascendancy (461 bc), when with the establishment of a public funeral for the war dead and its attendant *epitaphios logos* in 464 bc, anonymity of individuals' contributions and a collective glorification of the city became the norm.⁷⁷ This equal distribution of glory approximates to a new wave of democratic reforms from 462 bc on. Yet young aristocrats could be confident that their claim to innate *arete*, fortified by gymnastic training and equipped with instruction in Homer and archaic poets, provided them with 'the right stuff for leadership, such as their fathers and grandfathers, the men of Marathon, had demonstrated.'⁷⁸ An 'old oligarch' could boast that even in a democracy the people craved personally profitable magistracies, but were content to leave the important matters of generalship to the most capable men (Ps.-Xen., *Ath. Pol.* 1.3).

As the progress of Athenian democracy and imperialism converted the Delian League into Empire, the sophistic movement attempted to revolutionize education, turning knowledge into a collection of *technai*, Homer into an encyclopedia, and crafty rhetoric into the key to a political career. War itself became a *techne*, when first maintenance of the Empire, then the Peloponnesian War (431-04 bc) reinforced the military functions of Athenian strategoi (also the chief civil magistrates after 487/6 bc) and demanded increasing professionalism. Until his death in 429 bc Pericles the aristocrat, friend of sophists and skillful strategist, astutely guided Athenian

democracy, but his death left a power vacuum in Athenian politics, exacerbating an issue probably already debated – who should be elected a strategos? How to define the good general?

In a sense the debate had raged since 501/500 bc, but conservatives first demonstrably raised military competence as a criterion for the strategos in response to high casualties after Cimon's ostracism (461 bc) and again in the 420s, when non-aristocratic demagogues began to manipulate the *ecclesia*.⁷⁹ The radical Cleon, however, could sling the same mud at the strategos Nicias for not actively supporting the Athenians at Pylos (425 bc): 'if our strategoi were men (*andres*)' (Thuc. 4.27.5). Euripides joined the debate in 422 bc, interspersing his *Suppliants* with aphorisms about the good general. Indeed the eulogies of the seven heroes who died at Thebes offer a composite description of the ideal general's traits of character, that is temperance, unselfishness, endurance of hardships, and devotion to the state.⁸⁰ Similarly, Thucydides turned the new genre of history into a textbook for strategoi (as both politicians and generals) to study - especially the models of Themistocles the astute general and Pericles the wise statesman.⁸¹ Xenophon's Agesilaus and his fictitious Cyrus the Great, just as Isocrates' portrait of Timotheus (15.107-28), continued the concern for defining the good general into the fourth century.

As war became a *techne*, significant changes occurred. First, Achilles, the traditional ideal warrior, no longer satisfied the new complexities of generalship. The wily Odysseus emerged as an alternative model stressing intelligence, cleverness, and trickery instead of brute force and open confrontation. Themistocles, the master of stratagems, came to represent the first Odyssean general, whose trickery in war corresponded to the skillful craftiness of sophistic rhetoric.⁸² Sophocles would indirectly discuss the ideal general in 409 bc with the contrast of Odysseus and Achilles as a major theme of the *Philoctetes*. Second, *techne* denoted a teachable skill. Hence generalship could be learned from Homer, lessons from *hoplomachoi*, or by digesting this skill from didactic handbooks, a genre the sophists developed.⁸³ Thucydides sought to teach strategoi their craft through the medium of history, but Xenophon in such works as the *Hipparchikos* and the *Cyropaedia* and Aeneas Tacticus in his *Strategika*, a military encyclopedia, founded the new genre of military theory.⁸⁴ Third, these changes affected not only strategoi but also the hoplites. Courage (*arete*, *andreia*) could now be taught as well as inherited, and excessive emphasis on bravery alone could be disastrous (Eur., *Supp.* 161-2). A basic tenet of the hoplite's ethos established by Tyrtaeus was being questioned.⁸⁵ Aristotle (*EN* 3.7.13-8.9) continued this discussion in his tripartite distinction of

courage, whereby he rejected the new military trends: courage through fear and discipline and courage through the mercenary's professionalism were morally inferior to the citizen-hoplite's desire for honor and avoidance of cowardice – the shame culture which constituted the hoplite's Homeric inheritance.⁸⁶

Definition of the good general, growing military professionalism, and the emergence of a new type of commander preferring intelligence to bravery, all form the background for the transition from phalanx general to the battle manager. Still another trend, however, also comes into play – the rise of great individuals, all commanders at one time or another, who resisted or refused to be bound within the restraints of the polis. Pausanias and Themistocles in the Persian wars, Alcibiades and, to a lesser extent, Brasidas and Lysander in the Peloponnesian War, the famous mercenary commanders of the fourth century, and the tyrants Dionysius I and Jason of Pherae mark stages in a progression toward military monarchy, often seen as a trend divorcing civil from military functions within the polis, and culminating in the greatest of all the great individuals, Alexander the Great, and subsequently the apotheosis of the charismatic in Hellenistic ruler-cult.⁸⁷

A few examples will suffice to demonstrate the growth of the general's personal importance. After Marathon Miltiades desired to claim sole credit for the victory by having his name inscribed on the depiction of the battle on the Stoa Poecile. The Athenians refused this honor, although they compromised by allowing Miltiades' figure a prominent place in the painting. Similarly, Pausanias had the tripod dedicated at Delphi from the Persian spoils at Plataea inscribed with a couplet attributing the victory to himself alone. The Spartans were outraged, erased the couplet, and added a list of all the Greek allies. A few years later, the Athenians also refused Cimon the privilege of inscribing his name on three stone herms set up in the Stoa of Hermae to commemorate his capture of Eion from the Persians. In all these cases victory was still believed to be the fruit of collective action, but a century later Iphicrates would be distinguished as the first strategos to have his own name instead of his city's inscribed on the spoils of war.⁸⁸

Likewise the anonymity of individuals and the collective glory of the polis characteristic of the Athenian *epitaphios logos* yielded to a new prominence for generals in Hyperides' speech for the dead of the Lamian War (323-22 bc): a city could be praised for its policy and the dead for their *andreia*, but Leosthenes the strategos authored the policy and led the army as *hegemon*. Thus praise of Leosthenes denoted praise of his soldiers and praise of the victory was to honor the general and his men simultaneously, for the general's

responsibility lies in good planning and ensuring that his army wins. For Hyperides *arete* belongs to the strategos alone.⁸⁹ The general of the hoplite phalanx has turned into the Hellenistic strategos.

If the general outline of the transition from Homeric warrior to battle manager is now clear, the details of that process in the age of the hoplite phalanx remain clouded. To view the problem schematically, the individualism of the Homeric warrior's physical leadership blended into the anonymous collective action of the phalanx, which as a group shared the laurels of *arete*. Subsequently the commander as an individual re-emerged, now to direct more than to participate in the group's action and once again to claim the most glory. It can be posited *a priori* that the warrior chieftain never lost his distinction within the group: his immersion into the phalanx and apparent obscurity are an illusion of scanty sources. Hanson (1989:107-16) has strongly argued, however, a view of 'the soldier's general' who inspired his men by becoming one of them and equally enduring the risk of personal combat. To what extent does the phalanx commander as a 'soldier's general' represent the true state of affairs, or is this simply an aspect of a general's 'mask of command'?

In the democratic phalanx of 'interchangeable parts' social distinctions had no place, since qualification to serve depended on the ability to furnish one's own equipment. Except for mercenaries, inclusion in the phalanx or relegation to the light infantry (*psiloi*, peltasts, archers, etc.) resolved the social question. Hoplites belonged to the middle or upper class until the fourth century (cf. Diod. 18.10.1) and usually had the means for their own servants to carry their equipment on campaign. In the Spartan army, where *perioikoi* could be hoplites, Spartiate could not be discerned from perioikic dead on the battlefield.⁹⁰ An officer class simply did not exist in classical Greek cities. By at least the late fifth century bc Spartan high commands were open to talent (e.g. Lysander), and Athenian strategoi and taxiarchs were annually determined posts: hoplites held these commands, then returned to non-officer positions (if not re-elected) the following year.⁹¹

Nevertheless, lack of an officer class did not mean that men in positions of command and authority were only distinguished by their physical place in the formation and did not wear special armor or clothing as a mark of rank (Anderson 1970:39-40). By the fourth century, if not the fifth, national uniforms became common, for example, the famous Spartan red tunics and cloaks or the white shields of the Argives. Similarly, family or clan emblems on shields known from archaic vase paintings gave way to lambda's on Spartan shields, Poseidon's trident on Mantineian, sigma's on Sicyonian, and mu's on those of the Messenians.⁹² The level of available technology

and practical experience also dictated a certain uniformity in the absence of government issue' equipment, but shield devices could remain a matter of personal preference – at times with disastrous results, as when the Athenians at Delium (424 bc) killed each other in the confusion of battle.⁹³ The type of helmet and/or crest may also at one time have differentiated friend from foe (cf. a Corinthian crater of ca 600 bc: Ducrey 1985:49 pl.28).

Officers did not necessarily wear more armor than their men (cf. Bugh 1986 (*supra* n. 53): 92 n. 41), but they were distinguished by differences in helmet/crest, clothing, and ornateness of armor. According to Thucydides the size of a Spartan army could be determined by applying a basic knowledge of their military organization to the view that the front rank of their phalanx offered. Thucydides implies that the individual subunits of the phalanx from *enomotia* to *lochos* were discernible to an observer. A distinction of subunits by spacing seems unlikely, given the phalanx's dependence on close continuity of files, so Thucydides must mean that commanders of at least some of these subunits were conspicuous by appearance in the front rank.⁹⁴ In fact a late archaic statuette shows a Spartan warrior wrapped in a military cloak and wearing a helmet with transverse (ear-to-ear) crest. This deviation from the normal front-to-back crest of Greek helmets and analogy with the transverse crests of Roman centurions would indicate an officer.⁹⁵ A peculiar, excessively plumed helmet seen on another Spartan statuette might also designate an officer (Sekunda 1986 (*supra* n. 93): 28). At Athens taxiarchs were known by their triple-plumed helmets and bright red clothing (whether tunics or cloaks is uncertain), and strategoi in the fourth century bc continued to wear Corinthian helmets as a sign of rank long after Phrygian helmets for hoplites of the rank and file came into vogue.⁹⁶

Brilliantly shining and extremely ornate armor had characterized the Homeric warrior chieftains at Troy: Hector's conspicuous shining armor during the attack on the Achaean ships has been mentioned, and Achilles' equipment forged by Hephaestus (*Il.* 18.456-616, 19.367-91) merits note. Numerous examples attest that commanders of the fifth and fourth centuries continued this tradition, which Alexander, Pyrrhus, and other Hellenistic generals perpetuated. Nicias' elegant purple and gold shield was hung as a trophy in a Syracusan temple and Alcibiades' golden shield emblazoned by an Eros armed with a thunderbolt aroused conservative comment. Xenophon while with the Ten Thousand fastidiously prided himself on his armor. In Sicily Dionysius I had elaborate armor manufactured for his officers, cavalry, and personal bodyguard of mercenaries. Later Dion's brilliant armor also attracted attention.⁹⁷ Of course any wealthy citizen could

equip himself with elaborate armor, but the sources emphasize that generals in particular were conspicuous by their dress and arms.⁹⁸

Onasander's account of the ideal general (33.6) specifies that the strategos should be mounted, and the Hellenistic/Roman general usually would be on horseback during battle. Not until the fourth century bc, however, do references occur to a mounted general of infantry, but even these few are episodic. The mercenary general Clearchus occasionally rode a horse – not unusual, since his command included Thracian cavalry (Xen., *Anab.* 1.5.12-13). During the retreat of the Greeks after Cunaxa (401 bc), Xenophon relates that while mounted he tried to lead a sortie of peltasts and hoplites against the Persians, only to dismount after a hoplite's criticism for being on horseback (Xen., *Anab.* 3.4.46-9). In the *Cyropaedia* the young Cyrus fights the Assyrians in the Persian front ranks on foot, but immediately after the battle curiously he appears on a horse. At Thymbrara Cyrus definitely was mounted as commander of the cavalry on the right wing.⁹⁹

Although evidence from mercenary practice in the Near East and the testimony of a didactic novel might be questionable for phalanx commanders on the Greek mainland, Xenophon implies that Agesilaus rode as well as marched on campaign, and Plutarch has him lead a cavalry charge against the Pharsalians at Mt Narthacium. Most problematic, however, is the contradiction of sources concerning Pelopidas' death at Cynocephalae (364 bc): in Plutarch he dies leading an infantry attack, while Nepos recounts a cavalry charge.¹⁰⁰ The mounted general became more or less a fixture from Macedonian influence in the second half of the fourth century, when cavalry became more than an auxiliary arm in battle. Thereafter battle management required the elevated view a horse provided and the speed to bolster morale at any threatened point on the battleline (cf. Polyaeus 6.4.1). Perhaps the episodic notices of mounted generals in the early fourth century anticipate another distinction of strategos from *stratiotai* yet to become customary.

Besides armor, arms, and (after 400 bc) occasionally a horse, the general surpassed other hoplites in pay and the proportion of booty he received. At Athens military pay, probably introduced about the same time as jury pay ca 462 bc, followed the principles of fifth-century democracy in opening the higher magistracies to all classes. Strategoi and hipparchs received a *per diem* wage, which wealthy aristocrats probably refused to draw. Campaign pay for taxiarchs and phylarchs tripled that of the simple hoplite and *lochagoi* received a double rate.¹⁰¹ In mercenary service strategoi might get quadruple, and *lochagoi* double the pay of the rank and file.¹⁰² If victorious, a general could expect to receive a superior amount of booty and even outright

gifts from allies. After Plataea Pausanias was awarded perhaps ten times the amount distributed to other participants, and Spartan kinp customarily (according to Phylarchus) claimed a third of all booty. 103 Gifts to victorious generals from their men and allies ranged from gold crowns and panoplies to the property of enemy commanders, but gifts to generals (whether before or after battle) could also lead to corruption or charges of treason and bribery.104

Generals, however, not only received greater rewards, but could also grant them (cf. Keegan's concept of sanctions *supra*). Agesilaus awarded prizes to motivate training, and Jason of Pherae promised mercenaries double, triple, or even quadruple pay for good performances. Iphicrates before battle encouraged his mercenaries with honors and a larger share of booty to those displaying the most valor as hoplites, cavalry, and peltasts.105 The Homeric competition between warrior chieftains for each to prove himself the best fighter was perpetuated in the ethos of the hoplite whether mercenary or citizen. After battle, awards of *aristeia* to individuals and/or cities could be granted. The bonds of patriotism, friendship, and kinship which united citizen-hoplites competed with a drive for individual distinction and doing the most for one's citjr, including a desire to claim having killed the most of the enemy.106 Yet the phalanx had replaced the fury (*lyssa*) of the Homeric warrior with *sophrosyne*: foolhardy daring could neither be tolerated nor rewarded with *aristeia*, as the Spartan Aristodamus at Plataea, and Isidas defending Sparta against Epaminondas discovered. Heroic death in battle had to be accepted without overtly seeking to be a kamikaze.107

Furthermore, officers as well as their men sought *aristeia*. In a skirmish with the Drilae near Trapezus, Xenophon notes that the *lochagoi* competed with *lochagoi* for distinction and junior officers with their superiors (*Anab.* 5.2.11, 13). Generals, too, contended for *aristeia* in battles from Salamis (480 bc) to the Granicus (334 bc).108 Officers felt a greater drive for valor than the rank and file – the old obligation that privileges demanded greater exertion as recompense.109

A strategos' distinction from *stratiotai* in dress, arms, pay, and proportion of allotted booty undercuts the idealistic notion of the hoplite phalanx as an anonymous mass of equals sacrificing themselves for the glory of the polis – the general picture of Athenian *epitaphioi logoi* – especially since the agonistic spirit of Greek civilization maintained its vitality in the competition of hoplites and officers to prove themselves the best. Even the democratic basis of the phalanx at Athens comes into question from the realization that, except in a levy of the whole people (*pandemei*), levies by the taxiarchs before ca 375 bc aimed at drafting the best men available (even if they had previously served), rather than drawing the net of

service indiscriminately among males of military age.¹¹⁰ Nor is the anonymity of generals in *epitaphioi logoi* reflected in inscribed documents: the tribal casualty lists from the mid-fifth century to the time of Chaeronea (338 bc) show that generals killed in the line of duty were distinguished from other dead by inclusion of their office, and lists from the last years of the Peloponnesian War show designation of taxiarchs, a phourarch, trierarchs, and a *mantis*.¹¹¹ Certainly the distinction of command also had its drawbacks: after the Syracusan debacle only the Athenian generals Nicias and Demosthenes were marked for immediate execution, while their hoplites were sold as slaves, died in the quarries, or saved themselves by reciting Euripides to their drama-starved captors.¹¹²

If the concept of the phalanx as a military form of democracy in action breaks down upon analysis, the fault lies not with Greek democracy but in the demands of war for a hierarchy of command. For the most part distinctions of strategos from *stratiotai* followed the pre-state tradition of the warrior chieftain, whose greater risks in battle justified social privileges and whose notable costume served the tactical function of easy recognition of the group leader in combat. Only commanders abusing this unwritten social contract encountered criticism. Archilochus' parody of his strategos (fr. 114 West) reflects a lack of confidence in an officer too fastidious and conceited to be trusted under combat stress. A hoplite's rebuke of Xenophon for being mounted in an infantry attack (*Anab.* 3.4.46-9) seems the common soldier's protest against officers enduring fewer hardships. Yet the other soldiers verbally and physically abused the protester. Furthermore, Aristophanes' lampoon of the taxiarch Lamachus, probably a displaced jab at Cleon, was intended not to ridicule officers but the war, symbolized by the officer's uniform, although calling Lamachus *mistharchides* ('a seeker of pay') may be an objection to higher pay for officers.¹¹³ Outside the context of combat a Greek army could maintain the democratic functions of a polis, and even Spartan discipline permitted rank-and-file criticism of a commander's tactical decisions during battle.¹¹⁴

Proper observance of the social contract between general and men, however, produced the best *modus imperandi*. Plato's prescription for military service in his ideal Cretan city (*Leg.* 12.942A) listed obedience to leaders and collective action as the most efficient weapons for victory. Obedience and effective command method, as modern military commentators also stress, depend on establishing bonds between officers and men, removing psychological distance so as to motivate the commanded, that is the establishment of kinship. The general, an embodiment of power, regulates morale by his command style, whether keeping close to the rank and file's daily existence (the

soldier's general), maintaining stern discipline, inspiring his army through personal bravery and tactical or strategic brilliance (*le grand chef*: cf. Plut., *Pel.* 2.2), or some combination of these.¹¹⁵

Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.1.37) advised that the general should be braver than others, plan for the good of his army, and set an example for enduring hardship. Agesilaus, Xenophon's model general, perhaps more than any other commander in the age of the hoplite phalanx, exemplified the principle of kinship in his 'mask of command.' His Spartan simplicity in dress, moderate consumption of food and drink, his indifference to heat and cold, his lack of sleep, and his delight in toils made him his men's equal but also their trusted leader by surpassing them in endurance.¹¹⁶ Above all, Agesilaus strengthened his role as a soldier's general through accessibility and constant visibility (Xen., *Ages.* 9.1-2). Iphicrates also used kinship to inspire morale: when his men were ill-clothed and poorly fed on a winter campaign, he dressed in summer clothes and went barefoot (Polyaenus 3.9.34). Kinship became a common characteristic of great generals and a *topos* for Roman emperors in the *Historia Augusta*.¹¹⁷ Yet even in the tolerance of hardships, as Cambyses tells the young Cyrus (Xen., *Cyr.* 1.6.25), the general and the private differ, for honor and the prominence of the general's every act lighten his burdens.

Whether the general built morale on kinship, as did Agesilaus and Iphicrates, or discipline like Clearchus (Xen., *Anab.* 2.6.7-15), the general and his army's morale became inextricably intertwined. Long before Napoleon, du Picq, or Foch, Xenophon recognized that morale counted for more than numbers¹¹⁸ and a general's duty to bolster morale required his presence in battle, riding along his battleline sharing the danger, encouraging, praising, reproaching.¹¹⁹ Indeed already by the fourth century (if not earlier) the general had become the single most important part of the army: an army was inoperative without its general – its metaphoric, spiritual, and physical head.¹²⁰

Tactical repercussions ensued from this development. In an anecdote of Polyaenus probably related to the Leuctra campaign (371 bc), Epaminondas encouraged the Thebans by comparing the Spartans and their allies to a snake: if the Spartan head were crushed, the rest of the body was useless. Accordingly Epaminondas' fifty-man deep deployment against the Spartan right aimed at knocking out the Spartan king.¹²¹ Some years before at Tegyra (375 bc), which Plutarch calls a prelude to Leuctra, the battle centered on the location of the commanders: Spartan morale collapsed with the loss of their two commanding polemarchs. Alexander the Great pursued a similar battle plan at Granicus, Issus, and Gaugamela, directing his own cavalry charge at the Persian commanders in the first case and at Darius III in the other two.¹²² Given the usual placement of commanders on their

respective right wings, a type of stratagem often called a *salubre mendacium* could be exploited: by shouting out to one's own troops and within hearing distance of the enemy that the opposing king or general had been killed, a commander could simultaneously further incite his own army and sow panic in the enemy ranks.¹²³ This stratagem could be effective, since a commander's death aggravated a tactical crisis or negated exploitation of victory: Cleombrotus' death at Leuctra precipitated a Spartan rout; Epaminondas' wound at Mantinea produced confusion in the victorious Thebans; and a Spartan attack on Olynthus collapsed after the death of the general Teleutias.¹²⁴

As the general himself became the focal point of morale and hence a tactical objective for the enemy, it would be logical to expect that casualty rates for generals would increase. Moreover, if Xenophon is credible, officers had a greater drive for distinction and generals were expected to prove themselves braver than others.¹²⁵ The Homeric tradition of the warrior chieftain leading by his example of courage still flourished in the hoplite phalanx: generals, after all, also sought *aristeia*. Besides, except for Spartan kings, generals usually had previous experience as hoplites and would return to hoplite status after their term of office: Aristides and Themistocles served as hoplites at Marathon; Pericles, not yet a strategos, distinguished himself at Tanagra; Agesilaus before his kingship received hoplite training in the Spartan *agoge* and in old age fought in the ranks as a mercenary commander in Egypt; also Epaminondas and Pelopidas did hoplite duty at Mantinea (385 bc). Later, Pelopidas became leader of the Theban Sacred Band only when he missed appointment as a boeotarch (371 bc).¹²⁶

Examples of valorous conduct by commanders abound. Brasidas' daring exploits as a local district commander at Methone (431 bc) and as a trierarch at Pylos (425 bc) mark stages in the advancement of his career. The Athenian strategos Lamachus died when he was cut off too boldly trying to exploit a Syracusan rout (414 bc). Chabrias fell leading an amphibious assault on Chios (357 bc) and Plutarch of Eretria charged at the head of his mercenaries at Tamynae (349 bc).¹²⁷ Battle scars were signs of reverence (Agesilaus) or a source of boasting (Chares).¹²⁸ Yet Homeric *lys sa* had not disappeared. Pyrrhus madly raged in battle against the Spartans who had killed his son Ptolemy. Pelopidas' grudge against Alexander of Pherae precipitated his death at Cynocephalae, and Teleutias' anger prompting his foolhardy demise at Olynthus aroused Xenophon's condemnation - emotions should not influence military decisions.¹²⁹

Certainly generalship could be hazardous to health: defeated commanders usually died in battle; the victorious sometimes did; and

few generals with repeated commands passed away through old age.¹³⁰ The scanty sources preclude, however, any possibility of quantifying casualty rates for generals to determine if they increased, declined, or remained stable in the fifth and fourth centuries bc.¹³¹ Despite the logical assumption that rates would rise with the increased importance of generals, the transition of commanders from Homeric warrior chieftains to Hellenistic battle managers permits the hypothesis that rates declined, as the participation of generals in combat changed from the status of 'always' to 'sometimes.' For the commander of a hoplite phalanx, physical leadership in the tradition of the Homeric warrior continued to play an important role, as numerous cited examples attest. But leading a charge in a skirmish, rallying one's troops to pursue a routed foe, and a headlong sally in a burst of anger do not prove either that a general stationed himself in the front rank of the phalanx at the beginning of a formal pitched battle, or that kinship and morale explain the apparently high casualty rates for fifth- and fourth-century generals. The placement of officers within the phalanx as well as the circumstances and motives of commanders' deaths require closer examination.

Archaeological sources do not clarify these matters. The Nereid Monument of Xanthus in Lydia (ca 400 bc) bears a relief showing a row of charging hoplites, of which the figure in the center is taken to be an officer with his head turned to the right and his raised right arm apparently gesturing.¹³² Unfortunately, this figure is the only hoplite in the relief whose head and right arm are preserved. In the Spartan phalanx all the front-rank men (*protostatai*) were officers.¹³³ Thus, if a single row of hoplites in this relief is intended to represent a phalanx, all the figures could be officers and the better preserved central figure offers no indication of a strategos.

It is generally agreed that subordinate officers stood either at the head of files or somewhere within the body of the phalanx, although this rendered some files deeper than others. No geometric compulsion necessitated that all files, all *lochoi*, or all contingents in an army of independent allies observe the same depth, and blind files (i.e., an officer standing in the first rank of the phalanx, to the right of his unit, but without anyone behind him) did not exist.¹³⁴

Nevertheless, even the detailed descriptions of a Hellenistic phalanx in the Stoic tacticians give no clue to the army commander's position.¹³⁵ Custom held that a Greek general commanded from the place of honor, the army's right wing, and a Spartan king could be either on the right between two *morai* or in the center of the line, as Agis at Mantinea.¹³⁶ These indications of battleline longitude omit reference to latitude: was the commander on the right or center in the front rank, somewhere within the body of the phalanx, or behind it?

Once again, an argument must be pieced together from episodic anecdotes of what a general did or did not do in a particular situation. It can be hypothesized *a priori* that some commanders enjoyed and sought personal combat, while others did not. An exception can be found for any absolute interpretation. An argument, however, can be presented that generals of the fifth and fourth centuries bc did not stand in the front rank of the phalanx to begin a pitched battle and that motives other than morale and kinship contributed to commander fatalities, especially for defeated generals.

In his encomium of Agesilaus (6.1) Xenophon would appear to offer explicit testimony that generals always fought in the first rank of the phalanx: *proton heauton tatton*. But why should Xenophon exceptionally praise Agesilaus for his battle scars and front-line service, if such were typical of all generals? The real implication of the passage is that this conduct was not typical. Other evidence produces doubt of Agesilaus' frequency in the front rank. Plutarch (Ages. 26.2) gives no details of how Agesilaus was wounded in the Boeotian campaign of 378 bc. At Coronea (394 bc) Herippidas, commander of the mercenaries, led the charge from Agesilaus' sector of the battle-line, and the Argives fled before the Spartans made contact. Agesilaus, who did not lead the mercenaries' charge, was nevertheless receiving garlands of victory from these men when the report came that the Thebans after routing Agesilaus' left were at his baggage train. Nothing so far indicates Agesilaus' participation in combat or front-line service.¹³⁷

In the second stage of the battle Agesilaus countermarched his forces to face the Thebans head-on. A fierce struggle ensued, in which Agesilaus fighting with his bodyguard of fifty volunteers was wounded.¹³⁸ Plutarch emphasizes, however, that Agesilaus suffered his wound despite the efforts of his bodyguard to protect him. Hence the inference is justified that Agesilaus was close to, but not in the first rank of his phalanx.

This interpretation can be supported by other examples of Spartan kings. Agis at Mantinea was surrounded in the center of his battleline by the 300 *Hippeis* who routed the enemy center, but Thucydides says nothing of Agis himself joining in the combat. At Leuctra Cleombrotus also had the protection of the 300 *Hippeis* (or their equivalent as part of a *mora*).¹³⁹ Furthermore, there are several references to Spartans fighting in front of a Spartan king – additional proof that the king was not in the first line of the phalanx.¹⁴⁰ Indeed Xenophon (*Lac. Resp.* 11.6) recounts a special maneuver to protect the king, when fighting appears imminent. A lapse of over a century between royal Spartan deaths in battle (Leonidas at Thermopylae (480 bc) and Cleombrotus at Leuctra (371 bc)) would also suggest the absence of

Spartan kings from the phalanx's front line (Lazenby 1985:160), although Thermopylae was not a conventional pitched battle (*parataxis*).

Agasilaus' wounding in the second stage of Coronea likewise corresponds to other evidence: generals were frequently killed or wounded not through presence on the front line in the initial clash of rival phalanges, but rather in the second stage of battle when a general too boldly attempted to exploit the rout of a beaten foe or tried to rally his own troops. Examples range from Callimachus at Marathon (490 bc) to Epaminondas at Mantinea (362 bc).¹⁴¹ Casualties to strategoi would therefore correspond to du Picq's view that the greatest losses in ancient battles occurred after one side fled, and Hanson's thesis about certain types of wounds proving a general's place in the front rank needs some modification.¹⁴²

A number of anecdotes relate commanders making tactical decisions at the beginning or in the middle of battles. These appear implausible for a general in the front rank of a phalanx when fighting for his life. At Oenophyta (457 bc) the Athenian strategos Myronidas employed a variant of the *salubre mendacium* stratagem: he first ordered his left to charge the Thebans, then ran to his right flank and shouted that they were victorious on the left. His ruse produced success. Daphaenus, a Syracusan general of the late fifth century, defeated a Carthaginian army with much the same trick.¹⁴³ At Delium (424 bc) when the Athenians were defeating the Boeotian left and the Thebans were winners on their right wing, Pagondas the Theban general ordered two squadrons of cavalry secretly to circumvent a hill and to surprise the victorious Athenian wing (Thuc. 4.96.5) – an impossible act for a man fighting in the forefront on his own right, while still gaging the action on the opposite flank. Nor could Alcibiades be fighting in the front when a messenger approached him with news of a Persian threat to his fleet (Front., *Strat.* 2.7.6). Although the silence of Plutarch, Xenophon, and Diodorus casts doubt on this incident's historicity, Herodotus (9.76.1) relates a similar story about Pausanias at Plataea. When the tide of battle had turned in the Greeks' favor and the Spartans were still engaged in slaughter, a female captive of the Persians succeeded in crossing the lines and approaching Pausanias. She did not find him personally engaged in combat, but rather directing the Greek effort (*horosa de panta ekeina dieponta Pausanien*) – presumably in the rear. Agis' last-minute attempt to adjust his left flank at Mantinea could also be cited, but Agis (as argued above, p. 148) was not in the front row of the phalanx.¹⁴⁴ Certainly Iphicrates did not stand in the first rank of his troops when he deployed them in a plain with a ditch dug behind them to compel their bravery.¹⁴⁵

Furthermore, the *sphagia*, a propitiatory blood sacrifice performed just before a formal pitched battle (*parataxis*), gives some indication of a general's location.¹⁴⁶ In theory the sacrifice occurred when both sides were present and deployed. The commander would perform the sacrifice, then raise the paean to begin battle. In practice, however, the *sphagia* often happened when the two battlelines were advancing or even already engaged (Pritchett, *War* 2. 73-4, 83). Even so, Pritchett insists that the sacrifice was made in the *metaichmion* (the no-man's land between the two armies) while the enemy watched, but this view is difficult to reconcile with reality.¹⁴⁷ At Plataea when Pausanias tried to gain favorable *sphagia* while his men endured Persian fire, Herodotus gives no hint that Pausanias was dodging Persian arrows.¹⁴⁸ Phocion (Plut., *Phoc.* 13.1-3) had the same problem at Tamynae: his sacrifices proved unfavorable until the enemy was actually storming the ramparts of his position. He was hardly stationed in front of his men. But then in the second stage of the battle he collected his scattered forces and led a charge.

No doubt some generals deployed their forces, harangued them, performed the *sphagia*, took a place in the front ranks, and began battle with the paean. Epaminondas probably stood in the forefront at Leuctra.¹⁴⁹ Others and particularly Spartan kings, however, as this survey of the evidence suggests, did not stand in the front rank when battle began, but could assume the moral and physical leadership of a Homeric chieftain at a crucial point, especially in the second stage of a hoplite battle when either one side fled or the ordered ranks of the rival phalanges dissolved into a *melée* of human carnage so graphically described by Hanson (1989:152-218).

But if all generals did not seek combat in the initial clash and the deaths and wounds of commanders seem to occur most frequently in a hoplite battle's second stage, then the general's kinship with his troops and his morale-boosting presence (not always in the first rank) do not necessarily explain the high fatality rates of generals – most of all for the losers. The collective action of the phalanx obscured the competitive nature of its 'interchangeable parts.' *Aristeia* awaited the most courageous survivors and the dead were guaranteed their eternal fame. As the spiritual descendants of Homeric chieftains, strategoi felt the burdens of the heroic ethos. Epaminondas said that the noblest (*kalliston*) death was in war (Plut., *Mor.* 192C). Some in the spirit of Heraclitus' dictum (fr.H9D-K) felt that a man's character was his *daimon*: Agesilaus considered a quiet death for himself unworthy; Leonidas thought a glorious death nature's gift to *aristoi*.¹⁵⁰

Moreover, death in battle provided an honorable departure for losers. In Onasander's view a defeated general should not desire to live, and no Spartan king survived a lost battle until Cleomenes III fled

to Egypt after Sellasia (222 bc).¹⁵¹ Some losers resorted to suicide, although this ultimate act gained more respectability in the Hellenistic period under Stoic influence.¹⁵² At Athens strategoi who failed, even if not defeated in a major battle, faced exile, fines, or prosecution for bribery and treason.¹⁵³ Paches, who put down the revolt of Mytilene (427 bc), committed suicide at the audit of his generalship, and the Athenians condemned to death Lysicles, the strategos who survived Chaeronea.¹⁵⁴ As the Athenian siege of Syracuse (415-13 bc) dragged on without success, Nicias justifiably feared the consequences of returning to Athens (Thuc. 7.48.3-5).

Yet Greek punishment of unlucky generals was no worse than at Carthage, where the ignominy of defeat brought disgrace for the commander's family but exile or crucifixion for the general.¹⁵⁵ No wonder that the Spartan Anaxibius, the victim of his own carelessness and an ambush of Iphicrates, opportunely chose the noble (*kalon*) alternative – death in battle (Xen., *Hell.* 4.8.38). In contrast, Hasdrubal, killed at the Metaurus (207 bc), merited a fitting eulogy from Polybius (11.2) for taking the proper precautions but knowing his duty to die in defeat. Thus the frequent deaths of defeated generals often have little to do with their physical location within the phalanx at the start of battle or kinship with their men. Rather, failure demanded the ultimate sacrifice to avoid ignominy for the commander and to appease his city. Although defeated, the general could still claim a hero's status.

This survey of the transition from Homeric warrior chieftain to Hellenistic battle manager has traced the development of combat leadership in relationship to the evolution of the hoplite phalanx. The ethos of Homeric heroes continued to influence hoplite behavior even after the abandonment of pre-state warfare, and the presence of commanders in combat remained essential, although their physical leadership on the front line (at least initially in battle) did not always occur. Indeed the age of the hoplite phalanx witnessed a trend (exceptions considered) for commanders to avoid the front rank at the beginning of battle and to return to this traditional position of physical leadership only in a phalanx battle's second stage, when they led the pursuit of a beaten foe or, alternatively, either tried to stem a rout of their own forces or sought death to salvage their own reputations in defeat. To apply this to Keegan's categories of command style, the hoplite general already shows a tendency to participate personally in combat *sometimes*, but certainly not *always* in the same sense as a Homeric warrior chieftain.

Believers in a single scenario for the combat role of the strategos in a phalanx (i.e., the general was *always* in the front rank and *always* entered combat) will no doubt find these results disturbing. Some

generals sought personal combat; others did not. Battle involves too many historical variables for a single scenario to satisfy all cases. The traditional scenario is a composite picture of direct evidence, logical inference, and conjecture, since no single ancient account of a phalanx battle provides all the details that we moderns wish to know, and (as suggested above pp. 125-6) a 'typical' hoplite battle is illusory. Certainly this study has not answered all questions of where the general was at every moment in battle: if he was not in the front rank, where was he? For all battles we simply do not know from direct and unequivocal evidence, although some cases suggest the rear and others indicate a position somewhere in the phalanx but behind the front rank. In ancient history a comprehensive, neat picture is not always possible, and there is value in recognizing the limits of the evidence. In fact, the *opinio communis* would often seem to exaggerate the extent to which one man fighting for his life in the front rank could control an army of hundreds or thousands and gage the course of a battle along an entire front sometimes hundreds of yards long. The role of battle manager did not exist from the beginning of the hoplite phalanx, but evolved over time. Some additional considerations remain to complete this account of the general as hoplite.

When the delimiting rules of Greek in-group warfare started to collapse, tactical considerations demanded that battles be managed as well as fought. Brains could now negate superior brawn. Supervision of combat required, apparently beginning at some point in the fourth century, the added mobility and visibility provided by a horse. The emerging significance of cavalry as an independent tactical arm and the prevalence of Macedonian influence from the time of Philip and Alexander guaranteed that Hellenistic army commanders would usually be mounted. Furthermore, the increasing importance of the general's person necessitated that he either did not enter battle or, if he had to, that he did so cautiously (cf. Garlan 1975:146-7). A general's rash personal daring, so the Hellenistic argument ran, could hurt his cause more if he were killed than a single man's contribution would aid victory.¹⁵⁶ Or, as Livy asserted in describing the duel of Junius Brutus and Arruns Tarquinius (2.6.8), *decorum est turn ipsi capes sere pugnam ducibus* – implying that in his own time personal combat by commanders was improper. No doubt the 'Achilles complex' of the *philokindynos* Alexander influenced this shift in military theory, as criticism from the great Macedonian's contemporary Nearchus demonstrates (*FGrHist* 133 F 42.3 = Arr., *Anab.* 6.13.4). it is important, nevertheless, to emphasize – and it is confirmation of the trend in command style argued in this chapter – that this alleged Hellenistic idea already occurs at the end of the fifth

century: Cyrus the Younger was strongly advised not to enter battle at Cunaxa in 401 bc.¹⁵⁷

Cyrus refused to listen: a king must show that he is worthy of the kingdom he seeks to win.¹⁵⁸ A commander's personal bravado still mattered; generals on occasion still charged headlong to their doom. Homeric *arete*, however, also changed in the age of the hoplite phalanx. The *Iliad's* chieftains were distinguished in arms and privileges – the benefits of superior *arete*. Tyrtaeus transvalued *arete* for the emerging phalanx of the nascent Greek city-state, but officers and especially strategoi still marked themselves by dress and, later, greater pay and booty. The democratic phalanx did not eliminate the gradation of leaders from followers: Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.1.37) testifies to their continued distinctness.

By the early fourth century even the criterion of heroic death differed for generals and rank and file. All types of battle deaths for generals were no longer equal. Surprised before the walls of Haliartus (395 bc) at the head of his army, Lysander suffered the inglorious death of a peltast or a scout, as did Hannibal's foil Claudius Marcellus, ambushed by Numidians in 208 bc.¹⁵⁹ Such deaths were improper for generals. The distinction of strategos from *stratiotai* became a permanent feature of antiquity in judging a general's personal daring.¹⁶⁰

Even so, a general's personal, physical leadership was demanded in times of crisis. Two final examples will suffice. At the siege of Amida (ad 359), to boost the sagging morale of his army and although a Persian king was not obliged to enter battle, Sapor II led a charge *proelioris militis ritu* against the Roman garrison. Similarly, in one of history's most poignant instances of heroism, Brig.-Gen. Lewis A. Armistead commanding his brigade in Pickett's Charge (3 July 1863), initially drew his sword only as he broke the first Union line on Cemetery Ridge, placed his hat upon its point, and with his sword-tipped hat raised above his head charged to meet his maker against the second Union line. If the thesis of a recent book arguing the influence of the Celtic military tradition and Sir Walter Scott's novels on the American Southern aristocracy be accepted, then we gain some sense through a modern example of how the Homeric ideals of the warrior chieftain continued to affect the general as hoplite.¹⁶¹

Works referred to by author alone or with short title or date are cited in full in the Bibliography to this volume.

Notes

¹ Plut., *Pyrrh.* 16.7-8; on the importance of presence of mind (*phronein* in Plutarch, *echein noun* in Polybius) to generalship see Polyb. fr.63 B-W: 'Generals

must have presence of mind and be daring – (properties) which indeed are most important for precarious and hazardous acts.’ Cf. Polyb. 10.3.7.

2 Plut., *Pyrrh.* 1.2, 7.4; Just. 17.3. On Achilles see K. C. King, *Achilles: Paradigms of the War Hero from Homer to the Middle Ages* (Berkeley, 1987) 2-7, 58-66, 104.

3 Cf. van Creveld’s definition of ‘command/ understood as the modern C3 I (command, control, communications, intelligence): M. van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, Mass, 1985) 5-6. The general’s duties as tactician and strategist lie beyond the scope of this chapter.

4 Scipio: Front, *Strat.* 4.7.4; Iphicrates: Plut, *Mor.* 187B; van Creveld (*supra* n. 3) 17. Battlefield duels between opposing commanders are attested as late as the Thirty Years’ War: see Fuller 1958:152 n. 4.

5 A cursory discussion of the transition in John Keegan, *The Mask of Command* (New York, 1987) 122-4; also see Van Creveld (*supra* n. 3) 6, 9. Cf. H. H. Turney-High, *The Military: the Theory of Land Warfare as Behavioral Science* (West Hanover, 1981) 250-71.

6 *Risikobereitschaft* – readiness for risk. On the Homeric code see W. Jaeger, *Paedeia*, 1 (2nd edn, Oxford, 1945) 3-14; King (*supra* n. 2) 2-28; Keegan (*supra* n. 5) 123; on risk see Latacz 1977: 153-9.

7 Thuc. 2.42.3; Dion. Hal, *Ant. Rom.* 5.17.5-6; King (*supra* n. 2) 47; N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens: the Funeral Oration in the Classical City*, tr. A. Sheridan (Cambridge, Mass, 1986) 52, 99.

8 M. Détienne, ‘La phalange: problèmes et controverses,’ in Vernant 1968:128-31, 140; P. Vidal-Naquet, ‘La tradition de l’hoplite athénien,’ in Vernant *ibid.*: 170-74. Cf. Plut., *Ages.* 26.4-5, *Mor.* 214A; Polyanius 2.1.7. I owe this reference to Plutarch to Victor Hanson.

9 Tyrtaeus fr. 12 West; Hor., *Carm.* 3.2.13: *Dulce et decormest pro patria mori*) cf. Eur., *Tro.* 386-7; Cic, *Phil.* 14.31; Verg., *Aen.* 2.317; Jaeger (*supra* n. 6) 90-4; Detienne (*supra* n. 8) 129-31; C. W. Müller, “Der schöne Tod des Polisbürger oder ‘Ehrevoll ist es, für das Vaterland zu sterben,’” *Gymnasium* 96 (1989) 317-40 (written without reference to Loraux’s work).

10 Loraux (*supra* n. 7) 52; ‘HEBE et ANDREM: deux versions de la mort du combattant athénien,’ *AncSoc* 6 (1975) 30; ‘Mourir devant Troie, tomber pour Athènes: De la gloire du héros à l’idée de la cité,’ *Social Science Information* 17 (1978) 801-17.

11 Jaeger (*supra* n. 6) 32-4, 45-9, 185-6, 199-204, 216-18; H. I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, tr. G. Lamb (Madison, 1982) 3-13.

12 Ar., *Ran.* 1034-5; Pl., *Ion* 541B, *Lach.* 191A-B, *Rep.* 10.606E; Xen., *Symp.* 4.6; Isoc. 4.159; Strab. 1.2.3-4; Paus. 4.28.7-8; Jaeger (*supra* n. 6) 196; E. A. Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963) 61-86; W.J. Verdenius, ‘L’*Ion* de Plato,’ *Mnemosyne* 11 (1943) 245-52. On the Homeric *Táctica* see Wheeler 1983: 17 n. 85, 18 n. 91 and ‘*Polla kena tou polemou*: the history of a greek proverb,’ *GRBS* 29 (1988) 179-80.

13 Hanson (1989:25, 220-1, and *passim*) generally discounts the Homeric legacy of hoplite battle. Cf. my review in *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 21 (1990) 122-5.

14 Thuc. 5.66.3-4, 68.3; Xen., *Lac. Resp.* 11.4-6; Kromayer and Veith 1928:35.

15 Keegan (*supra* n. 5) 315-38; R. A. Beaumont, ‘Command method: a gap in military historiography,’ *Naval War College Review* 31.3 (1979) 70-1. On willing obedience see Xen., *Cyr.* 1.1.3-5, 6.20-1; 3.1.37; 5.3.1-4; 7.1.41-5; R. Höistad,

16 E. Lammert, 'Die geschichtliche Entwicklung der griechischen Taktik,' *NJb* (1899) 11; Delbrück (tr. Renfroe 1975) I, 232; Adcock 1957:6; Snodgrass 1967:62; Anderson 1970:70-1; Pritchett, *War* 2. 206; Garlan 1975:146; van Creveld (*supra* n. 3) 42; Keegan (*supra* n. 5) 119, 122-4, 331; P. Cartledge, *Agesilaus and the Crisis of Sparta* (Baltimore, 1987) 206; G. M. Paul, Two battles in Thucydides,' *EchMCl* 6 (1987) 307; on fatality rates and wounds see Hanson 1988:200-201 with n. 30 and 1989:107-8, 111-14, 162-4.

17 Cf. Delbrück (tr. Renfroe 1975) I, 232 on Alexander and the transition to battle manager. Delbrück's emphasis on the role of tactical reserves ignores that the idea of reserves began to develop in the late fifth century: see Wheeler 1983:2 n. 4. On Macedonian kingship see A. E. Samuel, 'Philip and Alexander as kings,' *AHR* 93 (1988) 1270-86; Alexander and Achilles: P. R. Hardie, *Tmago Mundi: cosmological and ideological aspects of the shield of Achilles*, *H5* 107 (1987) 25-31; P. A. Stadter, *Arrian of Nicomedia* (Chapel Hill, 1980) 74-6, cf. A. B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire: the reign of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge, 1988) 38-9. According to Onesicritus, Alexander slept with the *Iliad* under his pillow: *FGrHist* 134 F 38 = Plut, *Alex.* 8.2. Keegan (*supra* n. 5) 122-3 and *passim* exaggerates Alexander's role as a religious leader in his position as warrior king.

18 Marathon and Plataea against supposed Persian hordes hardly qualify as 'typical', and the tradition about Marathon (despite detailed topographical investigations and the publication of at least one article on the battle nearly every year) is so steeped in Athenian propaganda as to be of questionable credibility. Cf. Theopompus, *FGrHist* 115 F 153.

19 Ritualistic aspects: Pritchett, *War* 4.1-7; D  tienne, in Vernant 1968:124; cf. Connor 1988:3-27; on military myths about the Archaic Period see Schwertfeger 1982:253-80; Wheeler 1987: 157-82. Herodotus 7.9)3.1-2 offers strong support that at least some aspects of the typical hoplite battle antedate the fifth century, although I surmise that a systematic survey of Greek military activity in the seventh and sixth centuries would conclude that few formal pitched battles (*parataxeis*) between Greek phalanges occurred. On the rules of Greek warfare see Lonis 1969; Garlan 1975:23-77; P. Karavites, *Capitulations and Greek Interstate Relations* (Hypomnemata 71: G  ttingen, 1982) 13-26; J. de Romilly, 'Guerre et paix entre cit  s,' in Vernant 1968:207-20; on rules of war in general cf. E. L. Wheeler, The modern legality of Frontinus' stratagems,' *Milit  rgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 44.1 (1988) 7-29 and J. Huizinga, *Homo Ludens* (New York, 1950) 11-12, 64-5, 89-100.

20 On the changes in Greek warfare see de Romilly (*supra* n. 19); Garlan 1974; Ferrill 1985:149-86 with my review in *Armed Forces and Society* 14 (1987) 156-8; Wheeler 1981:74-9; career officers: Lengauer 1979, cf. C. W. Fornara (1966) on the new position of *strategos autokrator* at Athens: *The Athenian Board of Generals from 301 to 404* (Historia Einzelschrift 16: Wiesbaden, 1971) 14, 64; mercenaries: Parke 1933; Best 1969; L. P. Marinovic, *Le mercenariat grec et la crise de la polis*, tr. J. and Y. Garlan (Paris, 1988); *epilektoi*: Detienne, in Vernant 1968:134-42; G. Hoffman, 'Les choisis: un ordre dans la cit   grecque?' *Droit et Cultures* 9-10 (1985) 15-26; Lazenby 1985:54-6; N. Loraux, 'La "belle mort" Spartiate,' *Ktema* 2 (1977) 117-18; Garlan 1989:149-50; L. Tritle, 'Epilektoi at Athens,' *AncHistBull* 3 (1989) 54-9; cf. Hanson 1989:124; on the *hoplomachoi* see Wheeler 1983:1-9.

21 Contrary to modern usage, the term phalanx' in classical Greek does not denote a specific formation but either an arrangement of troops broader than it is deep or simply a 'battleline.' A battle formation in the sense of *Schlachtordnung* is *taxis* or *parataxis*: see Lammert 1938: 1631-5. Latin usage of 'phalanx' and the

term in Greek writers of the Hellenistic and Roman periods can be more specific: cf. Wheeler 1979:303-18; B. Bar-Kochva, *Judas Maccabaeus: the Jewish struggle against the Seleucids* (Cambridge, 1989) 76 nn. 23-4, 432-7.

22 Xen, *Cyn.* 12; *Cyr.* 1.2.10, 6.28-9, 39-41; 7.5.62-4; 8.1.34-8; PI, *Euthd.* 290B-D; Garlan (1989) 24-6; J. Aymard, *Essai sur les chasses romaines* (BEFAR 171: Paris, 1951) 470-2; cf. H. D. Dunn, 'The hunt as an image of love and war in classical literature' (Diss. U. Calif, Berkeley, 1980); Turney-High (*supra* n. 5) 21.

23 Turney-High (*supra* n. 5) 25-45, esp. 30, 34, and *Primitive Warfare: its Practice and Concepts*, (2nd edn, Columbia, 1971) 61-90, 145-7; E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans* (Oxford, 1965) 48-9, 56, 63-4; Neolithic painting: Ferrill 1985:21. For a full bibliography on pre-state warfare see R. B. Ferguson with L. E. Farragher, *The Anthropology of War: a Bibliography* (H. F. Guggenheim Foundation, Occasional Papers 1: New York, 1988). Keegan's scenario (*supra* n. 5, 8-10) for the evolution of the warrior chief from the hunting band leader need not be taken as universal.

24 *Il.* 2.362, 655, 668; Lammert/Lammert 1921:440. Van Wees (1986:296, 298 with n. 64, 299), overlooking the Rhodians, rejects any connection between Nestor's advice (*Il.* 2.362) and actual organization of the Achaean or Trojan war bands. Indeed he claims that kin groups never formed the basis of military organization in Greek history. This view ignores the anthropological data from comparable pre-state societies (cf. *supra* n. 23), denies the well-known connections between social and military organization (cf. the modern classic, S. Andreski, *Military Organization and Society* (Berkeley, 1971)), and seems contradictory to his own anthropological citation of the Philippine Tausug as a parallel to the retinues of Homeric chieftains. Although at Athens, the best documented polis, direct evidence is lacking and the relationship of clans and phratries to the organization of the pre-Cleisthenic army may be 'theoretical,' to reject all kin groups as a component of military organization is hypercritical. Cf. Frost 1984: 283-5, 293; P. Siewert, *Die Trittyen Anikas und die Heeresreform des Kleisthenes* (Vestigia 33: Munich, 1982) 156. For a belief in tribal organization of the early Spartan army (cf. Tyrtaeus fr. 19 West) see Cartledge (*supra* n. 16) 427-8, cf. Lazenby 1985:50-2, 70-2. Furthermore, Van Wees denies any possible regional or kin association in the five Trojan units which attack the Achaean ships (*Il.* 12.86ff), but comparative data would support a contrary view: the retinues of German war chiefs could be 'inter-tribal.' See Thompson (*supra* n. 23) 58.

25 See A. Arnaud, 'Quelques aspects des rapports de la ruse et de la guerre dans le monde grec du VIII^e au V^e siècle' (3rd Cycle Thesis: Paris, 1971) 28-31.

26 H. van Wees, 'Kings in combat: battles and heroes in the *Iliad*,' CQ 38 (1988) 13-22.

27 Tac, *Ger.* 7.1-2: *Reges ex nobilitate, duces ex virtute sumunt. . . et duces exemplo potius quam imperio, si prompti, si conspicii, si ante aciem agant admiratione praesunt. ceterum neque animadvertere neque vincere, ne verberare quidem nisi sacerdotibus permissum . . . quodque praecipuum fortitudinis incitamentum est, non casus nec fortuita conglobata turmam aut cuneum fecit sed familiae et propinquitates.* Cf. *Ger.* 13-14 and Thompson in n. 23 *supra*.

28 T. S. Burns, 'The Barbarians and the *Scriptores Historiae Augustae*,' in C. Deroux, ed., *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History* (Collection Latomus 164: Brussels, 1979) I, 524-5; van Wees (*supra* n. 26) 18-22. Cf. Tac, *Ger.* 14-15.

29 King (*supra* n. 2) 3-4; van Wees (*supra* n. 26) 19-20.

30 Pritchett, *War* 4. 7-33; similar views in F. Albracht, *Kampf und Kampfschilderung bei Homer* (Naumburg, 1886); A. Lang, *The World of Homer*

(London, 1910) 54-59; Lammert/Lammert 1921:436-45; Lammert 1938:1625-7; Kromayer and Veith 1928:26; Detienne, in Vernant 1968:138 n. 101. Cf. Latacz 1977:26-44 for additional bibliography.

31 Van Wees 1986:285-303 and (*supra* n. 26) 1-24. Cf. Hanson 1989: 41; R. Leimbach, review of Latacz, *Gnomon* 52 (1980) 418-25: no coherent, unified picture of Homeric combat possible; Snodgrass 1964b: 176-9: no phalanx in Homer.

32 Van Wees 1986:285-92 and (*supra* n. 26) 13-14.

33 Van Wees (*supra* n. 26) 10-11; cf. Latacz 1977:170-8.

34 Caes., *BG* 1.24.5, 5.2.4-5; cf. Liv. 32.17.11; G. Gundai, 'Der Keil in der germanischen Feldschlacht,' *Gymnasium* 50 (1939) 154-65; cf. Thompson (*supra* n. 23) 114.

35 Cf. Eust. ad *Il.* 4.250ff and Didymus schol. in *Il.* 3.136, where definite sizes are assigned to these units; Pritchett, *War* 4.22; Lammert/Lammert 1921: 436-41; Lammert 1938:1626. That later Greeks (Polyb. 12.21.8; Diod. 16.3.2; Arist., fr. 152 Rose) conceived Homeric warfare in terms of the hoplite phalanx of their own time does not offer proof (so Pritchett, *War* 4. 24-5) that Homer described the hoplite phalanx. These later Greeks display the influence of the sophists' view of Homer the military expert; Aristotle's *Homeric Problems*, which included commentary on-military questions (see Wheeler in n. 12 *supra*), and similar Peripatetic works in this genre probably originated some of the curious material in Eustathius and other commentators. Likewise, Xenophon's use of *hoplites* (the standard classical Greek term for a heavy infantryman) in reference to non-Greek heavy infantry does not prove the non-existence of a pre-hoplite phase of Greek warfare (so Pritchett, *War* 4.11). The word is not attested before the late sixth or early fifth century: Snodgrass 1964b:204.

36 Cf. Tac, *Ger.* 14.1: *Cum ventum in aciem, turpe principi virtute vinci, turpe comitatus virtutem principis non adaequare*. Van Wees ((*supra* n. 26) 5 with n. 18,12 n. 40) correctly rejects Pritchett's concept of duels in Homeric battles and his view of the *promachoi* as a forward echelon unit (*War* 4. 21-6). *Monomachia* of commanders or champions, as Pritchett's own catalog of examples shows, generally occurs as a substitute for an engagement of all forces. The term *monomachia* in classical Greek and Hellenistic historians for the occasional confrontation of opposing generals is no doubt used to recall the heroic duels of epic, although the word *monomachia* and its variants do not occur before Herodotus: LSJ9 svv.; Pritchett, *War* 4.19-20 nos. 13-14, 16-17.

37 See nn. 27-9 *supra*. Military service, the *impôt de sang*, remained an aristocratic argument for privileges until the French Revolution: A. Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (New York, 1959) 57. On Pindar see Jaeger (*supra* n. 6) 214-16. Latacz (1977:43-59) correctly argues that *promachos* and *promachesthai* do not indicate social rank. *Contra* Pritchett, *War* 4.26 n. 83; van Wees (*supra* n. 26) 18-22, although he concedes (21 nn. 68-9) that all *aristoi* in battle are not *basileis*.

38 Tac, *Ger.* 13.2: *insignis nobilitas aut magna patrum merita principis dignitatem etiam adulescentulis adsignant*.

39 *Il.* 11.61-6, 163-71, 284-99; 12.86-7, 437-71. Cf. Latacz 1977:175-8.

40 King (*supra* n. 2) 248 n. 11. Nestor's deployment of suspected cowards between reliable troops and his other tactical instructions at *Il.* 4.297-309 could also be cited as early evidence of battle management. The frequent citation of this passage in later sources indicates its use in Homeric *Tactica*: n. 12 *supra*; Xen, *Mem.* 3.1.8, *Cyr.* 7.5.5, cf. 3.3.41; Arist, fr. 152 Rose; Pyrrhus, *Tactica*, in Front, *S trat.* 2.3.21; Amm. 24.6.9.

41 On the hoplite panoply see Snodgrass 1964b: esp. 61-7 and 1967:53-5 on the *hoplon*; also Hanson 1989:55-88, esp. 63-71, and essays in Part II of this volume.

42 Perfection of the phalanx or sudden creation: Latacz 1977:237-8; Cartledge 1977:11-27; Lorimer 1947:76-138; cf. Salmon 1977:87-122; outcome of experimentation: Snodgrass 1965:110-22 and *Archaic Greece: the Age of Experiment* (London, 1980) 104-6. For Pritchett (*War* 4.7-44), who finds a disciplined fully organized phalanx in Homer, changes in Greek armor had no effect.

43 Snodgrass 1964b: 179-83, 1965:116, 1967:61-7 and *supra* n. 42: 104-6; Latacz 1977:229-37 with M. L. West's review, *CR* 29 (1979) 135-6; van Wees (1986) 302; *contra* Pritchett, *War* 4.33-42; Cartledge 1977:11-27; Lazenby 1985:76-7 (apparently unaware of Latacz's book). Latacz 1977:233 denies use of the hoplite shield in Tyrtaeus, based on fr. 11.23-4 West (the shield covers both shoulders, whereas the *hoplon* protected only one), but he places too much weight on a poetic plural.

44 Tyrtaeus (ed. West) fr.11.35-8, 19.1-9 with Pritchett, *War A.* 38; *P. Oxy.* 3316.14; West (*supra* n. 43) 136; Kromayer and Veith-1928:80-ji. 2..

45 Tyrtaeus (ed. West) 10-12, 19.10-17; Pritchett, *War A.* 39-41. Tyrtaeus reported that Spartan lack of discipline necessitated deployment before a trench to prohibit flight: Arist, *EN* 3.8.5 with anon, schol. in 3.8.11 (*Comm. Arist. gr.* 20, ed. Heylbut). Pausanias' account of the battle of the Great Trench (4.17.6-9) omits this aspect of the struggle.

46 Tyrtaeus (ed. West) fr.10.21-25, 11.23-4; Pritchett, *War A.* 41, 43 with n. 142. 1 remain unconvinced by Pritchett's ingenious attempt to rehabilitate Pausanias' account of the Messenian wars (often thought to reflect Messenian propaganda of 370 bc and later) through topographical study and arguments that Pausanias' narrative derives from Tyrtaeus: see *Topography* 5.1-68 and Itr 4.37-8, 41,42 n. 135. Nor do I find compelling West's analysis of Tyrtaeus fr. 19: a change in perspective from marching to battle order occurs at 19.13. See West, *ZPE* 1 (1967) 174-6, followed by Pritchett, *War* 4.38, 41.

47 Snodgrass 1964b:181-2, 1967:61-7; *contra* Pritchett, *War* 4.40 n. 131. Cf. the insertion of files of *psiloi* between the hoplite files of the phalanx, called *parentaxis* in Asclep, *Tact.* 6.1 but *entaxis* in Ael, *Tact.* 31.3; Arr, *Tact.* 26.6. Lorimer (1947:127) has the *gymnetes* protect themselves with their own shields.

48 On *othismos* see Pritchett, *War A.* 65-76,91-2; Hanson 1989:28-9,169-77. Hanson *ibid*, 173 takes Tyrtaeus 11.21-2 as an illustration of *othismos*, but I see here no evidence of collective pushing by those behind the file leader, if files are meant at all. An attempt to argue that the phalanx was an open and not a closed formation is totally misguided: Cawkwell 1978:150-3 and Orthodoxy and hoplites,' *CQ* 39 (1989) 379-83 (the latter written without reference to Wheeler 1979, 1982, 1983; Krentz 1985a:50-61. *Contra* Holladay 1982:94-7; Anderson 1984:152).'

49 Chigi vase: Lorimer 1947:81 fig. 2; H. Payne, *Neocorinthia* (Oxford, 1931) 32, 301 no. A-3; D. A. Amyx, *Corinthian Vase-Painting of the Archaic Period* (Berkeley, 1988) II, 369: a date of ca 640BC Despite arguments concerning the technical inability of vase painters to depict a phalanx, a rigorous methodology requires evaluation of what the evidence actually shows, not what we conjecture a painter had in mind. Furthermore, Tyrtaeus (11.11-14 West) does refer to men in the rear, as Hanson (1989:168) notes, but just as on the Chigi vase no indication is given that the second rank directly supports the first, in fact, *laon opisso* could refer to those behind the first rank of the formation or even men behind the

formation possibly guarding the army's camp. Comparison of the Spartan flutists at Mantinea in 418 bc (Thuc. 5.70, cf. Plut, *Lyc.* 22.2-5) with those seen on the Chigi Vase and a proto-Corinthian aryballos from Perachora (Lorimer 1947:93 fig. 7: ca 675 bc) is too facile. Although the classical Spartan and other Greek phalanges marched in step and one tradition (Ath. I4.630e) credits Tyrtaeus with the composition of marching songs (*enoplia*), except for these vase paintings flutists and drill or cadenced marching in Greek forces of the seventh century is not attested. The function of the flutists in these vase paintings cannot be to ensure keeping in step. Cf. Snodgrass (*supra* n. 42) 106 against Salmon 1977:87-122. Also see Wheeler 1982:232-3 with n. 51. According to Greenhalgh 1973 many hoplites rode horses to battle and dismounted to form the phalanx.

50 See Arist, *Pol.* 5.5.6-8; A. Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants* (New York, 1963) 31-53, 66-77; Cartledge 1977:11-27 and *Sparta and Laconia: a Regional History 1300-362 BC* (London, 1979) 123-40; Salmon 1977 87-122; *contra* Snodgrass 1965:114-16, 120.

51 Lycurg, *Leoc.* 106-7; Polyaeus 1.17; Ath. I4.630e; cf. Hdt. 7.104.5, 9.48.1; Thuc. 4.40.1; Loraux (*supra* n. 20) 105-6. Lazenby (1985:83) sees this Spartan imperative as part of the 'Spartan mirage' – a myth created by the battle of Thermopylae.

52 Lammert 1899:10; cf. Wheeler 1979:305 with n. 7 on the Roman phalanx. The earliest epigraphical attestation of a soldier who died *en promachois* comes from the base of a sixth-century Attic *kouros*. This wealthy young Athenian (a poor family could not commission a *kouros*) possibly died in the front ranks at the battle of Paliene ca 540 bc See Pritchett, *War* 4.88, cf. 39-41.

53 Thebes: Diod. 12.70.1; Lammert 1899:10 n. 1; Sparta: Lazenby 1985:11, 54-6; Athens: Arist, *Ath. Pol.* 73-4, cf. 4.3; Plut, *Sol.* 18.1-2; cf. Lammert 1899:2 n. 11. Aristotle (*Pol* 4.3.3, 13.10-11, cf. 6.7.1-3) associated cavalry with the aristocracies of the Archaic period. On *epilektoi* see n. 20 *supra*. Diodorus' identification (probably from Ephorus) of the Theban *Heniochoi* and *Parabatai* with the 300 *epilektoi*, the latter a phenomenon of the fifth and fourth centuries, would imply transfer of a traditional name to a new type of unit, and Diodorus' use of *proemachonto* would indicate deployment in the front ranks, not as an advanced unit (see Pritchett in n. 52 *supra*). Lazenby plausibly argues that the 300 Spartans at Thermopylae and at the *monomachia* for Thyreae are not the *Hippeis*, a royal escort of men under the age of 30, although the name implies a connection with cavalry in the distant past. Most recently, Bugh argues for the existence of Athenian cavalry before the fifth century (see Pollux, *Onom.* 8.10S), but denies that Solon's classes called *Hippeis* and *Zeugitai* reflect a military function: see G. R. Bugh, *The Horsemen of Athens* (Princeton, 1988) 4-38. Not all his arguments are equally compelling. Cf. Rhodes (*infra* n. 57) 137-8.

54 Tyrtaeus as general: *Suda* s.v. Tyrtaios; Polyaeus 1.17; Diod. 8.37; Phiiochorus, *FGrHist* 328 F 216 = Ath. I4.630f; Cailisthenes, *FGrHist* 124 F 24 = Strabo 8.4.10; Lycurg, *Leoc.* 106; Spartan kings: Hdt. 5.75.2 with How and Weils (*infra* n. 58) II, 41; Lazenby 1985:20. A second-century papyrus (copying Ephorus?) ascribes a military command to the famous ephor Chilon ca 556: *FGrHist* 105 F 1; Cartledge 1979 (*supra* n. 50): 140, 158. Possible military activity of the lawgiver Lycurgus was debated in antiquity: see Wheeler 1983:16-17.

55 Xen, *Lac. Resp.* 11.9, cf. 13.6. Unlike Lazenby (1985:175 n. 7), I do not accept assignment of this work to a Ps.-Xenophon, as K. M. T. Chrimes, *The Respublica Lacedaimonicorum Ascribed to Xenophon* (Manchester, 1948) and *Ancient Sparta* (Manchester, 1949) App. VII.

56 Thuc. 5.66.2-4, 68; Xen, *Lac. Resp.* 11.4. The complex problems of Spartan military organization cannot be treated here. See A. Toynbee, *Some Problems in Greek History* (Oxford, 1969) 365-404; Anderson 1970:225-51; Lazenby... 1985:4-10, 50-2, 66-80; T. J. Figueira, 'Population patterns in Late Archaic and Classical Sparta,' *TAPA* 116 (1986) 165-211; Cartledge (*supra* n. 16) 427-9.

57 Arist, *Ath. Pol.* 22.2; differing interpretations of this passage in P. J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford, 1981) 264-5; G. R. Stanton, 'The tribal reform of Kleisthenes the Alkmeonid,' *Chiron* 14 (1984) 15-16; Fornara (*supra* n. 20) 3-6; C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution* (Oxford, 1952) 145-6, 169-70, 176.

58 Arist, *Ath. Pol.* 3.2, 41.2, cf. 4.2; Hdt. 8.44.2 (Ion = *stratarches*); W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* (Oxford, 1912) II, 249; Hignett (*supra* n. 57) 47-55; Rhodes (*supra* n. 57) 66-73, 100; Schaefer, 'Polemarchos 4, *RE* Supplbd. 8 (1956) 1101-2.

59 Xen, *Lac. Resp.* 11.4; 13.1, 4, 9; Plut, *Lyc.* 12.3; Thuc. 5.66.3; schol. in Pl., *Phd.* 235D; Schaefer (*supra* n. 58) 1124-8, 1132.

60 Nicolaus of Damascus, *FGrHist* 90 F 57.5; anon, *FGrHist* 105 F 2; Schaefer (*supra* n. 58) 1121-2. Ephorus probably drew on the fourth-century tyrant of his own time as a model of interpreting archaic tyrants. On tyrants see n. 50 *supra*.

61 For the date of this reform I find Hignett (*supra* n. 57) 171-6 more convincing; opposing views summarized in Rhodes (*supra* n. 57) 264-5. The whole of *Ath. Pol.* 4 (Draco's constitution), where strategoi and phylarchs are mentioned, is anachronistic: cf. Rhodes 109-12. It should also be noted that tyrants and magistrates in Sicily also were called strategoi in the fifth century, but it cannot be demonstrated that Sicilian use of the term antedates the Athenian reform of 501/500 bc. Cf. How and Wells (*supra* n. 58) II, 197; Hignett, 116-17.

62 Arist., *Ath. Pol.* 8.3, 41.2; W. Schwann, 'strategos,' *RE* Supplbd. 6 (1935) 1071-2; Hignett (*supra* n. 57) 77; Fornara (*supra* n. 20) 6-7 with n. 17; Siewert (*supra* n. 24) 154. The analogy of phylarchs in Hdt. 5.69.2 with the tribal cavalry commanders in the fifth and fourth centuries (Arist., *Ath. Pol.* 61.5; Xen, *Mag.Eq.* 1.8.21-22, 25; 2.1.7; 3.6; 8.17-18) is false; nor can it be proved that the Athenian army was predominantly a cavalry force before the sixth century: see Fornara (*supra* n. 20) 1,8 with rebuttal by Bugh (*supra* n. 53) 5 with n. 14; Rhodes (*supra* n. 57) 686. Schwann (1072) equates *phylobasileus* with *stratarches*, but the latter word in Aesch. fr.304 Mette, where it would indicate a phylarch, is textually uncertain. Pindar twice uses *stratarches* in a Trojan War context for the leader of the Ethiopians (*Pyth.* 6.31; *Isth.* 5.40), and in Hdt. 3.157.4 it denotes Zopyrus' appointment to high command by Darius I. Definition of the term outside Athens may have been fluid, but Ion was believed to have been a polemarch (*stratarches*): see n. 58 *supra*.

63 Frost (1984) 283-94; H. van Effenterre, 'Clisthène et les mesures de mobilisation,' *REG* 89 (1976) 1-4; Connor 1988:6-7.

64 Arist., *Ath. Pol.* 15.4-5; Polyaeus 1.21.2; Frost 1984:291; on Cleisthenes' mobilization scheme see Siewert (*supra* n. 24) 10-13, 141-5; *contra* Stanton (*supra* n. 57) 3-6.

65 Herodotus' account (6.109-10) is riddled with anachronisms: see Hignett (*supra* n. 57) 170-3; M. H. Jameson, 'Seniority in the Strategia,' *TAPA* 86 (1955) 79-81; How and Wells (*supra* n. 58) II, 357; Rhodes (*supra* n. 57) 264-5; Fornara (*supra* n. 20) 6-7, 72-3. The right flank as the place of honor: Eur., *Supp.* 656-8; Hdt. 6.111.1; 9.28.1, 46.1; Thuc. 5.71; Xen, *Hell.* 2.4.30, *Lac. Resp.* 11.9; Plut., *Mor.* 626D-E; cf. Lammert 1899: 18-19.

66 Hignett (*supra* n. 57) 176; F. Lammert, 'Taxiarchos' and 'Taxis,' *RE* 5A.1 (1934) 75, 85-7; earliest reference: Aesch. fr.304 (= Ath. 1.11d-e), 596 Mette, cf. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 61.3; *taxis* = *phyle*: Thuc. 6.98.4. Rhodes (*supra* n. 57) 684-5 unconvincingly argues for taxiarchs before 487/6 bc based on the fourth-century Oath of Plataea.

67 *Ad hoc* command: see Rhodes (*supra* n. 57) 264; First Sacred War: Plut. *Sol.* 11.2; bibliography in Wheeler 1987: 172 with n. 69; Peisistratus: Hdt. 1.59.4; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22.3; Aen. *Tact.* 4.8-11; Front. *Strat.* 2.9.9; Just. 2.8.1-4; How and Wells (*supra* n. 58) I, 82; Schaefer (*supra* n. 58) 1122; Hignett (*supra* n. 57) 113. Given Herodotus' frequent anachronisms, his use of strategos for non-Athenian commanders of the seventh and sixth centuries does not prove widespread use of the term in the Archaic period, as N. G. L. Hammond thinks: 'Strategia and hegemonia in fifth-century Athens,' *CQ* 19 (1969) 113 with a 2.

68 *Contra* Stanton (*supra* n. 57) 1-41: the reforms aimed at increasing Alcmaeonid influence.

69 Hignett (*supra* n. 57) 69; Fornara (*supra* n. 20) 3-6; H. T. Wade-Gery, *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford, 1958) 154.

70 Arist., *Ath. Pol.* 7.3; Plut. *Sol.* 18.2; Rhodes (*supra* n. 57) 137-8.

71 Plut. *Arist.* 5.3-5, *Mor.* 626D-E; Hdt. 6.111.1; subunits: Hdt. 9.21.3; Xen. *Mem.* 3.1.5, 4.1; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 61.3; cf. *Isae.* 2.42; Kromayer and Veith 1928:49 with n. 3; Siewert (*supra* n. 24) 7 n. 42, 142-3; Lazenby 1985:193 n. 14; additional references in Rhodes (*supra* n. 57) 685, who doubts the existence of such units; trittycharch: Pl. *Rep.* 5.475A; cf. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 8.3, 21.4.

72 The young aristocrat's death *en promachois* possibly at Paliene ca 540 bc (n. 52 *supra*) implies close combat, but is too vague to prove use of a fully developed phalanx. Nor does reference to *parataxis* in a second-century ad commentary on Alcaeus (*P. Oxy.* 2506, fr.98) prove anything about the late seventh or early sixth century, as Pritchett (*War* 4.36-7) argues. As noted (*supra* n. 21), *parataxis* does not denote phalanx.' This noun first appears in Thuc. 5.11.2 (cf. 5.9.4) and the initial occurrence of the verb *paratatto*, Hdt. 9.31.2, regards *Persian* deployment at Plataea.

73 Law on desertion: Aeschin. *In Ctes.* 175; Schwertfeger (1982) 264-5; Solon's laws: Hignett (*supra* n. 57) 17-27.

74 Hdt. 6.114; for Herodotus' *aner genomenos agathos* = *arete*, see Loraux (*supra* n. 7) 99.

75 Cf. Hanson 1989:114. Miltiades' prominence in the depiction of Marathon on the Stoa Poecile, where he is seen exhorting the Athenians before the battle, in no way proves his presence in the front rank for combat. Aeschines' obscure *protot* (*In Ctes.* 186: mistranslated as 'in the front rank' in the Loeb edition) is clarified in Nep. *Milt.* 6.3-4: *Namque huic Miltiadi, quia Athenas totamque Graeciam liberarat, talis honos tributus est: in porticu, quae Poecile vocatur, cum pugna depingeretur Marathona, ut in decern praetorum numero prima eius imago poneretur isque hortaretur militis proeliumque committer et.* Callimachus also appeared in the painting: Paus. 1.15.3.

76 Cf. Hdt. 7.158.5: Gelon of Syracuse's demand to be strategos and *hegemon* of the Greek confederacy in 480 bc. strategos here may be anachronistic, but in this context it denotes absolute authority to command, whereas the leader of an alliance of equals was a *hegemon*, as Pausanias at Plataea (cf. Thuc. 1.18.2) and Philip II and Alexander in the League of Corinth: see Cartledge 1979 (*supra* n. 50):202-3; Bosworth (*supra* n. 17) 189-90 with n. 5. On Sicilian strategoi see *supra* n. 61. Analysis of Pausanias' tactical and strategic functions at Plataea lies beyond

the scope of this paper. It should be noted, however, that Pausanias styled himself *archegos* on the inscription he set up at Delphi (Thuc. 1.132.2; Plut, *Mor.* 873C), a word denoting more authority and power than the tamer nuance of *hegemon* in the Classical Period: cf. LSJ s.w. *Archegos* also appears in an incomplete line of the Themistocles Decree: Meiggs/Lewis 1969: no. 23 line 11.

⁷⁷ Loraux (*supra* n. 7) 42-76; on the date see Pritchett, *War* 4.112-24.

⁷⁸ Ar, *Nub.* 960-86; Thuc. 1.121.4, 123.1; PL, *Lach.* 179C; Xen, *Mem.* 3.5.3, 9-11, 22.

⁷⁹ After 461 bc: Arist, *Ath. Pol.* 26.1, cf. Ps.-Xen, *Ath. Pol.* 1.3; Rhodes (*supra* n. 57) 323-8; 420s: Arist, *Ath. Pol.* 28; Ar, *Pax* 672-8; Xen, *Symp.* 2.14, cf. Ar, *Av.* 1553-64.

⁸⁰ Eur, *Supp.* 161-2, 861-917.

⁸¹ Thuc. 1.138.3, 140-44; 2.60-5.

⁸² See Plut, *Them.* 2.4, *Mor.* 869F; E. L. Wheeler, *Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery* (Mnemosyne Supp. 108: Leiden, 1988) 25-41, esp. 29 with n. 22, 33 with n. 44.

⁸³ On Homer and the *hoplomachoi* see nn. 12, 20 *supra*; cf. Euripides' satire of sophistic military instruction: *Supp.* 902-8.

⁸⁴ Wheeler 1981:74-9 and 1983:2-6. Bibliography on Aeneas in Wheeler 1983:8 n. 40 and (*supra* n. 12) 175 with n. 67.

⁸⁵ See J. de Romilly, 'Réflexions sur le courage chez Thucydides et chez Platon,' *REG* 91 (1980) 307-23.

⁸⁶ Arist, *EN* 3.8.3; cf. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the irrational* (Berkeley, 1971) 17-18; E. Sagen, *The Lust to Annihilate: a Psychoanalytic Study of Violence in Ancient Greek Culture* (New York, 1979) 75-80.

⁸⁷ For a study of the trend from the standpoint of militarism see Lengauer 1979- Pritchett (*War* 2.4-116) disputes that a separation of civil and military functions occurred and documents, especially at Athens, continued civilian control of generals.

⁸⁸ Miltiades: Aeschin, *In Ctes.* 186; Nep, *Milt.* 6.3-4; cf. n. 75 *supra*; Pausanias: Thuc. 1.132.2-3; Plut., *Mor.* 873C; cf. Meiggs and Lewis 1969: no. 27; Cimon: Aeschin, *In Ctes.* 183-6; Plut, *Cim.* 7-8.2; Iphicrates: *Suda* s.v.; Parke 1933: 74 n. 2. Cf. M. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, II (Oxford, 1948) no. 130 (*IG* VII 2462) for an apparent protest by one boeotarch and two others against Epaminondas' prominence after Leuctra.

⁸⁹ Hyperides, *Epitaph.* 3, 14-15; Loraux (*supra* n. 7) 52, 111-13-

⁹⁰ Plut, *Mor.* 193B; Paus. 9.13.11-12; Anderson 1970:39.

⁹¹ Anderson 1970:39-40; Hanson 1989:63, 110; on Spartan officers see Lazenby 1985:18-24. Keegan (*supra* n. 5) 125 believes an officer class existed at Sparta but not elsewhere.

⁹² Greeks did not develop the more intricate Roman system of identification of subunits and even individuals' names on the shields. See Veg. 2.18: *Sed ne milites aliquando in tumultu proelii a suis contubernibus aberrarent, diversis cohortibus diversa in scutis signa pingebant, ut ipsi nominant, dignata, sicut etiam nunc moris est fieri. Praeterea in adverso s cuto unius cuius que militis litteris erat nomen adcrip tum, addito et ex qua esset cohorte quave centuria.*

⁹³ Snodgrass 1967:67, 95-6, 137 n. 25; Anderson 1970:17-20, 39-40; Lazenby 1985:30 175 n.4; Ducrey 1985:52; N. Sekunda, *The Ancient Greeks: Armies of Classical Greece, 5th and 4th Centuries BC* (London, 1986) 3, 6, 8, 25-6, pi. A1, A3;

on shield emblems see esp. L. Lacroix, "Les "blazons" des villes grecques," *EtArchClass* 1 (1955-6) 89-116. Hardie (*supra* n. 17) 12 discusses astrological symbols on shields.

94 Pace Kromayer (Kromayer and Veith 1928:83-4) intervals separated the subdivisions of the phalanx, but a supposed parallel with the deployment of Maurice of Nassau (early seventeenth century) is the only evidence cited. Nevertheless, a battleline consisting of contingents from more than one polis probably did tolerate gaps between the respective phalanges of each city, since each polis' forces functioned as a distinct unit: cf. the battles of Mantinea (418 BC), Nemea (394 BC), and Coronea (394 BC). A battle-line of allied Greek cities should not be conceived as a continuous phalanx from flank to flank.

95 Thuc. 5.68.2-3; Lammert 1899:17; statuette: Lazenby 1985:33, pi. 3; Sekunda (*supra* n. 93) 3, 6, pi. A1; cf. Veg. 2.13: *Centuriones . . . transversis cassidum cristis, ut facilius noscerentur, singulas iusserunt gubernare centurias*; G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army* (London, 1969) 132 with n. 4, 133, pi. IV.

96 Taxiarchs: Ar., *Pax* 1172-6, schol. in 241; *Ach.* 965; Kromayer and Veith 1928:51; Anderson 1970:40; strategoi: Sekunda (*supra* n. 93) 56. The shield apron of leather or cloth, doubtless an anti-missile device inspired by combat with Persians, appears on vase paintings of Asia Minor and the Greek mainland ca 550 BC to the early fourth century and was once thought the sign of an officer. Since file leaders do carry them, it cannot be denied that officers could be so equipped, but the shield apron would not necessarily distinguish an officer from a non-officer. See Anderson 1970:17 and, most recently, Eero, 'On the shield-apron in the ancient Greek panoply,' *AArch* 57 (1986) 1-25.

97 Arr., *Anab.* 1.14.4; Plut., *Alex.* 16.7, *Pyrrh.* 16.7, *Nic.* 28.5, *Alcib.* 16.1-2; Ath. 12.534e; Xen., *Anab.* 3.2.7, cf. AeL, *VH* 3.24; Diod. 14.43.2-3; Plut., *Dion* 28.3. Cf. Plut., *Demetr.* 21.3-4, Diod. 19.3.2.

98 Agesilaus, renowned for his simplicity of dress (Xen, *Ages.* 11.11), might appear an exception, but in his military role as Spartan king he did not renounce the customary royal Spartan practices. Plutarch (*Ages.* 19.4-6) shows only that he refused to adopt Persian customs, not that he lacked distinguishing armor. A general's spear (Plut, *Ages.* 19.6), unless ceremonial, would not have greatly differed from that of the rank-and-file hoplite. Cf. Hanson 1989:59.

99 Xen, *Cyr.* 3.3.61-2; 4.1.6; 7.1.20, 23, 26.

100 Agesilaus: Xen., *Ages.* 2.15; Plut., *Ages.* 16.5; Pelopidas: Plut, *Pel.* 32.5-7; Nep, *Pel.* 5.4. Diodorus (15.80.5) is vague on the matter. Buckler's reconstruction of the battle homogenizes the contradiction: Pelopidas first led a cavalry charge, then dismounted and died at the head of an infantry assault: j. Buckler, *The Theban Hegemony 371-362 BC* (Harvard Historical Studies 98: Cambridge, Mass, 1980) 176-80.

101 See J. A. O. Larsen, 'The *Acharnians* and the pay of taxiarchs,' *CP* 41 (1946) 91-8; Hignett (*supra* n. 57) 220; Bugh (*supra* n. 53) 53-4 denies that strategoi, hipparchs, and phylarchs received state pay, but cites no modern discussions of the question. Rates of pay for hoplites and rowers are discussed in Pritchett, *War* 1.3-29.

102 Xen, *Anab.* 7.6.1; Griffith 1935:295. Cf. Xen, *Anab.* 3.1.37.

103 Pausanias: Hdt. 9.81.2; cf. Pritchett *War* 1.83, *War* 2.289-90 with n. 56 on the amount; Spartan kings: Polyb. 2.62.1 (from Phylarchus); Pritchett, *War* 1.84, cf. 75-6; *War* 2.126. Little is known about the officer pay in the Spartan army (if it existed at all) except that the kings received a double portion of food and drink: Hdt. 6.57.1; Xen, *Lac. Resp.* 15.4, *Ages.* 5.1. Cf. Arist, *Pol.* 3.14.3-4; Cartledge

(*supra* n. 16) 105-6, 206.

104 See Pritchett, *War* 1.84; *War* 2.126-32, 276 n. 1.

105 Agesilaus: Xen, *Ages.* 1.25-6; *Hell.* 3.4.16, 4.2.5; Jason: Xen, *Hell.* 6.1.6; Iphicrates: Polyaeus 3.9.31. Cf. Xen, *Cyr.* 2.1.22-4.

106 Xen, *Ages.* 2.8 and esp. *Hiero* 2.15-16; cf. Hanson 1989: 119-21, 190-1. Evidence on the *aristeia* collected in Pritchett, *War* 2.276-90; *War* 3.57. A notable recent study of Roman military awards fails to consider Greek precedents: V. A. Maxfield, *The Military Decorations of the Roman Army* (Berkeley, 1981).

107 Hdt. 9.71.3-4; Plut, *Ages.* 34.6-8, *Pel.* 1.4; Loraux (*supra* n. 7) 99; *lyssa vs sophrosyne*: Detienne, in Vernant 1968:122.

108 Salamis: Hdt. 8.123.2; Plut, *Them.* 17.1, *Mor.* 871D; Granicus: Diod. 17.21.4. Cf. Caesar at Pharsalus: App, *BC* 2. 82.

109 Xen, *Mag. Eq.* 2.6, cf. *Anab.* 3-1.37, *Cyr.* 1.6.25.

110 See Andrewes 1981:1-3; Garland 1989:148-9.

111 Meiggs and Lewis 1969: nos. 33 lines 5-6, 33, cf. lines 128-9 (*mantis*), lines 67-70; 48 line 4; D. W. Bradeen, *The Athenian Agora XVIII: Inscriptions: the Funerary Monuments* (Princeton, 1974) nos. 22 A line 34, C lines 152-3, 159; 23 A; 25. Cf. Bradeen 1969: 145-59.

112 Thuc. 7.862; Plut, *Nie.* 28.2, 4; 29.

113 Ar, *Ach.* 597, 1071-234; Larsen (*supra* n. 101) 96. The ridicule of a taxiarch at Ar, *Pax* 1172-90 likewise is aimed at the officer as a symbol of military service.

114 Thuc. 5.65.2; Xen, *Hell.* 4.2.22; on the army as a city see C. Mossé, 'Le rôle politique des armées dans le monde grec à l'époque classique,' in Vernant 1968: 221-9.

115 Keegan (*supra* n. 5) 316-17, cf. 329-38; Beaumont (*supra* n. 15) 70-1. A current example of kinship is the US Army's policy that even general officers wear combat fatigues as their daily uniform.

116 Xen, *Ages.* 5.1-4; 6.4-7; 7.2; 8.1-4, 6-8; 10.1-2; 11; cf. *Cyr.* 1.2.1; Hanson 1989:110-11; Cartledge (*supra* n. 16) 206-7,

117 E.g. Liv. 21.4.2-8 (Hannibal); Dio 68.23.1 (Trajan); *HA, Had.* 10.2-6; *Pesc. Nig.* 10.11.

118 Xen, *Anab.* 3.1.42; *Cyr.* 3.3.19. Cf. Keegan (*supra* n. 5) 122-3.

119 Onas, 33.6; Phil.Mech, *Syn. Mech.* 5.D.68-9 Garland; cf. Front, *Strat.* 2.8.12-13.

120 See Xen, *Anab.* 3.2.29-30; Arist, *Metaph.* 11.10, 1075a12-15; Polyaeus 3.9.22; Plut, *Pel.* 2.1-2.

121 Polyaeus 2.3.15; Xen, *Hell.* 6.4.12.

122 Tegyra: Plut, *Pel.* 16.1, 17.3-4; Granicus: Arr, *Anab.* 1.15.3; Issus: Diod. 17.33.5; Curt. 3.11.7-11; Gaugamela: Arr, *Anab.* 3.14.2-3; Diod. 17.60.1-4; Plut, *Alex.* 33-3-8. Cf. Nep, *Epam.* 9.1.

123 Onas. 23; Front, *Strat.* 2.4.9 (cf. Plut, *Pyrrh.* 17.1-3), 2.4.10; Sail, *lug.* 101.6-8. Although all known examples of this stratagem are Roman, Onasander's treatise is a compendium of Greek military thought (fourth century and Hellenistic) for Roman consumption. See D. Ambaglio, 'Il trattato "Sul Commandante" di Onasandro,' *Athenaeum* 59 (1981) 353-77.

124 See Hanson 1988:200-1 and 1989:112; Teleutias: Xen, *Hell.* 5.3.6. Cf. the death of the poiemarchs at Tegyra (Plut, *Pel.* 17.3-4) and Nepos' account of

Epaminondas' end at Mantinea (*Epam.* 9.1-2).

125 Xen, *Mag. Eq.* 2.6; *Anab.* 3.1.37.

126 Marathon: Plut, *Them.* 3.3, *Arist.* 5.3-5; Tanagra: Plut, *Per.* 10.1-2; see Fornara (*supra* n. 20) 46 on Pericles' status; Agesilaus: Plut, *Ages.* 1.1-3, 37.1, 39.3-4; Mantinea: Plut, *Pel.* 4.4-5, 20.2; cf. Nep, *Epam.* 7.1-2.

127 Brasidas: Thuc. 2.25.2, 4.11.2-4; Lamachus: Thuc. 6.101.6; Chabrias/Plutarch: Plut, *Phoc.* 6.1, 13.1.

128 Xen, *Ages.* 6.2; Plut, *Ages.* 36.2, *Pel.* 2.3, cf. *Mor.* 187C.

129 Plut, *Pyrrh.* 30.4-6, *Pel.* 32.5-7; Nep, *Pel.* 5.1-4; Xen, *Hell.* 5.3.6-7.

130 See Hanson 1988:201 n. 30 and 1989:113-15.

131 Paul (*supra* n. 16) 308 counts twenty-two generals or independent commanders killed in approximately eighty-three land battles in Thucydides. Casualty figures for generals are not treated in P. Krentz, *GRBS* (1985) 13-20. Casualty rates for generals need not be a function of the level of technology. To cite a modern example, the so-called first 'modern war,' the American Civil War (1861-5), is known for high casualties among general officers: 80 generals on each side were killed in battle and 123 Union and 135 Confederate generals received battle wounds. But the American Revolution (1775-83), fought at a lower technological level, produced a higher ratio of general to total fatalities, 1:499 – the highest of any American war, although only twelve American generals fell in battle. For the Civil War the ratios are 1:1729 (Union) and 1:932 (Confederate). See R. K. Brown, *Fallen in Battle: American General Officer Combat Fatalities from 1775* (New York, 1988) 164, 197.

132 Snodgrass 1967:62 and pi. 54; Hanson 1989:111; Anderson 1970:pl. 13b.

133 Xen, *Lac. Resp.* 11.5; cf. Thuc. 5.66.4; Asclep, *Tact.* 2.2-3; Ael, *Tact.* 5.1-5; Arr, *Tact.* 5.4-6.6.

134 Pritchett, *War* 1.134-43, esp. 142-3; Lammert/Lammert 1921:446-8. The argument for blind files, based on the obscure Xen, *Lac. Resp.* 13.9, dates from Koch 1 y and Riistow 1852:121 and Boucher 1912:301. See Anderson 1970:79 with n. 49, 99 with n. 18.

135 I do not share the pessimism of Pritchett (*War* 1.150 n. 35, 153-4) and Hanson (1989:11-12, 47-48) on the value of these treatises. Terms such as *protostates* and *ouragos* occur in Thucydides (5.71.1) as well as Xenophon (*Lac. Resp.* 11.5; *Cyr.* 3.3.40), and the basic evolutions of drill probably changed little. Asclepiodotus (*Tact.* 2.2) was aware of differences between the classical and the Hellenistic phalanx: cf. Wheeler 1983:19. On the other hand, a credulous approach to the theoretical treatises can lead to absurdity: see Devine 1983:201-17 with the rebuttal by Buckler 1985:134-43.

136 See n. 65 *supra*; Xen, *Lac. Resp.* 13.6 with Buckler (*supra* n. 100) 63, followed by Lazenby 1985:29-30; *contra*, Anderson 1970:248; Agis: Thuc. 5.72.4. The Persian king also commanded from the center both for his own protection and to facilitate communications with both flanks: Xen, *Anab.* 1.8.22; Diod. 14.23.5; Arr, *Anab.* 3.11.5.

137 Xen, *Hell.* 4.3.15-18, *Ages.* 2.9-11; Plut, *Ages.* 18.1-2.

138 Plut, *Ages.* 18.3, cf. 19.1; Xen, *Hell.* 4.3.19-20, *Ages* 2.12-14.

139 Agis: Thuc. 5.72.4; Cleombrotus: Xen, *Hell.* 6.4.14; Buckler (*supra* n. 100) 63; cf. Anderson 1970: 201, 247-9, 322 n.43. The wounding of Cleombrotus possibly did not occur as early in the battle as Lazenby (1985:160) thinks; cf. Diod. 15.55.5; Xen, *Hell.* 6.4.13-14.

140 Xen, *Hell.* 6.4.13, 7.4.23; Plut, *Lyc.* 22.4.

141 Callimachus: Hdt. 6.113-14; Lycophron at Solymia (425 bc): Thuc. 4.44.2; Brasidas at Amphipolis (422 bc): Thuc. 5.10.8, 11; Laches and Nicostratus at Mantinea (418 bc) – probably trampled by their own men while trying to stop the rout: Thuc. 5.61.1, 72.4; Lamachus at Syracuse (414 bc): Thuc 6.101.6; Pelopidas at Cynoscephalae (364 bc): see n. 100 *supra*; Epaminondas at Mantinea (362 bc): Plut, *Ages.* 35.1; Xen, *Hell* 7.5.23-5; Diod. 15.86.3-87.1; Nep, *Bp am.* 9.1.

142 See A. du Picq, *Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle*, tr. J. N. Greely and R. G. Cotton (Harrisburg, 1947) 63-93; Hanson 1989:162-4, cf. 70. Hanson's argument for Epaminondas' wound is based on Diodorus' account, but Plutarch and Nepos (see n. 141 *supra*: cf. Paus. 8.11.5-10) tell different stories. Archidamus' wound at Cromnus (365 bc Xen, *Hell.* 7.4.23) occurs in a battle of encounter, not a pitched battle (*parataxis*). Brasidas' wound when a spear pierced his shield is associated with his death at Amphipolis by Anderson (1970:16-17) and Hanson (1989:70), but not by Plutarch (*Mor.* 190B, 219C, 548B), the sole source of this anecdote, or by Thucydides (5.10.8). The story could also be a corruption of Brasidas' wound at Pylos (Thuc. 4.12.1) or a later invention. Thucydides' account of Brasidas' headlong charge to surprise Cleon (Thuc. 5.10.6-8, cf. the cavalry duel of Brasidas and Cicion in Tzetz. in *Ar, Nub.* 549a) without reference to Brasidas' troops is a prime example of the general's name symbolizing the force under his command and does not necessarily indicate that Brasidas led the charge. A study of *hegeomai* and similar verbs in military contexts would probably support this view. Amphipolis, in any event, was a surprise, not a pitched battle. Finally, even Diodorus' highly rhetorical account of Epaminondas at Mantinea has the general come to the fore only after the battle has gone on a long time (15.86.4). Diodorus' source was Ephorus, and Polybius (12.25f,3-5) considered Ephorus' account of Mantinea full of errors. See Buckler (*supra* n. 100) 268-9, 321 n. 26.

143 Myronidas: Front, *Strat.* 2.4.11; Polyaeus 1.35.1; Thuc. 1.1083; Daphaenus: Polyaeus 5.7. Anderson (1970:160) rejects the story about Myronidas apparently from its sole occurrence in late sources, but it is well known that Ephorus was the chief source of Polyaeus' first book and Frontinus used earlier Greek sources: see Wheeler (*supra* n. 12) 174 with n. 65 and (*supra* n. 82) 18. Of course the authority of Ephorus does not guarantee accuracy, but it does eliminate Anderson's view for rejection.

144 See Thuc. 5.71-3; cf. Anderson 1970:71-2.

145 Polyaeus 3-9.12; cf. Arist, *EN* 3.8.5; Onas. 32.1. The controversy over the position of the Theban Sacred Band at Leuctra and Pelopidas' role in the battle does not concern us, since Pelopidas in this battle was a subordinate commander. I remain, however, unconvinced by the attacks on Anderson's view, since critics have not adequately addressed *inter alia* the parallel between Leuctra and Xenophon's battle of Thymbrara in the *Cyropaedia*. See Anderson 1970:165-220; *contra* Buckler (*supra* n. 100) 55-66 and 'Plutarch on Leuctra,' *SymbOslo* 55 (1980) 75-93; Lazenby 1985:155-62; C. J. Tuplin, 'The Leuctra Campaign: some outstanding problems,' *Klio* 69 (1987) 84-93; Hanson 1988:196-7. Polybius (12.25f.4) called Leuctra a simple battle!

146 Evidence collected in Pritchett, *War* 1.109-12; *War* 4.63, 73-4, 83-8.

147 Xenophon (*Lac. Resp.* 13.8) states that the enemy watches the sacrifice, but Plutarch (*Lyc.* 22.2) says only that the enemy is present. Pritchett (*War* 3.86) also emphasizes Thuc. 6.69.2 and Eur., *Heracl.* 672-3. The verb *propheron* in this passage of Thucydides need not mean 'carry in front of,' but rather could simply

indicate 'offer' or present.' A scholiast on the passage (*emprosthētes stratias esphagiāzonto*) does not have independent value. Likewise, Euripides says only that the sacrifice was *taxeon bekas*, not necessarily in front of the army. Similarly, the general or Spartan king did begin the paean (evidence in *War* 1.106-7), although *exerchen* in Plut., *Lyc.* 22.2 offers no proof that the king was physically in front of his men. In some cases the commander could raise the paean and lead the charge, as Cyrus commanding the right wing cavalry at Thymbrara (Xen., *Cyr.* 7.1.25).

148 Hdt. 9.61.3, 72.1; cf. Pritchett, *War* 3.78.

149 Diod. 15.56.1-2; Polyaeus 2.3.2. At Chaeronea (338 BC) Diodorus (16.86.4) has Philip II in the front ranks, but in Polyaeus (4.2.2) he executed a feigned retreat. The depiction of Miltiades on the Stoa Poecile offers no conclusive evidence that he stood in the front rank at Marathon: see n. 75 *supra*.

150 Plut., *Ages.* 36.3, *Mor.* 225D; cf. *Cleom.* 31.1-2.

151 Onas. 33.5; Polyb. 2.69.10; Plut., *Cleom.* 28.5; Hanson 1988:201 n. 30, 1989:113. Cf. Polyb. 11.2.11; Plut, *Comp. Pel./Marc.* 3.2, *Mor.* 24D.

152 Evidence in Pritchett, *War* 2.32; cf. Plut., *Cleom.* 31; F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, I (Oxford, 1957) 287; cf. J. T. Roberts, *Accountability in Athenian Government* (Madison, 1982) 139-40.

153 Exile/fines: e.g. Thuc. 4.65.3, 5.26.5 (Thucydides, cf. 4.104.4-107.2); prosecution: Pritchett, *War* 2.4-33; Roberts (*supra* n. 152) *passim*.

154 Paches: Plut., *Nie.* 6.1-2, *Arist.* 26.3; cf. Thuc. 3.18.3-5, 27-8, 33-6, 49-50; Diod. 12.55; Front., *Strat.* 4.7.17; Polyaeus 3.2. Roberts (*supra* n. 152:136-41) doubts the historicity of Paches' suicide, but offers no alternative explanation of Paches' end or the origin of the story. C. J. Tuplin defends the story's historicity: 'Fathers and sons: *Ecclesiāzusae* 644-45,' *GRBS* 23 (1982) 327-30.

155 Diod. 13.43.5; Polyb. 1.11.5. Romans later interpreted Carthaginian practice to mean that not only a general who suffered defeat but also one who planned poorly, even if victorious, was punished: see Val. Max. 2.7 ex. 1; J. Afric, *Cest.* 7.1.2; cf. Liv. 38.48.5; *De Vir. HL* 38.3.

156 Onas. 33; Phil. Mech, *Syn. Mech.* 5.D.20, 28, 68-9 Garland; Polyb. 10.3.7, 13.1-5, 24.2-5, 32-3, 41.2; Plut., *Pel.* 1-2, *Comp. Pel./Marc.* 3.2-3; Polyaeus 6.4.1; Lucian, *Dial. Mort.* 12.5.

157 Xen, *Anab.* 1.7.9. Later sources attribute this advice to Clearchus alone: Plut, *Artax.* 8.2; Polyaeus 2.23. Cf. Hanson 1989:111; Paul (*supra* n. 16) 307-8.

158 Diod. 14.23.5; Plut, *Artax.* 8.2-3.

159 Plut, *Lys.* 28.5 (cf. Xen, *Anab.* 3.5.18-19), *Comp. Lys./Sulla* 4.1-4, *Comp. Pel./Marc.* 2.3.

160 See Plut, *Pel.* 2.4; Nearchus, *FGrHist* 133 F 42.2 = Arr, *Anab.* 6.13.4; Polyb. 10.32.11; App., *Hann.* 50, *BC* 2.58.

161 Amm. 19.7.8; Fitzhugh Lee, *General Lee* (repr. Greenwich, Conn, 1961) 185-6. Cf. G. McWhiney and P. D. Jamieson, *Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage*

Κλοπή Πολεμοῦ: »Theft« in Ancient Greek Warfare

BY

David Whitehead

In his recent book on Pausanias, Christian Habicht issues a clarion call for a new commentary on that author, to draw upon the wealth of apposite archaeological and epigraphic material now available — and for scholars of the required stamina to contemplate manageable parts of such an undertaking even if prudently daunted by it *in toto*.¹ The present paper makes no contribution whatever in that direction, but does take as its starting-point a passage in Pausanias which even the existing commentaries, Frazer included, pass over in silence (1.13.5):

Λακεδαιμονίοις δὲ πρὸ μὲν τοῦ ἐν Λεύκτροις οὐδὲν ἐγεγόνει πταῖσμα, ὥστε οὐδὲ συνεχώρουν ἀγωνίᾳ πῶ κεκρατῆσθαι πεζῶ· Λεωνίδα μὲν γὰρ νικῶντι οὐκ ἔφασαν τοὺς ἐπομένους ἐς τελέαν ἐξαρκέσαι φθορὰν τῶν Μήδων, τὸ δὲ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Δημοσθένους ἔργον πρὸς τῇ νήσῳ Σφακτηρίᾳ κλοπὴν εἶναι πολέμου καὶ οὐ νίκην.

First some general remarks. Although the passage uses a vocabulary which betrays some signs of being Pausanias' own,² the grounds stated for discounting Thermopylai and Sphakteria as legitimate Spartan defeats, and thus as valid precedents for Leuktra, are represented as emanating from the Spartans themselves (ἔφασαν). Now it goes without saying that in this fully-developed, tripartite form (Thermopylai-Sphakteria-Leuktra) the argument cannot have been formulated before 371 itself. However, that fact alone could not exclude the possibility of an earlier version which simply linked Thermopylai and Sphakteria; and indeed such a conjunction appears elsewhere in Pausanias, as the burden of his namesake the Spartan king's case for making a truce with the Thebans at Haliartos in 395 (3.5.5). To quote the Loeb translation: 'Pausanias, fearing lest he should be caught between two enemy forces, made a truce with the Thebans and took up for burial those who had fallen under the wall of Haliartus. The Lacedaemonians disapproved of this decision, but the following reason leads me to approve it. Pausanias was well aware that the disasters of the Lacedaemonians always took place when they had been caught between two enemy forces, and the defeats at Thermopylae and on the island of Sphacteria made him afraid lest he

himself should prove the occasion of a third misfortune for them'.³

In addition to clarifying, for us, the precise nature of the perceived link between Thermopylai and Sphakteria — the fact that both hinged upon a surprise attack in the Spartans' rear, so as to catch them in a pincer movement⁴ — this second passage therefore offers strong corroboration that the Spartans themselves did think of the two battles as a pair, whether (as with king Pausanias) a pair of κακά which no sensible commander would risk repeating or else (as with the unnamed apologists of 1.13.5) a double-barrelled retort to any suggestion that the Spartans had known battlefield defeat in the fifth century. Used in either of these ways, the Spartans could no doubt have constructed the argument for themselves, and quite possibly they did; they were highly unlikely to forget the traumas of Thermopylai or (after 425) Sphakteria separately, and need not be thought to have required any prompting to remember them in tandem. If, however, any prompting occurred nonetheless, it may well have come from Thucydides; for it is he, in his account of the events on Sphakteria in 4.36, who first of all describes the surprise pincer movement itself and then, somewhat apologetically (ὥςμινηρὸν μεγάλῳ εἰνάσι), draws the Thermopylai analogy.⁵

Be that as it may, what emerges plainly enough is that by 371 if not earlier the Spartans were unwilling to concede that their opponents at Sphakteria had won a true victory (νίκη);⁶ they had merely pulled off what Pausanias calls (a)⁷ κλοπὴ πολέμου. Is the phrase Pausanias' own or what the Spartans actually said? An interesting but fruitless question, which I see no way of determining. What I should like to do instead is to show that in either case there is a good deal more to it than meets the eye.

On the surface, mere translation presents no problem. Some translators ignore πολέμου and concentrate on κλοπή: 'a cheat' (Frazer), 'une surprise' (Clavier). More usually an attempt is made to render the whole phrase: 'a trick in war' (W. H. S. Jones), 'a military trick' (Levi), 'une trahison de guerre' (Yon), 'un furto di guerra' (Musti). This last, Italian version serves as a reminder that the most obvious Latin equivalent of κλοπὴ πολέμου would be *furtum bellis* and so indeed it was rendered in the Romulus Amasaeus translation.⁹ But is any of this telling us what the notion of κλοπὴ in a military context truly meant? The crucial fact about the term κλοπή — and it applies, *mutatis mutandis*, equally well both to *furtum* and also to the English *stealth* - is that, as a cognate of the verb κλέπτειν, it in origin and essence denotes theft. Other connotations certainly develop, and sometimes they seem to predominate: surprise, secrecy, trickery, ingenuity, obliqueness. But on close examination an underlying idea of stealing something, whether concrete or (more interestingly)

abstract, is generally detectable and rarely absent.

A prime case in point is Xenophon, *Anabasis* 4.6.14, on which W. K. Pritchett makes an invaluable comment *obiter* in the second volume of *The Greek State at War*. One of the topics which Pritchett investigates there is ‘Surprise Attacks’, and in his opening paragraph thereon he writes as follows. ‘Parenthetically, we may remark that the Greek vocabulary seems to have developed no word for a surprise attack. The English-Greek Lexicon of C. D. Yonge-H. Drisler (New York 1870) offers the word κλοπή, and this same definition is found in LSJ 962 (»in warfare, surprise«); but the sole reference is to Xenophon *Anab.* 4.6.14, where theft is involved’.¹⁰ Just so. To be sure, Xenophon uses the word there of a plan which *mill in fact* depend upon taking the enemy by surprise, but the overall context scarcely warrants a bald definition of it in those terms. Rather, as Pritchett points out, the key notion is that of theft. The mercenaries are faced with an enemy holding a mountain pass and they discuss how best to negotiate this. Pointing out that the bulk of the mountain is apparently undefended, Xenophon himself advocates a nocturnal attempt to ‘steal’ (κλέφαι. 4.6.11) an unoccupied section of it as a diversionary tactic. He goes on, in 4.6.13, to say that in his opinion such theft (κλέφαι again) would be perfectly feasible, neither overseen nor overheard. And the nature of the operation as, very specifically, an act of theft is immediately underscored by the exchange of good-natured insults which then breaks out between the Athenian Xenophon and the Spartan Cheirisophos in 4.6.14-16, with each of them insisting that theft — skilful, successful and publicly-admired stealing (κλέπτειν, in various forms, a further seven times) — is a product of the educational system in which the other was reared.¹¹

When therefore, in 4.6.14 Xenophon sparks off this quickfire duel with the rhetorical question »But why am I the one talking about κλοπή«am I the one talking am I the one talking there would seem every reason to translate the term, quite simply, as theft, stealing something from the enemy. It is what Polybius, writing of the Cretans, calls κλοπὰς πολεμίων (Polyb. 4.8.11) — a phrase rendered by W. R. Paton in the Loeb edition as ‘tricks played on the enemy’ but, I am suggesting, more accurately and idiomatically understood (if not actually translated) as *theft from* the enemy. Xenophon, after all, twice enunciates the view that the successful general should be, amongst other things, a κλέπτης (*Mem.* 3.1.6, *Cyrop.* 1.6.27).

What then is he to steal from his enemy? In the first instance, at a mundane level, the enemy’s tangible possessions. That, we may take it, is what is envisaged by Xenophon in *Hipparchikos* 5.2, which lays down that one of the things the cavalry commander must do is τὰ τῶν πολεμίων... κλέπτειν. However, as we have already seen with

Anabasis 4.6.14, the concept of theft from the enemy might also take a rather more subtle form — that of stealing from him something which, while equally tangible, is not so much his actual property as merely something to which he has staked a prior claim. In the instance in *Anab.* 4.6.14 the mountain »belongs to« the Chalybes and their allies twice over: it is in their territory, and they have occupied it (albeit ineffectually) first. The idiom occurs again, briefly, later in the narrative (5.6.9) with reference to the mountains of Paphlagonia: Hekatonymos of Sinope advises against any attempt τὰ... ὄρη κλέφαι. 'Stealing across the mountains' is Rex Warner's translation here — but what *Xenophon* says is stealing the mountains themselves. Xenophon's ideal general, as we have seen, should be prepared to take on the role of a κλέπτης, and in his encomiastic biography of the man who (in his eyes) most closely approached that ideal Xenophon gives us the »theft« motif again: in *Agesilaos* 6.6 the Spartan king is represented as so adept at nocturnal operations as to have been able to deal with any and all enemy strongholds (ἐχυρά) — τὰ μὲν πάριων, τὰυέυπερβαίνων, τὰ δὲ κλέπων.¹²

One can therefore steal something which literally does belong to the enemy — his bootlaces, or whatever; and one can also be said to »steal« from him, to be (in relation to him) a thief, in respect of chunks of territory — not least *his* territory — which he has occupied first and which one decides to take from him covertly rather than overtly. So far so good. But does the identification of this second, less direct form of campaigning »theft« bring us back full circle to Pausanias and the κλοπή πολέμου of 425? Not so, for two reasons. One is the nature of the »theft« on Sphakteria, which Pausanias' own formulation obliges us to think of as the stealing, by the Athenians and their helpers, of something completely intangible: the victory itself. And the other, of course, is the unfavourable value-judgement, discounting a victory achieved by κλοπή as a true νίκη.

To take up this second point first: the notion of κλοπή in warfare evidently contains no intrinsic moral element. The moral element may or may not be there, depending upon the particular context; and we have already seen contexts, in Xenophon most particularly, where such an element is altogether lacking.

A pair of passages in Arrian's *Anabasis* provides further illustration and illumination. Arrian does not furnish us with an instance of a κλοπή in so many words, but he does, twice, use the verb κλέπτειν (3.10.2 and 5.10.3). In 5.10.3 Alexander, in 326, is on the west bank of the Hydaspes. Poros, elephants and all, is on the east bank, blocking his passage. Yet Alexander does pass: κλέφαι οὖν ἐπενόει τὴν διάβασιν, writes Arrian, which turns out to involve, first, a species of feinting tactic to induce Poros to stand his ground and then a

successful (if eventful) crossing, under cover of night, some seventeen miles upstream. Not the slightest suggestion is conveyed that any of this was morally dubious;¹³ if any implication is detectable at all, it is that of a sensible commander doing the sensible thing. Compare and contrast, therefore, 3.10.2. It is five years earlier, on the eve (literally) of the battle of Gaugamela, and Arrian presents a story (λέγουσιν: 10.1) of Parmenion suggesting to his king a surprise attack by night. ‘Alexander, however, replied, since others were listening, that it was dishonourable (αἰσγρὸν) to steal the victory (κλέφαι τὴν νίκην), and that Alexander had to win his victory openly and without stratagem’.¹⁴ Curtius Rufus has a more longwinded version,¹⁵ but in Plutarch Alexander’s reply, which he says became a famous one (μνημονευόμενον), is simply: οὐ κλέπτω τὴν νίκην.¹⁶ In his introduction to and commentary on the Arrian version, Brian Bosworth observes that the anecdote ‘is certainly designed to show Parmenion unconfident of the outcome — in sharp contrast to Alexander’ and he believes that it ‘may ultimately derive from Callisthenes’ derogatory portrait of Parmenion’¹⁷ At all events, Bosworth also, and more importantly for my purposes here, draws attention to another contrast, the one between how ‘baldly’ the κλοπή of 5.10.3 (the Hydaspes crossing) is presented and the ‘heroic overlay’ which covers this eve-of-Gaugamela story. Alexander’s riposte, Bosworth writes, ‘is characteristic of the heroic portrait of the younger Alexander, represented on every occasion as engaging the enemy frontally and under the most adverse circumstances. Failure was shameful (2.26.3), but the use of underhand stratagems to achieve victory was even more so’.

Did Alexander really say οὐ κλέπτω τὴν νίκην (or at least closely equivalent words to that effect)? It is not my concern to try to prove that he did, any more than that the classical Spartans — as opposed to Pausanias — really did call Sphakteria a κλοπή πολέμου. It must suffice to say that the sentiment in question was one which was *either* truly uttered by *or* plausibly attributable to individuals or groups who might wish to be seen as taking a high moral line on such matters.¹⁸

So much for the texts; the question now is, what to do with them? How to locate the notion of κλοπή within our understanding of the principles and practice of ancient Greek warfare as a whole?

The problem which this presents should already have emerged plainly enough. It is that there seems to be a fundamental contradiction here. On the one hand, the Spartans (if Pausanias is to be believed) cried »Foul« after Sphakteria; on the other, such ploys were all in a day’s work for Xenophon and the type of Greek general which he admired and exemplifies. The Gaugamela κλοπή suggested to Alexander is anathema to him — yet to cross the Hydaspes he

blithely puts into effect a plan which is hardly different.

Let us, for ease of argument, call the Gaugamela/Sphakteria type of κλοπή »bad« κλοπή and the Hydaspes/Xenophon variety »good«. I have said that there 'seems to be' a deep-seated contradiction between them. But actually my contention is that there *is* such a contradiction. To dismiss it as merely apparent would entail discounting, as real and important, one type or the other; and that we cannot and must not do. Our modern, cynical sensibilities, shaped by the idea that »all's fair in love and war«, will probably be tempted to claim a monopoly of reality for the »good« type, laughing off the »bad« as merely sour grapes (Sphakteria) or narcissistic posturing (Gaugamela). But our concern here is with *ancient* sensibilities, and they, manifestly, were different. Arrian's comment, for instance, on what Alexander said (or was said to have said) before Gaugamela is that it was big talk (μεγαλήγορον), not utter absurdity or incipient dementia.

At least part of the reason for this must surely be the durability, so to speak, of the root meaning *theft* in the term κλοπή, which I have been at pains to emphasise. We should, in other words consider but reject the possibility that for the Greeks of the classical and later periods this basic meaning was ever displaced by or submerged under other meanings, as has happened during the last two hundred years or so to the English *stealth*. After all, quite aside from other considerations (such as the apparent inter-changeability of idioms with the noun κλοπή and the verb κλέπτειν), the simple fact that κλοπή was the common technical term for the crime of theft cannot but have guaranteed its continuing comprehensibility in that sense; and although for normal purposes the field of battle and the courts of law might be thought to be worlds apart, we saw with Xenophon, *Anabasis* 4.6.14-16 how naturally a discussion of κλοπή could shift from the one to the other.

Now theft is indeed a crime, and was so in antiquity — something legally wrong because morally unacceptable; and that, some might feel, is warrant enough for a line of argument which would seek to claim semantic centrality for κλοπή not of the »good« type but the »bad«; to claim, that is, that the true nature of κλοπή πολέμου was that of a shameful backdoor route to success, which proved too tempting for the Athenians in 425 but could be manfully spurned (when it suited their book, at least) by the likes of Epameinondas and Alexander. On this line of reasoning κλοπή would be — as indeed Frazer translates it in the Sphakteria passage — nothing less than cheating, breaking the hallowed rules of the great game that was war; and people like Xenophon who not merely saw nothing wrong in breaking them but positively recommended doing so were quite definitely Players rather than Gentlemen,¹⁹ oblivious of the fact that

an engagement in war was a contest, an ἀγών, to be won in a properly chivalrous way and crowned with victory likewise.²⁰ What is more, an emphasis of this kind, on »bad« κλοπή, might seem to be readily reconcilable with the clear evidence for its »good« manifestation, also, in *historical/developmental* terms. In his commentary on Arrian 3.10.2, as we saw, Bosworth writes of the 'heroic portrait' of Alexander before Gaugamela, thinking of his honour and determined to behave decently and openly. Could it therefore be that »bad« κλοπή really belongs to the mentality of Homeric and pre-classical combat (phase A) and that it gradually gave ground to »good« during later and more brutally pragmatic epochs of warfare (phase B)?

I do not think that such a scenario can be accepted, for it distorts and caricatures both phases of the supposed development. As regards phase B, there is still ample evidence for the persistence of an »agon-model« of warfare. Over and above the continued use of the word ἀγών itself one could cite, for example, Polybius 1.57-58, with its string of such metaphors — the boxing match, the 'good umpire' (ἀγαθὸς βραβευτής), the fighting cocks — for the campaigning between Rome and Carthage in the mid 240s.²¹ And conversely, was warfare in phase A always conducted in the spirit of Pierre, Baron de Coubertin? Far from it. The ancient idea of an *agon* is by no means the same as our modern notion of »fair play«, and such a notion simply did not exist in the Homeric era.²² On the contrary, the military paradigms which the Homeric poems provided (Aristoph. *Frogs* 1034-36, etc.) were recognised as including numerous *sophismata* and *strategemata* (Paus. 4.28.7-8); and indeed one searches in vain in Homer for any model or precedent for the Plutarch-Cuitius-Arrian Alexander and his 'heroic' disavowal of such ploys. What we find instead is, for example, *dolos* as a perfectly fair way to win a duel (*Il.* 7.142 ff., cf. 197-98), *polemos* and *lochos* as equivalent fields of a warrior's endeavour (*Il.* 1.225-28, cf. *Od.* 14.217 ff., at 222), and even *lochos* as the best test of *arete* (*Il.* 13.276 ff.). The fact is that in order to bring forward any other assertions of the moral superiority of a straight fight over a stratagem we are obliged to look not to Homeric epic itself but rather to its retrospective, artificial analogue in *Latin* literature.²³

Our overall conclusion must surely be, then, that κλοπή πολέμου was an inescapably ambivalent concept, within the broader ambivalence of ancient attitudes towards appropriate and inappropriate routes to military success and to admirable and despicable human qualities therein displayed. Ancient warfare would not be the subtle and interesting phenomenon that it is if its only ethos was the one which we find in the genre of stratagem literature,

such as the *Stratagems* of Polyaeus and Frontinus. I referred earlier to the »alFs fair in love and war« doctrine; but even its most case-hardened modern adherents might be startled by the sheer devilry of some of the ruses which these writers so dispassionately record.²⁴ Nor can one easily divide commanders into sheep and goats, those who habitually played fair and those who did not. If Epameinondas ever said (or acted on the principle) that a night attack was a *κλοπή* and thus an unfair tactic, he was evidently prepared to resort to comparable ploys where necessary (Polyaen. 2.3.14, cf. Front. 2.2.12, a surprise attack involving a nasty trick with dust; Polyaen. 2.3.9, cf. Front. 2.5.26), as well as to lie (Front. 1.11.6), to fabricate religious manifestations (1.11.16, cf. 1.12.5-7), to disguise his troops as women (3.2.7), and to make covert retreats (3.11.5). And if Alexander truly did contemplate only to reject the idea of »stealing« victory at Gaugamela,²⁵ his equally »stolen« crossing of the Hydaspes duly found its place in the stratagem literature (Polyaen. 4.3.9, Front. 1.4.9), together with other successes of his based upon surprise and/or deception, such as the *σχῆμα προσκυνήσεως* of Polyaen. 4.3.5 (cf. *Excerpta* 18.5) and the surrender trick of 4.3.20.²⁶ Both of these sets of attitudes to war and how to win it co-existed and competed with each other, in all periods; and what I have tried to show here is that *κλοπή πολέμου* lies at the very heart of that fluctuating process.

1 C. Habicht, *Pausanias' Guide to Ancient Greece*, The Sather Classical Lectures, vol. 50 (Berkeley 1985) 64-65 and 94. In the chapter which spans these two passages he makes a magisterial start in answering his own call; see also his paper *Pausanias and the evidence of inscriptions*, *ClAnt* 3 (1984) 40-56.

2 Notably *πταῖσμα*: see Habicht, *Pausanias' Guide* (above, n. 1) 112 with n. 58.

3

Paus. 3.5.5.: ἔδεισεν οὖν ὁ Παισανίας διπλοῦ στρατιωτικοῦ πολεμίων ἀνδρῶν μεταξὺ ἀποληφθῆναι, καὶ οὕτω σκυνθᾶς τε πρὸς τοὺς Θηβαίους ἐποίησατο καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῷ Ἀλιάρτιῳ τελεχεὶ πεσόντας ἀνέλειπε. τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν ἐγένετο οὐ κατὰ γνώμην, ἐγὼ δὲ ἐπαίνω τῶνδε ἑνεκα τὸ βασιλευμα· ἅτε γὰρ εἰς εἰδὼς ὁ Παισανίας ὡς τὰ σφάλματα δεῖ Λακεδαιμονίους γίνονται ἐν μέσῳ πολεμίων ἀποληφθεῖν, τό τε ἐν Θερμοπύλαις καὶ ἐν τῇ Σφακτηρίᾳ νήσω δειῖμα ἐποίησατο μὴ σφισι καὶ αὐτοῖς τρίτου γένηται κακοῦ πρόφασιν.

4 Irrelevant here, it would therefore seem, is the Demosthenes-at-Pylos stratagem recounted in Polyaen. 3.1.1, which seems to be concerned with the initial occupation of Pylos and is not easily compatible with Thucydides' account of even that.

5

Thuc. 4.36.3: καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι βαλλόμενοι τε ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἦδη καὶ γιγνόμενοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἑμπύλωματι, ὡς μικρὸν μεγάλῳ εἰσάσαι, τῷ ἐν Θερμοπύλαις, ἐκείνοι τε γὰρ τῇ ἀτροπῇ περιελθόντων τῶν Περσῶν διεφθάρσαν, οὗτοι τε ἀμφιβολοὶ ἦδη ὄντες οὐκέτι ἀντεῖχον κτλ. It is of course entirely possible that Thucydides took the idea from the Spartans rather than *vice versa*.

6 Naturally enough those opponents disagreed: in 4.36.6 Pausanias tells us that the Athenians dedicated a bronze Nike on the Akropolis ἐς μνήμην τῶν ἐν τῇ Σφακτηρίᾳ (cf. 1.15.4, the shield dedications in the Stoa Poikile). Note also Paus.

5.26.1, where he mentions the marble Nike of Paionios at Olympia, dedicated by the Messenians of Naupaktos, but doubts their claim that Sphakteria was the unspecified victory that it commemorated. The Messenians' claim has won few modern adherents either, though there is no consensus as to the correct alternative: see (e. g.) J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias' Description of Greece* vol. 3 (London 1898) 643-46; R. Meiggs and D. M. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the end of the fifth century B.C.* (Oxford 1969) 223-24, no. 74, as corrected by F. W. Mitchel, *Three bars or four?*, in *ΦΟΡΟΣ: tribute to Benjamin Dean Meritt* (Locust Valley 1974) 107-109; L. H. Jeffery, *Some Nikai-statues at Olympia in the late fifth century B.C.*, in *ΦΙΛΙΑΣ XAPIN: miscellanea di studi classici in onore di Eugenio Manni*, vol. 4 (Rome 1980) 1233-39.

7 Why one might wish to omit the indefinite article will emerge below.

8 Note *furta belli* in Sallust, *Historiae* 1.86 Dietsch (= 1.112 Maurenbrecher); and compare *furtum armorum* in Silius Italicus, *Puntea* 17.90.

9 Taken over by (e. g.) C. G. Siebel (1822) and L. Dindorf (1882).

10 W. K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*, vol. 2 (Berkeley 1974) 156.

11

Xen. *Anab.* 4.6.14-16: ἀτὰρ τί ἐγὼ περὶ κλοπῆς συμβάλλομαι; ὑμᾶς γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὦ Χειρίσοφε, ἀκούω τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ὅσαι ἐστὶ τῶν ὁμοίων εὐθὺς ἐκ παλίων κλέπτειν μελετᾶν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καλὸν κλέπτειν ὅσα μὴ κωλύει νόμος. (15) ὅπως δὲ ὡς κράτιστα κλέπτῃτε καὶ πειράσθε λανθάνειν, νόμιμον ἄρα ὑμῖν ἐστίν, ἵαν ληφθῇτε κλέπτοντες, μαστιγοῦσθαι. νῦν οὖν μάλα σοὶ καίρος ἐστὶν ἐπιδειξάσθαι τὴν παιδείαν, καὶ φυλάξασθαι μὴ ληφθῶμεν κλέπτοντες τοῦ θροῦ, ὥς μὴ πληγὰς λάβωμεν. (16) Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Χειρίσοφος, καὶ γὰρ ὑμᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀκούω δεινοὺς εἶναι κλέπτειν τὰ δημόσια, καὶ μάλα θνητὸς θειοῦ τοῦ κινδύνου τῷ κλέπτοντι, καὶ τοὺς κράτιστους μέντοι μάλιστα, εἴπερ ὑμῖν οἱ κράτιστοι ἄρχειν ἀξιούνται· ὥστε ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὴν παιδείαν.

12 I take *πάριων* to mean bypassing rather than surpassing, which will then leave the distinction between *ὑπερβαίων* and *κλέπτων* as that of direct and indirect entry; this seems the best logical sequence.

13 It was, indeed, after this crossing and the successful battle against Poros which it led on to that Alexander founded Nikaia, Victory City (Arr. *Anab.* 5.19.4, etc.).

14

Arr. *Anab.* 3.10.2 (I have quoted the Loeb translation): ὁ δὲ ἐκείνῳ μὲν ἀποκρίνεται, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι κατήκουον τῶν λόγων, αἰσχρὸν εἶναι κλέφαι τὴν νόμην, ἀλλὰ φανερώς καὶ θνεὺ σοφίσματος χρῆναι νικῆσαι Ἀλέξανδρον.

15 Curtius 4.13.3-10, at 8-9: »Latrunculorum«, inquit, »et nimm ista sollertia est, quam praecipitis mihi: quippe illorum votum unicum est, fallere. meae vero gloriae semper aut absentiam Darei aut angustias locorum aut furtum noctis obstare non patiar: palam luce aggredi certum est: malo, me meae fortunae poeniteat, quam victoriae pudeat... «.

16 Plu. *Alex.* 31.10 ff., at 12: ὁ δὲ τὸ μνημονευόμενον εἰπὼν, Οὐ κλέπτω τὴν νίκην», κτλ.

17 A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrians History of Alexander*, vol. 1 (Oxford 1980) 295-96.

18 As well as Alexander, another possible case of this is Epameinondas. According to Polyaeus. 2.3.7, prior to his campaigns in the Peloponnese Epameinondas cultivated a reputation for never attacking before sunrise, ὡς ἐν τοῦ προφανοῦς διαμάχοιτο. However, in the excerpted version (*Excerpta Polyaei* 13.3) this phrase becomes more colourful and, for our purposes here, more significant: ὡς οὐδέποτε κλέφαι βούλοιοτο πόλεμον. The chances of this phraseology's being *echt* Epameinondrian are necessarily very remote indeed, but

it is still noteworthy that someone used it of him.

19 I should explain to non-English readers that this refers to the demarcation which used to exist in the game of cricket (and indeed was not abolished until 1962) between mercenary professionals and high-minded amateurs.

20 See R. Lonis, *Guerre et Religion en Grèce à l'époque classique: recherches sur les rites, les dieux, l'idéologie de la victoire* (Paris 1979) 231-61, at 253, on the nature and functions of Nike: 'la déesse qui apporte la victoire dans les compétitions guerrières est la même que celle qui préside aux compétitions sportives, musicales ou poétiques...' On the »agon- mentality«, in athletics and more generally, see the works cited below, n. 22, and in the bibliographical review by N. B. Crowther, *CW* 79.2 (November-December 1985) 129-31.

21 See F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* vol. 1 (Oxford 1957) 121-23; and note Polybius' references to the *nomoi* of war in such passages as 2.58.10 and 5.11.3.

22 See on this I. Weiler, *Agonales in Wettkämpfen der griechischen Mythologie* (Innsbruck 1969), and W. J. O'Neal, *Fair play in Homeric Greece*, *CB* 56 (1980) 11-14; and consult, more generally, D. C. Young, *The Olympic Myth of Greek Amateur Athletics* (Chicago 1984).

23 Notably Vergil, *Aeneid* 10.732-35, where Mezentius acts on such a principle in his fight with Orodes (atque idem fugientem haud est dignatus Oroden/ sternere nec iacta caecum dare cuspide vulnus;/ obvius adversoque occurrit seque viro vir/ contulit, *haud furto melior sed fortibus armis.*) Compare Ajax speaking of Odysseus in Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 13.103-104: qui clam, qui semper inermis/ rem gerit et funis incautum decipit hostem. In Polybius 4.8 — cited earlier for the κλοπὰς πολεμίων phrase in 4.8.11 — a series of contrasts is made between individuals and ethnic groups with particular strengths and weaknesses in different fields of war, including open battle and covert operations; here and there the language used could possibly be pressed to indicate the moral superiority of the former over the latter, but the great bulk of it is resolutely neutral.

24 One of my own favourites in this regard is Polyæn. 1.19 (Front. 2.5.41), the single combat between Xanthos and Melanthos, which the latter wins with an utterly outrageous »Look behind you« trick.

25 There is perhaps a faint (and generalised) echo of this in Front. 1.3.1: Alexander Macedo, cum haberet vehementem exercitum, semper eum statum belli eligit, ut acie ('in open battle', Loeb) confligeret.

26 See also Front. 2.5.17 and 3.7.4. For Alexander's attitude to νίκη, note also the ploy of the falsified sacrifice in 1.11.14 — though the same thing is attributed to Agesilaos by Plu. *Mor.* 214E-F and to Attalos by Polyæn. 4.20.

On The Possibility of Reconstructing Marathon and Other Ancient Battles

N. Whatley

[THIS paper was read to the Oxford Philological Society on October 22, 1920. Present: J. L. Myres (in the chair), A. C. Clark, J. A. R. Munro, J. K. Fotheringham, G. B. Grundy, E. M. Walker, W. W. How, J. U. Powell, R. H. Dundas, D. C. Macgregor, N. R. Murphy, G. H. Stevenson, M. N. Tod, H. M. Last, F. P. Long, J. Beil, and five visitors. It has never been published, though Mr Whatley has given a brief account of Marathon in the *Proceedings* of the Hellenic Travellers Club, 1927. It was intended to provoke a discussion (in which it failed) rather than for publication, and the author had thought that the publication of *CAH* iv made it out of date. It has, however, been in private circulation for many years, and Mr Hignett, among others, has acknowledged its influence. Mr Whatley has been persuaded to believe that it is perhaps only superficially out of date, and it is printed here more or less as it was delivered.]

I must begin with an explanation of my reasons for writing this paper. I have for some years been interested in modern attempts to reconstruct ancient campaigns and battles—especially those between Greece and Persia—in fact, most of the arguments I am using tonight were first written down in a rather different form in 1913. But I should not have thought it worth while to read them to this Society had not Admiral Custance's book, his lectures, his address to this Society and the discussion which followed it made me feel that this subject is still one of fairly general interest, that we are still far from arriving at certainty with regard to the history of ancient fights, and that it may be worth while to raise some general questions such as, 'How far it really is possible to reconstruct ancient battles with any finality' and 'how far the methods of attempting to do so usually followed by modern writers really are the soundest methods to employ'. I felt, for instance (and I think others did too), in the case of Admiral Custance, that so long as he was using his expert knowledge in cases where there was no doubt about the essential facts and no question of motive or intention, he was most convincing and illuminating. The Athenian fleet at Syracuse *was* made to wait upon the army and this *did* nullify its possible usefulness. Similarly his professional knowledge led him to insist on the fact (already emphasised by Macan, Grundy and Tarn, but constantly forgotten)

that ancient ships in line of battle cannot have been packed together side by side like hoplites. But he was less convincing when he proceeded to fix the interval between ships, when reconstructing the detail of the different fights and when interpreting the minds of generals and statesmen, I do not propose tonight to cover the same ground as Admiral Custance. But I hope it will be clear that whatever ancient campaign is selected for illustration the same fundamental problems with regard to the evidence arise in more or less degree. I want, if possible, to raise these fundamental questions for others, better qualified than myself, to discuss.

Nor do I propose to offer any fresh reconstructions. I am afraid that the more I study the subject the more sceptical I become about the possibility of reconstructing the details of these battles and campaigns with any certainty and of discovering what was in the minds of the admirals and generals who conducted them. In saying this I do not, of course, mean to suggest that the attempt at reconstruction should not be made. Not only would such a suggestion be useless, for no one can read Herodotus' account of Marathon, for instance, without automatically trying to reconstruct it; but also the mere fact of playing about with such problems must, I suppose, increase our familiarity with—ultimately, perhaps, our knowledge of—ancient life. But it must be frankly admitted that there is so far very little to show as a result of a generation of controversy in the way of undisputed new knowledge. Almost the only new fact concerning the Persian Wars about which all modern writers are agreed is the negative one that Xerxes' army was not really nearly so big as Herodotus represents it. And I cannot help thinking that modern writers often spoil a valuable piece of criticism or research by finding it necessary to tack on a constructive suggestion of their own. Obst's *Feldzug des Xerxes* is a good example of this. The book consists mainly of a thorough and valuable analysis of the narrative of Herodotus in relation to his sources and a summary of the chief modern views. Obst appears to have just the kind of mind for doing that part of the work excellently. Unfortunately professional etiquette compels him to tack on original views of his own with regard to the chief battles and these, with possibly one exception, are merely futile. I have some pet theories of my own about the Persian Wars, but they are the merest theories and to drag them into this paper would merely obscure my main idea of reviewing the whole situation. My rather brief experience of teaching makes me strongly of opinion that such general reviews are occasionally healthy. For inexperienced students at any rate the undiluted study of reconstructive theories is apt to have two undesirable effects: first, that they accept what are only clever hypotheses as established truths (I have constantly found this to be the

case with the Battle of Marathon) ; second, that they lose the wood for the trees. We shall never know exactly what happened at Marathon, but we know enough to be able to allot it its place fairly satisfactorily both in the History of the Art of War and in the Histories of Greece and Persia. I am not sure that this fact is not sometimes overlooked in the excitement of the hunt for the Persian Cavalry.

Of all controversial subjects, military history seems especially to stir very deep passions. I suppose there is usually so little evidence that what there is must be used with unrestricted force if it is to carry any conviction. But in this country, where military reconstruction is particularly popular, strong opinions have been expressed and criticisms uttered without much bitterness. We have not descended to the personal abuse which accompanies the controversies conducted by Delbrück on the one side and by Kromayer and Veith on the other, I hope that any controversial criticisms I make in this paper will be regarded as being much more humble in spirit than might be suggested by the rather bald expression of them which limitations of time make necessary. I want to emphasise this point, for the matter is a rather delicate one seeing that several of the authors I shall criticise are senior colleagues of my own (and actually present in this room). I only wish that there was time for me to begin by attempting to express my consciousness of the immense amount I owe to them.

To begin with I want to make a few remarks about military history generally. Battles of all periods are difficult things to reconstruct. In battle many and different events' happen simultaneously and changes are rapid. The actors are in a state of excitement and extreme nervous tension—the worst possible condition for viewing a situation with a proper sense of proportion. It is impossible for anyone to know what is happening in every part of an engagement and there is unlikely to be the occasion, even if there is the desire, for an impartial inquiry and examination of representative witnesses while the battle is recent and its memory fresh. There is the greatest difficulty in distinguishing what was foreseen from what was unforeseen, able generalship from a stroke of good luck.

It is particularly difficult to discover what was in the mind of a general. The general himself may not find it easy. No battle follows one simple plan. There are not only constant improvisations to meet new situations, but constant flukes and, above all, constant mistakes. But it is only human to forget the mistakes if they do not lead to disaster and the flukes if they lead to success. Similarly, outside opinion inevitably tends to regard what happened as having been carefully thought out and intended, which is by no means always the case. But I must give one or two illustrations. A Fellow of this College, being interested in the question of the value of the evidence of

participants with regard to the details of a battle, tried an experiment on the spot in the recent war. He had been out at night with a patrol of quite intelligent Territorials. Immediately on returning to our trenches he asked each man how many bombs he had thrown. The total of the answers came to 21: the correct total was 7. The N.C.O. was positive that the officer had recharged his revolver and that he and the officer between them had fired at least 12 shots. Really only 3 had been fired and the officer's revolver had not been recharged. In the same Battalion the Adjutant in describing a night working party said that there was a bright moon and he was surprised that the Germans did not fire: the Colonel, reporting the same occasion in the Battalion War Diary, said, 'Luckily it was a very dark night'. Similar instances will occur to everyone who has tried to reconstruct any military operation from the reports of participants. But there is similar disagreement about infinitely more important occurrences which one would at first think must from their very obvious importance have stamped themselves indelibly on the minds of all spectators. Who raised the white flag at Nicholson's Nek? Every Irish fusilier with, I believe, absolutely sincere conviction asserts that it was a Gloucester : every Gloucester, with equal sincerity, that it was an Irish Fusilier. To whom belonged the credit of shaking Napoleon's Old Guard as it came up the slope at Waterloo? To the British Guards in front or to the 52nd Light Infantry on the flank? The point has been disputed for 105 years, and even impartial spectators of that memorable scene were at variance. There is the same sort of doubt as to what was in the minds of the generals on great occasions. Was the Battle of the Marne premeditated by Joffre or did Gallieni let him in for it? Who is right about le Cateau, French or Smith-Dorrien? And yet, how many of us on November 11, 1918, innocently thought that now we should really know all about these things. Some of them may be cleared up when reputations have no longer to be saved, but only by means of official evidence such as did not exist in the Greek world. For in the case of modern wars we are in a comparatively advantageous position. For establishing a true narrative of events we have, to begin with, a keen contemporary interest in getting at a true history; specialists employed for this purpose; the Press and its correspondents; official War Diaries kept by every unit in the field and handed over at once to the official historians; written operation orders which are preserved; field messages written or signalled whenever possible and copies of them kept. The numbers of units present on any occasion are known from orders : the strength of these units from Ration States and similar evidence. Above all, we are completely informed about the organisation of the armies engaged, their drill, formations and methods of fighting ; the nature and limitations of the weapons they

employ.

To assist us in discovering the plans of generals we have their correspondence with their governments, the orders they issued, their diaries, memoirs, and those of their staffs. We know what course of study they pursued at the military colleges, what previous campaigns they may reasonably be presumed to have studied. As a result we can in the case of almost all modern wars get a very good general picture both of the strategy and the fighting; but we are still constantly in doubt about two things: (1) the exact details of what happened on any particular occasion, and (2) exactly what was in the minds of the generals, what was foreseen and what unforeseen. Yet these are precisely the things which modern writers reconstruct most positively in the case of ancient battles.

It will be argued against this that ancient battles were much more simple, and from some points of view this is certainly true. Otherwise we could not even attempt to reconstruct them. Ancient armies were much smaller (though Macan and Grundy are inclined to credit Mardonius at Plataea with an army several times larger than that of Wellington at Waterloo and than our own regular army in July 1914); but in the case of modern battles obscurity in detail is by no means restricted to the battles where large numbers were engaged, and ancient strategy and tactics were simple almost to crudity: ancient armies fought in close order and therefore in small space and the view of spectators was not impeded, as at Waterloo, for instance, by smoke. But here again there is another side. To begin with there were no expert spectators. Napoleon had an excellent view of Waterloo through glasses, waiting with his reserve, and even when his reserve went in he had no more thought of accompanying it than did Haig of assaulting the Hindenburg Line in person. But Callimachus had no reserve and was in the thick of it on the right wing; Miltiades was almost certainly with his tribal τᾶξις. Alexander in person led the charge of his cavalry into the unfortunate Persians and cannot himself have had any general view of his battles. Even Caesar, whom the Roman discovery of the value of a reserve made more detached, went into the front line when the situation was critical. Secondly, the Greeks, at any rate, had no permanent Staff and no War Office to prepare plans and organise reports—a fact so often forgotten by historians of the Persian Wars. Thirdly, close order fighting is not necessarily easier to reconstruct than open—at least in detail: an Association Football forward would find it easier to reconstruct a particular match than a Rugby forward, and a cricketer would find it easier than either. Fourthly, though Greek strategy and tactics were simple they seem to have been unscientific and rather illogical. War was treated rather as a religious ordeal. There is an element of the

heroic combat about many Greek fights besides those referred to by Professor Gardner in the paper on the Lelantine War which he read to this Society last year.¹ In wars between Greeks and Greeks, at any rate, a request for the return of corpses led automatically to a cessation of fighting. There was no attempt to follow up a victory. The two sides went home with as little attempt to molest each other as do the rival teams after a modern football match. Similarly there is very seldom any attempt to take advantages or effect surprises—to attack an enemy's phalanx before it is properly drawn up, for instance, which was the Roman way of dealing with a phalanx. Polybius² tells us that thought little of victories gained δι' ἀπάτης and not ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς; and the history of Greek warfare in the fifth century so far as we know it on the whole bears this out. But this kind of simplicity is not a help to the historian. From the military point of view it is extremely illogical. In modern times we can assume that every army is at least aiming at the crushing defeat of the enemy and is only fighting a particular battle as a means to that end. But that lack of hard logic about Greek warfare makes it as hard to reconstruct the actions of generals on *a priori* grounds of strategy as it is with the conventional warfare (in many ways so like Greek warfare except that it was fought on horseback) of the age of chivalry. (These last remarks do not apply to Philip and Alexander or to the Romans.)

We lack, then, in the reconstruction of ancient battles, those sources of information which are our chief assistance in dealing with modern military history—written orders, states, diaries and the like. Equally important is the fact that the ancient historians on whose narratives we have to rely were to all intents and purposes as much without this form of evidence as we are. Herodotus, certainly, had practically nothing of the kind; Thucydides very little; Roman historians rather more, because the Romans had more national instinct for preserving this kind of record. The technical military writers—Aeneas, Arrian, Vegetius and others—only rarely throw light on particular campaigns, though they are of some help towards an understanding of Greek and Roman armies. We are thrown back on ancient historical writers who usually take a knowledge of military routine for granted (Polybius and Josephus, who describe what to them are foreign armies, are an exception to this and therefore particularly valuable) and whose narratives are based on very few real military documents, but on more or less careful examination of participants in the battles or of previous similarly unscientific histories. We get the best results with painstaking people like Thucydides and Polybius. When they give a reasonably coherent story (Thucydides' account of the Sicilian Expedition, for instance) I think we may safely accept at least its main outlines. But where their

accounts are not wholly acceptable or do not give us as much detail as we should like (Thucydides on Mantinea, for instance, or Polybius on Cannae) and we want to reconstruct or supplement, we at once have to fall back on mere conjecture which, as far as I can see, is very unlikely in most cases ever to become anything else.

Of all ancient campaigns we undoubtedly know Caesar's best. In studying them we can start with a very fair knowledge of the topography of his various campaigns; quite reasonably good knowledge of the numbers engaged—at any rate on Caesar's side; and of the organisation, equipment and methods of fighting of Roman armies of the period. On top of this we have in Caesar's commentaries a clear, in many ways short, but at any rate authoritative, account both of what happened and of what was in the general's mind. Yet even with Caesar we are helpless the moment his account is incomplete or open to the suspicion of partiality. Where, for instance, was Caesar's cavalry in the last stage of the battle of Pharsalus? Did they not rally after being beaten back at first and take part in the flank attack on Pompey, or was this really carried out as Caesar suggests by about eight, cohorts of infantry only? If so this looks like another case of *χωρὶς ἱππεῖς*. In particular we suffer from not having a similar record written by - one of his opponents, Caesar's estimates of their numbers, for instance, are much less convincing. It must be remembered, too, that we do not know enough of the method of fighting of Caesar's army to reconstruct its battles in exact detail. We do not know, for instance, what was the depth of a cohort, whether there were gaps between cohorts, how the change was made from fighting *densis* to fighting *laxatis ordinibus*; and here again continuous controversy does not seem to be leading to a decision. Nor, I fear, is fresh evidence very likely to solve these problems of battles and tactics. It is very significant that in what is practically the only sphere of ancient history in which we are undoubtedly getting new military knowledge, as distinct from theory, namely, the Roman Empire, it is with regard to the organisation of the Roman Army and its frontier defences that our knowledge is enlarged. We do not get any nearer to solving the problems connected with particular battles (those at Bedriacum, for instance). In all branches of history I suppose we have a much better chance of reconstructing organisations and institutions than events and motives; but I hope I have shown that in the case of military history reconstructing the latter is quite exceptionally difficult and especially in the case of ancient history.

I now want to consider under separate headings the different methods employed by modern writers in their reconstructions. All, of course, start from the ancient texts though they vary considerably in their attitude to these; but as the texts are unsatisfactory

reconstruction can only be attempted with the use of certain Aids.

The *first Aid* is the study of geography and topography of the theatre of war and is employed by all modern critics, but especially by Grundy, Kromayer and many writers of specific articles (such as Sir William Ramsay's investigation of the topography of Xerxes' march through Asia Minor).³

Until someone with the necessary qualifications takes the trouble to do for an ancient campaign what Grundy has done for the Persian Wars and Kromayer for some of the less known later wars, examination of the campaigns is more or less futile. We cannot even argue about them. Topography gives us negative evidence which is almost irresistible. If a particular move is rendered absolutely impossible by the nature of the country, that move (unless there has been an earthquake since) never took place. An examination of a scaled map of the Straits of Salamis shows decisively that the battle of Salamis never took place as Herodotus described it and with the number of ships which he states. The importance of the study of topography to the military historian cannot, therefore, be exaggerated. It is an essential study, but cannot give positive results of itself. Let me take a simple imaginary instance. Suppose that someone had in the distant future to reconstruct a battle fought, say, in the neighbourhood of Shotover, his information consisting of rather vague Herodotean accounts which gave a general but no full or very clear account of the movements, but mentioned certain definite features —The Brickworks, The Reservoir, Open Brasenose, Blackbird Leys Farm—in connexion with these movements. By visiting the district the reconstructor might identify these sites rightly, but he would still be far from reconstructing the battle unless he also knew the numbers engaged, the orders issued, the formations adopted and the training manuals of the period. Only so could he discover among other things how much ground was covered, who was visible from where and when. I have fought many sham battles over that ground: the same topographical features were prominent in each, but the battles were entirely different. I have also given different bodies of cadets the same battle to fight—that is to say issued the same scheme and the same orders. But the resulting battles were never identical or even very similar, though precisely the same tactical features were there. Herodotus, in speaking of what is usually called the second position of the Greeks at Plataea, says that they were drawn up near the fount of Gargaphia and the precinct of the hero Androcrates. We will suppose that Herodotus is right in this. We will suppose, too, that some modern historian has rightly identified these spots (though there does not seem much prospect of general agreement). We are still far from knowing what position the Greeks took up, for even if we accept Herodotus' estimate

of the numbers we still do not know what formation the 38,000 Greek hoplites adopted. Supposing they were 8 deep: then they covered $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles frontage; if 16 deep, only $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles: if 4 deep, 5 miles. It makes all the difference, but we do not know. Where too were the 69,000 light-armed and attendants? Till we know that, and I do not think we ever shall, it is hopeless to try and trace on the ground the exact movements of the troops. It is impossible to say at exactly what stage of the battle the Greeks were hidden from the Persians by this or that hill. If the numbers for the two armies usually accepted in this country are even approximately correct the whole district must have been thick with troops; and it would be a clever staff officer who worked out orders for the supposed crossing of one another in the night (during the retirement from the second to the third position) by the Greek left and centre (16,000 and 20,000 strong respectively) which would not break every ordinary military rule of space and time. It is easy enough to draw little squares representing troops on the map, but it is extraordinarily difficult to make these squares correspond to the facts and realise how immensely they should increase in size the moment they are put in motion.

Topography, then, is an essential Aid to military history, but we want much more knowledge than it can supply by itself. It gives good negative results: to positive results it can contribute, but only in a limited degree.

The *second Aid* may be called the use of *a priori* deductions from modern works on Strategy. It is the method particularly followed by Henderson in his *Civil War and Rebellion in the Roman Empire*, in which the evidence of Tacitus is treated with suspicion and the campaigns are rewritten in accordance with excerpts from Von der Golz's *Nation in Arms* and Hamley's *Operations of War*. No other critic carries this method so far as Henderson, but it is very commonly employed. If the Persians, argues Munro, had intended to march on Athens from Marathon, they would have occupied the passes: they did not occupy the passes, therefore they did not intend to march on Athens. Custance employs this method constantly and every critic inevitably uses it to a certain extent. But it is a method which can justly be used only with the greatest caution, for it tends to make two false assumptions: first, that generals never make mistakes, whereas it is notorious that success in war consists in making rather fewer mistakes than the man on the other side; second, that there are certain great military principles which have been fully understood in all ages. Now it may be true that with a number of qualifications and if allowance is made for changes in armour, the introduction of gunpowder, etc., certain strategical principles are always true in the sense that their employment on suitable occasions always makes for success. Napoleon certainly found

it helpful to study Caesar's Commentaries. But it does not follow that generals have always been guided by these principles even today when they have Napoleons as their examples, a vast literature of military science, maps, an intelligence service, trained war staffs, and, above all, when they lead trained and disciplined armies. Much more was this the case in the Greek world before Alexander and Hannibal and Caesar had discovered the art of war and when untrained generals led half-trained troops. I doubt whether Napoleon himself could have been clever with a fifth-century Greek army unless he were given opportunity to train it—certainly not if his own experience of leading large armies was as small as that of, say, Pausanias, and if he had Homer's *Iliad* as his Field Service Regulations. Yet modern writers take up modern books on strategy and rewrite ancient wars in the light of them. The result is magnificent, but it is not ancient war.

Only three things seem to be universally true of all armies :

(1) That a man takes up a certain amount of room and that therefore a large army, especially on a narrow road, takes up a great deal of room. (Xerxes' army, for instance: compare what I have said above about Plataea.) Henderson seems to me to leave this out of account altogether in his reconstruction of the movements before the first battle of Bedriacum. From Herodotus downwards many writers about ancient wars have treated armies on the march as if they were flags stuck in with pins on a *Daily Telegraph* war map.

(2) That a man takes time to move and that with a long column when the head halts the rear takes a long time to come up with it (and yet someone is always surprised if an army on the march delays at all before delivering battle).

(3) That a man has a stomach which must periodically be supplied with food. I am almost inclined to add, though they are not of quite such universal truth :

(4) That generals make mistakes and do idiotic and irrational things, and

(5) That large bodies of troops are awkward things to handle, and when in contact with the enemy always tend to settle a fight in their own way.

As a note to my discussion of this Aid, I should perhaps just mention the drawing of analogies from modern battles. This again is not only irresistible, but may be of considerable help. But it must be used with great caution, for no two military situations ever are alike. Let me take just one example. Casson⁴ has compared the action of the Persians at Marathon with that of Von Kluck in the great German sweep of 1914. So far as this is a reminder that generals make blunders the quotation seems to me admirable; but when he states that the Battle of the Marne is the modern counterpart of Marathon and argues from the supposed parallel action of General Manouri that the Greeks were deployed at the foot of Mount Agriliki, he is, in my

opinion, on very dangerous ground. The analogy of modern battles is good argument for the possibility of certain general occurrences in certain types of situation in battle, such as delay, irresolution, over-confidence, etc. It will never prove reconstructive detail.

The *third Aid*—which no doubt overlaps the second—may be called *Sachkritik*, the attempt to reconstruct in accordance with *die Realität der Dinge*. It is the favourite German method.. Like the last it is an *Aid* which must be used—I am trying to use it myself in this paper—but is very constantly misused. On the whole I think we may say of *Sachkritik* as of Topography that it is much more valuable as negative than as positive evidence. To take a stock instance. Delbrück⁵ shows that if Xerxes' army really numbered the five millions credited to it by Herodotus and if, as in many places the geography requires, it marched along one road in a narrow column, even if it had much less baggage and as good march discipline as a modern army, then just about when the Advanced Guard reached Thermopylae, the Rear Guard was leaving Sardis. This is a very good way of proving that Xerxes' army was anyhow much smaller than Herodotus states. Hauvette's⁶ reply that the army marched in great squares can easily be destroyed by further employment of *Sachkritik*. A literal interpretation of the mile run at Marathon may I think be similarly disproved in spite of what Hauvette⁷ declares himself to have witnessed in the case of French soldiers. But the moment anyone tries to get positive results from *Sachkritik* the result is much less convincing. Take, for instance, Delbrück's method of fixing the size of the Persian army at Plataea.⁸ If the Persians had considerably outnumbered the Greeks at Plataea Mardonius would have detached a turning force. "He did not do so (according to Delbrück). Therefore the Persians did not outnumber the Greeks. As Delbrück by rather similar methods has fixed the strength of the Greeks at 20,000 hoplites and 40,000 light-armed, he concludes that therefore the Persians had altogether 60,000-70,000 men

One of the chief difficulties seems to be that it is hard to get agreement as to exactly what *die Realität der Dinge* is. Delbrück⁹ is very anxious, for reasons which I need not go into here, to prove that in the Macedonian phalanx which met the Romans at Pydna and elsewhere each man was allowed a frontage of only $1\frac{1}{2}$ feet. To support this argument he apparently borrowed the long spears in the Zeughaus in Berlin, armed his seminar with imitations of them and found that they could work quite well as a phalanx with only $1\frac{1}{2}$ feet to each man and claims to have proved his point. But Veith,¹⁰ who is a real Hauptmann, says that this is nonsense. He has drilled a lot and his whole military experience makes him certain that a man must have more room in the ranks than $1\frac{1}{2}$ feet. Again Delbrück¹¹ wants to prove that the gaps usually supposed to have existed between

maniples in the Roman army before the time of Marius were not really there at all. To do this he has to ridicule the well-known statement of Polybius¹² that at Zama, because of Hannibal's elephants, Scipio placed the maniples of the *principes* behind the maniples and not as usual behind the gaps of the *hastati* (i.e. so as to allow the elephants an attractive avenue to bolt along when they became excited). Delbrück thinks the whole idea mere imagination. Why, make avenues for elephants? Elephants, even infuriated ones, could perfectly well zigzag. He does not, unfortunately, seem to have borrowed elephants from the Zoologischen Garten in order to demonstrate this point with his seminar, but quite apart from the far-fetched nature of the argument, the inherent weakness of it is that even if Delbrück is right about the habits of elephants, Scipio may not have been equally well-informed, or if well-informed, may have been unwilling to take the risk.

I could continue this sort of thing indefinitely, but I hope I have said enough to show that the moment *Sachkritik* is used to give positive constructive results it is very easily abused.

Note to Aid 3 on Numbers. I am not in this paper going very fully into the problem of the numbers of ancient armies, immensely important though it is. The details of a campaign, for instance, cannot be reconstructed without fairly exact knowledge of numbers or at least of the number of units (legions, for instance) present on both sides. The exact number present with each legion, so long as we know it approximately, is not quite so important. For the general understanding of a campaign exact detail as to numbers is not quite so essential, though here too we must have approximate knowledge and above all we must know the relative strength of the armies engaged. Three methods are available for dealing with numbers :

- (1) To accept the numbers given to us by the ancient authorities.
- (2) To argue from probabilities and possibilities.
- (3) To deduce the numbers from what we know of command and organisation.

With regard to these;

(1) No one accepts all the figures given by the ancient authorities. Often they are incredible (Herodotus' numbers for Xerxes' army, for instance), and often the authorities contradict each other or themselves. Many modern authors, however, select a number here and there which suits their theories, but there is considerable variety of choice. Many suspect round numbers but jump at exact figures such as 1,207 or 53. Others (Tarn for instance) are more inclined to accept the round numbers because they look like evidence of a definite organisation. Beloch rejects both: round ones because they are round: odd ones because if you make a judicious selection and add them together they become round. Numbers of troops based on the calculations of participants in battles,

even generals, are so notoriously unreliable that I think it impossible to put much faith in the numbers given by Greek historians until we have evidence that scientific methods of counting were employed.

(2) The argument from possibilities and probabilities helps, as I have already argued, to reduce absurdly big numbers. It does not help so much to fix exact numbers. We cannot deduce the numbers from the tactics employed or from the casualty list (even if the latter is accurate). Munro's suggestion¹³ that 20,000 Persians fought at Marathon on the ground that 6,400 were slain and the Persian centre wiped out and that $6,400 \times 3 =$ about 20,000 is to my mind unacceptable as an argument even if the conclusion be approximately correct. A centre is not very likely to be exactly one-third of an army. It is a rough tactical not an exact mathematical division, nor is it at all likely that the centre was really exterminated or that the wings got off scot free, or that the survivors of the centre were equal in number to the killed of the wings. Still, Munro does not urge that argument at all strongly.

The argument from the analogy of what we know of the population of Greek states later in the fifth century is of some help with regard to Greek armies in the Persian wars, but every link in such chains of argument is weak and the conclusions arrived at cannot really be so positive as Beioch would have them.

(3) The argument from command and organisation is more promising at any rate with armies which, like the Persian, appear to have had a thorough organisation. Nothing is more attractive in the writings about the Persian Wars than Munro's discussion of the organisation and strength of the Persian army¹⁴ and Tarn's corresponding treatment of the navy.¹⁵ But even if the recurrence of certain round numbers such as 10,000 and 60,000 does point to some real bit of Persian military organisation, it is still possible to argue for 300,000, 180,000 and even 60,000 as the strength of Xerxes' army. Even if new evidence from Asia teaches us more about the Persian army we shall still probably remain uncertain as to what units of this army came to Greece and how far these units were up to establishment. There is enough evidence to justify ingenuity: not enough to hold out much prospect of certainty.

The *Fourth Aid* is what I think I may call the Sherlock Holmes method. This again is used inevitably by all historians, especially in this age of Quellenkritik, but its own particular master is Munro. Reading his article on Marathon leaves me with just the same feeling as reading Conan Doyle. It is so attractive and auch an artistic whole that it seems almost a crime to take it prosaically to pieces and inquire whether the steps in the first argument do follow one another so irresistibly as at first appears.

This Aid consists in a combined use of the three Aids I have previously mentioned together with an ingenious selection of statements from ancient authors of different periods and a subtle interpretation of them. Here I am touching on a very big question which affects a great deal of the modern interpretation of, at any rate,

Greek history and I want if possible to avoid raising that question in too general a form tonight, but ancient history does lend itself particularly to this kind of treatment. The subject, we have already seen, is one in which we often know little of facts and still less of motives, and thus a wide field is open for speculation. The evidence is very incomplete. There are obvious difficulties and gaps and the temptation to try to solve these difficulties and fill in the gaps is very great. It goes against the grain to admit that we cannot find out with greater certainty. The ancient accounts (that of Herodotus, for instance) are often tinged with a supernatural colouring and do not appear to be the work of military experts. This gives many opportunities for accepting one statement and rejecting another so as to suit a particular theory; also for inventing motives and strategical designs to explain the selection of facts which one has made from the unmilitary ancient historians. Furthermore, the ancient tradition of the Persian Wars grew and grew until by the early years of the Christian era it had incorporated many details which are absolutely contradictory to the statements of our ancient historians. I do not see any prospect of the most exhaustive Quellenkritik ever really deciding which of these details are late additions and which really go back to Ephorus or, even if it could, of deciding for Ephorus against Herodotus. It seems so clear that the Sherlock Holmes method began to be employed in a mild way very early in Greek historiography and the chances that the earliest account of a Greek war that we possess is the best seem to me very great indeed. But the modern method is so often to accept as sound any element in the later stuff which suits a particular theory (for instance, Nepos on the Athenian defensive arrangements at Marathon, Suidas on the Persian cavalry or Diodorus on Salamis) and to reject the rest as valueless, I cannot help thinking that a sounder attitude is that declared by Tarn to be his,¹⁶ that we cannot make much use of this late evidence, though it is at least interesting when we find that our own conclusions agree with it.

Lastly, the wars I am chiefly alluding to tonight belong to a period of history which every classical scholar studies and on whose interpretation there is, here in Oxford in particular, great concentration of energy. The evidence being what it is this has of itself, I think, made for rather excessive ingenuity. Each new writer or teacher tries to screw one little bit more out of it. Compare the very elaborate causes which are now usually alleged for the Peloponnesian War and contrast any ancient war which has not attracted many historians, where it will be found that people are still allowed to go to war for quite simple reasons and to fight in quite simple ways. I am going to deal with Marathon in a few minutes, but a few points about Marathon here will illustrate my point. Munro's theory argues from,

among other things, a supposed silence of Herodotus on one point, a rather strained interpretation of one phrase in Herodotus (about the Persians being in their ships when the shield-signal was made) which involves supposing that Herodotus has got the phrase from someone else and has surrounded it in his account with statements which are false, from an explanation in Suidas of the proverb *χωρίς ἰππεῖς* and from a statement in Nepos (though this is not urged strongly) that 100,000 Persian infantry were present at the battle, when he has previously mentioned 200,000 as the total Persian infantry strength—from these and other similar points it is argued that half the Persian infantry and all the Persian cavalry were on ship-board during the battle. (Incidentally Nepos says that all the cavalry were present at the battle and Suidas never says that they were on ships.) A comparatively slight supposed silence of Herodotus is thus employed as an argument in favour of a whole theory of the battle about which Herodotus is entirely silent and which in my opinion involves shutting up Herodotus as absolutely valueless at any rate on this battle. Yet How,¹⁷ in replying to Casson, argues for Munro's theory and maintains that in so doing he is arguing for the authority of Herodotus. It seems to me that it would be at least equally legitimate to argue back again from the silence of Herodotus as to the cavalry being in the ships and from Nepos' statement that the cavalry were present, to a battle very like that which one would naturally deduce from Herodotus' narrative. It is merely a question as to which of many flatly contradictory bits of late evidence you select. But more about Marathon later.

Note to Aid 4. Another rather popular method of dealing with the ancient evidence is to cling to one main ancient authority (Herodotus, for instance) and to try and get some fixed rule for his interpretation. The rule most commonly adopted is to suppose that Herodotus heard the views of soldiers who took part in the battle, but not the views of officers: that the facts in Herodotus are, therefore, more or less right, but that the interpretations put upon them are wrong or distorted. Henderson takes much the same view of Tacitus and Cushman of Xenophon. With regard to this matter I would urge :

(1) That to my mind fixed rules of this kind cannot be applied at any rate to Herodotus, who is good and bad on no fixed system. It is part of his charm.

(2) Even if it were correct it would not follow that we have got the facts right. I have already tried to show that a private soldier's imagination soon gives him a very false picture even of that part of a battle in which he was personally engaged and also he certainly applies what was only local to the whole fight. A much more critical investigator than Herodotus would be required to find out even the facts. Details of distance and the like would be particularly unreliable.

(3) The attempt to work out the theory in detail leads to what seem to me rather strained suppositions.

(4) I find it hard to believe that even in democratic Athens Herodotus, the friend of Pericles, should have got to know only the families of privates and never those of officers. This is at least equally true of Xenophon and more so of Tacitus or his sources.

I think that camp gossip did probably lead to many of the absurdities which have crept into our accounts, but recognition of the fact will only help us part of the way towards reconstruction.

The Fifth and last *Aid* consists in making the most thorough study from all sources of the armies engaged, their strategy and tactics, their weapons and method of using them, their system of recruiting and organisation, their officers and staff. This, when taken in conjunction with a judicious use of the other Aids I have mentioned, seems to be so extremely helpful, if only as a guide to the understanding of ancient authors, that it is surprising that it has not been more consistently employed. In the case of the Persian Wars, Macan makes frequent allusions to Greek military peculiarities, but his book contains no full consideration of the subject. He never, for instance, to the best of my knowledge, emphasises the difference between a Greek and modern army in the matter of a staff. Grundy draws constant attention to the difference between Greek and Persian methods of fighting, but his book on the Persian Wars does not, like his book on Thucydides, review the whole subject in full detail. Tarn, in his article on the Fleet of Xerxes, does base many of his conclusions, which are, however, rather far-fetched, on a thorough study of ancient naval warfare. But to the best of my knowledge Delbrück is the only historian of the Persian Wars who employs what seems to me to be the correct method of starting off with a study of the Greek and Persian armies. He is a historian of wars throughout the ages and has thus realised that in any age you must understand the armies before you can understand the wars. Unfortunately he is not a reliable Greek historian and his excellent method is spoiled: (1) By not being thorough enough. He omits an adequate treatment of the higher command of Greek armies and seems to assume that somewhere at the top is a German war-lord with a trained staff. (2) By misinterpreting the evidence about the Greek and Persian armies when, for instance, he says that the Greeks had no light-armed combatants and the Persian army was a small army of picked troops with no general levy. (3) By the blatant misuse of Sachkritik which I have already illustrated.

But on the whole modern writers have not made a sufficient use of what we can learn, little though that is, from the study of ancient armies. Occasionally a reference is made and occasionally a parallel quoted. But often, I think, further investigation will show that the parallel is not a real one, or that there are other instances which point

to a different conclusion. I will illustrate this when I discuss the inferences usually drawn with regard to Marathon from the behaviour of the Persian cavalry at Plataea.

The armies of different countries differ as much as the constitutions. No one would endeavour to interpret the political history of the age of the Gracchi without making a thorough study of the Roman constitution. I suggest that a study of ancient armies is equally necessary for an understanding of ancient military history.

In discussing these five Aids I have tried to give some idea of what is in my opinion the legitimate and the illegitimate use of them. I am afraid my discussion has consisted mainly of a scattered collection of remarks, but would it not be possible for some better qualified historian to propound principles of criticism whose general acceptance might act as a steadying influence in military reconstruction ? Have we not been rather carried off our feet by the great flood of research ? Where is it taking us ? The propounding of these questions is really the chief object of this paper. But I feel that in order to justify many of the criticisms I have suggested I must give rather more illustration than I have done. So I propose, in conclusion, without attempting to go into all the problems raised by the battle of Marathon, to offer a few reflections on one or two of the salient points in modern reconstructions of that battle.

I select Marathon for several reasons. Not because I agree with Casson's statement¹⁸ that 'Marathon, perhaps the most important battle in antiquity, is the least accurately described'. The importance of Marathon seems in many ways to have been exaggerated by most ancient writers except Herodotus, and even Herodotus shares in the exaggeration in Book ix, Chapter 27. It certainly was not one of the decisive battles of the world. It decided nothing, for the Persians came again in ten years. Certainly it illustrated, possibly for the first time, the superiority of the hoplite in close order to the skirmishing Persian; but not in a way which the Persians accepted as decisive. As for accurate description, one has, I think, only to wade through half a dozen of the campaigns that are known to us only through Diodorus, Plutarch and others, to realise that it is just because we do know quite a lot about Marathon that we are all so desperately anxious to know more. My reasons are rather :

(1) It is the first battle in Greek history that lends itself to criticism.

(2) The whole campaign is so small that the main problems stand out clearly.

(3) (My chief reason) It is the battle of all others in which at any rate in this country what are mere theories are tending to be regarded as established truths. Practically every English writer from Macan and Bury onwards has accepted the theory that during the battle the Persian

cavalry were on shipboard; practically every English writer since Munro has accepted his suggestion that half the infantry was on shipboard as well and that the landing at Marathon was a mere feint to lure the Athenians out. Grundy agrees with Munro on most points. How and Wells almost entirely; How, in the *JHS*,¹⁹ speaks of 'Theories already well known and in England at least widely accepted'. Caspari, in an earlier number of the *JHS*,²⁰ says, 'Why did the Persians offer battle at all in an unfavourable position and why did their cavalry take no part in the action? Since no adequate answer has been given to these questions, the presumption is in favour of the alternative theory which has been adopted by the leading English historians.'

So strong is the tendency to regard the embarkation of the cavalry as established that Casson in his earlier article²¹ while arguing for the acceptance of Nepos' view of the battle, which states that the cavalry were present and that the Athenians constructed special works (of a suspiciously Roman type, by the way) to render them ineffective, still accepted the fact that the cavalry were on board. 'Undoubtedly the Persian cavalry was re-embarked, not so much for its supposed utility on the plains of Phalerum, but because of the discovery of the deceptive nature of the place which had been specially selected for its manœuvres.' In his later article,²² logically, I think, he modifies this view. 'The presence or otherwise of the cavalry is of less importance if the battle proves to be the counterpart of the Marne.' I do not think it will prove to be that; but it is at least comforting to find Casson, the first Englishman for thirty years or so, hesitating to accept the embarkation of the cavalry.

First, then, how far are we well equipped with evidence with regard to Marathon? Herodotus' account contains a number of difficulties, some, I think, less serious than is often made out; but still, difficulties are there. They are not sufficient to prevent a general understanding of the battle, but they are sufficient to prevent a detailed reconstruction unless we have any other really good evidence. Unfortunately we have very little. The other literary sources either help us very little, such as Pausanias, or are of indisputably doubtful worth, such as Nepos and Suidas. The topography of the district is well known and assists a general understanding of the campaign; but although it limits the possible number of detailed reconstructions of the battle I do not see how it is ever going to decide definitely for any one. The Soros is a great asset, but though I entirely agree with those who argue that it probably marks the actual battleground, that of itself only rules out a certain number of hypotheses.

Archaeology has done a great work in proving the antiquity of the Soros, and it is quite conceivable that there is still something to discover by excavation—the site of the Greek and Persian camps, for instance. This would rule out still more hypotheses, but it would

probably start a number of new ones. With regard to the numbers we can, I think, regard 10,000 Athenians and Plataeans as right within a few thousand. But of the Persian numbers we are in complete ignorance. The fact that they came in ancient ships rules out the vast numbers of post-Herodotean writers, but whether they were equal to the Greeks, twice their number, or what, is merely a matter for conjecture.

I think, then, that it is reasonable to start an inquiry into Marathon without expecting either to solve all the problems raised by Herodotus' account or to establish much certainty on points of detail. I believe that if we do this we shall get nearer to the truth than we are likely to if we expect to explain everything, especially if we can put Marathon definitely in its proper place in the history of warfare. That involves seeing what use can be made of the fifth and last of the Aids I mentioned above, but unfortunately it is not possible within the limits of this paper to embark on a full discussion of Greek and Persian armies and their methods of conducting war. I must be content with a very few short extracts from what was originally a much fuller treatment.

The Persian Army. There is not time to discuss organisation, strategy and policy, but I must say a few words about tactics. How was the Persian army armed? Herodotus' description of the dress and armour of the different nations is almost certainly incomplete (unless a great many of them were very naked) and is probably not altogether accurate, but certain prominent features stand out which there is no reason to dispute :

(1) There were great varieties of armour and therefore varieties in method of fighting.

(2) There is (except in the case of the Assyrians and a few others) a marked absence of strong defensive armour. Therefore the infantry was very vulnerable at close quarters.

(3) There is a marked predominance of distance weapons (the bow, javelin, etc.) which confirms the impression that the natural role of the Persian infantryman was not hand-to-hand fighting, and this is borne out by what we know of their tactics in the wars with the Greeks. The Persian (whether mounted or on foot) hustled the Greek with arrows; at close quarters he was no match for the Greek hoplite. At Thermopylae, Plataea and Mykale this was clearly the case, and what we know of Marathon bears this out, although the army of Datis and Artaphernes was very likely a picked force. What formation the Persians employed we do not know, but probably it was much more open and less symmetrical than the Greek. Both at Plataea and Mykale we hear of Persians fighting gallantly in small groups.

The Persian cavalry was obviously an important arm of the service. Its tactics seem to have been like those of the infantry and it made great

use of the bow. It did not employ shock tactics, that is to say it did not close with unbroken infantry. (The action of the Theban cavalry at Plataea²³ is an exception which proves the rule. It was Greek cavalry and its victims were advancing in disorder.) The ordinary method was to ride up close to the infantry and shoot, then they wheeled and went back to prepare for another advance. (Masistius at Plataea.) Even in Asia against inferior infantry the Persians did not employ cavalry shock tactics until the opposing infantry was much broken.²⁴

With regard to Persian *ships* I need say very little here, but one can safely say three things: (1) That the number of horses carried in any fleet of the period cannot have been large. The facts, so far as I know them, of all ancient seagoing expeditions support this. (2) Ancient transports were uncomfortable, crowded and dangerous. They were merely a means of crossing water when this could not be avoided. Their first object was to get to land as soon as possible. (3) Though I, do not know how ancient horses were embarked and disembarked, it was, if modern analogies are worth anything, a troublesome business not undertaken more often than absolutely necessary.

The Greeks. Here again I can only mention a few points. Most of our evidence comes from a later period. It is not impossible that in 490 the Athenian Army had better organisation and training than sixty years later, but it is unlikely. The discipline quite possibly was better. . No Greek army of the fifth century, except Sparta's and possibly Boeotia's, has left to us these little glimpses of organisation which, I believe, always appear in the military records of states like Sparta, Rome and even Persia which have a proper system of discipline and subordinate command. Armies which have not got this are likely to rely on an orthodox type of tactics and on the use of men in bulk more than on individual trustworthiness. The Greek phalanx was a suitable formation for such an army, and there can be no doubt from what Herodotus says both of Marathon and Plataea that the Greeks already employed the phalanx (though we do not know its depth) whose members were armed as hoplites, that is to say their defensive armour was very strong and their offensive armour very strong at close quarters. But until he got to close quarters the hoplite could do nothing. He had not even the pilum of the Roman legionary. The hoplite phalanx on suitable ground at close quarters was a most formidable army. Its weaknesses were:

(1) Its clumsiness. Everything depended on the whole phalanx being properly drawn up. It was quite unsuited for sudden surprises. That is why when Greek meets Greek there is no hurry. Each side let the other's phalanx draw up in peace and it took two to make a fight.

(2) Its inadaptability. It held no reserves. Nothing was left to subordinates. It could only fight one type of battle.

(3) Its liability to confusion. So much depended on the unbroken line. It could not seek out an enemy : only a battlefield. Nor could it attempt subtleties. For much the same reasons it could not pursue.

The Greeks who fought Persia employed no cavalry at all. Light-armed troops were doubtless present on all occasions, but until the Peloponnesian War light-armed troops seem to have been almost untrained and to have played little part in the battle.

The Greeks and Persians from the point of view of one another. What did the Persian know and expect of the Greek ? He had met and conquered the Greek of Asia Minor, who had, however, put up a good fight. How far the Persian had actual experience of Greek infantry tactics we do not know; we do not, I think, even know whether the Ionians employed the hoplite phalanx. They probably did; but, as Grundy points out, the Ionian revolters can have had no military training for some thirty years or more; their phalanx would therefore be out of practice and easily thrown into confusion. This would give more opportunity to the Persian cavalry and may have led to an underestimate of Greek infantry. But what could the Persian do when he met a trained phalanx? If it encamped in the open his cavalry could ride up and shoot arrows at it, as in the second position at Plataea. His infantry could do the same, as against the Spartans at Plataea. But the enemy the Persians were used to were in the habit of fighting in this way too. It is easy to imagine that the Persians were puzzled when at Marathon, the first engagement, the Athenians advanced to close grips at once. (That, I think, was what surprised the Persians; not a mile run literally interpreted but the fact of closing without the preliminary bow and arrow business.) How were the Persians to deal with this? The cavalry which could hustle the Greeks at rest seems to have been quite ineffective against the phalanx in action at close quarters (in the final stage of the battle of Plataea, for instance). Mardonius' curious treatment of the Phocians might even be fancifully interpreted as an attempt to find out what would happen if he charged unbroken hoplites with his cavalry. 'The Persian horse having encircled the Phocians charged towards them as if about to deal out death with bows and arrows ready to let fly, nay here and there some did even discharge their weapons. But the Phocians stood firm, keeping close together and serrying their ranks as much as possible; whereupon the horse suddenly wheeled round and rode off.'²⁵

On the other hand, what would the Greeks think of the Persians? No doubt they were frightened of them, but Athenians in small numbers had dared to go to Sardis; the Ionians had held out for a long time, and Miltiades at any rate knew how the Persians fought. They had every reason to feel fairly confident about their prospects when they got to grips : the problem was how to get there. For, in the open,

Persian arrows, if not very destructive, were at least most unpleasant.

I once umpired a Field Day on Roehampton Common between the Kensington Cadets armed with carbines and the Westbourne Boy Scouts who relied on the use of the staff at close quarters. I thought of the Persian Wars, for the real interest in the detail of the fighting in these wars is that the two sides fought in quite different ways. It was the spear versus the bow, as Aeschylus says. How could the Greeks get to close quarters without heavy preliminary loss? No wonder that at Marathon, Thermopylae and Plataea there were delays before the fights.

One last point. In all ancient warfare the Intelligence service seems to have been bad (in the preliminaries to the battle of Issus for instance). I think the Persians and the Greeks were probably much more in the dark about each other's movements than is often supposed.

From this point of view let us approach the modern English theories of Marathon; and I will first deal with the two points common to all the theories and go on to deal with a few of those raised more particularly by Munro. The two points are: (i) Where was the Persian cavalry during the fight? (2) Why was there delay and why did the battle finally take place?

(1) The Persian cavalry. It is argued that the cavalry were embarked before the battle. The only evidence put forward for this is (i) the absence in Herodotus of any reference to the cavalry during the battle, during the Greek pursuit and in the casualty list, (ii) Suidas' explanation of the proverb *χωρὶς ἱππέων*. Other evidence has been put forward in support of some division of the force, but no other for the specific inclusion of the cavalry in the separated portion.

First, I should like to repeat that, though it is not necessary to suppose, as Beloch²⁶ very typically does, that only horses sufficient for officers and orderlies can have been brought over, the evidence of other naval expeditions is in favour of the cavalry being few in number and small in proportion to the infantry. Also that simply on grounds of general probability, which I admit are not final, nothing is in itself more unlikely or more absurd from a military point of view than a re-embarkation of the cavalry. Incidentally they were the only troops who would have had any chance of stopping the Athenians returning to Athens. Infantry cannot act as a retaining force to infantry unless they block the line of retirement.

Now as to the silence of Herodotus. It is argued that as at the battle of Plataea Herodotus tells us that Persian cavalry checked the Greeks' pursuit we should have heard the same at Marathon if they had been there. At Plataea the Persians were retreating to a camp which cavalry

would enter last: at Marathon to the ships which, owing to difficulties of embarking, they must obviously reach ahead of the infantry if they were to get on at all. I do not think I need say more. As to the absence of all reference to horsemen and horses in the casualty list, this is very regrettable; but if it means that no cavalry took part in the battle we must, to be logical, argue that in practically all ancient fights the cavalry were removed before battle. There is, for instance, no such reference in Herodotus' much fuller account of the battle of Plataea. The argument proves nothing at all. So we pass to the more serious argument from the supposed absence of reference to the cavalry in the actual battle. I say 'supposed' because Herodotus seems to me most clearly to imply that they were there, not so much in his remarks about the Persian reasons for landing at Marathon as when, in one of those passages which read so very much as if they came from a Persian source—possibly a Persian prisoner—he says how surprised they were to see a mere handful of men coming on without horsemen or archers. If I read in an account of a golf match that Braid on coming to the first tee expressed surprise that Taylor's bag did not contain a niblick, I should be justified in inferring that Braid had a niblick himself. I have always inferred from Herodotus' account that the cavalry were there with the infantry. But what did they do? I imagine that they were at the very least reduced to the value of Persian infantry by the rapid closing of the Athenian phalanx. This is entirely supported by Herodotus' account of the battle of Plataea, which is almost universally quoted to prove the opposite. At Plataea so long as the Athenians are at rest on the hills the Persian cavalry harass them, but do not close and are driven off; when the Greeks advance and encamp in the open the Persian cavalry makes itself very unpleasant, but again without closing. When the Greeks retire the Persian cavalry hustle them, but the moment the Spartans and Tegeans take the offensive and close with the Persians the cavalry disappears from the picture as completely as at Marathon until it as suddenly reappears during the pursuit, and that in spite of the fact that Herodotus' account of Plataea is much fuller in its detail and the Persian cavalry were much more numerous. Mardonius, we are told, was on a white horse; otherwise the one bit of Plataea which resembles Marathon is described by Herodotus with a precisely similar silence about horses and horsemen. Herodotus does mention (ix. 63) *λογάδας τοὺς ἀρίστους χίλιους* as fighting especially gallantly with Mardonius. These may be the 1,000 picked cavalry. Herodotus expressly says that they were on the defensive and resisted attacks, i.e. they did not do what everyone says the Persian cavalry must have done at Marathon if it had been there, namely, attack in flank or rear. The Greeks had no cavalry at all in either case. Clearly Persian cavalry

did not dare to close with an unbroken phalanx or dared and failed. Herodotus, who is writing of things that happened and seldom mentions things which did not happen, is quite consistent in saying nothing about them.

But what about Suidas? It seems to be generally agreed that he lived about A.D. 1000—considerably closer to Macan and Munro than to Marathon. Great as is his apparent honesty, is it really conceivable that a version of Marathon so entirely different from that of Herodotus can have been a genuine version which blushed unseen not only by Nepos, Trogus, Pausanias and their sources, but also by the well-read author of the *de malignitate Herodoti* who is at special pains to find fault with Herodotus' account of Marathon? That there was a proverb *χωρίς ἱππῆς* is of course probable. But it is a not very likely or is at any rate a very pointless proverb for fifth-century Greece, in whose states cavalry existed not at all or in very small numbers and was quite ineffective in battle. On the other hand, it was a very natural proverb in the years after the battle of Adrianople, when cavalry came into its own. But once the proverb existed its attribution to Marathon was not unnatural. Marathon became *the* ancient battle, an earlier Hastings; and any intelligent reader of Herodotus' account in the centuries following A.D. 378 would, judging by the warfare of his own day, be surprised at the apparent inactivity of the cavalry, just as we are today until we study the warfare of the period. But, argues Macan, the circumstantial detail in Suidas goes to prove the genuineness of his statement. I cannot help feeling that the circumstantial detail, though it may support the origin of the proverb in some definite incident, is only one more argument against its having any connection with Marathon. Ionians, says Suidas—and it is surprising to find Ionians in a picked force so soon after the revolt; still, they might have been sailors—Ionians climbed up into trees and signalled to the Athenians that the cavalry were away. Now to me this is merely incredible. Did they use Morse or Semaphore? In the Peloponnesian War there is a good deal of evidence for the use of simple signals, probably of a pre-arranged type. But this implies a definite alphabet. That the Athenians and Ionians had such a thing which they could mutually understand and which could be employed from trees and read at a distance before the discovery of telescopes is more than I can swallow. And why should it be necessary? The embarkation of horses is not only a noisy business, but must have been considerably more visible at any rate than an Ionian up a tree. I mention all this not very seriously but simply to show what the accepting of Suidas involves, especially when he is further strained to support modern theories. For Suidas says nothing about ships; at least I can find nothing though I read in one recent work, 'The fact that the

cavalry were embarked (Suidas) is the strongest evidence that the move on Athens was to be made by sea'.

If Suidas supported anything at all it would be the absence of the cavalry foraging or its employment on some such tactical turning movement as that of Hydarnes at Thermopylae. But there really is no evidence at all in favour of this embarking of the cavalry. It is in itself most unlikely, and I cannot see any serious difficulty in supposing that the cavalry was present at the battle.

(2) The second problem—the delay before the battle and the reasons for its finally taking place—cannot be dealt with so precisely, because there is not the same agreement among modern writers. All seem to see a need for some ingenious explanation of the battle, but some (Grundy, for instance) are not worried by the delay. I will therefore deal with the delay very shortly. If the Greeks were going to attack, it is asked, why delay when there was fear of treachery? If the Persians were going to attack, why delay when there was a chance of Spartan reinforcements to the enemy? I can only reply that there has been delay before half the battles in history. Opposing armies are always extremely unlikely to delay while they make preparations (disembark stores, for instance), conduct inquiries or hope that the other side will make a mistake. Delay is especially likely if, as probably at Marathon, the smaller army is the more strongly posted. Compare the delays at Thermopylae and Plataea which have also caused what seems to me unnecessary worry. Here at Marathon was the added reason that one side expected reinforcements and the other treachery (for that like so many Sherlock Holmes arguments can be used both ways). The two forces were differently armed and had no experience of one another. The warfare of the period made a battle unlikely until both sides wanted it. Compare the numerous occasions in ancient history in which one army 'offers' battle: for instance Caesar's in the days preceding Pharsalus. More modern parallels are equally numerous, but I will only mention one. The manoeuvres of Cromwell and Leslie which culminated in the battle of Dunbar afford a parallel with Marathon which superficially (compared for instance with the battle of the Marne), is quite extraordinarily close. I do not want to deduce any reconstructive detail from the parallel: there were of course great differences. But it is legitimate to use it as an illustration that delay in war is quite usual.

What then led to a fight? Two opposing armies constantly delay. On the other hand there is almost sure to be a fight before long. A situation such as that at Marathon produces a gradually increasing tendency to collision. Hunger, cold, ambition, mere impatience, and above all misjudgement—all have their influence. There is very likely no sufficient military reason. The history of war is very largely the

history of generals selecting the wrong moment for attack. Why did Pompey finally accept battle at Pharsalus? Why did Leslie finally come down into the plain at Dunbar? The latter, at any rate, is usually recognised to have made a blunder; and Cromwell's 'The Lord has delivered them into our hands' is a parallel to the Persian 'Look at these fools coming on without cavalry and archers', with just this difference—that Cromwell was right and the Persians wrong.

It also seems to me that the expression 'taking the offensive' is often used rather wildly. It is often hard to say which side did take the offensive. At Pharsalus Caesar was trying to bring on a battle for some days, but the actual day was fixed by Pompey drawing up his army for battle. Then in the battle itself the tactical offensive was taken by Caesar. At Dunbar the strategical offensive was taken by Leslie when he came down to the plain, but the tactical offensive by Lambert's cavalry. Wellington's usual tactics in Spain can only be described as defensive-offensive. At Marathon the tactical offensive was, I think, certainly taken by the Athenians; but from Herodotus' account it seems extremely likely, as has been pointed out by others, that the Persians challenged them by drawing up their army and offering battle; just as the Peloponnesians did, though without success, outside Athens during their first invasion of Attica.

But I do not pretend to be able to interpret exactly what passed through the Athenian generals' minds. I do, however, insist that there is no justification for the way Marathon has been discussed as though it were very peculiar in these matters.

Finally, just one or two remarks about Munro's theory. Munro, I should say, never claims that it is more than a theory. 'The theory put forward', he says, 'does not contradict any well-accredited fact in the evidence, nor involve imaginary causes.' I cannot subscribe to that, but it is the more recent tendency to regard his theory as final which makes a further reference to it imperative. I have already dealt with the cavalry problem. For the supposed division of the infantry the additional evidence is so slight that there is hardly anything to argue about. Everything in Nepos' account, especially the numbers, seems to me palpably unreliable. The suggestion that the shield signal, which according to Herodotus was only shown when the Persians were in their ships, was really when half of them were in their ships, still leaves the same difficulty that the Persians took action before the signal. If their intelligence service was so good that they knew that the signal was imminent, as Munro suggests, why was it necessary to employ so cumbrous a method of sending the final information? With what we now know of the value of tales about signalling to German submarines, I think we may well give up all hope of fixing the exact place of the shield signal in the story. An at first sight stronger

argument of Munro is that the landing at Marathon must have been a feint to lure the Athenians from Athens. 'Why burden themselves', he says, 'with a march of five and twenty miles through the enemy's country when their fleet might have put them at once within striking distance of the city?' How and Wells put it more strongly still. 'Nor is it likely that the Persian leaders doubted their power to force a landing on the open coast near Phalerum.' But the whole of military history, ancient and modern, shows that landings on foreign soil are generally made, if possible, away from the defending army. The Athenians, it is true, landed near Syracuse, but they first drew the Syracusans away by a fictitious message (they did not divide their force), for, says Thucydides,²⁷ 'They knew that they would fail of their purpose if they tried to disembark their men in the face of an enemy who was prepared to meet them'. Compare the great difficulty Caesar has in landing in Britain, where he fails to secure an unopposed landing. Contrast his easy landing in Epirus. But there is no need to go far afield for parallels. Immediately before Marathon the Persians attacked Eretria. In this case they landed at three different places, one of which, Tamynae, was some fifteen miles distant from Eretria.²⁸ Why? Did they doubt their ability to land closer or were they intending to lure the Eretrian army out of Eretria? I cannot find that any modern writer has noticed this simple parallel. I suggest that the landing at Marathon was the most natural thing in the world and was due to a combination of simple causes. It was a good landing-place, fairly near Eretria and more or less on the direct route to Athens, where the Persians could disembark their cavalry and stores undisturbed. As I have said before, the ancients used ships as little as possible when they could use land, and to land at Phalerum would not only involve a longish sea voyage round a promontory, but would at the very least have been an extremely difficult operation in the face of the Athenian army. But, says Munro, if they intended to march on Athens from Marathon the Persian generals had quite time enough to send an advanced guard to occupy the passes. How and Wells are again more positive. 'The idea that the Persians intended to march from Marathon on Athens is decisively negated by the fact that they made no attempt to seize the passes leading from the plain of Marathon towards Athens.' As so often it is here argued that a general cannot make a mistake, though history is crowded with instances of omissions by generals to take obvious precautions. And what does 'occupy the passes' mean? There is no Thermopylae between Athens and Marathon. Even if there had been, the detaching of a small body of Persians would not have denied it to the Athenians. The language of an age of machine guns is inapplicable to an age of bows and arrows. To occupy the passes the Persians would have had to detach

several bodies each of which would have had to hold a position which could easily be forced or turned by superior numbers. It would have been a mere waste of men. Nor, even if successful, would it have secured the Persians an approach to Athens unless they occupied the Athenian end of the passes. To send scouts out would be reasonable ; they may have done it, but if so the fact is recorded neither here nor on most other occasions in ancient warfare when the sending out of scouts seems reasonable. There are very few references in Greek historians to scouting, still fewer to the more solid protective duties, especially to the holding of advanced positions by small outposts.

To me it seems much more likely that the Persians had the surprise of their lives when the Athenians came out to Marathon. What the Persians finally did, or would have done, when thus cornered I do not know. They might have tried to re-embark their whole force, they might have tried to force their way through to Athens. Their position was a very difficult one. The Athenians finally accepted a challenge to battle. That at least seems most likely from Herodotus and is intrinsically most probable. If anything more elaborate happened we can only say that the means of discovering what it was are irretrievably lost.

Yet I do not wish to argue that there are no unsolved problems connected with Marathon. The importance to be attached to the possibility of treachery is a great problem which I do not pretend to solve. I would only point out that it is unlikely that, as seems often to be supposed, all the loyal men came to Marathon while the traitors were graciously excused the levy and allowed to remain behind. Nor have I attempted to meet all the arguments raised in favour of modern theories. If it is urged that their strength is in their cumulative effect I will try to deal with others during the discussion. I feel that I have said enough to make clear my point that though we cannot hope to reconstruct all the detail, Herodotus' account may not be quite so inadequate when judged in the light of what we know of contemporary warfare as it is if we take it apart from its context, and that where the evidence fails it is better to admit the fact. As Strachan-Davidson writes of German pamphlets in the introduction to his Polybius: 'I find myself in agreement with each of them in turn as each upon one point or another is content to accept the plain statements of Polybius or to draw obvious common-sense inferences from his language. Beyond this, unless I am mistaken, little has been discovered or can be discovered of sufficient certainty to justify us in receiving it as history. Of most of the propositions advanced I feel myself compelled to repeat "It is probable and the contrary is also probable". When, as is too often the case, the theory leads along an elaborate series of deductions into direct contradiction with a

statement of Polybius, a more decisive verdict may be pronounced upon it.'

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¹ CR xxxiv (1920) 90-1.

² xiii 3. 2-3.

³ JHSxl (1920) 89ff.

⁴ JHSxl (1920) 44.

⁵ ' *Die Perserkriege und die Burgunderkriege*, 138.

⁶ *Hérodote*, 311 —12.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 261.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 144.

⁹ *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, i3 433.

¹⁰ E.g. in Kromayer-Veith, *Heerwesen u. Kriegskunst*, 358.

¹¹ *Perserkriege u. Burgunder kriege*, 269 ff. esp. 303-4.

¹² xv 9. 7.

¹³ JHSxix (1899) 189 1. 1.

¹⁴ Ji/Sxxii (1902) 295-8.

¹⁵ JHSxXviH (1908) 202ff.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 203, but *cf.* 232. vol. lxxxiv

¹⁷ JHSxxxix (1919) 48 ff.

¹⁸ JHSxl (1920) 43.

¹⁹ xxxix (1919) 48.

²⁰ xxxi (1911) 104.

²¹ *Klioxiv* (1915) 69 ff.

²² JHSxl (1920) 44.

²³ Hdt. ix 69. 2.

²⁴ Hdt. vi 29. 1.

²⁵ Hdt. ix 18. 1.

²⁶ *Griechische Geschichte*, ii2 2, 80-1.

²⁷ vi 64. 1.

²⁸ Hdt. vi 101. 1.

Othismos: The Importance of the Mass-Shove in Hoplite Warfare

Robert D. Luginbill

As A RESULT of recent work on hoplite tactics, the traditional notion that *othismos* (ώθισμός), or literal shoving, played a decisive role in hoplite battles has been called into question.¹ Since this long-standing idea has come under attack as a theoretically improbable tactic, it seems appropriate, after a brief examination of the traditional view and the objections lodged against it, to offer some arguments of a likewise theoretical nature in support of the assumption that hoplite battles were generally decided by a mass-shove.

1 The Traditional View

A brief survey of the contemporary historians yields a fairly persuasive *prima facie* case for the traditional assumption that hoplites pushed *en masse* to punch through an enemy phalanx. Herodotus characterizes the struggle which occurred over the body of Leonidas at Thermopylae as “a great shoving”(ώθισμός πολλός, 7.225), and his description of Marathon argues for the mass-shove, for he attributes the success of the Greek flanks to their mass and depth (το δέ κῆρας ἐκάτερον ἔρρωτο πλήθει, 6.111; cf. 6.113). Literal pushing is also evident in Thucydides. At Delium, swollen torrents prevent the flanks of either army from engaging, but the centers collide in a “fierce struggle and pushing of shields” (καρτερᾷ μάχῃ καὶ ώθισμῷ ἀσπίδων, 4.96), while at Anapus, breakthrough occurs only after the Ar-gives and Athenians have “pushed back” the Syracusans opposite them (ώσαμένων, 6.90). We get much the same picture from Xenophon, who tells us that at Piraeus, part of the Athenian line was actually pushed into the marsh of Halae (ἐξέώθησαν, *Hell.* 2.4.34), that at Leuctra the Spartans were “shoved back” by the mass of the Theban phalanx (ὕπὸ τοῦ ὄχλου ώθούμενοι, *Hell.* 6.4.14), and that at Coronea, the opposing sides “set shield against shield and pushed” as they “fought, killed, and were killed” (συμβαλόντες τὰς ἀσπίδας έωθοῦντο, έμάχοντο, ἀπέκτεινον, ἀπέθνησκον, *Heil.* 4.3.19). While it may perhaps be possible to interpret the “pushing” in these and similar passages as metaphorical, or to see it as something less than decisive, the reason for the longstanding assumption about the primary importance of *othismos* in hoplite

battles should be clear: it flows from a natural reading of the best available contemporary witnesses to this sort of combat.²

II Objections to the Traditional View

The Press of Arms

Could hoplites really fight and shove? Later sources attest to the fact that in post-Classical times, at any rate, massed infantry formations did employ the tactic of generating force by the bodily pressure of rank upon rank.³ Polybius (18.30.4) explains that “by the very weight

of their bodies” (αὐτῷ γε μὴν τῷ τοῦ σώματος βάρει) the rear ranks of the Macedonian phalanx contribute to the battle by “pressing

the forward ranks in the charge” (οὗτοι τοὺς προηγουμένους κατὰ τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν πιεζοῦντες) and thus “lend impetus to their advance”

(βιαίαν μὲν ποιοῦσι τὴν ἔφοδον). Arrian’s comments are similar (Tact. 16.13-14).⁴ In his opinion, one cannot gain the same advantage by massing cavalry in depth as one can from massing infantry. For by melding with those in front, he says, the infantry forms a single cohesive mass from many parts

(συνεχεῖς γιγνόμενοι τοῖς πρὸ σφῶν τεταγμένοις ἐν τι βάρους τοῦ παντὸς πλήθους ἀποτελοῦσιν). It is clear, moreover, that this “advantage” of infantry over cavalry is one of increased physical pressure produced through pushing, for, as he tells us, it derives from the fact that cavalry cannot “press” (ἐπερείδειν)

horse to horse or “shove” (ἐπωθοῦσι) those in front as infantry can.⁵

Despite this testimony, however, the feasibility (and, therefore, the importance) of literal *othismos* in the Classical period has been questioned on precisely these grounds. The press of so many men in a true *othismos*, so the argument goes, would knock the front ranks off balance, making it virtually impossible for them to make effective use of their weapons.⁶ However, Arrian’s description of the manner in which the physical pressure is applied (Tact. 16.13-14) helps to explain how such force might have been exerted without robbing hoplites of the stability necessary to manipulate shield and spear. Arrian tells us that infantrymen do not stand with shoulders squared to the fore;⁷ rather each soldier “presses” on the shoulder and side of the man in front κατὰ τοὺς ὤμους καὶ τὰς πλευρὰς αἱ ἐνερείδεις

γίγνονται τῶν πεζῶν), not on his back. This explanation of the mechanics of pushing is consistent with Xenophon’s description of the Egyptian phalanx in the *Cyropaedm* (Cyr. 7.1.33). He tells us that the

Egyptians' shields (ἀσπίδες) "are an aid in pushing" (πρὸς τὸ ὠθεῖσθαι συνεργάζονται) when they are set on the shoulder (πρὸς τοῖς ὤμοις οὔσαι).⁸ These passages suggest that pushing could be accomplished without a "shove in the back," and the implications for hoplite warfare of the Classical period are significant. For if the hoplites of this time also stood at an angle, not parallel, to the enemy line, and received the "push" in the side (or right shoulder) instead of in the back, they would be better able to brace themselves against the surge from the rear, thus keeping their balance.

There is, in fact, substantial evidence to suggest that hoplites routinely adopted just such a posture, commonly known as the "striding stance."⁹ In this oblique stance, a most natural one for men marching forward in ranks,¹⁰ the left leg and shoulder were advanced toward the enemy, the right leg and shoulder were drawn backward to the right, and the shield was angled forward to the left. The resulting "open v-shape" of this stance enabled front-rank hoplites to hold their opponents at a greater distance than they would otherwise have been able to do with shields parallel and shoulders squared.¹¹ Advancing left shoulder first with the shield thrust forward at an angle, a hoplite could more easily avoid being thrown off balance, while at the same time directing the pressure from behind forward, thus transferring the shock of the push to the enemy line with the edge of his outstretched shield.¹²

Phases of Battle

Was the pressure generated by *othismos* then continuous, or was *othismos* a tactic used primarily in the final phase of battle? The "final phase" theory of *othismos* rests heavily upon Herodotus' account of Plataea (9.62).¹³ Here Herodotus describes the battle between the Spartan and Persian infantry after the collapse of the wall of shields (τὰ γέφυρα) as fierce and protracted "until they came to *othismos*" (ἐς ὃ ἀπίκοντο ἐς ὠθισμὸν). This has been taken to mean that the Spartans engaged in loose-formation single combat with the Persians until, suffering the loss of their spears, they resorted to the "tactic" of *othismos*. It is unlikely, however, that the Spartan line found itself in any position to engage in such individual combat during this second phase of the battle, because it must have already been formed into close-formation to push down the Persian barricade during the first phase. Herodotus' narrative suggests as much, indicating that after the battle opened with a struggle for this defensive barricade, the wall of shields "fell down" as a result of the fight (ἐπεπτώκει). The clear implication is that the Spartan line *pushed* it down in the course of their attack in the same way that, at the battle of Mycale, the allied

force broke through an identical Persian shield-wall by physically knocking it over as they advanced in ranks (διωσάμενοι γὰρ τὰ γέρρα οὗτοι φερόμενοι ἐσέπεσον ἅλεις ἐς τοὺς Πέρσας, 9.102). The clause in question (ἐς ὃ ἀπίκοντο ἐς ὠθισμὸν) is best taken as a description of the eventual displacement of the Persian line through the continuing pressure of *othismos* (present from the start). Understood in this way, the clause would mean that after breaking down the wall of shields, there was a long, fierce fight around the temple of Demeter “until [the Spartans] finally reached the point of pushing-through”¹⁴ The reference then would be not to the commencement of *othismos*, but to the eventual Spartan success in driving the Persians back.¹⁵

The notion that the hoplites of that day had either the discipline or the training to change from an open formation engaged in individual combat to the close order necessary for a push has been justly criticized.¹⁶ It would also have been impractical. No loose formation could hope to resist a mass-shove. Since the first side to organize for *othismos* would thus necessarily be victorious, there would naturally be a huge incentive to form up ready to push from the very start.

Tie Question of Stamina

This brings us to a third objection to the traditional position on *othismos*: namely, that since *othismos* could not be long sustained, it would not have been a permanent fixture in pitched battle.¹⁷ While the length of hoplite battles may bear upon this problem, it is important to note that protracted combat and *othismos* were not mutually exclusive.¹⁸ In his description of the battle of Delium, Thucydides relates that it ended at nightfall νυκτὸς ἐπιλαβούσης, 4.96); yet, as we have seen, he characterizes the battle as a “fierce struggle and pushing of shields” (καρτερὰ μάχη καὶ ὠθισμῷ ἀσπίδων, 4.96).

A consideration of the possible mechanics of *othismos* may help to explain how its force could be sustained over prolonged periods. In cases where the *primus impetus* did not serve to break the cohesion and shatter the ranks of one of the two lines, we can surmise that the initial shock gave way to a protracted struggle in which the tension caused by continuing *othismos* would wax and wane as the individual hoplites relaxed or intensified their efforts, much in the manner of a “tug of war” in reverse, with the important provision that the very front ranks would be simultaneously engaged in fierce combat. Fatigue, terrain, casualties, skill, courage, and cowardice would doubtless all play a role in varying the amount of force imparted by the leading edge of shields, but whenever two opposing phalanxes

“came to grips,”¹⁹ the physical pressure of *othismos* would normally continue until one side literally pushed the other to the breaking point. Polyaeus preserves a tradition which explains how Epaminondas broke just such a deadlock at Leuctra. While the issue of the battle was in doubt, the Theban general encouraged his soldiers to push one more step forward (ἐν βῆμα χαρίσασθέ μοι, καὶ τὴν νίκην ἔξομεν, 2.3). They did, the Spartan line shattered, and the battle was won.²⁰

III Arguments in Support of the Traditional View

If it is true that the idea of a literal, sustained *othismos* poses problems of a theoretical nature for adherents of the traditional view, it is also true that there are certain elements of hoplite battle for which an actual, physical pushing is the best explanation. These elements, then, to the extent that they argue for the importance of mass, physically applied, advance the case for *othismos* beyond the explicit literary evidence.

The Importance of Order

As Aristotle points out, hoplites are useless “without good order” ἀνευ συντάξεως, *Pol* 4.10.10, 1297b20). This judgment is confirmed by the historians. Thucydides informs us that it was for the sake of maintaining especially tight and well-ordered ranks that the Spartans eschewed the charge, and instead made a habit of advancing slowly into battle to the sound of the flute (5.70). Moreover, his *History* is replete with instances in which a disorderly line brings about defeat.²¹ In one particularly notable case, he relates how Brasidas assured his own outnumbered troops that their Lyncestian opponents would not prove their equals in a fight, since they observed no disciplined order (οὔτε γὰρ τάξιν ἔχοντες, 4.126.5). Herodotus cites the Persian deficiency in tactical skill relative to the well-drilled Spartans as a significant factor in their poor showing at Thermopylae (ἀν οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι μάχεσθαι ἔξεπιστάμενοι, 7.211) and their defeat at Plataea (ἀνεπιστήμονες ἦσαν καὶ οὐκ ἔξεπιστάμενοι, 9.62). In both cases, this deficiency is made manifest by the Persian tendency to break ranks in the heat of battle.²² Xenophon is also concerned with good order, equating it with safety in his initial harangue to the Ten Thousand (Anafe. 3.1.38). At Leuctra, moreover, it is the disruption of the Spartan phalanx which he sees as at least partially responsible for the overall Theban victory (*Hell* 6.4.13).

Since hoplites were notoriously vulnerable to attacks from the flank, an unbroken line was a necessity under any theory of hoplite

warfare. The examples cited above, however, speak to the importance of maintaining order *within ranks*. If hoplite battles were essentially a mass compilation of *monomachiae*, as indeed *othismos* skeptics claim, a formation seven or eight men deep would be unlikely to develop gaps in the line as a result of confusion in the ranks. Once the two opposing lines were engaged, the sheer mass and depth of the phalanx would tend to prevent the opening up of holes through mere attrition. If, however, direct physical pressure were to be brought to bear through *othismos*, a phalanx whose members were not properly lined up in ranks one behind the other would find itself at a considerable disadvantage in a mass-shove. The *othismos*, then, helps to explain the emphasis placed by contemporary sources upon this principle. With its ranks in disarray, a phalanx was “off balance” : that is, without the physical cohesion necessary to withstand the shock of *othismos* and thus more susceptible to being pushed back or ruptured by the physical pressure exerted by an opposing line.

The Charge

One means of producing physical shock was the charge, a brisk advance whose purpose it was to smash the mass of one’s own phalanx into the enemy line with maximum force.²³ Marathon was, to Herodotus’ knowledge (6.112), the first instance in which a Greek phalanx charged its opponents at a dead run. Yet Thucydides’ characterization of the Spartan habit of advancing slowly (βραδέως, 5.70) as exceptional among the Greeks suggests that an energetic advance of the type employed by the Argives at Mantinea was the norm (ἐντόνως καὶ ὀργῇ χωροῦντες, 5.70). This initial, swift advance did occasionally, however, develop into a run, as at Cunaxa, when one part of the Greek line found itself lagging behind and began to race forward, causing the entire phalanx to follow suit (Anab. 1.8.18). Thucydides tells us that at Delium the Athenian line dashed forward against the Boeotians “on the run” (4.96.1). Whether a particular “charge” was delivered at a literal run (as at Marathon, Cunaxa, and Delium), or at a rapid, forceful marching pace (as at Mantinea), vigorous assault was a standard feature in hoplite battles.²⁴ While a swift advance might convey the additional benefits of enhancing morale and limiting exposure to enemy missiles,²⁵ these factors alone cannot explain the development of the charge into a hoplite convention, given that hoplites charged whether or not missiles were a problem, and given that even short charges in heavy armor were physically exhausting.²⁶ The charge made a literal clash of lines inevitable, since a rapidly advancing, heavily-armed formation of hoplites eight ranks deep would have to halt abruptly in its tracks to

avoid a physical collision with an equally determined, advancing enemy force.

Concentration in Depth

In the Classical period, we know of only a few occasions when a phalanx of hoplites was drawn up for battle with a depth of less than eight ranks.²⁷ Since the length of the average hoplite's thrusting spear measured two to three meters overall,²⁸ initially only the first (and possibly the second) rank would be able to bring their spears to bear.²⁹ The additional ranks seem unnecessary, unless we understand that their purpose was to lend weight for pushing. It is wrong to think of these additional hoplites as reserves, whose primary job it was to step in and replace their comrades in the front-rank as these were wounded or killed.³⁰ While fallen front-rank fighters were replaced by those behind them, hoplite battles were not decided by attrition. Long before the number of hoplites in the rear ranks of either side had been depleted, one phalanx or the other would crack and flee.³¹ Nor should we see the purpose of these multiple rear ranks as merely one of boosting morale by encouraging those in front and preventing their untimely retreat.³² Soldiers take encouragement from those who can actually render them direct assistance (as the rear ranks could not in the absence of *othismos*). Furthermore, the front ranks would be the last to take up precipitous flight, being the elite of the army, selected for their courage, strength, and skill.³³ In any case, multiple rear ranks dedicated exclusively to such purposes would be superfluous.³⁴

Attempts to explain phalanx depth apart from the value of mass and the shock which mass imparts seem particularly ineffective in the case of the Theban phalanx which was 25 deep at Delium (Thuc. 4.93), and 50 deep at Leuctra (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.12), or in the case of the Boeotian phalanx at the river Nemea, which Xenophon tells us was significantly deeper than sixteen ranks (Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.18). Boeotian hoplites were not in need of greater encouragement or coercion than their opponents, and any incremental psychological advantage gained by this multiplication of ranks could not have compensated for the very real danger of being outflanked (given that a concomitant shortening of the line would be necessary to produce such depth).³⁵ In each of these three battles, Delium, Leuctra, and the river Nemea, the Theban and Boeotian hoplites did achieve significant breakthroughs, which are best explained by the increased force of *othismos* which the additional ranks produced.³⁶

Concentration in Width

In certain cases, the task of breaking through an opponent's phalanx

was accomplished by concentrating one's own formation not only in terms of depth, but also in terms of width. Xenophon describes such a situation in his account of the battle of Coronea (*Hell* 4.3.16–19). The Thebans contracted their interval before charging (συσπειραθέντες ἐχώρουν ἐρρωμένως, 4.3.18), and as a result were successful in their attempt to break through the Peloponnesian line. Thucydides (1.63.1) also describes a similar occurrence, reporting how Aristeus “drew his men together” (ξυναγαγόντι τοὺς μεθ’ ἑαυτοῦ ὡς ἐς ἐλάχιστον χωρίον) in order to force his way into Potidaea on the run (δρόμῳ βιάσασθαι ἐς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν).³⁷

Instances of closing ranks to increase shock-effect are also to be found in later sources. Plutarch (*Pel* 17.2) records that Pelopidas used the same tactic to good effect at Tegyra where he drew his hoplites into a tight formation (εἰς ὀλίγον συνήγαγεν) with the expectation that, in spite of the superior numbers of the enemy overall (ὑπερβάλλοντας πλήθει τοὺς πολεμίους), his own highly concentrated force would thus be able to cut through at the point of impact (ἐλπίζων καθ’ ὃ προσβάλῃ μάλιστα διακόψειν).³⁸ The picture given by Diodorus is similar. During the siege of Halicarnassus, Ephialtes’ forces won an initial success against the Macedonians by attacking in a formation which was notably compact as well as deep (ἐν βαθείᾳ φάλαγγι πεπυκνωμένων, 17.26.4), assuming that such mass would make them invincible (δόξαντας διὰ τὸ βάρος ἀκαταγωνίτους εἶναι, 17.26.4).³⁹ They were only defeated after the Macedonian veterans likewise concentrated and closed ranks against them (συναθροισθέντες καὶ συνασπίσαντες, 17.27.2). Diodorus also tells us that it was with a similar result that Epaminondas organized a select group of hoplites into an unusually tight formation during the battle of Mantinea (ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς ἀρίστους καὶ μετὰ τούτων συμφράξας, 15.86.4), and was then able to cut through the enemy phalanx with this concentrated force (διέκοψε τὴν φάλαγγα τῶν πολεμίων, 15.86.5).

In each of the above cases, the tactic of massing hoplites into an unusually tight formation by reducing their file intervals provided some degree of success. Given the increased difficulty a hoplite would have manipulating his weapons in a restricted formation of this sort, such a tactic would seem curious indeed, unless we understand that the concentration thus achieved paid a direct and tangible benefit by increasing the physical pressure of *othismos*.

Othismos helped to make the phalanx of the Classical period the successful military machine it was. Until the advent of superior tactics, only similarly armed and organized hoplites who were equally willing, in Xenophon's words, "to set shield against shield, push, fight, kill, and be killed," could hope to oppose it effectively.⁴⁰

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1 The latest attack on the significance of *othismos* has been launched by G. L. Cawkwell in "Orthodoxy and Hoplites," *CQ* NS 39 (1989) 375-389. Expanding arguments first made in his *Philip of Macedon* (London 1978) 150-157, Cawkwell claims that individual weapons-play was the heart of hoplite warfare, and that *othismos* would be used (if at all) only in the later stages of a battle. Other important opponents of the traditional view are A. D. Eraser, "The Myth of the Phalanx-Scrimmage," *Classical Weekly* 36 (1942) 15-16, and Peter Krentz, whose article, "The Nature of Hoplite Battle," *CA* 16 (1985) 50-61, finds *othismos* to be little more than a metaphor. Those taking a more traditional approach include J. Lazenby, "The Killing Zone," in V. Hanson, *Hoplites* (London 1991) 87-109; V. Hanson, *The Western Way of War* (Oxford 1989); W. K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War* (Berkeley 1971-85) 1.175; 4.65-73; J. Buckler, "Epameinondas and the Embolon," *Phoenix* 39 (1985) 134-143, at 141-142; J. K. Anderson, "Hoplites and Heresies: A Note," *JHS* 104 (1984) 152; and A. J. Holladay, "Hoplites and Heresies," *JHS* 102 (1982) 94-103.

2 Among military historians of the pre-war era, there is general agreement on the importance of literal shoving in battle. H. Delbrück, for example, in his *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte* 1: *Das Altertum* (Berlin 1920; new ed. by K. Christ, Berlin 1964) 32, refers to the "physical" contribution of the rear ranks in pitched battle, and sees the force so developed as a basic principle of hoplite tactics. J. Kromayer and G. Veith, although viewing *othismos* as a tactic used toward the end of a battle, nonetheless see it as decisive (*Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer* [Munich 1928] 85). See also H. Droysen, *Kriegsalterthümer* (Freiburg 1888) 90-103, and F. Lammert, *RE* (1938) 1637 s.v. Phalanx.

3 On the value of later tactical writers for hoplite issues see E. L. Wheeler, "The Occasion of Arrian's *Táctica*," *GRBS* 19 (1978) 351-366; idem, "The Legion as Phalanx," *Chiron* 9 (1979) 303-318; and idem, "The Hoplomachoi and Vegetius' Spartan Drillmasters," *Chiron* 13 (1983) 1-20.

4 The citations in this article from Arrian's *Táctica* follow the edition of A. G. Roos (Leipzig 1967).

5 Compare Mauricius' remark about the comments of "the ancients" on this same point: οὐδὲ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς πεζικῆς τάξεως, ἐκ τῶν ἀπισθεν διὰ τοῦ βάθους ὀπισθοῦς τις γενέσθαι δύναται, ἵνα καὶ ἀκοντες οἱ πρωτοστάται τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐπὶ τὰ πρόσω ποιοῦνται, ὅτι μὴ παρῦκασιν οἱ ἔποιοι μετὰ τῆς ὄψεως αὐτῶν συμφώνως, ὡς οἱ πεζοί, ἀθεῖν τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν (*Strat.* 2.6).

6 The point is made by Krentz (above, n. 1) 58 f.; Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* (above, n. 1) 151-152; Fraser (above, n. 1) 15 f.; and A. W. Gomme, *Essays in Greek History and Literature* (Oxford 1937) 135.

7 Compare *Tact.* 3.5, where Arrian speaks of "the leg which is thrust forward in battle" (τῆς κνήμης τῆς ἐν ταῖς μάχαις προβαλλομένης).

8 While Xenophon means that the shields are set on each soldier's own left shoulder, the fact that the Egyptian infantry lead with their left shows that we are to understand an oblique stance of the type Arrian described: i.e., the left shoulder and shield are placed against the right shoulder and side of the forward rank.

9 Many contemporary bronzes, friezes, and vase paintings illustrate this posture: the bronze warrior statuette from Dodona, G. Richter, *Sculpture and Sculptors of the Greeks* (New Haven 1929) 379, fig. 100; the warrior reliefs on the east frieze of the Siphnian treasury at Delphi, S. Meletzes, *Delphi* (Munich 1964) 39-50; the Nereid monument from Xanthus, J. K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley 1970) plate 13; and the collection of military scenes on vases and aryballoi collected by H. L. Lorimer, "The Hoplite Phalanx with Special Reference to the Poems of Archilochus and Tyrtaeus," *ABSA* 42 (1947) 76-138.

10 As noted by P. A. L. Greenhalgh in his *Early Greek Warfare* (Cambridge 1973) 72.

11 In this way the outstretched shield could also be used either to deliver blows in the manner of a "left jab," as in the depiction of the battle between the Greeks and Amazons on the Mausoleum, Richter (above, n. 9) 588, and in that of the falling warrior on the Siphnian frieze, Richter (above, n. 9) 391. The shield might also be used to ward off spear thrusts with a sweeping motion, as is illustrated by a red-figured hydria in A. D. Trendall, *The Red-Figured Vases of Lucania, Campania, and Sicily* (Oxford 1967) vol. 2, plate 129, fig. 5.

12 V. Hanson in "Hoplite Technology in Phalanx Battle," in Hanson, *Hoplites* (above, n. 1) 63-84, argues that the hoplite shield was designed in a concave shape to keep weight off the left arm, increase frontal protection, and facilitate pushing.

13 Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedón* (above, n. 1) 152.

14 "Pushing" is similarly equated with victorious displacement of the enemy in Aristophanes' *Wasps*: "But nonetheless with heaven's help we pushed them back at eventide." (ἀλλ' ὁμως ἀπεωσάμεσθα ξύν θεοῖς πρὸς ἑσπέραν, 1085).

15 This interpretation also makes the best sense out of the explanatory clause which follows, since we can now take the γάρ as explaining the Persians' tenacity in prolonging the battle (χρόνον ἐπὶ πολλόν). By breaking off so many Spartan spears, the Persians blunted their opponents' attack somewhat, and thus delayed the outcome. Since the Persians were lightly armored (9.62-63) and particularly vulnerable to Spartan spear-thrusts, Herodotus must have felt that the length and ferocity of Persian resistance after the collapse of their protective barrier called for some explanation: it was a long time before the Spartans could push the Persians back (ἐς ὃ ἀπίκοντο ἐς ὠτίσιν), because the Persians had broken off so many of their spears.

16 Holladay (above, n. 1) 94-97. The Spartan attempt to make even less radical adjustments to their line resulted in complete disaster at Leuctra. J. Buckler, "Plutarch on Leuktra," *SO* 55 (1980) 75-93.

17 Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedón* (above, n. 1) 150-153.

18 The evidence for hoplite battles of long duration is sketchy, as can be seen from Pritchett's chart (above, n. 1) 4.46-51. Statements in the historians to the effect that a particular battle lasted "a long time" (e.g., Hdt. 6.29.1; Thuc. 4.44.1) may be relative to the typical pattern of near immediate resolution such as we find at Mantinea in 418, and at Cunaxa. This pattern is described by Polybius as a quick decision at the moment the two opposing lines collided

(εἰς καιρὸς ὁ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον καὶ σύμπτωσιν τῆς δυνάμεως, 35.1).

19 This direct contact of two hoplite lines is commonly expressed by the phrase εἰς **χεῖρας** or **ἐν χειρσί** or ἐν χειροί. In Thucydides' description of Delium (4.96.2) the phrase means "engaged in close combat." At Delium, the extremities of the opposing formations never came **ἐς χεῖρας** because the terrain (swollen torrents) prevented it. It seems likely then that "close combat" was the normal method by which hoplites did battle. If so, the situation would be as Arrian explains it (Tact. 4.5; 4.9), when he distinguishes skirmishers (**ἀκροβολισταί**) from heavy infantry by the fact the former do not come to grips with the enemy (**οἱ μὴ ἐς χεῖρας ἰόντες**), but rather shoot at them from a distance (**ἀλλὰ πόρρωθεν ἐξακοντίζοντες**). For a different view, see Pritchett (above, n. 1) 4.54–57.

20 Lazenby (above, n. 1) 97, notes by way of comment on this anecdote that, while one may wonder whether Epaminondas could have made himself heard by many of his soldiers amidst the din of battle, Spartan soldiers apparently did normally expect to receive orders in combat, as in Thucydides' account of Sphacteria (4.34.3). The problems of noise and distance might have been overcome by relaying the general's commands and exhortations down the line.

21 Such as 3.108.3; 4.126.5; 5.9.3; 6.97.4; 7.53.2; 8.10.4; 8.25.3.

22 At Thermopylae, they impetuously pursued the feigned retreats of the Spartans, and at Plataea, they hurled themselves upon the Spartan line individually or in small groups. Herodotus censures both practices.

23 For the effectiveness of the *primus impetus* see Kromayer and Veith (above, n. 2) 84; Pritchett (above, n. 1) 4.72–73; and Hanson, *The Western Way* (above, n. 1) 135–159.

24 Consider Herodotus' account of the allied assault at Mycale (διωσάμενοι γὰρ τὰ γέγρα **οὔτοι φερόμενοι ἐσέπεσον ἄλεες ἐς τοὺς Πέρσας**, 9.102).

25 Delbrück ([above, n. 2] 61) saw three reasons for the charge at Marathon: "die Wucht des Anpralls moralisch und physisch zu bestärken und den Pfeilschub zu unterrennen."

26 W. Donlan and J. Thompson, "The Charge at Marathon: Herodotus 6.112," *CJ* 71 (1975/76) 339–343 and "The Charge at Marathon Again," *CW* 72 (1978/79) 419–420.

27 Pritchett ([above, n. 1] 1.135) has collected the data. Eight is the most common depth. Of the four instances where phalanx depth is reported as less than eight ranks, three refer to Spartan troops (one deep at Dipaea ca 471, Isoc. *Arch.* 99; four deep at Athens in 408, Diod. Sic. 13.72.5–6; two deep at Thebes ca 394, Polyaeus 2.1.24). The fourth instance cited by Pritchett (Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.15) is not a battle, but a description of the Ten Thousand holding a military review. The tacticians consider eight ranks the minimum standard depth (Arrian *Tact.* 5.5; Asclep. *Tact.* 2.1; Aelian *Tact.* 4.2). Arrian also notes that extending a standard eight-rank phalanx into one of four ranks results in a phalanx "without depth" (ἀβαθὴς ἢ φάλαγξ).

28 See P. Cartledge, "Hoplites and Heroes: Spartan Contribution to the Technique of Ancient Warfare," *JHS* 97 (1977) 11–27, at 14–15, and A. M. Snodgrass, *Arms and Armour of the Greeks* (Ithaca 1967) 38.

29 Arrian *Tact.* 12.1 states that second-file men need a measure of courage

second only to the first-file men, because their spears also reach the enemy (

δευτέρους δ' ἐπὶ τούτους

κατ' ἀρετὴν χρὴ εἶναι τοὺς τῶν λοχαγῶν ἐπιστάτας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ τοῦτον δόρυ ἐξικνεῖται ὥστε ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους).

³⁰ See Buckler (above, n. 1) 141, n. 24. Arrian Tact. 12.4 stresses the importance of this duty only in the case of the second rank (

καὶ πεσόντος ἡγεμόνος ἢ καὶ τραθέντος ὥς

ἀνόμοχον γενέσθαι, προσηδήσας ὁ πρῶτος ἐπιστάτης ἐς λοχαγοῦ τάξιν καὶ ἀξίωσιν κατέσθη, καὶ ἄρραγῇ τὴν πᾶσαν φάλαγγα παρέσχετο see also 12.1).

³¹ Casualty figures for pitched battles in the Classical period simply do not support the argument that multiple ranks were necessary to supply the losses resulting from attrition. In his article, “Casualties in Hoplite Battles” (*GRBS* 26 [1985] 13–20), P. Krentz effectively challenges the assumption that casualties in such encounters were relatively light. According to his data, the average losses for the losing side were 14%, and the highest recorded losses are 20%. Krentz argues that in the small world of the Greek *polis*, even a 5% figure would be a significant loss. This is undoubtedly true, but on the battlefield, even the 20% loss figure would not seem to create a situation in which the rearmost ranks of the phalanx would be needed as attrition reserves. Additionally, many, if not most, of the casualties incurred by the loser of a pitched battle often came in flight and pursuit after their phalanx had already been broken.

³² See Krentz (above, n. 1) 60 and Pritchett (above, n. 1) 1.141.

³³ Arrian Tact. 12.1–2 puts a priority upon the “size, might, and skill” of the file leaders (

ἀγαθὸν δὲ εἶπερ τι ἄλλο καὶ τοὺς λοχαγοὺς τοὺς μεγίστους τε καὶ κρατίστους εἶναι καὶ τῶν

κατὰ πόλεμον δαημονεστάτους, and likens them to the “cutting edge” of a sword (τὸ ἴσον

παρέχεται ἐν ταῖς μάχαις ὅ τι περ τὸ στόμωμα τῷ σιδήρῳ). They are the “yoke” that holds the entire phalanx together

(τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ ζυγὸν ξυνέχει τὴν πᾶσαν φάλαγγα). This last comment suggests that Arrian did not envision the front rank being whittled down by attrition in the course of a normal battle.

³⁴ The tacticians felt that the final rank, the “file closers” (οὐραγοί), were sufficient to the task of restraining sluggards in all ranks:

τοὺς λευτοτακτοῦντας διὰ δειλίαν εἰς τάξιν ἐπάγοιεν, Asclep. Tact. 3.6. See also Aelian Tact. 5.5 and Arrian Tact. 5.5. Arrian also recommends that the file closers be on a par with the file leaders (Tact. 5.6).

³⁵ This is especially true in light of the very real disadvantages of such deep formations discussed by V. Hanson in “Epameinondas, the Battle of Leuktra (371 B.C.), and the ‘Revolution’ in Greek Battle Tactics,” *CA* 7 (1988) 190–207.

³⁶ Theoretically, a commander could increase the chances of a breakthrough by tightening and deepening his phalanx, but, as Onasander points out (*Strat.* 21.1–2), this would render the flanks particularly vulnerable to attack. A tactical stalemate thus reigned until the advent of the Theban innovation. Better tactical conception and execution, and better use of cavalry to screen the flanks eventually made greater concentration a less risky proposition.

³⁷ E. A. Bétant explains ξυναγαγόντι here as *contrahere* in *Lexicon Thucydideum* 2 (Genf 1847) 200.

³⁸ Though writing well after the event, Plutarch had good sources for this particular battle, consulting, as he tells us, Ephorus, Callisthenes, Polybius, and

“certain other writers” (*Pel.* 17.2). See Buckler (above, n. 13) 75–76.

³⁹ The Halicarnassians were presumably still using classical tactics and formations. Ephialtes and his men had assumed that “because of their mass” they could not be stopped (δόξαντας διὰ τὸ βάρος ἀκαταγωνίστους εἶναι, 17.26.4).

⁴⁰
συμβalόντες τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐωθοῦντο, ἐμάχοντο, ἀπέκτεινον, ἀπέθνησκον *Hell*
4.3.19.

Hector's Body: Mutilation of the Dead in Ancient Greece and Vietnam*

Lawrence A. Tritle

... and now [Achilles] thought of shameful treatment for glorious Hector. In both of his feet at the back he made holes by the tendons in the space between ankle and heel, and drew thongs of ox-hide through, and fastened them to the chariot so as to let the head drag, and [Achilles] mounted the chariot ... then whipped the horses to a run, and they winged their way unreluctant. A cloud of dust rose where Hector was dragged ... since by this time Zeus had given him over to his enemies, to be defiled in the land of his fathers.¹

The very experience of war is a brutalizing process in which human beings sometimes get caught up in the cycle of violence, lose self-control and commit what can only be regarded as the basest of acts, killing civilians and unarmed soldiers, and in extreme moments mutilating their enemies. That such acts as these occurred in Vietnam may be documented and verified easily, which I will do in the course of this paper. But what of the ancient Greeks? Did they know such acts, or did they enjoy some sort of a pure and rational experience of violence and not commit such violations? Older scholarship earlier in this century thought not. This may be seen in the work of W.W. Tarn, who rejected Curtius' account of Alexander who, after killing Batis the Iranian garrison commander at Gaza, dragged his body around the fallen town much as Achilles did Hector's.² The underlying assumption to Tarn's rationale is essentially that good Europeans did not act like this. Against this view the contrary reports of British soldiers after the battles of Lexington and Concord, veterans of the Eastern Front of the Second World War, and similar occurrences in the Balkans during the 1940s and 1990s make it plain that Europeans, just like any other cultural group when adequately provoked or terrified, can commit the worst of acts.³ Tarn's linking reflects his Victorian sensibilities which itself is ironic in an era that produced Jack the Ripper!

What I would like to suggest in this paper is that recent scholarship into the 'western way of war', particularly that in the ancient world, has ignored evidence that reveals the depths of human experience and its darker realities.⁴ Moreover, it must be seen that acts of war and killing leave their marks not only on the participants and survivors of violence, but also on those with whom they will later associate—their wives/husbands, children, and parents. Even more so does this apply

to those who mutilate their enemy. These dimensions of violence and survival are too infrequently taken into account in studies of conflict and war. Those occasions that we can locate in the history of the ancient world, e.g., the Athenian massacres at Mycalessus, Melos and Scione (Thuc. 7.29-30, 4.122, 5.32), may show that such modern counterparts as the My Lai massacre have antecedents which, while certainly not comforting, provide an understanding of the ranges of human experience: of what happens when you watch the deaths of those nearest and dearest to you while undergoing the stresses induced by violence.

The first item to be discussed is the validity to the comparative study briefly alluded to here. This may be defended rather simply on medical and scientific grounds, as suggested by Jonathan Shay in his powerful study *Achilles in Vietnam*.⁵ Shay notes that when humans are placed in situations of extreme stress, hormones secreted by the adrenal gland, including adrenaline and a group of steroids known as glucocorticoids, induce a predictable range of physical reactions. Neither Achilles nor Hector, Shay notes, 'could have remained alive for more than thirty seconds in the absence of Cortisol', i.e., the chemical that enables humans to withstand stress.⁶ For present purposes this reaction may be summed up succinctly as the 'flight or fight' choice and this, again in view of the chemical influence and the range of reactions, will not vary that much from time to time and place to place. Certainly no two cultures and societies will have identical reactions, but then too, no two human beings will either.⁷ Consequently, there is a strong *a priori* foundation that validates the basis for the present study and arguments.

This medical foundation has a counterpart in the still primitive nature of human society, as evidenced broadly in its on-going passion for war and violence that is demonstrated not only by the mutilation of the dead but also the homeopathic belief that eating the flesh of your defeated enemy will both demonstrate your power and strengthen you.⁸ This will undoubtedly shock those who might think this, as well as the idea of the mutilation of the dead, are far-fetched as well as revolting, a view to be examined below (Pt. HI. 'An Unwritten History'). Yet as Achilles exults over Hector's fallen body, he cries out to his enemy that anger and fury have driven him to the point that he could eat his flesh (Horn. II. 22. 344-54). What Homer refers to here is the primitive idea noted above regarding the homeopathic belief. Some commentators will, and actually have, perceived this as a metaphor simply contrasting civilized with uncivilized behavior.⁹ An example of this skepticism may be found in a spring 1997 issue of the journal *Lingua Franca*. In this essay, Marianna Torgovnick claims, 'cannibalism, human sacrifice and head-

hunting apparently did not and do not really exist within most indigenous cultures.’¹⁰ Such practices, she and others argue, are fantasies of the European, and it seems fair to add, white mind, which has created these tilings as expressions of deeper desires, terrors, and passions. Such views are difficult to comprehend and reflect the musings of those who have remained too long in the ivory tower, who have no idea (or knowledge) of what happens in the ‘real’ world. How such statements could find their way into print after recent atrocities in Bosnia and Rwanda, to mention only a couple of recent cases, is really a mystery.

While Achilles’ boast might be employed by Homer as a sort of metaphor, the roots of his crowing lay much deeper and possess a substantive reality rather than merely a metaphorical one. It might be thought too that this simply a relic of man’s primitive state. As an infantry officer in Vietnam, however, I could testify to Viet Cong soldiers mutilating fallen South Vietnamese soldiers by removing their livers and other body parts which they would later eat; so too by American soldiers with whom I served.¹¹ These things do and did happen. Similar practices may be found among the Zulu (who slit the belly of the slain to release the spirit, thereby saving the killer from pollution), the Lakota/Sioux (who cut throats), and the Mae Enga of New Guinea who stuff the severed penis of the enemy into the mouth (also done in Vietnam by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army).¹² What these references and practices point to is the short distance between so-called primitive peoples, ancient Greeks and modern Americans at war.

The justification for a comparison of the nature of brutality in war should be seen as compelling as well as real. Before proceeding, however, to an analysis of the evidence, there are some situations that occur in war which may be discounted here though they surely play a contributing part to the often vicious course that war takes. This is the grotesque nature of wounds and deaths that occur as the result of battlefield trauma. Examples of this range from the gory descriptions of dismembered heads and limbs in Homer, the death of Aeschylus’ brother Cynegirus at Marathon, occurrences that could surely be duplicated many times over, to the terrible wounds inflicted, in Vietnam and elsewhere, by modern high velocity weapons of all types. While these might be rationalized away as the unfortunate result of conflict, watching those close to you die—by whatever means—would leave you with not only a legacy of bitter memory but guilt as well for having survived. These factors and others can lead the survivors to strike down a defenseless civilian population or prisoners of war, to mutilate those who fall before them.

I. Acts of Violence in Ancient Greece and Vietnam

Seizing Issus he [i.e., Darius] grievously mutilated and slew all the invalid Macedonians left behind there whom he captured. Arr. 2.7.1.

The Greeks lived in a world in which violence was a commonplace and memories of it confronted them virtually everyday and in many ways. It was depicted on and/or off the dramatic stage: Oedipus gouging out his eyes, Medea's murder of her children (see also *Eur. Bacch.* 1141, *Elec.* 898, *Hec.* 154-68, *Heracl.* 567-8¹³); Pausanias' story of Oenomaus' 'trophies', i.e., the heads of his daughter's unfortunate suitors nailed to his wall, speak as well to the presence of violence (Paus. 6.21.7-11 *LIMC* 5 (1990) 439-40). These 'mythic' accounts have their 'real-life' counterparts in Homer's *Riad*, a work that must be seen as a living document reflecting the culture and ways of a real-life society. This includes, for example, the gift-giving described in Homer, the rules for which are not explained because the poet takes for granted that his audience will understand the gestures and actions. In much the same way, the relations between *demos* and *polis* in the poems are also matters of common recognition.¹⁴ For this reason then, the violence and mutilations (e.g.) that Homer relates are analogues to later examples of similar behavior from 'historical' Greece: Tyrtaeus' description of the grizzled hoplite holding his genitals in his hands (10.21-5), Xenophon's account of the Greeks in Cyrus' army mutilating Persians they have killed in order to terrorize the living (Xen. *Anab.* 3.4.5) provide additional testimony to Greek mutilation of their own kind as well as the 'Other.' Additionally, the punishment of *apotympanismos*, crucifixion, and the macabre *maschalismos*, an obscurely known ritual in which a murder victim was draped with a necklace made from his own extremities, reveals further the violence that lies hidden in Greek culture.¹⁵ Finally, the many commemorative monuments in Athens—that of Chabrias for instance, and the casualty lists in the Kerameikos—constantly reminded the Athenians not only of the heroic sacrifices of fathers, brothers, and husbands and touched the nerves of the survivors, but kept them aware that the world was a violent place.

The connections between monuments, memory and the toll of violence are brought together effectively by K. Raaflaub in his lecture, 'Father of All, Destroyer of All. War in Late Fifth Century Athenian Discourse.'¹⁶ This examination of monuments and memory figured in the discussions this past term in my 'Achilles in Vietnam' seminar.¹⁷ The lecture was followed by a student presentation on American memorials to the dead of the Vietnam War, particularly the Vietnam Veterans' Memorial in Washington, D.C., which included a brief viewing of the 1989 film 'In Country.' At the end of this film, visitors

to the Memorial gaze into the wall of names and themselves and the effect created, as anyone knows who has visited this Memorial, is emotionally powerful. The Athenians of the fifth and fourth centuries BC, gazing and reflecting into their own monuments would have experienced similar reactions, as conveyed to us perhaps in the famous 'Mourning Athena' relief now in the Acropolis Museum in Athens.¹⁸

Young Americans growing up in the halcyon days of victory over Germany and Japan in the 1950s and early 1960s could match the Greeks item for item. Sergeant Stryker at Iwo Jima, Sergeant Rock, and Audie Murphy all told stories of heroism in war, but now we can see that it was a strangely one-sided, biased account. It was always the other side, the brutal Nazi or the little grinning 'Jap' (a term used deliberately for effect: I'm fully aware of its connotations) who committed the atrocities, the brutal acts of violence. Only now, some fifty years later, and thanks to the heart-rending accounts of Paul Fussell's *Wartime* and *Thank God for the Atom Bomb* and E.B. Sledge's *With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa*, are we beginning to learn the 'truths' of the American way of war then: the souvenir hunting of Japanese skulls and bones and the mutilation of Japanese dead, the summary execution of German prisoners of war, the callous treatment of the dead.¹⁹ Both cultures, then, Greek and American, in their own ways prepared the young for violence and atrocity, and each said little of it though it surely existed.²⁰

Greek mutilation of the dead, occasionally of the living, took a variety of forms. This includes Alexander's mutilation of Batis already mentioned. Alexander later carried out similar acts upon those towns and peoples who stood against him, particularly in the Indus River valley. In particular we know the fate of the Malli whom Alexander and his troops butchered—something that even the sober-minded Arrian reveals clearly.²¹ Lest it be thought that the Macedonians monopolized such conduct, it should be remembered that the Persians were certainly capable of such actions too. These include Leonidas' head mounted on a spear after Thermopylae (Hdt. 9.78), the mutilations of Cyrus the Younger (Xen. *Anab.* 1.10.1) and Xenophon's literary hero Abradatas (Xen. *Cyr.* 7.1.30, 3.8), whose fate is surely not imaginary. Arrian (2.7.1) provides clear-cut evidence of Persian brutality when he relates the preliminaries to the battle at Issus in 333 BC. Here Darius' great army managed a rare success, crossing Alexander's line of communications back into Asia Minor and Greece. Arrian quietly mentions how the Persians found Alexander's sick and wounded, left behind to recover before rejoining the main army. In a few lines, Arrian tells how these men were butchered, one can imagine, as so many cattle. As we know of this, its report must have

reached Alexander and his men. There can be little doubt that when they learned of this, both Macedonians and Greeks in Alexander's army became motivated by a 'get back' attitude. Gustav Hasford, in his novel *The Short-Timers* (the work that inspired the film 'Full Metal Jacket') calls it 'pay-back' and explains it as the primary motivator of Marines in Vietnam.²² In the words of Animal Mother, one of the novel's/film's characters, 'payback is a motherfucker' and like Achilles who becomes so enraged and violent that he could eat Hector, so too were some Americans in Vietnam similarly moved.

Just these few examples reveal the range of abuses which the Greeks/Macedonians practiced in war. These range from the Homeric/Alexandrian dragging of the dead, to the butchery of fallen opponents as in the case of Cyrus the Younger and the Greek-Macedonian sick and wounded at Issus. We can add the fates of oarsmen captured by the Athenian general Philocles (who on one occasion tossed overboard two ships' crews, Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.31—an act analogous in a sense to the Vietnamese prisoners of war thrown out of US helicopters over Vietnam), to Xanthippus' hanging or crucifying of the Persian satrap Artayctes (Hdt. 9.120-22), whose son was butchered before his dying eyes.²³

II. The Ritual of Mutilation

There was no emotion in her stare, no sense of the person behind it. But the grotesque part... was her jewelry. At the girl's throat was a necklace of human tongues. Elongated and narrow, like pieces of blackened leather...the tips curled upward as if caught in a final shrill syllable.

Tim O'Brien, *The Things They Carried* (1990), 120

What is involved with the act of mutilating and otherwise dishonoring a fallen enemy? J. Shay suggests that 'the veteran's self-respect never fully recovers so long as he is unable to see the enemy as worthy.' He continues that 'Homer is not a propagandist for either Greeks or Trojans, and he does not dehumanize the warriors of either side, inflaming our emotions against them as evil monsters or subhuman vermin.'²⁴ Yet as already noted, Achilles dragged Hector's body around Troy subjecting it to horrible disfigurement. In what might be considered a subconscious reference, Homer also refers to Achilles taunting Hector that he would 'eat him' and to other warriors stabbing Hector's lifeless body before Achilles dragged it around Troy (Horn. *Il.* 24.345-48, 370-1). What are the rituals of mutilation that are preserved here, acts that have historic and classical counterparts in those cases of mutilation just mentioned?

Achilles' conduct and that of the unnamed warriors who join him in abusing Hector's corpse have their foundation not in any

dehumanizing of Hector and the Trojans generally, but rather from senses of rage and revenge, emotions so violent that control or restraint are lost. These lead Achilles to outrage Hector's body, an act which the others join in as their passions too are ignited by the act of combat. These acts Homer, through the mouths of the gods, repudiates, though it seems clear that those observing Achilles understood what motivated him in the first place (Horn. *H.* 24.18-25). That this is the case Homer's *Iliad* confirms—what Achilles did was the result of the evil in his heart.

Two factors, rage and revenge, impel Achilles in his violent struggle with Hector, his equally violent impulse to abuse Hector's body, and not any 'dehumanization' of his enemy. Here it will clear that my interpretation of this differs in part from the views of J. Shay. First, the reference that Achilles could 'eat' Hector represents a deeply rooted and primitive notion that eating your enemy will empower or strengthen you. This idea has been mentioned earlier, but it seems worth noting again that the Greeks were not unaware of ritual cannibalism, the sort of conduct that might be expected from 'primitives' anywhere but in Old Europe', yet the evidence points to exactly that.²⁵

While Achilles taunts Hector with the threat that he could eat him, the full fury of his abuse lies in the mistreatment of the corpse. This is much more 'rational' in a sense, as its stimulus is the rage in Achilles over Patrocles' death, responsibility for which Achilles takes personally. This sense of guilt drives Achilles to the point that he loses self-control and avenges himself and Patrocles on Hector's body. It may seem that this interpretation is in a sense, ahistorical, that it is a fictional literary account under analysis. As argued above, Homer's poetical account is not simply a literary device or fictional creation, but rather a reality drawn from the actions of his contemporaries and so sensible to them. Otherwise the poem and its action makes little sense. The Homeric record, then, authenticates accounts of violence and mutilation that can be documented in the later classical era, most notably in Alexander's mutilation of Batis at Gaza.²⁶ It is well known that the siege of Gaza was short but violent. Alexander himself was wounded; an unknown number of Greeks and Macedonians were killed; possibly as many as 10,000 Gazans perished, probably the entire garrison which fought to the death as no quarter was given (Arr. 2.27.7). Such circumstances as these suggest that Alexander's rage, his desire for revenge so great, that his emotions exploded as self-control was lost. He certainly knew how Achilles had outraged Hector's body. But the siege at Gaza, coming so soon after that of Tyre, may well have pushed him to the breaking point and led him to mutilate his opponent. It is of no little interest that the same emotions

surface in Vietnam and were too the experience of not a few Vietnam combat veterans.

It would be a truism that many Americans serving in Vietnam despised and otherwise viewed the Vietnamese with contempt, both those they fought and those they were there ostensibly to defend, as in a sense, subhuman. This was the result of the widely different cultures, but also in the conduct of the Viet Cong and later the North Vietnamese Army. Here I refer to my own experiences of Viet Cong mutilating the bodies of South Vietnamese soldiers, something that had many precedents earlier in the war.²⁷ This may be seen in the 1965 battle of the Ia Drang, the 1967 battles around Dak To in the Central Highlands.²⁸ The point here is that by 1967 it was widely known that the enemy regularly abused and mutilated the corpses of American soldiers who in turn were motivated, by themselves and higher command, 'to get some pay-back.'

There should be no doubt that American soldiers in Vietnam also mutilated their enemy. The above epigraph from T. O'Brien's *The Things They Carried* describes the surreal experiences of a soldier's girlfriend, Maryann, who sneaks into Vietnam to join him. Once 'in country', she becomes consumed by the violence to the extent that she too takes souvenirs from the dead. O'Brien's point would seem to be that anyone placed in such an environment can fall prey to it and the regularity with which Vietnam era writers generally refer to the taking of ears, fingers and skulls supports its practice among American soldiers.

Such conduct, however, reaches back to the early history of the Republic, including the infamous Sand Creek Massacre in 1863, the widespread western habit of selling scalps and other body parts of Indians, and the atrocious acts committed in the Pacific against an equally atrocious enemy in the Second World War.²⁹ Yet I doubt that many American GIs serving in Vietnam between 1965 and 1970 knew much about any of these. Nor do I think that such acts were solely caused by racism. While Americans generally did refer to the Vietnamese as 'gook' and 'dink', it seems legitimate to ask to what extent, after repeated use, such labels conveyed a powerful enough meaning, or at least sufficient authority, to provide a rationale to mutilate the enemy. J. Shay is right to note the negative force of dehumanizing the enemy, but as he and Homer show, mutilation can occur even when this does not happen, when emotions are simply brought to boiling by the loss of friends and the desire to strike back causes a loss of self-restraint. This is the case with Achilles and Hector's body, and it surely was too with American GIs in Vietnam who mutilated their enemies not from any belief that they were subhuman, but simply because they had become so enraged by what

they saw around them that self-control was lost and they acted out their rage, anger, and frustration.³⁰

A Greek account of this sort of thing from the *Iliad* is to be found in book 13 (202-205). Here in one of the many battle scenes described, the two heroes named Ajax fought the Trojan Imbrios and killed him. Typically, the victors stripped the vanquished of his armor, but added more insult by mutilating his corpse. The Aiantes had watched Hector kill their friend Amphinomachos. Now the lesser Ajax, angry beyond words (*kecholomenos*), cut off the head of Imbrios and threw it, 'spinning like a ball' (trans. R. Latthnore) so that it landed at the feet of Hector. No dehumanization of the enemy here, no racism—just blind fury.

It might be objected that this scene is literary fiction, and that the Greeks in the historical era did not cut off heads and so mutilate their enemies. I doubt that such a view would be true. At the battle of Plataea in 479 BC, the Greeks completed the destruction of the Persian army that invaded Greece under Xerxes, the Persian king, the year before. They also avenged the defeat suffered at Thermopylae. As they were cleaning up the battlefield at Plataea, the Aeginetan Lampón suggested to the Spartan commander Pausanias that he abuse the body of the Persian commander Mardonius by cutting off his head and crucifying his body, the same acts carried out by the Persians on the corpse of Leonidas the year before (Hdt. 9. 78). The speech that Herodotus attributes to Pausanias in response—that this was a barbaric act unbecoming to Greeks—has found much favor with modern commentators, and for obvious reasons.³¹ Yet in the *Iliad*, a work often characterized as the 'Bible' of the Greeks, we have a clear cut case (pun intended!) of Greeks in the heat of battle and anger mutilating their enemy. The *Iliad*'s familiarity to the Greeks suggests that mutilation of the dead was not something peculiar to foreigners or barbarians, but something that their own great heroes did when angered or frightened. What then of the remarks of Lampón? It may well be that Herodotus heard accurately what the Aeginetan and Spartan discussed. But Pausanias, as other soldiers in other times however angered by the horrific scenes around him, could not bring himself to mutilate his enemy though others did not share his views.³² Herodotus then dressed the incident up, taking advantage of it to stress the differences between the Greeks and the 'barbarians.'

A personal account will perhaps amplify the point. During my tour I served in the southern end of the Mekong Delta while the so-called 'Vietnamization' phase of the war was underway (in fact, the war here was always a traditional guerrilla war involving small unit actions). Early in 1971, South Vietnamese air force crews replaced the US Army helicopter units that had provided our air support. On one occasion a

Vietnamese infantry battalion (which I had worked with myself and so knew the advisors personally) was abandoned by the air force in a particularly bad area and the battalion had to extricate itself on foot, fighting its way out. Fortunately, the opposing Viet Cong forces were not too strong and the battalion made its way out suffering ‘only’ light casualties and inflicting the same. The American advisors, however, were enraged at the cowardice and incompetence of the Vietnamese Air Force (I recall the Vietnamese infantrymen were not too happy either!), and to demonstrate their contempt and anger, they placed at the door of the Vietnamese Air Force base commander, the head of a Viet Cong soldier. These were men who lived and worked with the Vietnamese and enjoyed a good rapport with them (I recall one night in fact nearly getting into a brawl after several American enlisted men began mouthing off about the ‘gooks’ in their club), and yet they participated in what can only be described as a ghastly act of mutilation. Racism, however, is not, involved here. Rather these American advisors, with the connivance of their Vietnamese friends and allies, shared in the mutilation of the enemy in order to vent their anger and, I think, fright at having been left in a dangerous and exposed position.

This personal story, one suppressed until I began this research, suggests that race and racism, a need to dehumanize the enemy, are not essential conditions to the mutilation of the enemy. Certainly, in some cases, racism and a notion that the enemy was sub-human, induced atrocities and I would be among the first to acknowledge this. It must be seen, however, that as with Achilles and Hector, Alexander and Batis, and the American advisors just described, anger and fear, when heightened to the breaking point are more than sufficient causes for mutilation and mistreatment of the enemy.

III. An Unwritten History

What ‘savage’ tribe ever had more primitive ideas or a more realistic symbolism than the Greek populace—and perhaps not populace only—of classical times in the sinister backwaters of their life into which we have for a moment descended?

Erwin Rohde, *Psyche* (1925)³³

Several years ago the outline of this paper was first described to a friend and former teacher. After recounting some of my Vietnam experiences, he said to me, ‘Larry, that’s enough, I don’t want to hear anymore.’ Other scholars echo this sentiment. Gilbert Murray writing in the early part of the twentieth century told how scholars talked of such things in ‘hushed and vibrating notes, telling of something scarce to be spoken;’³⁴ the closing statement from Rohde’s analysis of the

maschalisimos ritual cited above is even clearer in expressing scholarly repugnance and bewilderment at such acts. Other statements could be easily located, e.g., How & Wells argue in their commentary that the Greeks were really not inclined to acts of cruelty.³⁵ There are probably some readers of this article who have similar reactions, and wonder how this can be construed as scholarship or history, ancient or modern. In response I would note the reflections of Tim O'Brien: 'If you don't care for obscenity, you don't care for the truth; if you don't care for the truth, watch how you vote. Send guys to war, they come home talking dirty.'³⁶ The desire to silence the obscenities of war reflects the unwritten history of not just war, but of violence and its effects on culture and society. A brief historiographical digression seems appropriate then.

R.G. Collingwood is famous for his critique of the traditional 'scissors and paste' style of history in which historians construct a past by simply pasting together the different accounts found in older works.³⁷ Applied to the topic at hand, this technique would create an account in which all that people find unpalatable is omitted, as the same old stuff reappears while the brutality, the violence, the nastiness is left out.³⁸ What most people are exposed to then is the unwritten history of war—where violence, obscenity, and their consequences find no place. One of the differences, and a major one, between those Americans who recorded the Second World War and the Vietnam War is that the portrayal of war is so vastly different that it makes one wonder if the latter accounts are not flights of fantasy or deliberate sensationalism. In an essay on atrocity in Vietnam War literature, CA. Cronin, writes that the ' WWII writers almost never ask the questions' that Vietnam writers ask. In the former, atrocity is seen as the unfortunate exception, while in the works of Philip Caputo, Larry Heinemann, and Tim O'Brien, atrocity stands out as the reality of conflict.³⁹ Yet, as soldier-scholar Paul Fussell tells us:

One of the cruxes of war ... is the collision between events and the language available or thought appropriate—to describe them.... Logically, there is no reason why the English language could not perfectly well render the actuality of... warfare: it is rich in terms like *blood, terror, agony, madness, murder, sell-out* and *hoax*, as well as phrases like *legs blown off, intestines gushing out over his hands, screaming all night, bleeding to death from the rectum*, and the like ... The real problem was less one of 'language' than of gentility and optimism.... The real reason [that soldiers fall silent] is that soldiers have discovered that no one is very interested in the bad news they have to report. What listener wants to be torn and shaken when he doesn't have to be? We have made *unspeakable* mean indescribable: it really means *nasty*.⁴⁰

This unwritten history has an old one that dates to Herodotus and Thucydides and their audiences in the fifth century. Consider this.

Thucydides describes ground combat, something that can only be characterized as brutal and vicious, largely in abstract terms. True, he does relate the anxieties of Phormio's sailors and marines about to engage the Spartans (2.88-89); he does relate the fear and confusion of the night battle at Epipolae above Syracuse (7.43-44); he reveals, unsurprisingly, the cowardice of Cleon at Amphipolis (5.10). Compare, however, his silence over the execution of the Mytilenians and Melians, the generality of his reference to the rape of Scione. Only in the account of Mycalessus does Thucydides come close to revealing the brutality and the atrocity of war. Here he steps down from his pedestal and tells what really happens when you send in the troops: boys massacred in their school, young and old, men and women killed indiscriminately. The destruction of Mycalessus was surely an ugly scene and there can be little doubt that had there been a camera present it would have recorded images remarkably similar to those of the My Lai massacre today. It is easy to lay this atrocity at the door of the 'barbarous' Thracians employed by the Athenians and the majority perpetrators of this massacre. But remember that an Athenian general, Diitrephes, was in overall command and he surely was not the only Athenian present. What this points to, not unlike what occurred at My Lai 4 in March 1968, is simply state-sanctioned slaughter, with the most terrible of killings and mutilations of the living and dead a commonplace.

Evidence for the mutilation of the dead in ancient Greece requires careful reading and attention to the usual allusive nature of the sources. That for Vietnam is clear and unequivocal. Two after action accounts from ancient Greece and modern America allow some final comments and thoughts on the treatment of the fallen. In 424/3 BC the Boeotians defeated the Athenians at the battle of Delium (Thuc. 4.93-101), and after setting up their trophy, they stripped the dead—as in the case of Tyrtaeus' grizzled veteran, one can imagine with brutality and outright mutilation. What does this passage and so many others from the Greek sources mean when they refer to the stripping of the dead? In Homer and in later Greek writers too stripping the slain of their armor added an extra sting of outrage in that the victor tore off the dead man's tunic and left him naked (cf. Horn. *II* 13.439 and Thuc. 4.93-101). Long ago Gilbert Murray suggested that this would have been a violent act involving not only the stripping of the body but perhaps also some other form of abuse; a vivid image of this sort of thing may be found in a passage in Michael Herr's *Dispatches* in which dead Marines are being collected—and by their own friends and comrades: 'One of the dead Marines had gone stiff and they had trouble getting him to fit (i.e., into a body-bag). 'Damn', one of them said, 'this fucker had big feet. Didn't this fucker have big feet', as he

finally forced the legs inside.’⁴¹ One can only imagine how much more brutal the treatment would be for an enemy, especially those you had recently fought.

After the Gulf War in the spring of 1991, as US Marines and other American and allied troops were policing the battlefield, some Marines were to be seen posing for photographs with the charred bodies of Iraqi soldiers hanging out of their vehicles, ‘punching them out’ and otherwise humiliating them.⁴² These scenes from America’s most recent war echo those of Vietnam, from Herr’s *Dispatches* describing Marines and soldiers taking photos of dead Viet Cong to the similar scene in ‘Full Metal Jacket’ in which Marines pose for pictures beside a dead North Vietnamese Army soldier.⁴³ ‘Full Metal Jacket’ is one of the better known Vietnam war films for high school and university students today, and this scene and its real-life counterparts raises that old saw, does art imitate life or life art? Souvenirs from the Gulf War, including body parts with little doubt, were also taken though official policy and orders were to the contrary. Dishonoring the dead has a long history in part because the issue is not raised: because it is not discussed we pretend it does not happen. But it does.

In closing, some final thoughts: (1) The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*— and the other ancient texts discussed here—should not be imagined as literary fossils to be read and studied for some abstract intellectual purpose, but rather as living texts; this is evident in the many parallels that show ancient Greeks and modern Americans suffering similarly as they experience acts of war and violence. (2) It may seem that in arguing that Greeks of the Homeric and classical eras inflicted ugly mutilations on their enemies that they have somehow lost their ‘classical’ stature. This may be true, though I would suggest that the label ‘classical’ itself is an antiquarian remnant, an old-fashioned idea commenting on the nature of scholarship more suitable to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than today. More to the point, however, by showing the Greeks as perpetrators of some of the brutalities known to us in our own time, perhaps we have really made them a little more human, a little more like ourselves.

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¹ Horn. *II.* 22.395-404 (R. Lattimore trans.). There are two basic works that deal with the theme of mutilation in Homer; cf., e.g., S.E. Bassett, ‘Achilles’ Treatment of Hector’s Body’, *TAPA* (1933) 41-65, at 54 and C. Segal, *The Theme of*

the Mutilation of the Corpse, Mnemosyne Suppl. vol. 17 (Leiden 1971) 14. Generally, I incline to Bassett's views as these strike me as truer to the experience and trauma of combat, despite his view (p. 49) that warfare in the classical era was somehow less violent than in Homeric times and that warfare in medieval times was somehow 'noble' or 'knightly'—it wasn't. See e.g., Z. Oldenbourg, *Massacre at Montségur*, trans. by P. Green (London 1961) 136, where Simon de Montfort took one hundred prisoners, gouged out their eyes and cut off their noses and upper lips. One man, left a single eye, led his friends away, a living example. I thank W. Heckel for the reference. Cf. also W.K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*, 5 pts. (Berkeley, 1971-91) 4: 6. See below n.11 for further explanation.

2 Curt. 4.6.21-29; cf. W.W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, vol. 2: *Sources and Studies* (Cambridge 1948) 267-8. Arr. 2.25.4 gives the name as Batis, but other authors prefer Betis or similar forms; see e.g., Jos. AJ 9.8.3. Arr. 2.27.3-7 omits any mention of Alexander's killing of Batis; A.B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander*, 2 vols. (Oxford 1980-95) 1: 258, 260 refers to his death but without taking a position.

3 For Lexington and Concord see V. Kehoe, *We Were There! April 19, 1775* (Concord, Mass. 1975). This work was privately printed and made available at Minute Man National Historical Park in Concord. Divided into two parts, 'The American Rebels' and 'The British Soldiers', it cites eyewitness accounts of Americans mutilating British dead (e.g., 169) and of British soldiers killing civilians and burning houses (e.g., 129) out of fright and anger. German veterans of the *Ostfront* and Balkans (1941-45) have told me of atrocities committed there, while in the 1990s 'Third Balkan War', newspapers regularly recorded Croat, Muslim and Serb brutalities. If more evidence is needed for the ubiquity of such conduct, cf. the terror in Algeria today, marked, as the 'Notebook' in *The New Republic*, September 22, 1997, puts it [by] 'the slashing of civilian throats and the evisceration of genitals. (This last surgery is usually reserved for women.).'

4 V. Hanson, *The Western Way of War* (New York 1989) 197-209, comes close to conveying the nature of the 'killing field', but his descriptions lack the pathos that would establish the traumatic impact of these events. E.g., his account of Tyrtaeus' dead grizzled veteran (Tyr. 10.21-25), omits any discussion of the old Spartan's mutilation, as he lies stripped and holding his genitals in his hands—hardly a natural pose! See also F. Jacoby, 'Zu den älteren griechischen Elegikern', *Hermes* 53 (1918) 24-5.

5 J. Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam. Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* (New York 1994).

6 Ibid., 92; see also the study of R. Sapolsky, *The Trouble with Testosterone and Other Essays on the Biology of the Human Predicament* (New York 1997) 120-1, 234, who adds additional details on the biology of stress.

7 Perhaps the greatest cultural contrast lies in the Japanese code of the Bushido, which advocates death before a life of dishonor brought on by surrender. Yet there are accounts that show Japanese soldiers even during World War II questioning the Bushido. See e.g., E. Bergenia, *Touched with Fire. The Land War in the Pacific* (Harmondsworth 1997), 479 (testimony of Japanese army officer A. Tani who, after surviving Guadalcanal, questioned all that he had been taught), H. Gordon, *Die Like the Carp!* (Stanmore [Australia] 1978) 12-13 (on Bushido), 51, M. Shinya, *The Path from Guadalcanal* (Hamilton, [New Zealand] 1979), who was a Japanese naval officer who, during captivity, converted to Christianity after undergoing a crisis of belief similar to Tani's referred to above. I thank my colleague Walter Skya for these latter references.

8 J.G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough* (London 1922) ch.51; see also F. Parkman, *The Jesuits in North America* (Boston, 1899) 491, where the Iroquois drink a slain Jesuit's blood and eat his heart (thanks to J. Buckler for the reference). For similar images see also Horn.-77. 4.34-6, *Od.* 22. 474-76, *Xen. Hell.* 3.3.6, the latter a reference to how helots and the other dispossessed in Sparta could eat the Spartiates 'even raw.'

9 A point made (e.g.) by Segal (above n.1) 36, 40-1. E. Vermeule, *Aspects of Death in Early Greek Art and Poetry* (Berkeley 1979) 94, links that Achilles' cry that he would eat Hector are [sic] so much rhetoric. Given what men are capable of in the heat of battle, and the moment, I would see it as an unfortunate reality.

10 L. Osborne, 'Does Man Eat Man?' *Lingua Franca* (April/May 1997) 28-38, at 30.

11 As an advisor to South Vietnamese forces (May 1970-March 1971) in B a Xuyen province (Advisory Team 71, Mobile Advisory Team 50 [we really weren't very mobile!]).

12 L.H. Keeley, *War Before Civilization* (New York 1996), 102-3.

13 For discussion see R. Seaforth, 'Homeric and Tragic Sacrifice', *TAPA* 119 (1989) 87-95.

14 A discussion of this issue exceeds the scope of this paper. For full examination and convincing treatment of this topic see K.A. Raaflaub, 'Homeric Society', in *A New Companion to Homer*, I. Morris and B. Powell, ed., *Mnemosyne* Suppl. vol. 163 (Leiden 1997) 624-48, and id., 'Politics and Interstate Relations in the World of Early Greek *Poleis*: Homer and Beyond', *Antichthon* 31 (1997) 26-7.

15 See P. Green, 'On the Thanatos Trail', in *Classical Bearings* (New York 1989) 73, 71, E. Rohde, *Psyche*, 2 vols. (London 1925 = New York 1966) 2: 582-6, and Vermeide (above n.9) 236, n.30. Greek authors use *kremannumi* and *anakrennumi* for 'to hang', whether for cases of suicide (e.g., *Diod.* 2.6.10, 4.62.3) or for punishments of others (e.g., *Diod.* 17.46.4, *Arr.* 6.17.2). Roman authors, e.g., *Curt.* 4.4.17, think of such punishments as crucifixion and this is probably what it amounts to for the Greeks as well. I.e., the easiest way to carry out this form of execution would be with a couple of stakes (in military situations always available) planted in the ground; this is essentially crucifixion, perhaps not with a cross as in a Judaic-Christian sense, but close enough. I thank J. Buckler for raising the issue, and also for the references.

16 K. A. Raaflaub, 'Father of All, Destroyer of All. War in Late Fifth Century Athenian Discourse', in *War and Democracy: A Comparative Approach*, D. McCann and B.S. Strauss edd. (Washington, DC, forthcoming).

17 Readers may be surprised to learn that I am included among Homer's 'killers', at least as far as V.D. Hanson and J. Heath, *Who Killed Homer?* (New York 1997) 257 are concerned. Here they characterize the 'Achilles in Vietnam' course as "ersatz", claiming that such courses, offered by 'enterprising but foolish Classicists', are so much pandering to students, efforts to boost enrollment. My department and students know this is not the case and I have the 'numbers'—student and peer evaluations, enrollments and grade profiles over twenty years—to prove the contrary. But more to the point, Hanson and Heath, in their whiny and self-serving diatribe, seem unable to understand - perhaps because they really can't - that one can find an innovative approach to a topic: one that resonates with student interests and provides an avenue to understanding the ancient world, which sparks wide-ranging discussions in the classics and elsewhere. Readers can judge for themselves in my forthcoming essay, 'Teaching the Vietnam War With the Greeks' in *Perspectives*, the Newsletter of the American Historical Association

(November 1998).

18 See J. Boardman, *Greek Sculpture. The Classical Period* (London 1985) fig. 41.

19 P. Fussell, *Wartime* (New York 1989) and id., *Thank God for the Atom Bomb* (New York 1988), the latter including the important 'Postscript (1987) on Japanese Skulls;' E.B. Sledge, *With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa* (Novato, CA 1981). Other recent works discussing the American World War II experience also refer to various brutalities, including atrocity, mutilation, etc. See e.g., S.E. Ambrose, 'Atrocities in Historical Perspective', in *Facing My Lai* (Lawrence, KS) 115, G.F. Lindermann, *The World Within War* (New York 1997) 120-32, 137, 143-84, and Bergerud (above n.7) 400, 411-12, 415.

20 It might be noted that the monuments and images referred to above prepared all members of society for lives in which violence was a commonplace. I have emphasized the young here because historically they have borne the brunt of wartime violence as well as the burden of living with it.

21 See further W. Heckel, 'Resistance to Alexander the Great', in *The Greek World in the Fourth Century*, ed. by L.A. Tritle (London 1997), 213-14 and A.B. Bosworth, *Alexander and the East. The Tragedy of Triumph* (Oxford 1996).

22 G. Hasford, *The Short-Timers* (New York 1979). Other Americans as well as Marines were also driven by this same sense of 'pay-back' or revenge.

23 On Philocles and his motion, approved by the Athenian *demos* to cut-off the right hand of oarsmen captured, see Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.32 and the discussion in D. Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire* (Ithaca 1987) 394-6.

24 Shay (above n.5) 115, 118.

25 For a Roman counterpart of this see H. Wagenvoort, *Roman Dynamism* (Oxford 1948) 167, who refers to the victorious general placing rouge on his face to celebrate his triumph. Wagenvoort argued that this was a 'historical' remembrance of the day in the perhaps not too distant past when the rouge was actually blood.

26 Vermeide (above n.9) 95 (and n.11) notes how in the classical era Herodotus, Sophocles and other authors are as inclined as Homer to convey scenes of brutality.

27 This occurred in my first airmobile assault with a South Vietnamese infantry battalion, one element of which was cut-off and destroyed; when finally reached the dead were found with their livers and arm muscles cut-out.

28 See e.g., H.G. Moore and J.L. Galloway, *We Were Soldiers Once ... and Young* (New York 1992) 284, 288-9 and E.F. Murphy, *Dak To* (New York 1993) 83-4. ...

29 See sources cited in n.19 above.

30 There may also be a 'magical' atropaic element at work in which one hopes to avert danger by a ritual of mutilation; see W. Burkert, *Creation of the Sacred. Tracks of Biology in Early Religions* (Cambridge 1996) 37-8. M. Herr, *Dispatches* (New York 1978) 57, refers to Americans picking 'relics off of an enemy they'd killed, a little transfer of power.' Some of these were ears and fingers, which were taken literally as magical amulets.

31 Cf. W.W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, 2 vols. (Oxford 1912) 2:321.

32 Pausanias might have appreciated the wisdom of another soldier and commander: 'Pay to the dead his due. Wound not the fallen. It is no glory to kill

and kill again', *Soph. Ant.* 1029-30.

³³ Rohde (above n.15) 586.

³⁴ G. Murray, *The Rise of the Greek Epic*⁴ (Oxford 1934) 74.

³⁵ How & Wells (above n.24) 2: 336, on Hdt. 9.121 and Xanthippus' crucifixion of the Persian Artycles. See also Arr. 6.17.2, Curt. 9.8.15, 4.4.17, Diod. 17.46.4, and 16.35.6, Philip of Macedon's crucifixion of Onomarchus, the Phocian warlord.

³⁶ T. O'Brien, *The Things They Carried* (Harmondsworth 1990) 77.

³⁷ R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, rev. ed. by J. van der Dussen (Oxford 1994) 257-66, and id., *An Autobiography*, with an intro. by S. Toulmin (Oxford 1978) 99-100.

³⁸ E.g., A. Santosuosso, *Soldiers, Citizens and the Symbols of War* (Westview, CO 1997).

³⁹ CA. Cronin, 'Line of Departure. The Atrocity in Vietnam War Literature', in *Fourteen Landing Zones. Approaches to Vietnam War Literature*, ed. by P.K. Jackson (Iowa City 1991) 213.

⁴⁰ P. Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (New York 1975) 169-70.

⁴¹ Murray (above n.32) 127-8 and Herr (above n.23) 82.

⁴² Personal communication to the author by a US Marine.

⁴³ Herr *ibid.*, 198-9; the scene in 'Full Metal Jacket' is taken from Hasford, *Short-Timers* 75.

[16] Casualties in Hoplite Battles

Krentz Peter

How MUCH RISK did a Greek hoplite run of losing his life in a set battle? The consensus of recent writers on Greek warfare is that casualties were light unless and until one side retreated.¹ “Greek armour gave reasonably good protection,” explains G. Cawkwell, “hence the small number of casualties on the victorious side in set battles—there were a mere 159 on the Greek side at Plataea in 479 B.C.” Oswyn Murray finds the battle of Plataea illustrative of hoplite battles in general: “It is typical of the nature of hoplite warfare that in this greatest of hoplite battles the Greeks lost only 159 men.” A. J. Holladay also cites Plataea, along with Mantinea, Delium, and Marathon—where 6,400 Persians died, but only 192 Athenians—to support his contention that “the total casualties in hoplite battles where we have reliable figures are remarkably light.” But Plataea and Marathon were not battles between two hoplite armies. Were their casualties typical or exceptional?

An answer may lie in the casualty figures supplied by our sources for set hoplite battles in the classical period between Plataea and Leuctra (479–371).² There are good grounds for taking these data seriously. For religious reasons, the Greeks regularly retrieved corpses and saw to their proper burial. In classical Athens the names of the dead were normally inscribed on stone; the custom is known in other Greek cities as well. Many fragments of these lists survive.³ They cannot be completely accurate, but we ought to remember Nicias, who realized at Solygea that two bodies were missing after the battle and sent a herald to recover them.⁴ The information, then, was available to contemporaries; and while it may be unlikely that any historian consulted the inscriptions themselves, Thucydides clearly had the capacity and the interest to talk to people who knew the (approximate) truth. He does not hesitate to let his reader know when he can only estimate, as in his discussion of the size of the Spartan army at Mantinea (5.68), and in at least one case he refuses to give the number killed because he did not believe the large number given him by his sources (3.113.6). When he gives a specific figure, I believe he has satisfied himself that it is correct to the extent indicated by attached qualifiers (provided always that we remember his tendency to round numbers, especially large ones).⁵ Later authors are more problematical. Unlike Thucydides, Xenophon does not customarily give specific figures for the losses on each side in a battle. Diodorus

gives numbers more frequently, but their reliability is questionable. Where we have Thucydides to compare, Diodorus often seems guilty of exaggeration. Where we do not have Thucydides, it is difficult to know how much to rely on Diodorus: where his source is ultimately the Oxyrhynchus historian, he may preserve sound evidence. If he is capable of citing fantastic numbers for the size of armies (cf., in addition to Mantinea, the battle between Croton with 100,000 soldiers and Sybaris with 300,000: Diod. 12.9–10), his casualty figures in our period are usually in the believable range. One point I would stress: the broader picture would remain unchanged if we discarded Diodorus altogether (though our sample would be considerably smaller). If someone was guessing on the results of the battles of Acragas, Himera River, Naryx, Nemea River, *etc.*, he knew what a reasonable guess was.

I give a brief discussion of the evidence. The results are summarized in the accompanying table.

ACRAGAS (472). According to Diodorus 11.53.4–5, a great many died because Greeks were fighting Greeks. The Acragantines and their allies lost more than 4,000 out of more than 20,000 cavalry and infantry, or about 20%. On the Syracusan side about 2,000 died, or about 10% if the two armies were equal in size. The ratio of winner's losses to loser's losses was approximately 1 : 2.

TANAGRA (457). Some 11,500 Peloponnesians and Boeotians faced 13,000 Athenians plus 1,000 Argives. Thucydides says only that there was "great slaughter on both sides" (φόνος ἐγένετο ἀμφοτέρων πολλός, 1.108). The broken inscription found in Athens listing the Argive dead originally contained, Meritt estimated, as many as 400 names.⁶ The Argives probably faced the Spartan right wing and suffered heavier casualties than their allies. The battle of Tanagra may lie behind the comment in Aristotle *Ath. Pol.* 26.1 on the death of 2,000–3,000 hoplites in each campaign during this period. But an estimate of losses for each side seems hazardous, and I omit Tanagra from the table below. I do not think anything can be gleaned from Plutarch's statement that 100 of Cimon's *hetairoi* fell (C/m. 17.3–6), other than general support for the high cost of the battle, on which all sources agree.

HIMERA RIVER (446). Here the Syracusans defeated the Acragantines again, killing more than 1,000 (Diod. 12.8.4). The size of neither army is given, nor are Syracusan casualties.

POTIDAEA (432). The Athenians lost 150 of their 3,000 hoplites (Thuc. 1.61.4 and 63.3, who reports only that "many" allied troops were present and does not give their casualties), or 5%. The Corinthians had sent 1,600 hoplites and 400 light-armed (Thuc.

1.60.1) and had an unspecified number of Potidaeans on their side; in all they lost a few less than 300 (Thuc. 1.63.3; Diod. 12.34.4 has “more than 300”). If the Potidaeans supplied 300 hoplites as they had at Plataea in 479 (Hdt. 9.28), and if we assume that the light-armed escaped, the Corinthian-Potidaean casualties were about 15.8%. (Probably, however, the Potidaeans turned out in greater force than they had in 479, and therefore this percentage may be too high). The ratio of winner’s losses to loser’s losses was 1 : 2.

OLPAE (426/5). The victorious Demosthenes and the Acarnanians lost about 300 men (Thuc. 3.109.2), but we do not know the size of their army, only that it was outnumbered (Thuc. 3.107.3). The Peloponnesian army included 3,000 hoplites sent with Eurylochus (3.100.2) plus an uncertain number of Ambraciots. The Ambraciots had originally sent 3,000 to besiege Argos (3.105.1). In the battle, the Ambraciots themselves emerged victorious, only to find that the greater part of their side had lost (τό πλεον νενικημένον, 3.108.3). A. W. Gomme may therefore have been right in suggesting that some Ambraciots were still at Argos.⁷ We would probably be safe in setting a maximum for the Peloponnesian forces at 6,000. Demosthenes lost, then, something more than 5%. While Thucydides does not give a number for casualties on the losing side, Diodorus claims that Demosthenes killed almost all 1,000 Ambraciots (12.60.4), but he says nothing of the Peloponnesian presence. There may be something salvable here, though it is clear from Thuc. 3.111.4 that many more than 200 Ambraciots survived the initial battle. Diodorus may be using a figure for the total losses on the losing side: 1,000 out of 6,000 (16.7%) would fit Thucydides’ statement that “many” Ambraciots died (3.108.3)—to say nothing of the major part of the army defeated first. The ratio of winner’s losses to loser’s losses would then be 1 : 3.3.

SOLYGEA (425). A few less than 50 Athenians died (Thuc. 4.44.6; Diod. 12.65.6 says 8) out of 2,000 (Thuc. 4.42.1), or about 2.5%. Of the Corinthians, 212 died (more than 300 according to Diodorus) out of a force of uncertain size (half the army in the field, which was not the full levy; it lacked 500 away on garrison duty, those who lived north of the isthmus, and the older men: Thuc. 4.42). If Beloch’s estimate of 3,000–4,000 young Corinthian hoplites at this time is correct,⁸ there were less than 1,750 present at Solygea (but probably not many less, since they withstood the 2,000 Athenians for some time). Therefore the Corinthians lost approximately 12.1%, and the ratio of winner’s losses to loser’s losses was 1 : 4.2. DELIUM (424). The Boeotians lost a few less than 500 (Thuc. 4.101.2) out of 7,000 hoplites (4.93.3), or 7.1% (Diod. 12.70.4 reports a loss of not more than 500 out of almost 20,000!). The Athenians lost a few less than 1,000 out of 7,000, or 14.3% (Diodorus says many times 500—

πολλὰ πλάσιοι τούτων—out of more than 20,000). Thucydides' figures do not seem to be low, as best we can tell from two casualty lists, which list 101 Thespians (Clairmont estimates there were originally ± 300) and 63 Tanagrans and Eretrians.⁹ The ratio of winner's losses to loser's losses was 1 : 2.

MANTINEA (418). The Argives and their allies lost 1,100 (Thuc. 5.74.2) out of some 8,000 men, or about 13.8%; the victorious Lacedaemonians lost about 300 of perhaps 9,000, or about 3.3%. The ratio of losses by winners and losers was 1 : 3.7. Thucydides expresses some hesitation about the number of Lacedaemonian dead here: it was difficult to learn the truth, he says, and he does not vouch for the figure he gives, but reports it as ἐλέγοντο. This may be a hint that he suspected the figure was low. For what it is worth, Diod. 12.79.4 reports that the 1,000 select Argive troops “made great slaughter” (πολὺν ἐποίονν φόνον).

LOCRIS (418). The Phocians killed more than 1,000 Locrians, according to Diod. 12.80.4. We do not have a figure for the total forces engaged on either side, but Diodorus' number seems too high for the size of Locris.¹⁰

SYRACUSE (415). Apparently only half (Thuc. 6.67.1) of the 5,100 Athenian and allied hoplites (Thuc. 6.43) fought, and of these about 50 died (Thuc. 6.71.1), or 2%. The size of the Syracusan army is not given; it formed up twice as deep as the Athenian (Thuc. 6.67.2), and presumably its line was roughly equal to the Athenian in length: perhaps 5,000 men in all, then, of whom about 260 died (Thuc. 6.71.1; 400 according to Diod. 13.6.5), about 5.2%. The ratio of losses by winners and losers was 1 : 5.2.

SYRACUSE (413). Fighting at night, the Athenians lost “not few” (Thuc. 7.45.2), 2,500 (Diod. 13.11.5), or 2,000 (Plut. *Nie.* 21.11), *i.e.*, 20–25% of what must have been a total of roughly 10,000 hoplites after the arrival of Demosthenes (Thuc. 7.42.1). MILETUS (412). Here 1,000 Athenian, 1,500 Argive, and 1,000 allied hoplites fought 800 Milesians plus an unspecified number of Peloponnesians and mercenaries. In this battle, as Thucydides notes, Ionians on both sides beat the Dorians opposed to them. The only casualty figure he gives is for the (defeated) Argives, who lost a few less than 300 (8.25.3), or slightly less than 20%.

EPHESUS (409). Tissaphernes' troops defeated and killed about 100 (Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.6) of Thrasyllus' 1,000 hoplites (*Hell.* 1.1.34), or 10%. Diodorus' report that 400 died (13.64.1) agrees with Xenophon's statement that about 300 peltasts and others were killed on the opposite side of the city.

TA KERATA (409). According to Diod. 13.65.1–2, 1,000 Athenians

under Leotrophides and Timarchus defeated the Megarians who came out against them πανδημεί, killing very many (παμπληθείς)

NARYX (395/4). Ismenias led 6,000 Boeotians in a victory against the Phocians, losing about 500, or 8.3% (Diod. 14.82.7–9). The Phocians lost almost 1,000, or—if we assume their army was roughly equal in size—about 16.7%. The ratio of winner's losses to loser's losses was 1 : 2.

NEMEA RIVER (394). According to Diod. 14.83.1, the victorious Spartans and their allies lost 1,100 (according to Xen. *Hell* 4.3.1 and *Ages*. 7.5, only eight were Lacedaemonians) of perhaps 22,500,¹¹ or 4.9%; the confederates lost 2,800 of some 24,000, or 11.7%. The ratio of winner's losses to loser's was 1 : 2.6.

CORONE A (394). Agesilaus lost 350 while killing 600 of the confederates (Diod. 14.84). Both sides had probably 20,000 men,¹² so the Spartans lost 1.8%, the confederates 3%. The ratio of winner's losses to loser's was 1 : 1.7.

PHLIUS (374). Mercenaries and exiles defeated the citizens, killing more than 300 (Diod. 15.40.5).

LEUCTRA (371). There are some unsettling discrepancies in the figures recorded for this most famous of Theban victories. Xenophon says that almost 1,000 Lacedaemonians died (*Hell*. 6.4.15), Pausanias more than 1,000 (9.13.12), and Plutarch 1,000 (*Ages*. 28.5). Yet Diodorus has “not less than 4,000,” an incredible figure, as comparison with casualty rates for other battles shows. On the other hand, Diodorus’ “about 300” for the number of Boeotian dead seems much more likely than Pausanias’ 47. Of 6,000 Boeotians, then, 300 died, or 5%; of 10,000 Peloponnesians, 1,000 died, or 10%.¹³ The ratio of winner's losses to loser's losses was 1 : 3.3.

Estimates are involved in a number of places, and the results should not be taken as precise. But with all due allowance for a proper margin of error in individual cases, the table reveals a clear overall pattern. The defeated army rarely lost more than 20%: typical is 10–20%, the average approximately 14%. The winning side never lost more than 10%: typical is 3–10%, the average approximately 5%. Only two of the battles fall significantly outside this pattern. Casualties at Syracuse in 415 and at Coronea in 394 were unusually low. In the first case fighting took place during a thunderstorm, and pursuit was prevented by the unchallenged Syracusan cavalry, as Thucydides notes (6.70.3). These two atypical conditions explain the light casualties. Xenophon says that Coronea was like no other battle in his day (*Hell* 4.3.16). Agesilaus' forces on the right did not even come to blows with the Argives, who fled; his troops in the center quickly routed their opponents. On the left the Thebans cut through

the Orchomenians, apparently with equal ease. There were probably few deaths until Agesilaus led his soldiers directly against the Thebans, a decision that aroused Xenophon's simultaneous admiration and criticism. Now came the hard fighting that led to the highest ratio of winner's losses to loser's losses in our sample. Unfortunately we do not know how many men met in this last engagement, but though the overall casualty rate was low, it must have been much higher in this part of the fighting to result in the scene described by Xenophon (Ages. 2.14):

Table Casualties in Battle

Winter	
1700	(20%)
4000	Heraclea River
1500	(55%)
1000	(16.7%)
1000	(10%)
1000	(11.3%)
1000	(13.3%)
1000	
1000	(12%)
1000	(20–25%)
1000	(20%)
1000	(10%)
1000	(16.7%)
1000	(10.7%)
1000	(12%)
1000	
1000	(10%)
1000	
1000	

When the battle ended, one could see, where it had taken place, the ground stained with blood, the bodies of friends and enemies lying together, shields broken in pieces, spears smashed to bits, daggers out of their sheaths, some on the ground, some in a body, some still held in the hands.

Because the average ratio of winner's losses to loser's losses was 1 : 2.9, Plataea and Marathon were not at all typical of hoplite battle casualties. To find something similar in Thucydides, we have to turn to the 'battle' of Amphipolis (422). Thucydides makes a point of explaining the large discrepancy between Athenian and enemy casualties (about 600 : 7): the fighting did not take place in the usual formation (it was not ἐκ παρατάξεως, 5.11.2; cf. his comment explaining the low number of Athenian losses at Sphacteria: ἡ γὰρ

μάχη οὐ σταδία ἦν, 4.38.5). Set hoplite battles were much more costly for the winners than Amphipolis, Plataea, or Marathon—unless the opponents did not stand and fight at all (which was the Spartans’ good fortune later in the “tearless” battle of 367). On the other hand, the Greeks (as Thucydides says specifically of the Lacedaemonians) did not usually pursue far once a battle was decided.¹⁴ This reluctance to go too far in killing enemy soldiers once their line had broken stemmed as much from the fear of a reversal if the troops dispersed as from a gentlemanly hesitation to kill fellow Greeks; but it did mean that the losers’ losses, while twice or three times as heavy as those of the winners, were rarely more than a fifth of their engaged forces.

Were losses in the truly typical battles, such as Delium and Mantinea, “remarkably light”? Modern opinions may vary, but what we really want to know is what the Greeks thought. I suspect that, in the small world of the Greek polis, the death of even 5% of the hoplites sent out to fight would seem a significant loss. The standard rhetorical description of a battle included a statement that “not a few” or “many” fell on both sides, as we can see from Diodorus.¹⁵ Such expressions are not confined to these rhetorical set-pieces: Thucydides states that “many” died in the minor engagements at Laodiceum (4.134.2) and Boliscus (8.24.3). Finally, there is the exaggerated but clear description of Greek warfare put by Herodotus into the mouth of Mardonius, who describes the Greek method of fighting to Xerxes as follows (7.9): “When they have declared war on each other, they fight on the best and most level ground they can find, so that the winners go away with great losses; I will not say anything about the losers, for they are utterly destroyed (ἐξώλεες).” Pericles’ strategy in the Peloponnesian War has received some deserved criticism, but he realized that casualties in a battle with the Spartans would not be considered light by his fellow Athenians, even if they won.

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¹ The quotations that follow are from Cawkwell’s notes to his Penguin edition of Xenophon, *The Persian Expedition* (1979) 166; Murray, *Early Greece* (Atlantic Highlands [N.J.] 1980) 278; and Holladay, “Hoplites and Heresies,” *JHS* 102 (1982) 97.

² Excluded therefore is the fighting at Spartolus (429), Aegitium (426), Sphacteria (425), Amphipolis (422), Mycalessus (413), Haliartus (395), Lechaenum (393, 392), Aegina (388), Olynthus (381), and Orchomenus (369). Pitched battles were obviously not the only danger hoplites had to face. Most of this evidence was assembled by Johannes Mälzer, *Verluste und Verlustlisten im griechischen Altertum bis auf die Zeit Alexanders des Grossen* (Diss.Jena 1912), who also treats losses in naval battles, from disease, etc. Mälzer concluded (unobjectionably but weakly) that “Es ist eine allbekannte Tatsache, dass der Sieger im allgemeinen geringere Verluste hatte als der Besiegte” (60). He cites Marathon and Plataea in support.

³ See Christoph W. Clairmont, *Patrios Nomos: Public Burial in Athens During the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.* (Oxford 1983).

⁴ Thuc. 4.44.5; Plut. *Nic.* 6.5–6.

⁵ See Catherine Reid Rubincam, “Qualification of Numerals in Thucydides,” *AJAH* 4 (1979) 77–95. Her approach makes sense, but I can see only one instance involving casualty figures where Thucydides’ choice of expression may be intended to influence our interpretation: the statement that a few less (ὀλίγω ἑλάσσονς, 4.44.6) than fifty Athenians died at Solygea. Thucydides probably knew the precise number, since he notes that the Athenians initially failed to find two bodies and had to ask for them under a truce. His point may be to stress the low number of Athenians killed in relation to Corinthian losses, given precisely as 212. We would then have an example of what Rubincam calls an “emphatic comparative qualification” (p. 85). But the same expression is used elsewhere without this sense (e.g. Thuc. 4.93.3).

⁶ Meiggs/Lewis 35, published by Benjamin D. Meritt, “The Argives at Tanagra,” *Hesperia* 14 (1945) 134–47, esp. 146; cf. “Greek Inscriptions,” *Hesperia* 21 (1952) 341–55, esp. 351ff.

⁷ *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* III (Oxford 1956) ad 3.108.2, with other possibilities that seem less likely to me.

⁸ K. J. Beloch, *Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt* (Leipzig 1886) 120.

⁹ *IG* VII 585 and 1888, with Clairmont (*supra* n.3) I 233.

¹⁰ Beloch (*supra* n.8) 175f.

¹¹ W. Kendrick Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography* II (Berkeley 1969) 73f.

¹² Pritchett (*supra* n.11) 93.

¹³ J. K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley 1970) 196ff.

¹⁴ 5.73.4. Later tradition considered “limited pursuit of a defeated foe” to be an aphorism of Lycurgus; see Everett L. Wheeler, “The *Hoplomachoi* and Vegetius’ Spartan Drillmasters,” *Chiron* 13 (1983) 17 n.84.

¹⁵ See Pritchett (*supra* n.11) 71. Examples include Diod. 11.76.2, 80.6, 86.2, 91.3, 12.29.3, 74.1, 79.4–5, and 13.8.1.

Part IV
The Peloponnesian War: 431–404 BC

Perikles and the Defence of Attika During the Peloponnesian War¹

L.G. Spence

GIVEN the increasing interest in ancient military history it seems timely to set Perikles' Peloponnesian War policy of avoiding major land battles in the context of the military options available and how these worked in practice. I should, however, sound one note of caution from the start. My discussion (especially sections I and II) represents a modern assessment of the defence strategies and options available to Athens in 431. While Perikles and his successors undoubtedly considered how best to fight the war, it would be misleading to even imply that their thought processes involved conducting an analysis anywhere near as sophisticated as the one which follows. Quite simply they lacked the theoretical concepts and even the technical vocabulary to do so. There was no history or tradition of staff college appreciations in fifth century Athens and no body of technical or theoretical military literature, and it seems clear that even experienced and successful commanders did not look at war with the same sort of theoretical constructs which we take for granted today.

To them, war was a series of practical problems which were solved (or not) without the benefit of formal training or a theoretical body of knowledge. They had no lists of 'principles of war' or principles of the different phases of war as we do today and presumably thought more in terms of 'if I do this I'll win, with the gods' help' rather than 'this plan is sound because it incorporates the principles of mobility, concentration, and speed'. Many decisions were probably based on precedent, what was normally done or what the commander had seen done in similar circumstances, rather than on a detailed and comprehensive analysis of all the factors involved. This is not to say that ancient generals were unintelligent or inferior, merely that they operated without the benefit of the theoretical framework of military tactics and strategy which we have developed after several thousand years of warfare. This should be kept in mind when reading the following assessment of Athenian war strategy.

According to Thukydides, Perikles' plan to deal with the Peloponnesian threat in 431 was to retire behind the walls of Athens and to replace the consequent loss of agricultural products by imports.² In this way Athens could take full advantage of her empire

and her naval supremacy to feed herself while avoiding a major hoplite engagement. As outlined by Thukydides, it is a delightfully simple policy, which took into account Athens' particular strengths and weaknesses—although it has been criticised by some modern scholars as an overly defensive strategy which could avoid defeat but which was also incapable of ensuring real victory.³

In an important development to the discussion of Perikles' strategy, H. D. Westlake cast the first real doubts upon the completeness of the account given by Thukydides at i 143.⁴ He argued, convincingly in my opinion, that Perikles' programme of seaborne raids on the Peloponnese and invasions of the Megarid was a large-scale and aggressive counter-measure to the annual invasions of Attika designed '... to cause so much economic distress that. . . the Peloponnesian League would have no heart to continue the war'.⁵ Although this view has largely been accepted by scholars,⁶ there is another aspect of Perikles' strategy which has often been neglected in discussions of the war and its conduct: the defence of Attika.⁷

Thukydides i 143.5 records Perikles' argument that:

... if we were islanders, who would be harder to come to grips with? So then considering ourselves, as far as possible, to be so, we must abandon our land and houses, guard the sea and city, and not, because of anger at their loss, fight the much larger numbers of Peloponnesians... ⁸

and most historians, including Westlake, have accepted this to mean that the Attic *chora* was simply to be abandoned to the Peloponnesians.⁹ However, an examination of how the war was conducted reveals that this remark is an over-simplification. It is quite clear from Thukydides' remarks at ii 1.2 and vii 2.75 that both Perikles and his successors did defend Attika, as far as it was possible to do so. This was done on two levels; some protection was gained from raids by means of the border forts like Oinoe and Panakton and, much more importantly, the damage caused by the annual invasions was considerably reduced by using the cavalry in a mobile defence rôle.

While the defence of Attika in such a fashion may have been only a relatively minor aspect of Athenian strategy it did aid the war effort in two important areas: minimising the damage to Attika and boosting Athenian morale. Both of these would undoubtedly have served to increase the ability and the will of the Athenians to resist and therefore render victory more certain. In terms of Westlake's theory, the longer the city could hold out the more likely it was that the attacks on Peloponnesian League territory would achieve their purpose and cause the enemy to sue for peace. This paper concentrates on the place of mobile defence in Athenian strategy and

is basically divided into three parts. The first discusses the threat to Athens in 431 and the possible responses, the second argues that cavalry could be used successfully in a mobile defence rôle, the third that it was in fact used in this way throughout the Peloponnesian War. I also believe that given the military threat facing Athens in 431 it was in fact the best option available to Perikles, although it did have unforeseen consequences for Athenian political stability.

I. The Threat and Possible Responses

I shall deal with the nature of the threat first. Although cross-border raids were a possibility, and did occur,¹⁰ the most likely enemy action in 431, and the one which did in fact eventuate, was a large-scale hoplite incursion. However, because fifth century assault and siege techniques were fairly limited and the Peloponnesian League was primarily a land-based power, Athens' navy and long walls precluded an effective siege of the city. Any invasions therefore were likely to follow the traditional pattern of hoplite warfare rather than involve direct action against the city of Athens itself.

This traditional pattern essentially involved marching against the agricultural land of the enemy who would either accept the challenge and defend his land or would decline and stay within his city walls. If the challenge were accepted and the defender won, his crops would be saved; if he lost, they would be ravaged. If the defender refused to fight, his crops would be ravaged anyway and the invader would return home having gained a moral victory besides inflicting economic damage on his foe.¹¹ In fact it was not only Athens which was safe behind its walls; the relatively primitive assault techniques and the expense of protracted sieges meant that, in most cases, a walled city's only vulnerable point, barring treachery, was its crops, orchards, and other fixed assets in the countryside.¹²

Most Greek cities could not afford to lose more than one harvest without being forced to import food to avoid starvation,¹³ and this should not be underestimated as a factor in classical warfare. The importance of crops is graphically illustrated by Agesilaos' actions in 390/89 when he allowed the Akarnanians to plant their crops unmolested so that he could threaten them more effectively once the grain was ready to harvest.¹⁴ In a basically subsistence economy the mere threat of having its crops ravaged was sometimes sufficient to make a city capitulate.¹⁵ Crops were therefore almost always defended, usually by hoplites, resulting in pitched battle between two hoplite armies, often supported by cavalry or *psiloi*. This was the normal, and traditional, means of defending the agricultural hinterland but there were three other active methods: a pre-emptive

strike, border defence, and mobile defence.¹⁶

Both a hoplite defence of the *chora* and a pre-emptive attack held the major attraction that if the enemy were decisively defeated it might be several years before he attempted to attack again. According to Thukydides, for example, Pagondas claimed before Delion in 424 that the Theban victory at Koroneia had secured Thebes right up until that time.¹⁷ However, both these options meant hazarding one's own hoplite forces in a single engagement. Because casualties could be as high as 8.3% and 20–25% of the total force of the victor and vanquished respectively¹⁸ this could be rather a gamble. This factor almost certainly explains why ten of the eleven Boiotarchs were against giving battle at Delion when it was realised that the Athenians were already on their way home. They were overruled by Pagondas, the supreme commander, who alone thought a battle worth the risk (ἄμεινον εἶναι κινδυνεῦσαι).¹⁹ The risk was compounded for Athens in 431 as she was faced by vastly superior numbers, including the best hoplites in Greece, so it is hardly surprising that Perikles did not view a pitched battle as an attractive option.

Although a pre-emptive strike would have involved fighting only part of the enemy's combined forces at any one time the remainder would still have to be faced shortly afterwards.²⁰ Only the Megarid and Boiotia were within easy striking distance of Athens, and a defeat of the cities in one or other of these areas would not have prevented the rest of the Peloponnesian League from marching on Attika.²¹ A preemptive strike was best employed not against a large coalition but against a single enemy and the Athenian failure at Delion in 424 illustrates the risk attached even to this strategy. It too was therefore not an appropriate choice in 431.

The theory of border defence has been strongly advocated in more recent times by G. E. M. de Ste Croix and by P. A. Cartledge who argued that an effective defence could be provided by using light troops (or lightly equipped hoplites according to de Ste Croix) to control the mountain passes.²² Such an approach to defence certainly was attempted from time to time, particularly in the fourth century; however, it also had several disadvantages which curtailed its usefulness in 431.²³


The first of these was the number of possible invasion routes into Attika. As MAP Ishows, there were three main directions from which an invasion of Attika could be launched and each of these included several alternative routes. These are: the South West, either along the coast past Eleusis or further inland; the North West, across Kithairon and Parnés, either south of Oinoe, through Oinoe itself, or via Panakton/ Phyle; and the North East, either through the Dekeleia or Aphidna passes or the longer routes via Marathon, Mount Pentelikon

or even around Hymettos.²⁴

To defend all of these routes with light troops or hoplites would have been both difficult and expensive, particularly as the possibility of unheralded invasion or seizure of passes in advance required that they be guarded for longer than the weeks immediately preceding the harvest.²⁵ To do so would rule out the use of citizen hoplites, and as Athens apparently had no organised light troops of her own as late as 424²⁶ the creation of a new force or the hiring of mercenaries would have been required. However, to feed and pay light infantry garrisons, and also to train them in the case of citizens, would have been prohibitively expensive.²⁷ In addition, several of the possible invasion routes would require a hoplite defence because of the width of the countryside: Oinoe and Panakton for example are either on or next to plains not passes. Finally, in the North West at least, many of the sites suitable for defence by light troops could be bypassed or turned relatively easily.

MAP 1

Invasion Routes into Attika



Therefore, in all probability, border garrisons of light troops would have been unable to prevent an army as large as that fielded by the Peloponnesian League from breaking into Attika. This is confirmed by the activities of the garrison at Oinoe which was clearly unable to do

anything except stay inside the walls when the League army invaded in 431.²⁸ There are other cases of hoplites forcing their way through defended areas or passes²⁹ and if such a breakthrough did occur the only function the garrisons could then fulfil would be to harass the enemy's rear. As fifth century armies, including that of the Peloponnesian League, usually lived off the land or on what they had brought with them they rarely had vulnerable supply lines which these garrison troops could cut.³⁰ Because of this, their only real value once bypassed would be if the enemy were then defeated on the plain in which case border garrisons could inflict further casualties upon them during their withdrawal.³¹

In fact, the only way in which any sort of secure, long-term, border defence of Attika could be effected was probably by establishing a system like the one which Ober has suggested was used in the fourth century.³² This, he argues, involved an integrated network of fortified positions and signal towers: the forts designed to impose considerable delay on the enemy or to provide advance warning of their approach and the towers designed to summon aid from Athens. However, the fourth century threat was not from the combined forces of the Peloponnesian League but from the armies of individual states or smaller coalitions and this aid was therefore in the form of a general mobilisation against the enemy incursion. Even this highly developed system then would not, in itself, provide a total defence but relied on the support of a hoplite mobilisation to back up the frontier garrisons. The fifth century threat was different, being from a larger force, and in 431 a response πανδημεί was the very thing which Perikles was trying to avoid.

There was one other variant of the border defence strategy possible for Athens in the fifth century, a forward defence based on the Megarid and Mount Geraneia. De Ste Croix has plausibly argued that the Athenian alliance with Megara effectively prevented a Peloponnesian invasion of Attika from about 460 to 440.³³ A similar policy may have been behind the unsuccessful attempt to seize Megara in 424 but, like the frontier border defence just discussed, it was also less than perfect. Firstly, and most importantly, such a policy was basically untenable without an alliance with Megara, an unlikely occurrence in 431.³⁴ Without support in the form of Megarian troops occupying, or helping to occupy, Mount Geraneia this strategy would almost certainly have failed as the cost of maintaining an Athenian or mercenary garrison there would be as expensive as garrisoning the borders of Attika. In addition, without Megarian help, manning the Megarid in sufficient strength to prevent an invasion by the bulk of the Peloponnesian forces in the south would effectively denude Attika of defence against invasion from Boiotia. Finally, with anything short

of an enthusiastic Megara to its rear, any Athenian garrison on Geraneia would be very isolated and a long way from Athenian help in the event of a major attack.

Therefore, border defence, whether frontier or forward, was not feasible unless Athens either was prepared to hire light troops (or develop her own *psiloi*), construct a network of fortified garrisons, *and* cover the threatened route with a general mobilisation or, alternatively, was able to ally with Megara. The latter was, to say the least, highly unlikely given the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of war. The former, on the other hand, would have involved major expense and in addition, if Attika were truly to be defended, suffered from the same basic defect as the traditional form of defence: the possibility of a hoplite battle against superior numbers.

Because of these problems with a hoplite or border defence strategy, there was no real likelihood of providing complete security to the Attic *chora*. The best that could be done here was to use border forts to minimise raiding and, not surprisingly, this tactic was used to reduce the damage in frontier areas during the war.³⁵ However, Athens could not prevent the Peloponnesian League army from crossing her borders and could not defeat it once it had arrived. Only one other active defensive option remained: mobile defence, and this was in fact the one which Perikles and his successors used. This strategy accepted that the enemy could not be stopped at the borders nor defeated in a decisive hoplite engagement and sought instead to limit the damage done to the countryside. This was achieved by the continual harassment of the invasion force, using cavalry (or *psiloi*) to restrict its movement and, as far as possible, to prevent its ravaging the city's agricultural hinterland.

II. The Theory and Practice of Mobile Defence

Section III of this paper examines the evidence for Athens' use of mobile defence during the Peloponnesian War, but it is necessary first to discuss how mounted troops were used in this way. The use of cavalry to bear the brunt of a hoplite invasion runs counter to the general assumption that Greek cavalry was really only of peripheral value prior to Philip and Alexander because of its inability to charge into formed bodies of heavy infantry.³⁶ Nonetheless, mobile defence was a feasible tactic and was used in several campaigns other than the defence of Attika from 431 to 404. For example, the Thessalians used it to good effect during the Athenian invasion of 457 when, according to that delightful statement in Thukydides i 111.1, the Athenians '... dominated the country, though without being able to go far from their camp because the Thessalian cavalry prevented them . . .'.³⁷ Other

examples of mobile defence occur elsewhere in Greece and it seems to have been a particularly common strategy in both Sicily and Persia.³⁸

Mobile defence could be achieved on a variety of levels. At its best it involved harassing, or (much more rarely) the destruction³⁹ of, the enemy's main force, thereby preventing it from damaging the countryside. However, even to attempt to do this required a very large cavalry force such as that possessed by states like Thessaly or Syracuse, and even then it could only succeed if the enemy had no effective cavalry protection of its own. At a lower level, if the enemy army could not directly be contained or destroyed then damage could be considerably reduced by preventing individuals or groups leaving the safety of the main force to forage and/or ravage.

The use of mobile defence was made possible by the vulnerability of infantry to good cavalry. By this I do *not* mean to imply that Greek cavalry was always, or even often, successful against Greek footsoldiers, merely that when well and aggressively led good quality horse could, in the right circumstances, be very dangerous to infantry. Although it is not widely recognised, mounted troops were capable of containing a large army of hoplites or a smaller combined force of hoplites supported by horse or light troops.⁴⁰ There are also recorded cases of cavalry destroying small or disorganised bodies of foot.⁴¹ The tactics involved in this were relatively simple and effectively took advantage of the weaknesses of infantry. In the case of hoplites this was their lack of tactical mobility while for *psiloi* it was their lack of protection.

To take the hoplites first, their equipment and formation were primarily suited to fighting other hoplites and one of their main characteristics was the close ordering of the ranks for mutual protection.⁴² The cooperative nature of the hoplite phalanx is well illustrated by the rôle of the *aspis*. Despite Archilochos' studied indifference it was considered a disgrace to abandon one's shield in battle and at Athens, to be a ῥίψασπις was an indictable offence.⁴³ This is explained by Kleomenes' statement that it was disgraceful to lose one's shield but not one's helmet or breastplate because the shield was for the safety of the whole line while the other items benefited only the individual.⁴⁴ The fundamental importance of the *aspis* is further emphasised by the fact that as the other items in the original hoplite panoply were discarded or modified it remained unchanged.⁴⁵

The panoply was designed to protect the hoplite while he was in formation and, because of deficiencies in cavalry harness, and the use of short spears and the tetragonal formation common in Greece, it was also effective against a frontal cavalry charge.⁴⁶ However, it was probably less useful outside the phalanx as the large shield with its off-centre grip would have been rather unwieldy and its weight (along

with that of the other accoutrements) would have handicapped a fleeing or pursuing hoplite.⁴⁷ Xenophon points out how difficult it is for troops to stand and fight when they see others running away, so once a phalanx started to break the concern of most of its members would presumably have been to place as much distance as possible between themselves and the enemy.⁴⁸ This explains why the *aspis* was the first thing discarded in a rout. The individual hoplite was therefore vulnerable and needed to stay in formation to derive the maximum protection from his equipment.⁴⁹

To exploit this vulnerability to the full cavalry had to attack the hoplite outside the phalanx. This could be done when the phalanx had collapsed or was disrupted either by hostile action or an obstacle. Alternatively, as will be seen, effective assaults could be launched against hoplites scattered for foraging or ravaging or who had not yet formed their phalanx. However, the *hippeis* did not have to wait around for opportunities to catch infantry out of formation—they themselves possessed sufficient hitting power to break a hoplite phalanx either by charging its flanks or by harassing it with missile fire. Flank attacks allowed the cavalry to make use of shock action: hoplites were very vulnerable to an assault on their right or unshielded side or on their rear and would almost certainly break, before or on impact, if such an assault occurred.⁵⁰ Such attacks could be avoided by siting the flanks on obstacles or, alternatively (but only if the opposing cavalry had no hoplite force with it), by forming a square. But, whether a square was formed or not, the close ordered hoplite ranks provided a relatively easy target for projectile weapons like the javelins carried by many cavalymen.⁵¹ Apart from retiring to high ground the only defence a purely hoplite force had against this was to use detachments to charge out to keep the enemy out of range. While this tactic was practised (and even preferred on occasion to the use of *psiloito* help), the charging troops, or *ekdromoi*, were vulnerable to individual attack and often too slow to catch their assailants anyway.⁵²

Except in rugged country, cavalry could be much more dangerous in this rôle than *psiloi* because of its superior mobility. This allowed it the facility to harass hoplites with relative impunity until either their movement was curtailed or their formation collapsed allowing them to be mopped up individually. Even large bodies of hoplites could be contained by aggressive cavalry action, particularly where their own supporting arms were ineffectual or non-existent. This is graphically illustrated by Xenophon *Hell* vii 1.21 which describes an action near Korinth in 369. The cavalry sent by Dionysios of Syracuse numbered only fifty and was part of an allied Athenian/Korinthian army while the enemy referred to was a Theban invasion force of some seven

thousand foot and six hundred horse.⁵³ The passage is worth quoting in full for the picture it gives of the tactics involved:

But the cavalry sent by Dionysius, in spite of their small numbers, rode along the enemy's line either as individuals or in small detachments and charged down on them, hurling their javelins. When the enemy moved out against them, they would fall back, and then face about and hurl their javelins again. And in the course of all this they would dismount and have a rest; and if they were attacked while they were dismounted, they would easily leap on their horses and ride away. But if the enemy pressed his pursuit far from the main army, they would turn on them while they were going back again, and with volleys of javelins give them a very rough time. Thus they made the whole enemy army either advance or retreat just as they pleased.⁵⁴ (Warner)

Because of their inability to fight in formation most types of *psiloi* were as vulnerable to cavalry as individual hoplites. Although their limited armour did aid their mobility this was often insufficient to save them from a mounted enemy. Two Theban successes against Spartan peltasts in 378 illustrate the particular vulnerability of disorganised light troops but cavalry was also effective against organised *psiloi*. At least once Thracian peltasts fled before a cavalry charge even reached them.⁵⁵ However, those peltasts equipped with a shield and longer spear and who were able to fight in formation had to be attacked like hoplites.⁵⁶ They were therefore not always easy prey for cavalry as the Dioi proved at Mykalessos. Although some were cut down by the Theban troopers, the main body prevented the cavalymen from getting too close by using detachments to charge out against them.⁵⁷ Although these *ekdromoi* were probably less likely to suffer casualties than slower hoplite *ekdromoi* it seems likely to me that in this particular case it was the relatively short distance to their boats which saved the Thracians by denying the Theban horse sufficient time to pressure their formation into collapse.⁵⁸

Mobile defence utilising cavalry directly against the main enemy force could therefore work in theory and did work in practice. In 431, however, their own sizeable cavalry force probably protected the Peloponnesians from the spectacular and effective harassment of a hoplite army portrayed in the Xenophon extract quoted above.⁵⁹ Despite this, though, they were still vulnerable in one important area: highly effective cavalry charges could be launched against troops who had scattered to forage or to ravage agricultural land. In Greek warfare generally it seems that these were often left unprotected by their own cavalry, either because foraging was regarded as something which the individual undertook in his own time and at his own risk or because the foragers and/or ravagers were too widely scattered for effective protection.⁶⁰

Because of the methods used in devastating agricultural areas, the cavalry tactics described earlier in this section were particularly useful in their defence. Invaders deprived the enemy of agricultural produce by destroying the crops, harvesting them for their own use, or a combination of the two. Long term damage could be caused by the destruction of vines, trees, and farm buildings.⁶¹ The precise method of ravaging obviously differed according to local conditions but, although sometimes used, burning was probably not the most common medium of destruction during the Peloponnesian invasions of Attika. This is because, in some ways, it was not a particularly good method of destroying farmland and obviously could not be used indiscriminately where an army was harvesting crops for its own use. This was the case with the Peloponnesians who used the combination method against the Athenians from 431 onwards: although they brought some supplies with them they also used local crops (their 425 invasion for example had to be cut short because the Attic grain was still too green to harvest).⁶² However, the devastation of some areas in passing suggests pure destruction rather than harvesting.⁶³

The verb τέμνω, which is frequently used in the context of ravaging, strongly suggests that the cutting down of trees and crops was the standard practice⁶⁴ and in addition the three main objects of destruction: crops, trees, and farm buildings, are not as vulnerable to fire as is often assumed. W. G. Hardy, for example, claimed that Greek country houses were difficult to set alight and this is supported both by the archaeological evidence of their construction⁶⁵ and by Thukydides ii 14. 1 which states that the woodwork was removed before the invasion force arrived. Trees could be burned, but the olive in particular would probably have taken some trouble to ignite because of its thick bark, and as they were always planted a good distance apart it would presumably have been difficult for the fire to spread easily from tree to tree.⁶⁶

Thukydides vi 94.2 shows that on occasion crops were burned, but experimental tests conducted in the U.K. after the Second World War show that it is often surprisingly difficult to fire grain (especially wheat) and that the damage is limited to very small areas if the crop is not fully ripe or there has been recent rain.⁶⁷ In fact, the scientist who conducted these tests, D.J. Watson, claimed that 'the danger of loss by fire occurs mainly when harvest is delayed beyond the stage when the crop first becomes fit for cutting'.⁶⁸ The problem for an invader wishing to use fire would be to arrive when the crop was ripe but not yet harvested—not an easy feat as different crops ripen at different times.⁶⁹ It is clear then that not only troops harvesting crops but also, in many cases, those destroying crops, vines, trees, and buildings used tools to do so and did not therefore usually operate in close

formation.⁷⁰ Marching a formation through standing crops,⁷¹ although giving security to the destruction party, would presumably cause much less damage than burning or cutting as the area affected in a given time would be smaller and some at least of the trampled crop could probably be salvaged (even if only as animal fodder) after the invaders had left the area. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that most of the damage was in fact caused not by the core force of hoplites but by light troops operating away from the main body.⁷² Therefore, because of the methods of agricultural destruction most soldiers engaged in ravaging, whether *psiloi* or hoplites, operated out of formation and so were vulnerable to sudden attack of the type most effectively delivered by cavalry.⁷³

In addition, most Greek armies had no organised commissariat and therefore relied on individual foraging or the establishment of markets to feed their soldiers.⁷⁴ Markets, however, could not readily be established in Attika as it was hostile territory, and foragers were even more at risk from cavalry attacks than organised destruction parties because they operated, unprotected, as individuals or in small groups and were often encumbered by tools or booty.⁷⁵ Two incidents involving Greek troops in Asia show that even large bodies of foragers were at risk from horsemen. In the first, according to Xen. *Anab.* vi 4.24, two thousand foragers from the Ten Thousand were attacked by cavalry under Pharnabazos. About five hundred were killed and the rest forced to retire to the upland areas. Xen. *Hell*, iv 1.17–19 records that Pharnabazos was again successful under similar circumstances in 395 when he killed one hundred of a seven-hundred-man group from Agesilaos' army. On this occasion the Greeks managed to form a hasty phalanx when they realised the impending danger but were nevertheless disrupted by two scythed chariots and then attacked by the cavalry. Another large-scale loss of life among foragers is mentioned by Diodorus Siculus at xiii 44.1–4.

Given the success of these and other actions against foragers, ravagers, and even large hoplite forces, it is not surprising that the Persians and those Greeks from traditional cavalry areas like Thessaly and Sicily regularly used their mounted arm against hoplite incursions.⁷⁶ However, the defence of Attika during the Peloponnesian War represents the most sustained use of cavalry in the mobile defence rôle in antiquity.

III. The Defence of Attika 431–404

The Spartan strategy here was initially limited to the traditional one of forcing an enemy to submit by ravaging his crops. To this end Attika was invaded annually by two-thirds of the total forces of the

Peloponnesian League.⁷⁷ In the first invasion (see MAP 2), even before the main Peloponnesian army reached the outskirts of Athens, and while the Athenians were still hoping that it would withdraw as it had under Pleistoanax in 446, the Athenian cavalry was engaging the enemy at a place called Rheitoi on the Thriasian Plain.⁷⁸ Then, when the Peloponnesians moved northwards and began ravaging Acharnai in view of Athens, Perikles continually (αἰεὶ) used the cavalry to protect the countryside close to the city.⁷⁹ However, it was unrealistic to expect that the cavalry could protect the whole of Attika or could attack the main body of enemy hoplites as this was defended by its own cavalry, drawn from Boiotia, Phokis, and Lokris. But, as we have already seen, the Athenian *hippeis* were prepared to operate as far afield as the Thriasian Plain and in 430 they, and some Thessalian cavalry, are attested in Thukydides ii 22.2 at a place called Phrygia, in the deme Athmonon, north of Athens.⁸⁰

After their initial reverse at Rheitoi, which took place in unspecified circumstances, the *hippeis* seem to have perfected their tactics. They were apparently successful against the Boiotian horse at Phrygia and by 428, according to Thukydides iii 1.2, they were, as in 431, able to prevent ‘... the majority of the light troops from leaving their camp to harm the areas near to the city’.⁸¹ Thukydides also states here that this had been the practice on previous occasions which shows that this was the regular response to the annual invasion and not an isolated incident.

The meaning of ‘the areas near the city’ (τὰ ἐγγύς τῆς πόλεως) is vague, but Thukydides’ account of the operations of 431 at ii 19–23 states that the Peloponnesians kept to the west of Mount Aigaleos during their march to Acharnai and suggests that they did not come much, if at all, further south than Athmonon before leaving via Oropos. This may mean that the plains from the city walls out as far as Mount Aigaleos and Hymettos in the west and east and perhaps Athmonon in the north were relatively secure, although obviously the further from the walls the less safe property and crops would have been (see MAP2). Because of the economies of transport the bulk of the city’s local food supply was probably grown in precisely this area, that is, fairly close to the walls.⁸² However, the exact extent of the relatively secure area almost certainly varied from invasion to invasion and may not have been as large as this in other years.⁸³

MAP 2

Attika during the Peloponnesian Invasions



So, it is quite clear from Thukydides that the cavalry was used to protect as much of Attika as possible during the first four years of the Archidamian war and this was also the case for the whole of the Dekeleian War. With the Peloponnesian occupation of Dekeleia in 413 the ravaging became much more extended and Thukydides records at vii 27.5 that from this point onwards the cavalry rode out *every* day to harass the enemy and protect the countryside. This phase of the war lasted from 413 to 404 but the evidence for the remaining period of hostilities, that is from 427 to 421, is rather sketchy. This is not least because only two other invasions (427 and 425) are recorded for this period as the Spartans apparently abandoned their attacks on Attika after the capture of the garrison on Sphakteria in 425.⁸⁴ However, it does seem highly likely that if the cavalry was used in mobile defence for two-thirds of the war, including the periods at both the start and end of the conflict, that this was also true of the few invasions during the other third.

Additional support for this view is lent by Hippokrates' speech before Delion in 424. At iv 95.2, Thukydides portrays him encouraging the troops to fight by pointing out that if the Athenians were victorious the Peloponnesians, thereby deprived of the Boiotian horse, would never again attack Attika. This statement has been dismissed, unfairly in my view, by de Ste Croix,⁸⁵ but it makes eminent sense if Attika were being protected by cavalry. I have already argued that hoplites alone or even hoplites and light troops could be vulnerable to good cavalry and as Thuky. ii 9.3 suggests that the Boiotians provided the bulk of the Peloponnesian League's mounted arm their loss would severely hamper League operations in Attika. Hippokrates' remark then seems to show that the cavalry had been recently active in its normal rôle and in addition Aristophanes'

Knights, produced in the same year as the battle of Delion, contains the claim at lines 596–7 that the horses and men had shared in *many* raids and battles.

As a further piece of minor circumstantial evidence, the whole of Xenophon's *Eq. Mag.* is heavily influenced by the hit-and-run tactics employed against a superior enemy,⁸⁶ and I consider that this represents the lasting effect which over twenty years of such activities in defence of Attika had left upon Athenian cavalry tactics. More direct evidence though, if (as seems likely) he is referring to the Peloponnesian War, is his remark at vii 4 that:

if the city turns to her navy, and is content to preserve her walls, just as she did when the Lakedaimonians invaded with all the Greeks and expects her cavalry to preserve the things which lie outside the walls, and to run its risks alone against her foes; then indeed I consider we need first the strong friendship of the gods and second it is necessary that the hipparch be highly skilled.⁸⁷

The cavalry was therefore used throughout the war to provide what defence it could to Attika, and, according to Thukydides ii 22.1 and iii 1.2, was able to do so with some success. But one question remains which should be answered at this point: why did the Athenians bother to defend Attika at all? If goods and food could be imported as readily as Thukydides i 143.4–5 suggests then why bother to risk *any* Athenian lives in the defence of the *chora*?

The answer is twofold. Thukydides' remarks on the effect of the occupation of Dekeleia show that when Athens really was denied the use of much of Attika on a long-term basis it was a serious matter. He states:

and the food supplies from Euboia, which before had been brought in by the faster route overland from Dekeleia through Oropos had to go, at much cost, by sea round Sounion. Everything the city needed had to be imported and instead of a city it became a fortress.⁸⁸

Obviously things were not quite so grim during the Archidamian War when Attika could still be used for a large part of the year, and *Hell. Oxy.* xii 3–5 confirms that most of the serious damage to Attika occurred after 413.⁸⁹ However, even during the Archidamian war the loss of agricultural produce and rural property must have placed a significant financial burden on the population. Therefore, any measure of protection to Attika would have helped to reduce the economic drain on Athens and thereby prolong resistance.

However, while this may well have been part of the reason for Perikles' decision to provide as much security for Attika as possible, there was another important factor. Although he had good reason to avoid the possibility of a major hoplite defeat, the reaction to the first

invasion showed that Perikles could not afford to abandon Attika entirely to the enemy because of the risk of damage to his own political position and to the Athenian will to resist. Instead he chose to provide some protection to the Athenian *chora* with the *hippeis* and the frontier forts and to retaliate in kind with attacks on the Megarid and seaborne raids on the Péloponnèse.⁹⁰ The factor of morale was initially very important given the prominence of the hoplite ethos in Greek thinking.⁹¹ Perikles' problem was that in traditional warfare a state which did not mobilise its hoplites to defend its farmland was considered to have suffered a moral defeat.⁹² There is much evidence from both the fifth and fourth centuries to show that such a refusal to fight was considered dishonourable.⁹³

A prime example of this is Thukydides ii 21.2 which describes the Athenian reaction to the first invasion of the Peloponnesian War as follows:

when they saw the army at Acharnai, only sixty stades away from the city, they could no longer tolerate the situation. Their land was being ravaged right in front of them, something which the young men had never seen nor the old men except at the time of the Persian invasion. It was terrible and they, especially the young, wanted to march out and no longer put up with it.⁹⁴

Perikles was in fact accused of cowardice (ἐκἀκίζον) for not leading them out to defend their land and, significantly, Diodorus Siculus xii 42.8 notes that when he did lead the first retaliatory raid Perikles was praised by the Athenians '... on the grounds that he was acting as a general and waging war on the Peloponnesians'.⁹⁵

Perikles remained apparently unmoved by the accusations of cowardice and the demands to march against the enemy but he nevertheless refrained from calling an assembly, checked the city's defences, and tried to keep things calm. Importantly, as noted above, Thukydides adds that he also continually sent the cavalry out to prevent the enemy from ravaging the area close to the city.⁹⁶ In addition, his invasions of the Megarid and the large-scale seaborne raids on the Péloponnèse would also have helped to quieten those who were demanding an aggressive response to the invasions.⁹⁷

IV. Conclusions

The Athenians then did try to protect Attika by the most effective method available to them short of risking a major, and potentially disastrous, hoplite engagement. The protection provided by cavalry in the mobile defence rôle throughout the war was by no means total and was never intended to be so, but it was the best which could be achieved under the circumstances. It was not only a necessary factor

in raising and maintaining morale but also provided some measure of physical protection to Athens' agricultural hinterland and was therefore well suited to the threat not only in 431 but also to its extension in 413 when Dekeleia was occupied. As we have seen from Thukydides, this protection was greatest closest to Athens, although perhaps even extending as far out as Mounts Aigaleos and Hymettos, the area shown in MAP 2, and where most of the city's local food supply was presumably grown. This in turn must have helped to ease, even if only in a relatively small way, some of the financial burdens of the war. The efficacy, or at the very least the desirability, of using the *hippeis* against the invaders in this manner is illustrated by the fact that, whatever their war aims, Perikles' successors continued to follow his lead.

Thukydides i 143.4–5 therefore represents an oversimplification of Perikles' ultimate strategy. While, quite sensibly, he did, as Thukydides states, avoid a major hoplite clash with the main Peloponnesian army, Perikles did not just sit back and leave Attika to its fate. Instead he protected it to the best of Athens' ability, partially by use of the border forts against cross-border raids,⁹⁸ but primarily by using the cavalry to reduce the damage caused by the annual invasions. This, I would argue, was an important supplement to his programme of offensive action against individual enemy states already identified by Westlake. Whether Perikles intended to use the cavalry in this way right from the start or was first prompted to do so by the angry reaction of the Athenians to the first invasion is open to debate.⁹⁹ Nonetheless, it was not only a logical and sensible response to the enemy actions in 431 and the reactions these caused in Athens, but was, in my view, the best of the available defensive options.

However, the adoption of mobile defence did have one unforeseen result. The cavalry served continually in defence of Attika, the most important campaign area according to traditional values, and at some cost to themselves. Thukydides vii 27.5, for example, paints a moving picture of the hardships endured by both cavalryman and mount while riding out every day of the year against those in Dekeleia and Xenophon's *Eq. Mag.* vii 4 also stresses the difficulty of sustaining the mobile defence rôle.¹⁰⁰ The *hippeis* also served overseas while in contrast the other sections of the armed forces served *only* overseas and not in active defence of Attika. In terms of the *kaloï kagathoi* at any rate, the cavalry were the only ones actually doing something to protect the *chora*— the traditional focus of military activity. Ar. *Eq.* 573–80 contain a hint that as early as 424, long before the heavy commitment required by the Dekeleian campaign, the cavalry already believed that it was putting the most effort into fighting the war. It should also be remembered that while the cavalry, hoplites, and

rowers all served Athens with their persons, the cavalry class in addition shouldered an important part of the financial burden of the war through trierarchies and the *eisphora*.

Therefore, although Aristophanes' comment is obviously exaggerated in the context of the total war effort, it seems likely that the *hippeis* themselves considered that they were bearing an unfair share of the burden and that this feeling intensified as hostilities dragged on. If this is so, then it may provide an additional explanation for their participation as a group in the oligarchic movements in the latter part of the Peloponnesian War.

Appendix. Thukydides on Perikles' Intentions in 431

Although beyond the original scope of my article, it is necessary to discuss Dr Ober's explanation of why Thukydides' accounts of Perikles' war policy at i 141 ff. and ii 65 fail to mention mobile defence when his record of the events clearly shows that cavalry was used in this rôle. Dr Ober basically argues that, in order to ensure the acceptance of his 'no-battle strategy' before the war began, Perikles had to, and did, promise that the *chora* would be protected by the cavalry. Thukydides, however, suppressed this information because 'Pericles could not be depicted as making a deal with the rural citizens over a concern so negligible in the greater scheme of things as rural property'.¹⁰¹

The onus is clearly upon Dr Ober to show why the evidence of Thukydides' testimony here should be discarded but his theory seems unnecessarily complicated and relies on three basic assumptions which cannot be substantiated. The first is that the *ekklesia* would not have accepted the 'no-battle strategy' without the promise of safety for the *chora*, the second that Perikles made such a promise. Following on from these is the third: that before the outbreak of war Perikles had therefore planned to use the cavalry to protect the *chora* from harm.

However, there is another explanation of the contradiction identified by Dr Ober which has the major advantage of fitting in with the existing evidence, provided by Thukydides. This is simply that Perikles did not refer to a cavalry-based defence of the *chora* in his pre-war speeches and, in all probability, had not envisaged such a comprehensive defence until events persuaded him that it was a necessary and effective option.

To take Dr Ober's assumptions in order, I do not consider that a public promise to defend the *chora* was a necessary prerequisite for securing initial acceptance of the policy outlined in Thuky. i 141 ff.

Nor, perhaps, would such a promise have been compelling enough to have done so. Prior to the invasion of 431 Perikles had enjoyed well over a decade of dominance in Athenian politics and was at the height of his influence. In addition, as outlined in Section I, the avoidance of pitched battle was eminently logical under the circumstances and this must have been apparent to many Athenians. The *demos* did not always decide policy according to selfish motives (the use of the Laureion silver to build ships recorded in Plut. *Them.* 4 springs to mind here) and damage to the rural areas would not in any case have involved direct loss to many of the urban populace. Perikles' plan was logical, and if his arguments in its favour were as convincing as the ones presented in Thukydides then it is not hard to believe that a majority could have accepted it on its merits.

Furthermore, it is by no means certain that an undertaking to protect Attika would have carried much weight prior to the outbreak of war. Cavalry certainly could be effective in defence of territory (see Section II) but Athens was not traditionally a cavalry power and the influence of the hoplite ethos in 431 was probably quite strong.¹⁰² As a result, some Athenians undoubtedly believed that horsemen were incapable of providing a defence of the *chora*.

In fact, I seriously doubt whether any Athenians believed that the *hippeis* could protect *all* of Attika: the Peloponnesian army was too large and had too many mounted troops of its own. Moreover, the Athenian cavalry, only fairly recently increased from 300 to 1000 men,¹⁰³ was as yet largely untried in battle. This is why it seems likely that, whenever the decision was made, the cavalry was never intended to provide more than partial protection of the countryside. Any promise by Perikles that such protection was to be total would, I think, have been regarded as audacious, if not actually foolhardy.¹⁰⁴

It seems quite feasible then that a combination of Perikles' influence and the logic of his case could have persuaded sufficient pre-war voters to adopt his plan to avoid a hoplite battle. A promise to protect the *chora* was not therefore a logical necessity and need never have been made. The difficult task was, it appears, not so much to persuade the Athenians to accept the plan in the first place as to abide by the decision once the threat to Attika was realised.

Thukydides ii 21 clearly illustrates the problems of maintaining their resolve once the invasion force had materialised. However, even then the logic of Perikles' arguments still held and was presumably reinforced when the population was able to see the size and power of the enemy for themselves. Some Athenians therefore, and possibly still a majority, presumably remained convinced of the correctness of their original decision. Perikles certainly did,¹⁰⁵ but he also took active steps to minimise the force of the dissenting view by checking the

defences, muzzling debate, and by mobilising the *hippeis* to provide some obvious resistance to the enemy.

Perikles' use of the cavalry was certainly an important factor in ensuring that his strategy was not abandoned. But it was not the only factor, and the cavalry was not necessarily deployed in order to fulfill a promise made to the rural population nor because Perikles had always planned to employ them in this way. Given the size of the enemy and the relatively untried nature of the *hippeis*, he may not have realised their potential either for boosting morale or for protecting the city environs until they were actually put to the test and proved successful.

Thukydides ii 21–22 does in fact convey the impression that the Athenian reaction in 431 was worse than anticipated, and Perikles' actions here could well have been implemented more in response to the immediate crisis in Athenian resolve than in accordance with a long standing masterplan. I think we sometimes overestimate the extent to which political leaders operate to detailed blueprints for action¹⁰⁶ and in this case Perikles may simply have misjudged the effect of the first invasion and the extent of his personal influence. 'No plan survives the first contact with the enemy' is a common saying in military circles, and it seems quite feasible to me that Perikles had originally simply planned to fight the forthcoming war by avoiding a hoplite clash and feeding the city from the empire. However, when the war began and the harsh realities of this policy became apparent he extended the basic strategy to include seaborne raids and a much more comprehensive use of the cavalry.

If this analysis is correct, then why didn't Thukydides' description and assessment of Perikles' war plan at ii 65 include reference to these extensions? Again, the answer is more straightforward than a desire to suppress information detrimental to an idealised Perikles: Thukydides simply had more important things to discuss in his short section on this subject. The employment of the cavalry, like the use of naval raids identified by H. D. Westlake, was an adjunct to the main strategy of avoiding a battle. Both were in fact only relatively small parts of Perikles' overall strategy which was in itself a fairly major departure from normal practice. Thukydides apparently chose to concentrate on the main thrust of Perikles' plan.

If the tactic of mobile defence evolved fully only after it had proved its effectiveness in maintaining morale and reducing damage, then his silence at i 141 ff. and ii 65 is even more understandable: it was not part of a detailed battle plan worked out by Perikles in advance but was part of the measures he adopted to ensure his basic strategy actually worked. Thukydides did, however, record its use (as he did with the amphibious raids) and its success in protecting the areas

around the city. Given the relative lack of sophisticated military theory and strategic analysis in fifth century Greece¹⁰⁷ this is perhaps as much as we could have expected of him.

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² Thukydides i 143.4–5.

³ See for example K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* ii I (Berlin 1914) 300 and n. I. *OPW* 208–9 also stresses the inability of Perikles' plan to win the war. However, D. W. Knight, 'Thucydides and the war strategy of Perikles', *Mnemosyne* ser. 4, xxiii (1970) 150–61 goes further and argues that in a prolonged war fought according to Perikles' strategy the cost of maintaining her navy and empire would eventually have proved too heavy for Athens.

⁴ Westlake 'Seaborne raids' 75–84.

⁵ *Ibid.* 84; for the view that Perikles had in fact planned an *offensive* war see H. T. Wade-Gery, *OCD* 2 1069.

⁶ Cf. *OPW* 209 and D. Kagan, *The outbreak of the Peloponnesian war* (New York 1969) 334–5.

⁷ It was quite some time after this article had been accepted for publication that I discovered the discussion in Ober 'Thucydides', luckily in sufficient time to make some acknowledgement of his important contribution to the debate in the footnotes and to add a short appendix covering some points of difference. Although there is inevitably some overlap in content (for example we are in complete agreement that the cavalry *was* used to defend Attika) Dr Ober and I approached the subject with different aims and from a different direction—we also differ somewhat about the degree of Perikles' forward planning and the extent of the protection intended for Attika. Hanson (104–6) also notes the defensive rôle of the cavalry, although without relating it to the war strategies of Perikles and his successors. He also underestimates (103 n. 1) the value of cavalry against formed bodies of infantry, see below pp. 97–9.

εἰ γὰρ ἡμεν νησιῶται, τίνες ἂν ἀληπτότεροι
ἦσαν; καὶ νῦν χρή ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτου διανο-
ηθέντας τὴν μὲν γῆν καὶ οἰκίας ἀφεῖναι, τῆς δὲ
θαλάσσης καὶ πόλεως φυλακὴν ἔχειν, καὶ
Πελοποννησίοις ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὀργισθέντας πολλῶ
⁸ πλέοσι μὴ διαμάχεσθαι.

⁹ Westlake 'Seaborne raids' 75; it is also unequivocally accepted by Kagan (n. 6) 334.

¹⁰ Cf. Ar. *Ach.* 1018–36 and 1071–7. The statement at Thukydides ii 18.2 that Oinoe was there to guard the frontier should be interpreted to mean guard against raids or small incursions. The fort was patently unable to deal with anything

larger, as the siege of 431 shows: Thuky. ii 18.

11 For the general pattern of hoplite warfare see Gomme *HCT* i 10–15 and Anderson *MT* 2–3. For the moral victory see Xen. *Hell*, vi 5.21 and below, pp. 104–6.

12 Gomme *HCT* i 16–19; A. W. Lawrence, *Greek aims in fortification* (Oxford 1979) 39–42. The siege of Potidaia for example cost two thousand talents, Thuky. ii 70.2.

13 For example, Xen. *Hell* v 4.56 and vii 2.10, 17 ff.

14 Plut. *Ages*, xxii 5; the tactic worked.

15 Thuky. iv 84.2–88.1, cf. Epameinondas' decision to despatch his cavalry against Mantinea, Xen. *Hell* vii 5.14.

16 I exclude here the passive measure of completely abandoning the *chora* without any defence at all. The three main types of defence: hoplite, border, and mobile, are readily identifiable to anyone working in the field but the pre-emptive strike is less obvious and was first drawn to my attention by the discussion in Ober *FA* 70 ff.; he also examines the other types there.

17 Thukydides iv 92.6. The battle of Sepeia in 494 kept the Argives quiet for a generation, Herodotos vi 83.

18 P. Kreutz 'Casualties in hoplite battles' *GRBS* xxvi (1985) 14–20, especially the table on 19.

19 Thuky. iv 91.

20 Cf. Thuky. i 143.5 on this as a problem even if the Athenians were to win a pitched battle against the Peloponnesian League.

21 Although, as I argue below (p. 104), the loss of the Boiotian cavalry would have severely hampered League operations in Attika.

22 *OPW* 190–5 P. A. Cartledge, 'Hoplites and heroes: Sparta's contribution to the techniques of ancient warfare', *JHS* xcvi (1977) 22 ff.

23 For a list of examples of its use see *OPW* 192–4. For objections to this strategy in a general Greek context see Holladay 97–9.

24 For a more detailed description of the routes into Attika see W. W. Cruickshank, *Topography, movement and supply in the warfare of ancient Greece south of Thessaly and Epirus* (Diss. London 1955) 174–278. Ober *FA* 111–29 also has a useful discussion.

25 Holladay 98. Agesilaos' seizure of the passes into Boiotia in 378 and 377 is a good example of this, Xen. *Hell*, v 4–36–7, 47–8.

26 Thukydides iv 94.1.

27 Gomme *HCT* i 14; Anderson *MT* 5. For the daily ration per man and the number of transport animals required to move supplies see D. W. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the logistics of the Macedonian army* (Berkeley 1978) 18–19 and 123–6.

28 Thuky. ii 18.1–2.

29 Holladay 99.

30 An exception to this is the Plataian campaign of 479 where the Persian cavalry succeeded in destroying a Greek supply train en route for the army, Herodotos ix 39.

31 Cf. Thuky. viii 98.2 for the rôle of the Oinoe garrison in ambushing a Korinthian force returning from duty in Dekeleia.

32 Ober *FA passim*, especially 191–222.

33 OPW 190 if.

34 Although the Megarian decrees of the 430's may well have been designed to force Megara into such an arrangement (S. Horn blower, *The Greek world* 47g-323 [London 1983] 92) this had clearly not been achieved by the time war broke out.

35 Ober FA 192–5.

36 For example, Anderson MT 58, Gomme HCT i 15.

37 ‘... τῆς μὲν γῆς ἐκράτουν ὅσα μὴ προϊόντες πολὺ ἐκ τῶν ὀπλων (οἱ γὰρ ἱππῆς τῶν Θερσσεαλῶν εἶργον) ...’. Cf. Diod. Sic. xv 71.4–5.

38 Greece: Thuky. i III.I, ii 100.5; Herodotos v 63–3–4; Diod. Sic. xv 71.4–5; Xen. *Hell*, v 3.3–5. Other examples of cavalry used against ravagers and foragers (although not necessarily as the *sole* means of defence) include Xen. *Hell*, v 3–1–2, vii 1.20–2 and 2.4, 10 (helped by *epilektoi*). Sicily: Thuky. vii 4.6; Plut. *Nie*. xix 6; Diod. Sic. xi 21.2, xiii 44.3–4 and 88.1. Although the Syracusans also used their infantry on occasion it was their cavalry which often played the most effective part. For Persia see Xen. *Hell*, iv 8.18–19 and p. 102 below.

39 The defeat of Anchimolios' army in Attika in 511 is one of the best examples of this, Herodotos v 63.

40 See Xen. *Hell*, vii 1.21 (quoted below p. 99) and 2.10.

41 See below pp. 98–100 and also Xen. *Hell*, iv 8.18–19 (Persian cavalry), vii 2.4 and 21–2 (backed up by hoplites in the second example) and Thuky. ii 79.6, v 10.9 (supported by *psiloi* in both cases).

42 Although this has been challenged by G. L. Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedón* (London 1978) 150–3, Holladay 94–7 adequately disposes of his arguments. The close-ordering of the ranks was emphasised as late as Onasander xxvii.

43 A. R. W. Harrison *The law of Athens: procedure* (Oxford 1971) 32. See also Aristophanes' jibes at Kleonymos and others: *Pax* 446, 674–8, 1185–6, 1302–4; *Av*. 290, 1473–81; *Nub*. 353–4; *Vesp*. 15–23, 592, 822–3. In Lysias χ (c. *Theomn*.) 6 ft. it is associated in discussion with charges of murder, parent-beating, assault, and abduction.

44 Plut. *Moralia* 220A.

45 A. M. Snodgrass, *Arms and armour of the Greeks* (London 1967) 109 f; Anderson MT 13 ff. and 40–2; J. K. Anderson, *Ancient Greek horsemanship* (Berkeley 1961) 141–2.

46 I do not wish to develop my theory of cavalry warfare further here, as I believe that it deserves fuller treatment than can be provided in this article. It is enough for the moment to state that I consider that the Greek mounted arm prior to the developments under Philip and Alexander has been undervalued by most historians. Although incapable of *charging* into the front of an intact phalanx (but see n. 50 below), such cavalry could be effective against its rear or flanks, could use missile fire to destroy its cohesion, or could take advantage of any disruption caused by obstacles or by enemy action. While some examples of the efficacy of cavalry against even large hoplite forces and the theory of their use are given below, I shall be elaborating my views more fully in a book to be published by Oxford University Press.

47 H. L. Lorimer, 'The hoplite phalanx', *BS A* xiii (1947) 76–7; cf. Holladay 95.

48 Xen. *Hell*, vii 5.24. Sokrates' actions during the retreat at Delion are an exception and described as such, Plato *Symp*. 220E–221B, cf. Plut. *Ale*. vii 4.

49 This receives further confirmation from Euripides *HF* 190–4 where Amphiltryon, arguing that the bow is superior to the spear states that:

50 On the type of shock employed by cavalry see J. Keegan, *The face of battle* (Harmondsworth 1986) 95–6 and 154 ff.; but I have recently been convinced by Dr M. M. Markle that there is nothing in the nature of the horse *per se* which precludes its riding into a body of troops. He is intending to publish a paper on this area in the near future. However, like Keegan, I believe that cavalry normally achieved its effect by moral rather than physical shock and this is particularly true of the classical Greek arm. The front of a phalanx *could* be breached, using the tactics described by Arrian *Tact*, xvi 6–9, but in my opinion only by a force equipped with spears longer than those carried by the infantry (cf. M. M. Markle, ‘The Macedonian sarissa, spear, and related armor’, *AJA* lxxxi (1977) 339). Any penetration of a hoplite phalanx which stood firm almost certainly occurred at a pace much less than a gallop and was possibly achieved at little more than a walk.

51 The more lightly equipped hoplites of c. 431 onwards (Anderson *MT* 41) were of course even more vulnerable to missiles than their more fully-armoured predecessors. There are problems in determining cavalry weaponry at Athens as the *hippeis* could be armed in a variety of ways: with two javelins, with a thrusting spear, or with javelins *and* a thrusting spear. A sword was sometimes carried in addition to any of these combinations. Although Attic vase paintings suggest that most cavalymen were equipped with two javelins it is sometimes difficult to know how far to trust this evidence. I intend to include a detailed study of this question in my forthcoming book.

52 Thuky. iv 125–7; Xen *Hell* iv 5.14–17 (used against peltasts but demonstrating the same principles), *Anab.* iii 3.15. In the first example Brasidas placed his *psiloi* inside the hoplite square.

53 Diod. Sic. XV68.1. These figures applied at the start of the expedition and as Xenophon’s account of the engagement contains no mention of the Theban cavalry it might quite possibly have been occupied elsewhere at the time.

οἱ δὲ παρὰ τοῦ Διονυσίου ἵππεῖς, ὅσοι περ ἦσαν, οὗτοι διεσκεδασμένοι ἄλλος ἄλλη παραθέοντες ἡκόντιζόν τε προσελαύνοντες, καὶ ἐπεὶ ὤρων ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς, ἀνεχώρουν, καὶ πάλιν ἀναστρέφοντες ἡκόντιζον. καὶ ταῦτα ἅμα ποιοῦντες κατέβαινον ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων καὶ ἀνεπαύοντο. εἰ δὲ καταβεβηκόσιν ἐπελαύνοιέν τινες, εὐπετῶς ἀναπηδῶντες ἀνεχώρουν. εἰ δ’ αὖ τινες διώξειαν αὐτοὺς πολὺ ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατεύματος, τούτους, ὅποτε ἀποχωροῖεν, ἐπικείμενοι καὶ ἀκοντίζοντες δεινὰ εἰργάζοντο, καὶ πᾶν τὸ σπράτευμα ἠνάγκαζον ἑαυτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ προΐεναι καὶ ἀναχωρεῖν.

54

55 Disorganised troops: Xen. *Hell*, v 4.39 and 44–5; organised troops: Arrian *Anab.* i 2.5–6 (in conjunction with infantry), cf. the similar (but less successful tactics) in Thuky. ii 100.4–5. The Getai fled before contact, although Alexander’s unexpectedly easy crossing of the Ister apparently contributed to the shock of the attack, Arrian *Anab.* i 4.3.

56 For this equipment see J. G. P. Best, *Thracian peltasts and their influence on Greek warfare* (Groningen 1969) 139–42.

57 Thuky. vii 30.2. He only mentions one item of their equipment, the

machaira (vii 27.1), but because of their ability to fight in formation they must also have been armed with a shield and a spear as well. They lost 250 men out of 1300, mainly stragglers or those who drowned trying to swim out to the boats.

58 The distance from Mykalessos to the nearest bay is only some 5–7 kilometres so, allowing for the time it took the Theban cavalry to arrive, the pursuit was probably fairly short.

59 Thukydides ii 9.3 states that the cavalry was supplied by Boiotia, Phokis and Lokris. *Hell. Oxy.* xi 3–4 tells us that the cavalry of the Boiotian League in the early fourth century was 1100 strong.

60 Although this seems strange today, presumably one of the main problems involved in detailing troops to protect foragers or ravagers was that they were probably unwilling to stand by and watch others have the pick of the available food and/or booty. See also nn. 73 and 75 below.

61 W. G. Hardy, 'Hellenica Oxyrhynchia and the devastation of Athens', *CPH* xxi (1926) 348 ff..

62 Supplies: Thuky. iii 1.3; 425 invasion: Thuky. iv 6.1.

63 For example, Thuky. ii 23.1 and 3.

64 A. H. Jackson, 'The original purpose of the Delian league', *Historia* xviii (1969) 12–13; cf. the discussion in Hanson 14–20 (which makes rather more of the use of fire).

65 W. G. Hardy (n. 61) 348 n. 4; for house construction see Jones, Graham, and Sackett, 'An Attic country house below the cave of Pan at Vari', *BSA* lxxviii (1973) 355–452.

66 For the burning of trees and the distance between olive trees see Theophrastos *CP* ii 3.3 and 5.6. On the difficulty of igniting trees with thick bark see A. J. Kay 11, *A technique for studying the fire tolerance of living tree trunks*, Dept. of Forestry, Canada (Ottawa 1963) 19. The problems involved in burning olive groves have now been remedied by modern ordnance, cf. Robert Fisk, *The Times* (nth August 1983) 4.

67 D. J. Watson, 'Inflammability of cereal crops in relation to water content' *Empire Journal of Experimental Agriculture*, vol. xviii no. 71 (1950) 150–7. The experiments relate to U.K. conditions, and crops in Greece, because of the drier conditions there, would have been vulnerable for a longer period than Watson's results show. However, his overall conclusions, that it is not as easy to fire grain as most think, is still valid. Cf. the discussion at Hanson 42–6 which basically agrees with my views; although he tends to concentrate more on the success of fire most of his examples refer to *dry* crops (particularly stored grain or harvested sheafs in the field) and he too emphasises the relatively short period of vulnerability.

68 D. J. Watson (n. 67) 157. However, he also points out that with large crops such delays are not infrequent because of the difficulty of harvesting the entire crop as soon as it ripens.

69 See also Westlake *Essays* 93 n. 27.

70 Anderson *MT* 3.

71 For example, Arrian *Anab.* i 4.1

72 Hanson 21–5.

73 Foragers were certainly unprotected (see n. 75) and it seems that unless moving under orders as organised bodies (which reduced the amount of damage possible), ravagers also normally conducted their activities without much

protection. Although we might expect *psiloi* and cavalry to have performed this task it seems that they normally either concentrated on supporting the main body of hoplites or were off ravaging/foraging on their own behalf (see for example Thuky. iii 1.2 for the apparent lack of protection afforded to those operating away from the main force).

74 Pritchett, *The Greek state at war* i (Los Angeles 1971) 30–52.

75 Thuky. vii 4.6 and 13.2 (the Athenians at Syracuse). See Onasander x 7–8 for the defencelessness of those out looking for supplies—he advocated both banning unauthorised foraging and the protection of authorised foragers. Despite this, it was not usual Greek practice to protect foragers and the first examples of this concern Alexander, Arrian *Anab.* i 5.9 and iii 20.4(F). In later periods such protection may have been provided as a matter of course, Onasander x 8 (cf. Livy xxxi 2 for Roman practice). For the equipment carried by foragers see Xen. *Anab.* vi 4.23.

76 See above p. 97.

77 Thuky. ii 10.2, 47.2, and iii 15.1. He does not specify the numbers but Plut. *Per.* xxxiii 5 states it was sixty thousand; cf. Gomme, *HCT* ii 13, who estimates it at not more than about thirty thousand at most.

78 Thuky. ii 19.2.

79 Thuky. ii 22.2.

80 J. S. Traill, *The political organization of Attika*, *Hesperia* Supplement xiv (Princeton 1975) map 1.

τὸν πλεῖστον ὄμιλον τῶν ψιλῶν . . . τὸ μὴ
προεξιόντας τῶν ὀπλῶν τὰ ἐγγὺς τῆς πόλεως
κακουργεῖν.

81

82 I am grateful to Mr A. French for pointing this out to me.

83 For example, Thukydides' statement (ii 55.1) that in 430 the Peloponnesians ravaged the plain (ἔτεμον τό πεδίον) before moving on to the coast near Laureion and his remarks at ii 57.2 suggest that a larger area was devastated that year. However, I do not believe that 'the property protection scheme had apparently broken down completely', Ober 'Thucydides' 179. In my opinion it was never intended to provide total protection, merely to reduce the damage as far as possible; in 430, for the reasons stated in Ober 'Thucydides' 179–80, this happened to be more difficult than at other times.

84 Presumably because of the Athenian threats to kill the captives, Thuky. iv 41.1.

85 OPW 194.

86 See especially iv 13–20 and vii 5–14.

ἦν δὲ ἡ μὲν πόλις τρέπεται ἐπὶ τὰ ναυτικά
καὶ ἀρκῇ αὐτῇ τὰ τεῖχη διασώζειν, ὥσπερ καὶ
ὁπότε Λακεδαιμόνιοι σὺν ἅπασιν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν
ἐνέβαλον, τοὺς δὲ ἱππέας ἀξιῶσιν τὰ τε ἐκτὸς τοῦ
τείχους διασώζειν καὶ αὐτοὺς μόνους διακιν-
δυνεύειν πρὸς πάντας τοὺς ἐναντίους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ
θεῶν μὲν οἶμαι πρῶτον συμμάχων ἰσχυρῶν δεῖ,
ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὸν ἱππαρχὸν προσήκει
ἀποτετελεσμένον ἄνδρα εἶναι.

87

88 Thukydides vii 28.1. ἢ τε τῶν ἐπιτηδείων

παρακομιδῇ ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας, πρότερον ἐκ τοῦ Ὠρωποῦ κατὰ γῆν διὰ τῆς Δεκελείας θάσσων οὔσα, περὶ Σούνιον κατὰ θάλασσαν πολυτελῆς ἐγίγνετο· τῶν τε πάντων ὁμοίως ἐπακτῶν ἐδεῖτο ἢ πόλις, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ πόλις εἶναι φρούριον κατέστη.

Cf. Plato *Crito* 43

B 2–5 for the practice of passengers disembarking at Sounion and continuing overland, apparently because of the common problem of adverse winds around the cape itself.

89 Although, as Hanson points out, 142–3, while damage to agriculture was increased, the main losses were of property.

90 Thuky. ii 23.2–31, 56. If de Ste Croix's interpretation of the Megarian decrees (*OPW* 225–289) is correct then the invasions of the Megarid may also have been influenced by religious considerations.

91 There are strong links between the hoplite and the concept of the *agathos*. It was the hoplite who defended the city and his family, the key function of the *agathos* (A. W. H. Adkins, *Merit and responsibility* [Oxford 1960] 236–7). Other hoplite virtues such as steadfastness and cooperation also figured in contemporary or near-contemporary ideas about the ideal citizen; see for example Plato *Laches* 182A, Sophokles *Antigone* 666 ff., Ar. *Ran.* 1009–17, cf. Adkins 165.

92 Y. Garlan, *War in the ancient world* (trans. J. Lloyd) (London 1975) 60. Cf. Thuky. i 140.5, ii 21.2–3 and Diod. Sic. xii 61.2.

93 This was expressed as late as 355 in Isokrates viii 77. See also Xen. *Hell.* vi 5.20–1, Plut. *Nie.* xx 4–8, and Thuky. viii 27. Although the last two of these examples involve naval engagements, the *strategoí* involved were of hoplite class. Cf. Plut. *Per.* xxxiii–xxxiv.

ἐπειδὴ δὲ περὶ Ἀχαρνὰς εἶδον τὸν στρατὸν
ἐξήκοντα σταδίους τῆς πόλεως ἀπέχοντα, οὐκέτι
ἀνασχετὸν ἐποιοῦντο, ἀλλ' αὐτοῖς, ὥς εἰκός, γῆς
τεμνομένης ἐν τῷ ἐμφανεῖ, ὃ οὐπω ἑοράκεσαν οἱ γε
νεώτεροι, οὐδ' οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πλὴν τὰ Μηδικά,
δεινὸν ἐφαίνετο καὶ ἐδόκει τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ

94 μάλιστα τῇ νεότητι ἐπεξιέναι καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν. For similar sentiments see also Hermippos fr. 47 Kassel-Austin = Plut. *Per.* xxxiii 7. Gomme *HCT* ii 75–76 cites two fragments of comedy which may also refer to this incident.

95 ὥς δυνάμενος στρατηγεῖν καὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις διαπολεμεῖν (Budé).

96 Thukydides ii 22.2.

97 Westlake is correct to state that the morale factor was not the *sole* reason for Perikles' programme of raids and invasions, *Essays* 91 ff., 'Seaborne raids' 79–80 and 84, but I believe it *was* an additional, and not unimportant, reason for staging them.

98 Although the activities of the garrisons here were almost certainly not directed in detail from Athens but presumably relied upon the initiative of the local commander. It may well be that the function of these forts was to guard against raiders and that their use here was accepted simply as part of the natural scheme of things rather than representing any innovative, or even consciously formulated, part of Perikles' strategy. This is perhaps supported by Thukydides' remarks at ii 18.2 on the rôle of Oinoe in wartime.

99 See the discussion in the appendix.

100 This passage is quoted above p. 104.

101 Ober 'Thucydides' 181 and 182.

102 For its survival as late as 341 *cf.* Dem. ix 49.

103 On the date see G. R. Bugh, *The horsemen of Athens* (Princeton 1988) 76.

104 The evacuation of all their property, including the woodwork from their houses (Thuky. ii 14.1), suggests that the Athenians placed little faith in the possibility that their homes could be protected.

105 Thuky. ii 22.1.

106 On this see A. J. P. Taylor's analysis in *The origins of the second world war* (Harmondsworth 1973) *passim*, but especially 98.

107 See my opening remarks.

[18] The Progress Of Epiteichismos

H.D. Westlake

Scholarly interest in epiteichismos has, for various reasons, been centred almost exclusively upon the Athenian occupation of Pylos and the Spartan occupation of Decelea.¹ In occupying Pylos the Athenians were adopting epiteichismos for the first time, as were the Spartans in occupying Decelea. Both enterprises were on a considerable scale and deeply influenced the course of the Peloponnesian war, though neither so decisively as had initially seemed likely. Another source of interest in them is their link with the perennial problem of speeches in Thucydides. The Thucydidean versions of speeches delivered shortly before the outbreak of the Archidamian war include references to the possibility that epiteichismos might be attempted by both sides (1. 122. 1 ; 142. 3–4), although in fact Athens did not do so until 425, and then partly by accident, and Sparta not until much later. These puzzling references have been thought by some scholars to be anachronistic,² while others have disputed this inference, maintaining that even before the war military leaders had in mind the possibility of epiteichismos.³ A similar if less vexed problem arises from the fact that the occupation of Decelea, vigorously recommended by Alcibiades in the Thucydidean version of his speech at Sparta at the end of 415 and apparently accepted with enthusiasm (6. 93. 1–2), was not implemented until the spring of 413.⁴

This paper will not attempt to throw new light upon the occupation of Pylos and of Decelea or upon the problems arising therefrom. My purpose rather, after considering why epiteichismos came into being and suggesting a possible origin, is to show that it was prevalent not only during the last quarter of the fifth century but also during the first half of the fourth, in many cases where the term does not appear in the ancient evidence; that, while the principle remained the same, some variations in practice were introduced; that when, with Greece increasingly dominated by Macedonia, epiteichismos became largely obsolete, the term acquired a more general significance, often metaphorical; that, strangely enough, it came to be widely used centuries later, sometimes in theological contexts, by some most unmilitary authors.

I. Origins

The introduction of epiteichismos in inter-state warfare is largely

attributable to the notorious backwardness of the Greeks in conducting assaults on fortified positions, however weak,⁵ until the Macedonians demonstrated how most walled cities could be stormed.⁶ Unless aided by treachery, Greeks normally had to resort to circumvallation designed to lead to surrender through starvation, but this process, often lengthy, could be costly both in finance and in manpower, as the Athenians found at Potidaea. The traditional method of attacking an enemy might prove effective, namely by conducting a brief invasion of his territory at an appropriate season and, if he declined to fight a pitched battle, which he might well avoid because of its probable costliness in manpower, by plundering his farms and destroying his crops.⁷ The most celebrated failure of this method was the ineffectiveness, contrary to general expectation (Thuc. 7. 28. 3), of successive invasions of Attica by the Peloponnesians in the opening years of the Archidamian war. Even less was achieved by Athenian seaborne raids on enemy coasts. By 425 neither side could expect to gain a decisive advantage by using conventional offensive methods.

Whatever the source may have been from which the theoretical conception of *epiteichismos* was derived,⁸ the existence of favourable conditions and a substantial amount of planning and organisation were essential before a project for the establishment of a permanent fortified base in enemy territory could be put into operation. A site must be found which was easily defensible by limited forces and from which a large area of productive and well developed country could be ravaged. It must be easily accessible by sea or land so that supplies of all kinds, as well as relays of relieving troops, could be brought in without much difficulty, even in winter. Its prospect of success would be much enhanced if it could serve as a rallying point for local dissidents or slaves, who could provide the garrison with information or military assistance. Fortifications might have to be built or at least strengthened, and for this purpose craftsmen and their tools would probably be required. A type of offensive operation hitherto untried in inter-state warfare might prove to be a costly failure.

There is no means of determining where or by whom *epiteichismos* was first conceived. To deny that the Greeks might have learned about it through contact with other peoples would be hazardous, though its suitability to the geographical, climatic, social and political conditions of Greece does suggest that it was an indigenous growth. Its development in inter-state warfare during the last quarter of the fifth century is probably to a large extent the outcome of experience gained from similar operations which had already, since before the Persian wars, become a not uncommon feature of civil strife. Bodies of dissidents, often exiles, would seize and fortify a position within the

boundaries of their own state, sometimes with external aid, with the intention of harrying and, if possible, overthrowing the regime of their political opponents.⁹ Operations of this kind have obvious affinities with epiteichismos, as adopted in inter-state warfare towards the end of the fifth century, and must surely have influenced its development. They might be termed internal epiteichismos.¹⁰ Unfortunately, for those belonging to a period of some eighty years before the Peloponnesian war the surviving evidence is not sufficiently detailed to provide a wholly satisfactory picture.

An early example of this internal epiteichismos is the seizure and fortification of Leipsydrion on Mount Parnés about 513 by the exiled Alcmaeonidae. Although joined by some supporters from Athens, they were apparently not strong enough to put the tyrant-house under severe pressure and were overwhelmed after a valiant resistance (Hdt. 5. 62. 2; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 19. 3). In 499 the ill-starred expedition directed against Naxos by Aristagoras with Persian support, which led indirectly to the Ionian Revolt, was the result of representations to Miletus by Naxian oligarchs exiled by the democracy. Before the Persians withdrew to the mainland, they built fortifications for these exiles, presumably to serve as a base for harrying their political opponents (Hdt. 5. 30. 1 ; 34. 3). The oligarchs cannot have gained control of the island, since nine years later the Persians under Datis burned the capital city in revenge for this earlier fiasco (Hdt. 6. 95. 2–96). In Sicily the Gamoroi, who established themselves at Casmenae in Syracusan territory after their expulsion from Syracuse about 491, probably took action against the democrats, who had expelled them, until they were restored by Gelon (Hdt. 7. 155. 2).¹¹ An episode involving Aeginetan exiles, which occurred shortly before or shortly after 490, is similar in character to those already mentioned but differs from them somewhat because they operated from a point not on Aegina but on the nearby mainland.¹² After a coup led by an exiled democratic leader and designed to betray Aegina to Athens had failed to overthrow the ruling oligarchy, he escaped with some supporters to Attica. The Athenians granted him a base at Sunium, whence he conducted plundering raids against Aegina (Hdt. 6. 88–90). Since the oligarchical government retained control of the island, these raids do not seem to have achieved any striking success.

A celebrated example of internal epiteichismos, more likely than any other to have been borne in mind by leaders responsible for military planning before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war and during its opening stages, was the occupation of Mount Ithome by rebel helots and perioeci in 464. Interest in the revolt has always centred largely upon its influence in leading to a rift between Sparta and Athens and also, for modern scholars, upon its formidable

problems of chronology. The narrative of Thucydides is even more sparing of military detail than is normal in his excursus on the Pentecontaetia (1. 101. 2–102. 2). According to Diodorus, whose account is unusually free from conventional rhetoric, the rebels, though abandoning their initial intention to attack Sparta itself, occupied a stronghold in Messenia and ‘conducting their offensive from there, proceeded to overrun Laconia’ (11. 64. 1).¹³ This picture may be a little overcoloured, but it receives some confirmation from a reference by Herodotus (9. 64. 2) to an engagement at Stenyclarus in the upper Messenian plain when 300 Spartans were killed. It is clear that, before the lengthy and fateful struggle to reduce Ithome began, the rebels used their fortified area in the mountains¹⁴ as a base for offensive operations certainly into the Pamisus valley¹⁵ and probably further afield.

Another internal epiteichismos which apparently belongs to the Pentecontaetia was the occupation of Anaea, situated on the mainland facing Samos, by Samian dissidents. References by Thucydides to their activities during the Peloponnesian war do not provide positive evidence to date their occupation of Anaea in 439.¹⁶ It is, however, reasonable to believe that immediately after the collapse of the Samian revolt in that year oligarchs were expelled, or voluntarily fled, from the island. Throughout the Peloponnesian war these Samian exiles at Anaea seized every opportunity to harm the Athenians and aid the Peloponnesians. They also continually harassed their compatriots on the island and welcomed political refugees from there (Thuc. 3. 19. 2; 32. 2; 4. 75. 1; 8. 19. 1; 61. 2).

During the period between 431 and the occupation of Pylos in 425 two instances of internal epiteichismos which, at the outset at least, proved highly effective may have encouraged the belief that epiteichismos directed by one state against another might, despite the difficulties involved, yield valuable results. In 427 after the famous stasis at Corcyra five hundred surviving oligarchs occupied forts in Corcyrean territory on the mainland, whence they inflicted so much damage upon their democratic enemies as to cause severe famine. They then crossed to the island, where they built a fort on Mount Isthos, and gained control of the countryside until 425, when the Athenian force which had been in action at Pylos came to the rescue of the democrats (Thuc. 3. 85. 2–3; 4. 46. 1). In 426, or perhaps a little earlier, oligarchs expelled from Megara by the ruling democracy seized the Megarian port of Pagae on the Corinthian Gulf.¹⁷ It was sufficiently well fortified to be easily defensible¹⁸ and conveniently situated to serve as a base for plundering the more fertile parts of the Megarid and for denying the democrats access to the Corinthian Gulf. The oligarchs exploited it so successfully that by 424 a large section of

the Megarian populace was prepared to consent to their repatriation rather than suffer further hardship (Thuc. 4. 66. I).¹⁹

Although internal epiteichismos continued to be practised for many years,²⁰ it can no longer have exerted much influence upon the strategy of inter-state warfare after the success of the Athenian experiment at Pylos.

II. Archidamian War

As has already been noted, neither the Athenians nor the Peloponnesians, though perhaps giving some thought to epiteichismos, attempted to put it into practice during the first six campaigning seasons of the Archidamian war.

Some scholars have maintained that the principal aim of Pericles in his seaborne expedition against the Peloponnese in 430 was to establish at Epidaurus, which narrowly escaped capture by the Athenians, a permanent base for raiding Peloponnesian states.²¹ This suggestion should be rejected. Being an inhabited town of some size, Epidaurus would have been vulnerable to attacks by the Peloponnesians, and to have provided a permanent garrison strong enough not only to defend it but also to conduct offensive operations into enemy territory would have imposed a severe strain upon the limited manpower of Athens. In addition, the Athenians had opportunities during their seaborne raids in 431 and 430 to establish bases in sparsely populated localities much better suited to epiteichismos than Epidaurus, and yet they chose to withdraw without leaving garrisons.²² Another Athenian offensive action, which was on a far smaller scale, has also been unjustifiably regarded as epiteichismos. When Nicias in 427 seized Minoa, a small island off the coast of the Megarid, his intention was to secure an observation post so that enemy preparations for raids on Attica or on Athenian shipping could be more easily detected and also to reinforce the Athenian blockade of Nisaea (Thuc. 3. 51). The operation was not designed to provide a base for plundering raids on the adjacent mainland, nor does Minoa seem to have ever been used for this purpose. Little could have been gained thereby, since the Megarid was thoroughly devastated by a full levy of the Athenian land forces in a series of invasions begun in 431 and repeated each autumn for the next six years (Thuc. 2. 31).

The remarkable success won by the Athenians through their occupation of Pylos encouraged them to attempt to establish raiding bases at several localities during the remaining four years of the Archidamian war. Through their command of the sea they could disembark troops at appropriate sites with good prospects of achieving

surprise, and they could expect immunity from retaliation because they held the Spartans captured on Sphacteria.

In 425 soon after their success at Pylos the Athenians landed a powerful force in Corinthian territory, which won a victory at Solygeia but was then withdrawn by sea (Thuc. 4. 42–4). This operation is believed by some scholars to have had as its objective the establishment of a raiding base in Corinthian territory, which was not implemented because of Corinthian reactions.²³ Thucydides here records in great detail the course of the operation, but he does not provide any information about its aims.²⁴ The suggestion that *epiteichismos* was intended is not at all convincing: the occupation, fortification and maintenance of a base at Solygeia would have been a hazardous and burdensome undertaking unlikely to produce sufficiently advantageous results to compensate for the effort involved.²⁵ On the other hand, the same expeditionary force, after further brief landings, seized, fortified and garrisoned Methana with its peninsula on the Saronic Gulf, which was conveniently situated for raiding the territories of Troezen, Halieis and Epidaurus and could easily be supplied by sea (4. 45). Before the spring of 423 Troezen had come to terms with Athens (4. 118. 4), presumably because its rich coastal plain was plundered by the garrison from Methana.²⁶

In 424 the Athenians continued their new strategy by sending an expeditionary force to Cythera, which was occupied without much difficulty.²⁷ After landing at several localities on the mainland, this force withdrew to deliver further attacks elsewhere, but it left behind a garrison, which proceeded to make a series of plundering raids on Laconia. These raids, combined with those from Pylos, had a very damaging effect upon Spartan morale (4. 53–7).²⁸ Cythera is about five miles from the nearest point on the mainland, and a novel feature of this latest *epiteichismos* was that raiding parties were transported by sea from their base to their objectives, so that they were doubtless often able to land unopposed and to take the enemy by surprise.

The new strategy was not, however, everywhere successful. Thucydides makes abundantly clear that in 424 the Athenians intended to fortify Delium as a permanent base from which an Athenian garrison could plunder Boeotia, support revolutionary movements in Boeotian towns and provide a rallying point for dissidents (4. 76. 5). It was conveniently situated for this purpose, being close both to the coast and to the frontier of Attica.²⁹ The project embraced all the characteristics of the ideal *epiteichismos*. It failed because the Athenian army led by Hippocrates suffered a major defeat and the fortification built at Delium was later captured through the use of an ingenious siege engine (4. 90–101).³⁰

III. Deceleantonian War

Apart from the vitally important occupation of Decelea by the Peloponnesians, which became the *epiteichismos* par excellence (Andoc. 1. 101 ; Lys. 14. 30; Isoer. 16. 10), the operation was adopted sparingly between 413 and 404, largely because the Athenians could seldom take any offensive action owing to financial exhaustion and a shortage of manpower. They held Pylos till 409 and Cythera perhaps till the same time but can have made little use of them. Immediately after the Sicilian disaster they abandoned for financial reasons a fortification on an isthmus in Laconia which they had garrisoned some months earlier as a refuge for helot deserters and a base for plundering raids (Thuc. 7. 26. 2; 8. 4).

The Athenians did, however, direct against Chios an offensive which for some five months in 412–11 was strikingly successful and reduced the most powerful and most active of rebel cities almost to capitulation. This offensive should undoubtedly be classed as *epiteichismos*,³¹ but it was abnormal in that throughout its most effective period the Athenian troops operating on Chios were supported by a sizable fleet. Because of this abnormal feature the episode requires examination in some detail, especially as the narrative of Thucydides does not provide explicit answers to questions which it raises.

In the summer of 412 Athenian forces had already raided several districts of Chios, defeated Chian forces and caused so much damage to the prosperous countryside that some Chians favoured a rapprochement with Athens (8. 24. 2–6). The success of these brief raids so alarmed the Peloponnesians that they sent Pedaritus, a Spartan, to Chios with some mercenaries to take command there (28. 5; 32. 2), and so encouraged the Athenians that they undertook a more ambitious offensive against the Chians conducted by three generals in command of thirty ships and an unspecified number of hoplites (30). The troops landed on the north east coast and proceeded to fortify Delphinium, described by Thucydides as ‘a position naturally strong on the landward side and possessing harbours and not far distant from the city’ (38 . 2).³² Thereafter his narrative is confined to a record of action, or inaction, on the part of the Chians and Peloponnesians and of their increasing tribulations. Pedaritus, too weak to challenge the enemy, sent desperate appeals for help to the Spartan nauarchos Astyochus, but in vain. Chian morale was weakened by suspicions of treachery and by the desertion of many slaves, who gave the Athenians valuable information (40). Eventually Pedaritus in despair led an attack on Delphinium, but his force was crushingly defeated, and he was himself killed (55. 3). The Chians,

closely beset by land and sea, suffered severely from famine (56. 1).

The tide now turned (63. 1). The decisive factor was not that a Spartan sent with a small squadron to replace Pedaritus gained a slight advantage in a naval engagement (61. 2–3), but that twenty-four of the thirty-two Athenian ships were withdrawn from Chios to deal with a dangerous situation in the Hellespont (62. 2). Although these twenty-four ships were soon recalled to the Aegean, they were then based at Samos, not Chios. Thereafter, while the Athenians maintained a garrison at Delphinium till 406 (Diod. 13. 76. 3–4), the Chians no longer suffered either from famine or from intrigues by dissidents. They resumed their role as the most aggressive of rebel cities and contributed more ships than any of them to fleets under Spartan command.

Thucydides may be thought to imply that Chios was reduced to desperate straits because the Athenians exploited their command of the sea to blockade the island effectively. They doubtless made every effort to intercept supplies from the mainland, but triremes were ill suited to the task of maintaining a blockade, as had been found even in the narrow waters of Pylos. Chios is thirty miles long, and the channel between island and mainland only five miles wide at one point. Bad weather during the winter months, when the Athenian offensive was at its height, could also have caused difficulties. Thucydides mentions twice that the Chians were hard pressed by land as well as by sea (40. 1 ; 56. 1), so that the garrison of Delphinium must also have played an effective part. Delphinium is, however, inconveniently situated as a base for raids by land on the most fertile and developed parts of the island, which lie in the south east, whereas the northern half is mostly rocky and barren. To reach the south east by land would involve lengthy marches, especially as the environs of Chios city would have to be avoided. Although Thucydides, whose information seems to be derived almost wholly from Peloponnesian sources, does not explain how these raids were conducted, it is highly probable that, as during the earlier offensive when the Athenians had as yet no land base (24. 2–6),³³ troops were successively landed at selected points and, after causing as much devastation as possible, were re-embarked. Now that the Athenians held Delphinium, raids could be more frequent than before and their destructiveness intensified. This conclusion is supported by the rapidity of the Chian recovery after most of the Athenian fleet was withdrawn. The few remaining ships can have done little more than keep the garrison at Delphinium supplied.

This offensive, which is in some degree anticipated by the more modest operations based on Cythera, is of special interest because it apparently combined the well-established tactic of the seaborne raid

with the relatively novel tactic of the fortified base in enemy territory.

At a later stage of the Ionian war the Athenians established a fortified base on another rebel island. In 407 Alcibiades, after his triumphant return to Athens, was sent with a powerful force to take command at Samos. He interrupted his voyage to attack Andros, which had revolted, apparently several years earlier. The Athenians seized and fortified Gaurium on the north west coast, a most promising site for *epiteichismos* with some easily defensible hills close to a well-protected harbour. The Andrians, supported by some Spartans, committed their entire army to battle but were defeated and fled to their capital, which the Athenians then attacked. Alcibiades, in haste to reach the main theatre of war, remained for only a few days before he sailed for Samos, leaving behind some of his troops to garrison Gaurium (Xen. *Hell.* 1. 4. 21–3; Diod. 13. 69. 4–5).³⁴ Thereafter Conon was evidently in command of twenty ships based on Andros for the next few months. He may have been under orders to protect convoys sailing from the Hellespont, which were now vulnerable, but he may also have used his considerable naval force to transport troops from Gaurium to ravage some of the cultivable areas of Andros. When he and his squadron were sent to Samos, his successor, who had only four ships, can have done little more than safeguard the supply route from Attica, though he did capture two enemy triremes (Xen. *Hell.* 1. 5. 18–19). The fortified base at Gaurium seems to have been held until 405.³⁵

IV. Fourth Century³⁶

During the first half of the fourth century *epiteichismos* in various forms was not infrequently adopted. In a period when most Greek powers suffered severely from shortages of money and manpower it proved attractive largely because it was relatively economical in both. Modern scholarship seems disinclined to acknowledge that it was a fourth-century, as well as a fifth-century, phenomenon, although the term is applied by ancient authorities to some of the operations to be considered below.

In 400 the Spartans sent out an army under Agis to chastise the Eleans for persistent recalcitrance against their authority. The first invasion was abandoned because of an earthquake, but Agis returned in the next year with allied support and plundered the rich countryside. He made little effort to storm the unwallled capital, evidently expecting that an uprising by oligarchs against the democratic government would deliver the city into his hands. When this coup failed, he withdrew his army, leaving behind a garrison, assisted by refugee oligarchs, at Epitalium in Triphylia. From this

fortified base, which occupied a strong position on high ground near the mouth of the Alpheus,³⁷ Elean territory was for many months so effectively devastated that in the following year the democratic government made overtures to Sparta and accepted terms amounting almost to capitulation (3. 2. 21–31 ; Diod. 14. 17. 4–12; 34. 1 ; Paus. 3. 8. 3–5). By adopting epiteichismos, which was combined, as so often, with aid from dissidents, the Spartans ended this war at very modest cost to themselves.

Between 391 and 389 there was fighting on Rhodes, where Sparta assisted an oligarchical faction against a democratic faction assisted by Athens. The course of events is obscure because the accounts of Xenophon (4. 8. 20–5) and Diodorus (14. 97. 1–4; 99.4–5) are not easily reconcilable,³⁸ and indeed the conflict might be thought to be an instance of what was defined above as internal epiteichismos. It is, however, noteworthy that at different stages each side operated from a fortified base evidently somewhere in the Rhodian countryside, the oligarchs with Spartan support when the democrats held the capital (4. 8. 25) and the democrats with Athenian support when the oligarchs held it (Diod. 14. 99. 5).

In 389 the Spartan harmost on Aegina encouraged Aeginetans to ravage the coast of Attica. The Athenians responded by sending a hoplite force, supported by ten ships, to occupy a fortified base on the island and proceeded to harry the Aeginetans by land and sea (5. 1. 1–2).³⁹ The ships were soon driven off by a much superior Spartan fleet, but the hoplites held their fortified base for four months. Eventually, when they found themselves under greater pressure than they were able to impose on the enemy, they had to be evacuated to Attica (5. 1. 5). The failure of this epiteichismos induced the Athenians to launch a brief offensive on a larger scale, and the success of this more conventional operation temporarily protected them against attacks from Aegina (5. I. 10–13).

The war in which the Spartans and their allies reduced Olynthus to submission in 379 has considerable relevance for the present investigation. Although battles were fought close to the walls of the city and eventually capitulation became unavoidable because its inhabitants were starving, it was at no time closely invested. During much of the war, which lasted three years, the Spartans concentrated their efforts largely upon ravaging enemy territory, and the modified form of epiteichismos which they adopted proved ultimately the decisive factor in overcoming resistance.

At the outset a small advance guard was too weak to do more than establish a raiding base at Potidaea and send garrisons to friendly towns threatened by Olynthus (5. 2. 24; Diod. 15. 21. I). Later, when Teleutias arrived with a stronger force, he won an unimpressive

victory near Olynthus and devastated the countryside, but he then withdrew leaving the enemy free to ravage the territory of towns supporting Sparta (5. 2. 37–43; Diod. 15. 21. 2). Next year he continued his devastation so effectively that the Olynthians could cultivate only a fraction of their land, but he then rashly allowed himself to be drawn into an engagement close to their walls, where he and many of his soldiers were killed. The survivors scattered in flight to Spartolus, Acanthus, Apollonia and Potidaea (5. 3. 1–6). It was evidently from bases at these towns, which form an arc on the landward side of Olynthus, though at a considerable distance, that the Peloponnesians ravaged Olynthian territory. The Olynthians took advantage of the respite gained by their victory to replenish food supplies (Diod. 15. 21. 3). When Agesipolis arrived with powerful reinforcements, they were unable to prevent him from devastating agricultural land hitherto untouched and from destroying corn in the territory of their allies (5. 3. 8–9, 18; Diod. 15. 22. 2; Paus. 3. 5. 9). Agesipolis died, but his offensive measures virtually ended resistance. Hitherto most members of the Chalcidian League had evidently remained faithful to the Olynthians,⁴⁰ whom they must have provided with sufficient foodstuffs to prevent starvation when Olynthian territory was devastated. With this source of supply removed, the Olynthians became so weakened by famine that early in 379 they had to treat for peace. The Spartans thus eventually achieved their aim to reduce Olynthus by plundering raids, but they found themselves compelled to commit much larger forces than had originally been intended, thanks to the resilience of the Olynthians loyally supported by Chalcidian allies.

In 377 an Athenian force commanded by Chabrias ravaged the territory of Histiaea, which alone of Euboean towns had not joined the Second Athenian Confederacy but remained faithful to Sparta. He then fortified a strong position on a nearby hill and left a garrison there before withdrawing the rest of his troops for service elsewhere (Diod. 15. 30. 5). Soon afterwards Histiaea revolted from Sparta, though not primarily, if an anecdote recorded by Xenophon is authentic (5. 4. 56–7), because of pressure from the garrison established by Chabrias.

An operation exhibiting some characteristics of *epiteichismos* was the Spartan expedition to Corcyra in 373–2, described at some length by Xenophon (6. 2. 3–11, 15–26) and briefly by Diodorus (15. 46. 1–3; 47. 1–6). Mnasippus, the Spartan commander, did not attempt to storm the city or to reduce it by circumvallation. It cannot have been closely invested, since six hundred peltasts under an Athenian general contrived to join the defenders inside the walls without being detected. Mnasippus used his troops, mostly mercenaries, to ravage the well cultivated and richly stocked countryside and prevented the

Corcyreans from reaching it from the city. He established a camp on a hill some distance from the walls, protecting it with a stockade, while his fleet blockaded the principal harbour whenever weather permitted.⁴¹ The Corcyreans thus became desperately short of food, and large numbers of slaves and others deserted. The remainder of this campaign, which ended disastrously for the Spartans, has little relevance here. Xenophon is interested in it because he saw in Mnasippus an example of a military commander who by neglecting the well-being of his troops brought catastrophe upon them and himself.⁴² It is, however, noteworthy that, according to Diodorus, the initial appeal for Spartan intervention was sent by dissident oligarchs friendly to Sparta, of whom some, having evidently become refugees, joined the forces of Mnasippus on his arrival, and also that, when the Athenian general reached the city, he found the population still torn by civil strife.

During the period after Leuctra Phlius, which remained faithful to Sparta, was frequently harassed by more powerful neighbours allied with Thebes. The loyalty of insignificant Phlius to the Spartans in their desperate straits won the admiration of Xenophon. He devotes a long and graphic but rather naive excursus to the exploits of the Phliasians, who had often to struggle to preserve their independence (7.2.1–23).⁴³ Their enemies, who received some aid from local dissidents, occupied two naturally strong positions on mountain summits not far from the city to serve as bases for ravaging the plain. One of these had been fortified by the Argives (ἐπιτετειχότων) on Mount Tricarantum in Phliasian territory, the other was being fortified by the Sicyonians at Thyamia within their own territory but near the Phliasian border.⁴⁴ Attacked and pillaged from two directions, the Phliasians were unable to grow sufficient food and became dependent on what they could seize from their enemies and what they could bring in by a dangerous route from Corinth. In desperation they appealed to the Athenians, who sent Chares with a small mercenary force. He helped them to protect a food convoy against enemy attacks, and they persuaded him to support them in an attack on the unfinished fort at Thyamia. The garrison, taken by surprise, fled in panic. The Phliasians continued the construction of the fort, intending to turn the tables on the Sicyonians and use it as a base for raiding their territory.⁴⁵ This intention apparently remained unfulfilled because peace was concluded soon afterwards on terms requiring the restoration of Thyamia to Sicyon (7.4.11). There seems, however, to be no other recorded instance of what might be termed epiteichismos in reverse.

In Sicily, where factional strife was almost more prevalent than in Greece, epiteichismos might have been expected to have been widely practised, but it was not. One reason may have been that, because

Sicily was more fertile than Greece, the devastation of agricultural land tended to be less effective and was therefore less frequently adopted. Another factor was that the Siceliots, through bitter experience at the hands of the Carthaginians in the last decade of the fifth century, became more advanced in the technique of assaulting walled cities than the Greeks of the homeland. The spectacular success of the elder Dionysius in storming Motya was won largely by adopting methods of siege warfare hitherto alien to the Greeks. The reputation that he gained thereby must have caused many a Greek city threatened by him to choose submission in preference to resistance. Nevertheless, some varieties of *epiteichismos* were not unknown in Sicily in the fourth century and continued to be practised somewhat longer than in the homeland.

For many years Leontini was the traditional rallying point for refugees from Syracuse. It was, for example, to Leontini that the friends of Dion fled when worsted by Callippus in civil strife at Syracuse and from Leontini that Hipparinus, doubtless with their support, soon afterwards ousted Callippus (Diod. 16. 36. 5; Plut. *Dion* 58. 4; Polyæn. 5. 4). After the younger Dionysius had regained his tyranny, a curious episode occurred in which an unsuccessful *epiteichismos* undertaken against Syracuse by Hicetas led to a crushing victory over the troops of Dionysius. Taking the offensive from Leontini, Hicetas occupied the Olympieum, situated on a hill above the Great Harbour, and protected it with a stockade. He doubtless hoped for assistance from Syracusans hostile to the tyranny, but evidently no uprising took place, and eventually he had to withdraw. His troops turned on those of Dionysius, who were pursuing them, and defeated them so decisively that the entire city except Ortygia fell into his hands (Diod. 16. 68. 1–3, cf. Plut. *Timol* 9. 3).

Later Timoleon adopted what appears to have been a form of *epiteichismos* when striving to complete his crusade for the liberation of Sicily from military adventurers, who still held important cities but were now beginning to forfeit the loyalty of their own mercenaries. His success in liberating Leontini was achieved because, after he appeared there with an army, Hicetas was handed over to him in chains by mutinous mercenaries; evidently neither assault nor circumvallation was attempted (Plut. *Timol* 32. 1). A clearer example of this technique was his offensive against Messina, where Mamercus had taken refuge with the local despot Hippon. Timoleon established a base some twenty miles from Messina at Mylae, where he seems to have remained, though not necessarily inactive, until Mamercus surrendered to him personally and Hippon tried to escape by sea but was caught and tortured to death by the Messanians.⁴⁶

The rise of Macedonia under the leadership of Philip was to a

considerable extent due to his exploitation of new techniques in siege operations. Demosthenes chose to maintain that the successes of Philip against Greek cities were achieved mainly by bribery, and undoubtedly treachery often played a part. There is, however, abundant evidence that with the aid of professional experts Philip was responsible for dramatic advances in siegecraft.⁴⁷ Although he failed to reduce Perinthus and Byzantium, his unprecedented success in capturing walled towns by storm, often very rapidly, astonished and dismayed the Greeks. Because he enjoyed the benefit of these new developments, *epiteichismos* had no attraction for him, and the Greeks had little occasion to use it against one another, especially after the formation of the Hellenic League under his leadership. Alexander displayed a mastery of siegecraft superior even to that of his father, and in none of his many assaults on fortified positions did he ever fail. It is, however, interesting that even he did not entirely neglect *epiteichismos*. During his Indian campaign he ordered Coenus to occupy a fortified base in order to exclude the inhabitants of Bazira from access to their cultivable land (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 27. 7, ἐπιτειχίσαι). The operation proved effective, since the inhabitants abandoned their city, which was then garrisoned by his troops (ibid. 28. 1). This isolated and unimportant incident illustrates his versatility. Far more often, however, he developed new and original ideas, which permanently changed the traditional principles of strategy and tactics. Military leaders in the Hellenistic age, though taking advantage of some technological advances, were for the most part content to imitate his methods.

V. Aftermath

An indication that *epiteichismos* was already almost obsolete by the middle of the fourth century is provided by passages in the speeches of Demosthenes in which the term is seen to have acquired a more general, non-specialised meaning.⁴⁸ Apart from a reference to Decelea (21. 146),⁴⁹ there is only one passage in which Demosthenes could be deemed to be using the term in its special sense. In the *First Philippic* (4. 5) he suggests that Philip might have considered the Athenians difficult to confront in war in the past when they held τῶσ' αὐτ' ἐπιτειχίσματα τῆς αὐτοῦ χώρας, among which Pydna, Potidaea and Methone have been named in the preceding sentence. Demosthenes puts up this suggestion only to reject it, and he does not picture Philip as considering that these places had been occupied as fortified bases in his territory for plundering agricultural land,⁵⁰ but rather that they had been, more generally, potential bases for any kind of offensive action. Such indeed is the meaning of the term where Demosthenes

applies it, as he does several times, to interference by Philip in Euboea, especially by supporting tyrants there, with the intention of putting pressure on Athens, Euboea, he declares, as a whole is being exploited by Philip as an ἐπιτειχισμα against Attica (8. 66; 10. 68; 18. 71, cf. 87), and elsewhere the verb ἐπιτείχιζειν has tyranny in Euboea (10.8), or an individual tyrant (8. 36), as its object.⁵¹ The special features normally associated with epiteichismos are absent here, and the term has become largely metaphorical, as also in a passage relating to Rhodes (15. 12). Another development is that ἐπιτειχισμα begins to be used of any fortress, whatever its function or character. In a speech belonging to the Demosthenic corpus the fort at Eetionea is so described (58. 67), whereas in Thucydides it is τεῖχος (8. 90. 1–92. 10) or τείχισμα (92. 10; 93. 1; 94. 1).

A far stranger development took place long after epiteichismos had become outmoded as a military operation. The term began to appear in the vocabulary of authors in various fields, including philosophers and theologians, who used it in contexts mostly unconnected with warfare and in many cases concerned with abstract thought. A foretaste may be seen in a phrase quoted by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3. 3,1406b 11) from Alcidas, who declared that philosophy was ἐπιτειχισμα τῶν νόμων. It was, however, only under the Roman empire that the metaphorical use of the term seems to have become commonplace. Its popularity with authors of that period may be illustrated by referring to a brief and largely random selection of passages. The fashion may perhaps have been set in the first century A.D. by Philo Judaeus, who was evidently fond of it. In his works the verb denotes the act of setting up something as a menace or weapon τῶν ἐπιτείχιζόντων ψευδολογίαν κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας, *de aet. mund.* 69; γῆν ἐπετείχισαν οὐρανῶ, *de vit.* *de vit. Mos.* 2. 194), while ἐπιτείχισμός means in one passage an accusation brought against an individual (*ibid.* 176) and in another a powerful threat (*ibid.* 185). Josephus uses the term literally in military contexts, but with reference to fortification of any kind, as in the passage from the Demosthenic corpus cited above. The verb thus occurs with φρουρῶν as its object (*B.J.* 1. 419; 4. 446: cf. Dio Cassius 47. 31. 2; 54. 33. 4), but it may also have a metaphorical significance (δυναστεία ἐπιτετείχισται τῇ πόλει, *B.J.* 4. 352). Similarly, ἐπιτειχισμα may denote an actual bastion (*A. J.* 15.292), but also a figurative one, as in a striking passage where Herod recalls one of his sons to serve ὥσπερ ἐπιτειχισμα against his other sons (*B.J.* 1.448).

A consequence of the development whereby the term was applied to any kind of fortification was that it came to be used, in its metaphorical sense, of defensive or protective action, though still, and indeed more commonly, of offensive action. In Philostratus a miserly

person ἐπιτελιχίζει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πλούτον (V.A. 8. 7. 161), and in two passages of Sextus Empiricus ἐπιτείχισμα bears the sense of protection, though in both cases what is protected is something undesirable (*adv. Math.* 1. 298; 11. 180). On the other hand, Sextus also uses the verb of offensive action (*ibid.* 5.2), as do Lucian (ἐπιτελιχίσαντες τῷ πλούτῳ ὑπεροψίαν, *Nigr.* 23) and Alciphron (*frag.* 5). As late as the end of the fourth century A.D. the verb occurs in the homilies by St John Chrysostom on the Gospels and Epistles, where, for example, God is stated to have built up a bastion (ἐπετείχισε) against the Devil (*horn.* 26. 2 in 1 *Cor.*, 230D). A far cry from Pylos and Decelea.

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1 F. E. Adcock, *CR* 51 (1947), 2–7, provides a brief but basic survey. Y. Garlan. *Recherches de Poliorcétique grecque* (Athens, 1974), pp. 33–40. studies epiteichismos rather more widely and gives an admirable summary of its functions, but his discussion, punctuated by translations of relevant passages, is also brief.

2 cf. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London. 1972), pp. 209–10.

3 Adcock. *op. cit.* (above n. 1), 5–7; D. Kagan, *Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, 1969), p. 314.

4 Considered briefly but convincingly by K. J. Dover in A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes and Dover. *Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 4 (1970). p. 367.

5 Towns stated to have been taken by storm (in most cases κατά κράτος or αὐτοβοεῖ) in the late fifth or early fourth centuries were insignificant or unwallled, as the following selection will show: Astacus (*Thuc.* 2. 30. 1); Aegitium (3. 97. 2); Galepsus (5. 6. 1); Lampsacus (8. 62. 2. unwallled); Magnesia (*Diod.* 14. 36. 2–3. unwallled); Caryae (*Xen. Hell.* 7. 1. 28); Cromnus (7. 4. 20). Assaults on fortified positions normally involved casualties on a scale which Greek states could not afford.

6 On Greek siegecraft. Gomme, *op. cit.* (above η. 4) 1 (1945), pp. 16–19; F. E. Adcock. *Greek and Macedonian Art of War* (Berkeley. 1957), pp. 57–9, who points to some improvement in the fourth century. Aristotle. *Pol.* 7. 1330b- 1331 a. maintains that a city needed strong walls because of recent improvements in the efficiency of assault weapons.

7 An interesting example of success achieved by this method is the invasion of Acarnania by Agesilaus in 389. His troops were harassed in mountainous districts and failed in attempts, which pressure by his allies imposed upon him, to capture enemy towns, but in the following spring the Acarnanians capitulated in order to save their territory from further plundering (*Xen. Hell.* 4. 6. 4–7.1).

8 This question will be considered below. It may be observed that the abstract nouns ἐπιτελιχισμός and ἐπιτελιχίσις are virtually interchangeable and denote the military process; that ἐπιτετίχισμα denotes a fortification built in the course of this process; that the verb ἐπιτελιχίζειν is intransitive in Thucydides but elsewhere often has a place-name as its object.

9 At an earlier stage, in the eighth and seventh centuries, members of a defeated faction forced to leave their native city would normally initiate or join colonial enterprises overseas.

10 Examples of this civil warfare which occurred during the Peloponnesian war are classed by scholars as epiteichismos. cf. Adcock, op. cit. (above n. 1), 7. and Garlan, op. cit. (above n. 1), 33.

11 cf. ibid. 153. 2 on Geloan exiles at Mactorium, which was not far from Gela, many years earlier.

12 The case of Anaea (see below p. 15) is comparable.

13 cf. ibid. 4, where both sides are stated to have won victories.

14 Gomme, op. cit. (above n. 4), 1 (1945), p. 301. justifiably considers Ithome to have been a palisaded camp and not a walled town. The term *πολιορκία* used here by Thucydides (1. 102. 2) is very elastic; cf. 7. 28. 3, *πολιορκουμένων ἐπιτειχισμῶ ὑπὸ Πελοποννησίων*, which refers to Decelea.

15 cf. W. G. Forrest, *History of Sparta. 950 192 B.C.* (London, 1980). p. 102.

16 E. Will. *Rev. et. anc.*: 71 (1969), 318. Nor does Thucydides attest that the coast around Anaea was hitherto a peraia controlled from Samos, as the authors of *A.T.L.* 3 (1950), p. 196, suggest.

17 These oligarchs are almost certainly to be identified with, or at least included in their number, the Megarian exiles settled temporarily at Plataea in 427 but removed a year later (Thuc. 3. 68. 3).

18 N. G. L. Hammond, *Studies in Greek History* (Oxford, 1973), p. 439.

19 The complex and obscure stasis at Colophon and Notium from 430 to 427 (Thuc. 3. 34) is regarded by Adcock, op. cit. (above n. 1) 6. and Garlan, op. cit. (above n. 1) 33, as epiteichismos, but there is no mention of attacks by exiles.

20 Examples are: Antandrus in 424 (Thuc. 4. 52. 3; 75. 1); Phyle in 404 (Xen. *Hell.* 2. 4. 2–7); Phigalea and Phlius about 375 (Diod. 15. 40. 2 and 5); Zacynthus in 374 (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 2. 2 3; Diod. 15. 45. 2 4).

21 H. Delbrück, *Die Strategie des Perikles* (Berlin, 1890), p. 121, who points out advantages to be gained therefrom.

22 D. Kagan, *Archidamian War* (Ithaca, 1974), pp. 72–6; de Ste. Croix, op. cit. (above n. 2), 209.

23 G. Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.* 3. 2 (Gotha, 1904), 1114–16; Adcock, op. cit. (above n. 1), 6; Garlan, op. cit. (above n. 1), 33.

24 cf. my *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 89–90.

25 Gomme, op. cit. (above n. 4) 3 (1956), p. 494; Kagan, op. cit. (above n. 22), 252–4.

26 Halieis also probably submitted at this time, cf. Kagan, op. cit. (above n. 22), 306 n. 8.

27 cf. G. L. Huxley in J. N. Coldstream and Huxley, *Kythera* (London, 1972), p. 38, whose reconstruction of this operation is based on examination of the terrain.

28 Thucydides notes (53. 2) the benefits hitherto enjoyed by the Spartans through possessing Cythera, which were now lost.

29 W. K. Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography* 2 (Berkeley, 1969), pp. 24–36, cf. 3 (1980), pp. 295–7, locates it at Dilesi.

30 Early in 421 Sparta announced preparations for epiteichismos (Thuc. 5. 17. 2) but only to make Athens more favourably disposed towards the conclusion of peace.

31 cf. Garlan, op. cit. (above n. 1), 36–8.

32 J. Boardman, *BS A* 51 (1956), 41–54, provides a valuable report on

excavations conducted there.

³³ See above p. 17.

³⁴ According to Piut. *Alcib.* 35. 2, he was castigated by his enemies for having failed to capture the city. The accounts of Xenophon and Diodorus suggest rather that initially he had no intention of capturing it but that the Athenian victory led him to improvise a brief attack in the hope that it might be surrendered to him.

³⁵ cf. T. Sauciuc, *Andros* (Vienna, 1914), pp. 65–9.

³⁶ In this section references naming neither the author nor the work are to Xenophon, *Hellenka*.

³⁷ On the topography see Strabo 8. 3. 24; Paus. 3. 8. 5. E. Meyer, *Neue pelop. Wanderungen* (Bern, 1957). pp. 49–50, 60–1, locates Epitalium on a plateau above Agulinitsa.

³⁸ The difficulties are judiciously discussed by A. Momigliano, *Riv. Fil.* 14 (1936), 51–4.

³⁹ Xenophon uses both ἐπιτελιχίζειν and πολιορκεῖν in his account of this operation: as noted above (n. 14), the latter is a wide term, not necessarily denoting siege or circumvallation. The site of this fortified base is not specified, but it was probably on the north coast so as to be easily accessible from Attica, since the Athenians did not enjoy undisputed command of the sea. A possibility is Souvala, some five miles from the capital, with an anchorage and conveniently situated for plundering fertile areas in the north west of the island.

⁴⁰ M. Zahrtnt, *Olynth unci die Chalkidier* (Munich, 1971), p. 95. It was for this reason that the Peloponnesians had previously to operate from bases far from Olynthus.

⁴¹ B. Schmidt, *Korkyraeische Studien* (Leipzig, 1890), pp. 50–6, discusses the topography of this episode, but his conclusions do not seem wholly convincing.

⁴² J. K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley, 1970), pp. 55–6.

⁴³ The tone of this excursus is not unlike that of a Victorian adventure story for boys. Diod. 15. 75. 3 is very brief.

⁴⁴ The most recent study of the topography is that of Pritchett, op. cit. (above n. 29), 2. 103–5 (Tricaranum) and 107 (Thyamia).

⁴⁵ in their plea to Chares for collaboration in attacking Thyamia the Phliasians are stated to have told him τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐπιτετελικῶς ἔση (7. 2. 20).

⁴⁶ A fragment of Athanis (*FGrHist* 562 F 3, quoted by Plut. *Timol.* 37.9) refers to the base at Mylae, and the evidence of this contemporary historian is more likely to be accurate than a statement by Plutarch (ibid. 34. 4) that Timoleon blockaded Messana by land and sea; cf. my *Timoleon and his Relations with Tyrants* (Manchester, 1952), p. 51.

⁴⁷ G. T. Griffith in N. G. L. Hammond and Griffith, *History of Macedonia 2* (Oxford, 1979), pp. 444–9.

⁴⁸ In this section I use ‘the term’ to embrace the nouns and the verb referred to above n. 8. Hereafter the verb is by far the commonest. In *Hell.* 3. 2. 1 Xenophon uses the verb in a non-specialised but still military sense.

⁴⁹ cf. Aeschin. 2. 76. Later writers continue to apply the term to the occupation of Decelea; cf. Plut. *Alcib.* 23. 2, Paus. 3. 8. 6 and Polyae. 1. 40. 6, though Strabo 9. 1. 17 uses ὀρηγιον.

⁵⁰ Potidaea was in fact outside Macedonia.

⁵¹ When making precisely the same point in 19. 219 and 326, Demosthenes uses the non-technical word ὀρηγτήρια.

Thucydides and Spartan Strategy in the Archidamian War


Kelly Thomas

THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR, which ended with the Peace of Nicias in 421 B.C., is frequently viewed as a classic example of a war between a land power and a sea power. When this first phase of the Peloponnesian War began in 431 B.C., the Athenian navy was the largest and finest in the Greek world; for decades it had dominated the waters of the eastern Mediterranean. The Athenian army, however, was no match for the Spartan army, which for more than a century had been recognized as the most efficient fighting force in Greece. The stage was set, then, for Athenian victories at sea and Spartan domination on land.

At several places in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides assures us that in 431 B.C. the Spartans believed they could force a swift end to the Peloponnesian War by ravaging Athenian territory. In one passage he tells us that they believed such a strategy would result in victory in a few years; in another passage, where he does not mention the Spartans by name, he tells us that some Greeks believed the Athenians could withstand such invasions for one year, others for two years, but that no one believed they could hold out for more than three years.¹ Elsewhere, however, he informs us that at the outset of the war the Spartans sent orders to friendly states in Sicily and Italy to supply money and ships for the war effort, and with such aid the Spartans hoped to raise a fleet of five hundred ships.² There is an obvious incongruity here, for, if the Spartans really believed that invasion of Attica would end the war in a few years, they had no need to build up their naval forces. It is a tribute to our stereotyped notions of both Athens and Sparta—due in no small part to Thucydides himself—that students of the Peloponnesian War have long disregarded or sought to explain away the report that the Spartans hoped to build up their naval forces, while accepting unequivocally the report that invasion of Attica alone was expected to bring the war to a successful conclusion.

Such selective use of Thucydides is unjustified. If we are to understand Sparta's strategy for carrying on the war with Athens, we cannot arbitrarily reject one passage because it does not fit our preconceived notions and accept another passage because it does. This has, nonetheless, been the *modus operandi* of modern scholars, who,

secure in their belief that Spartan strategy was fully understood, regarded the subject as unworthy of independent investigation. Not until 1965 was Spartan strategy first treated in detail. In that year P. A. Brunt carefully laid out the enormous difficulties and disadvantages Sparta and its allies would have encountered in attempting to compete with the Athenians on the sea.³ Not only was the Peloponnesian fleet outnumbered, but a shortage of trained crewmen and money prevented them from putting to sea all of the ships in their possession. When they did sail out, they confronted an enemy superior in tactical skill and self-confidence. Faced with these difficulties, the Spartans simply could not take the offensive on the sea, and that, in any case, was not their aim. The Spartans entered the war, Brunt has argued, with the experience of their earlier war with Athens—the so-called First Peloponnesian War—uppermost in their minds. In 446 the Spartans had invaded Attica, and this invasion was quickly followed by the Thirty Years Truce in which the Athenians made important concessions. It was in view of this experience that in 431 the Spartans believed, as Thucydides informs us, that invasion of Attica would lead to speedy resolution of the conflict.⁴



Although this proposition was by no means original with Brunt, he was the first to assemble the evidence in support of it, and an impressive array of evidence it is. We know, for example, that when the Samians revolted and tried to secede from the Athenian empire in 440, the Spartans wanted to come to their aid, presumably by invading Attica, and in the winter of 433–32 the “authorities” at Sparta promised to invade Attica to assist the Potidaeans in their confrontation

with Athens.⁵ On the surface, at least, there would seem to be little doubt that invasion of Attica remained the keystone of Spartan strategy for waging any war against Athens, and Brunt's treatment of the subject has now come to be regarded as definitive.⁶

It cannot, of course, be denied that there were Spartans who believed that an invasion of Attica would quickly bring the Athenians to their knees, but it does not follow that all Spartans shared this belief. Sparta was clearly not the monolithic society it is often made out to be, and there is absolutely no reason to suppose that there were not differences of opinion there. Neither war nor peace is a one-dimensional issue, and, if there was to be peace with Athens in 431, surely Spartan opinion differed as to how high a price ought to be paid. Alternately, if there was to be war, surely there were differences of opinion as to what the war ought to accomplish for Sparta and, above all, differences of opinion as to how it would have to be waged.

In a recent re-examination of Spartan strategy in the Archidamian War, George L. Cawkwell has rightly recognized that such differences of opinion did exist.⁷ There were more radical Spartans who wished to see Athens crushed and the Greeks liberated, while others of more moderate persuasion were willing to treat with the Athenians. These differences of opinion gave rise to different military strategies; in fact, Cawkwell has argued, there was not a single strategy followed at Sparta during the war but two different strategies employed simultaneously. These he has labeled the "conventional" and the "adventurous." The "conventional" strategy, supported by moderate Spartans, consisted of ravaging Attica in the hope that this would bring on a decisive battle or force the enemy to submit. The "adventurous" strategy, supported by the more radical element, called for the war to be carried on in other ways—for example, by promoting revolt among Athens' allies and by building up Peloponnesian naval forces. Only after the capture of the Spartans at Sphacteria in 425, he has argued, was the "adventurous" strategy pursued in earnest. Until that time, it played some part in the conduct of the war; but, basically, the Spartans sought to win by the conventional means of invading Attica, and this strategy seemed to be effective.

Although Cawkwell is surely correct in recognizing that not all Spartans were of the same mind with respect to the Athenians and that there were differences of opinion as to how the war would have to be waged, Spartan military activity in the Archidamian War cannot be neatly separated into the "conventional" and "adventurous" categories he has proposed. A single example will suffice: in 427 the Spartans dispatched a fleet to Lesbos, an action that Cawkwell specifically included among his examples of the "adventurous" strategy in operation. At the same time as this fleet was being

dispatched, however, Peloponnesian land forces invaded Attica, an action that can only be seen as an example of the “conventional” strategy in operation. Thucydides informs us, however, that the situation was more complex than this, for the invasion of Attica was intended solely to occupy the Athenians and divert their attention from the fleet as it crossed the Aegean.⁸ In this instance, at least, the “adventurous” dispatch of a fleet and the “conventional” invasion of Attica were employed side by side and in concert. Consequently, neither operation can be viewed in isolation, for each formed part of a larger, over-all strategy.

If we are to understand this strategy we cannot be selective in our use of Thucydides. Nor can we employ as our primary evidence general statements of belief or intent that are found in his work. Instead, we must examine in their proper context Spartan military and diplomatic initiatives as related by Thucydides. Before this examination can be undertaken, however, preliminary matters must be taken up, especially the First Peloponnesian War, any lessons the Spartans may have learned from it, and, of equal importance, the information known and available to the Spartans on the eve of the war in 431 B.C.

THE SPARTANS MAY WELL HAVE ENTERED the Archidamian War with the experience of the First Peloponnesian War uppermost in their minds, but wars rarely provide clear-cut, unambiguous lessons. The First Peloponnesian War was no exception, and, if some Spartans concluded from it that Athens could be brought to its knees by an invasion, other Spartans may easily have learned different lessons. Indeed, it does not strain the evidence to say that they *should* have learned other lessons. Although the invasion of Attica and the Thirty Years Truce of 446 are closely related, they are not so closely connected that all else can be ignored. In truth, it was not solely the invasion but a variety of other problems that contributed to Athenian willingness to make concessions in the Thirty Years Truce.

Russell Meiggs has argued forcefully that the early years of the decade of the 440s, and especially the year 447, was a time of troubles for the Athenians.⁹ Disaffection was widespread, though uncoordinated, throughout the empire. Although resolved by 446, many of these difficulties would have been fresh in the Athenian mind as events of this year unfolded and problems shifted closer to home. In Boeotia, Chaeronea and Orchomenos were lost; Tolmides quickly recovered Chaeronea, but, before Orchomenos could be regained, he was killed and his army defeated at Coronea. In order to recover the prisoners taken there, the Athenians were forced to evacuate all of Boeotia. These reverses encouraged the Euboeans to revolt. Pericles was dispatched to subdue the rebels, but hardly had he landed on the

island when news reached Athens that the garrison at Megara had been massacred. The defection of Megara provided the Spartans with a direct invasion route to Attica, and they were quick to seize the opportunity. To meet the threat of invasion, Pericles had to be recalled from Euboea. Shortly thereafter, both sides agreed to the Thirty Years Truce.¹⁰ If some Spartans attributed the truce to the invasion alone, others must have grasped that a whole series of reverses suffered in quick succession had led the Athenians to yield.

Moreover, anyone who reflected seriously on the events of the war could hardly fail to recognize that Sparta and its allies were especially vulnerable to the superior naval might of the Athenians.¹¹ Even a cursory consideration of several instances in which the Peloponnesians suffered at the hands of Athenian naval power suggests that this should have been the outstanding lesson to be learned from the war. The Athenians were victorious in the only naval engagements that took place; at Cecryphaleia over the Peloponnesian fleet and at Aegina where seventy Aeginetan vessels were captured.¹² Even land operations were affected by Athenian naval presence. In 458 a force of 1,500 Spartan heavy infantry and 10,000 allies moved across the Gulf of Corinth to aid the Dorians of Doris in their struggle against the Phocians. This force was apparently transported by sea, thus demonstrating that Sparta and its allies had sufficient naval forces to convey a sizeable army beyond the Peloponnesus. Subsequent events show, however, that they had little confidence in these forces. The Phocians were quickly defeated; but the Spartans feared to return to the Peloponnesus by sea, and with the Athenians in control of Geranea they did not wish to risk returning by land either. The army was forced to winter north of the Isthmus. Not until it had defeated an army of Athens and its allies at Tanagra the following year did the Spartan expedition feel confident enough to return home over land. After its withdrawal the Athenians quickly marched into Boeotia, reasserted control there, and made substantial gains in Phocis as well. The Spartans were either unwilling or unable to move forces into this area a second time and made no effort to counter these moves.¹³

Twice during the war Athenian fleets circumnavigated the Peloponnesus, and on each occasion achieved notable success. A fleet commanded by Tolmides set out from the Piraeus and for a brief time gained control of Laconian Methone and Gythium, where the Spartan dockyards were burned. Zacynthus and Cephallenia were taken, as was Naupactus, where the Messenian rebels were settled, and Sicyonian territory was ravaged.¹⁴ Several years later a fleet commanded by Pericles set out from Pegae and circumnavigated the Peloponnesus in the opposite direction. On this expedition the Athenians were able to gain allies in Achaëa, to ravage parts of

Acarnania, and on one occasion to advance into the interior of the Peloponnesus as far as Nemea, where a Sicyonian force was defeated. According to Plutarch, these exploits made Pericles celebrated even among foreigners, and we should expect them to have the same impact at Sparta. Sometime during the war Athenian forces occupied Troezen, and before it came to an end Aegina was forced into total submission, its walls demolished and its fleet taken over.¹⁵ Henceforth, this previously staunch supporter of Sparta was a tribute-paying member of the Athenian empire.

With memories such as these it would be surprising indeed if everyone at Sparta was convinced in 431 that invasion of Attica would quickly resolve the upcoming war, as Thucydides assures us; and, in any case, this assurance is called into question by the information he supplies in a passage so important that it deserves to be quoted in full:

Now that the affair at Plataea had occurred and the treaty had been glaringly violated, the Athenians began preparing for war, and the Lacedaemonians also began; both sides were making ready to send embassies to the King and to the barbarians of any other land, where either of them hoped to secure aid, and they were negotiating alliances with such cities as were outside their own sphere of influence. The Lacedaemonians, on their part, gave orders to those in Italy and Sicily who had chosen their side to build, in proportion to the size of their cities, other ships, in addition to those which were already in Peloponnesian ports, their hope being that their fleet would reach a grand total of five hundred ships, and to provide a stated sum of money; but as to other matters, they were instructed to remain inactive and to refuse their ports to Athenians if they came with more than a single ship, until these preparations had been completed.¹⁶

One of the major stumbling blocks to accepting the information contained here is the number of ships Thucydides says the Spartans hoped to acquire. Although the number five hundred is consistent in all manuscripts, it has, as Gomme and many others have noted, an impossible ring. There is, however, no justification for dismissing it out of hand or emending it on the basis of information supplied by Diodorus.¹⁷ For the moment it will be useful to disregard this precise figure and consider the other information contained in the passage.

What we learn is that in one of their first acts after the Theban attack on Plataea the Spartans sent orders to friendly states in Italy and Sicily to build ships and provide money; at the same time embassies were being prepared for dispatch to the king of Persia and to other barbarians. With aid from these quarters the Spartans hoped to increase significantly the size of their fleet. Here in a very few words Thucydides provides us with clear and unequivocal proof that, whatever else the Spartans may have been planning in 431, they were also contemplating building up their naval forces. Until valid reasons

for rejecting this information are offered, we have no choice but to accept it and, of equal importance, accept its implications. If, in 431, the Spartans were undertaking measures to build up Peloponnesian naval forces, they were obviously not convinced that invasion of Attica alone would end the war and that it would, therefore, be necessary to conduct operations at sea as well as on land. These are the salient points of the passage, and they are of far greater import for our understanding of Spartan strategy than whether or not the number “five hundred” is accurate. Even if it is dismissed as erroneous, the other information contained in the passage and its clear implications remain unaffected and must be accepted.

IT WOULD BE NAIVE TO INSIST on the absolute integrity of the figure, but any assessment of its accuracy ought to begin not with an arbitrary rejection but, rather, with a consideration of the information known and available to the Spartans in 431. Although the Spartans had no sizeable navy of their own, they did have access, through their allies, to substantially larger naval forces than is generally admitted. Thucydides tells us specifically¹⁸ that no fewer than seven cities—Corinth, Sicyon, Megara, Pellene, Elis, Ambracia, and Leucas—contributed to the Peloponnesian fleet. He does not tell us how many ships each of these states possessed nor does he tell us the size of the combined fleet. We do know, however, that five of these states—Corinth, Megara, Elis, Ambracia, and Leucas—accounted for 149 of the 150 ship fleet that sailed against the Corcyreans in 433. Of these, 30 were lost in the engagement at Sybota, but, so far as we know, all but 1 of the 120 ships that survived the battle were still available for duty two years later when the Archidamian War broke out. Moreover, at least one state, Megara, was by then in a position to provide a considerably larger number of ships, 40, than the 12 it had contributed in 433.¹⁹ Unfortunately, we have no information on the number of ships available to Sicyon or Pellene; nor to the Spartans, who certainly had a few of their own. It is also possible that smaller allies such as Epidaurus, Hermione, and Troezen were able to make at least nominal additions to the fleet as they had done four years earlier, when jointly they had sent 8 ships with the Corinthian fleet that engaged the Corcyreans off Leucimne.²⁰ In view of these numbers it does not seem at all unreasonable to postulate a combined Peloponnesian fleet numbering approximately 150 vessels at minimum, and the total may well have been considerably higher. At the very least we know that in the summer of 430 a Peloponnesian fleet of 100 ships put to sea, and this fleet did not include 40 Megarian ships then in drydock at Nisaea.²¹ Admittedly, a fleet of 150 ships was certainly no match for the much larger Athenian fleet, which numbered 300, but if Sparta hoped to raise a fleet of 500 ships

it was certainly a good beginning, a nucleus to which additional ships could be added.

One of the key factors not always taken into account in attempting to understand Spartan hopes at the beginning of the war is the dramatic build-up in Peloponnesian naval strength in the years between 435 and 433 B.C. In the middle of the decade Corinth and its allies had sent a fleet of 75 ships against the Corcyreans at Leucimne. Only 40 ships survived that engagement, but immediately thereafter the Corinthians began a crash building program that quickly produced substantial results. When the combined Corinthian-allied fleet put to sea two years later, it consisted of 150 ships, nearly a four-fold increase.²² There can be no doubt that this sharp growth in Peloponnesian naval strength was cause for genuine concern at Athens. Thucydides does not say so specifically, but he certainly implies²³ that this concern was one of the reasons why the Athenians acceded to Corcyrean appeals for an alliance in 433.


The ability of the Peloponnesians to put together from their own resources such a large fleet in so short a time was not the only encouraging sign on the horizon. The Aeginetans were urging the Spartans to declare war on Athens,²⁴ and, if this strategically placed island could be detached from the empire, the Peloponnesians would have a naval base at the very gates of the Piraeus. Overtures for an alliance had already come from the Lesbians,²⁵ and their naval forces were considerable. Overtures had also come from Macedón, and, although Perdiccas was not a man to be trusted, he certainly had no love for Athens and did have money and timber, both so desperately needed by Sparta and its allies.²⁶ At Corcyra the Corinthians had skillfully laid a plan they hoped would rupture the alliance with Athens and lead to the formation of an alliance between the Corcyreans and the Peloponnesians. Next to the Athenians, the Corcyreans had the largest fleet among the Greek states, 120 triremes before their losses to the Corinthians at Sybota.²⁷ In the east, the same Persian king, Artaxerxes, who had provided the Spartans with money during the First Peloponnesian War, was still ruling.²⁸ In the west, the Doric states of Sicily except Camarina allied with the Spartans as the war began, and there was no reason to believe that they would not contribute to the war effort.²⁹

All of this information was available to the Spartans in 431, and it is in the light of this information that their hope of raising a fleet of five hundred ships must be viewed. The picture contains a great many "ifs," to be sure. But, if ships and money were supplied by friendly states in Sicily and Italy, if aid came from the Persians, if Aegina could be taken over, if Perdiccas could be enlisted as an ally, if Lesbos should rebel against Athens, if Corcyra should come over to the

Peloponnesian side, and if a crash building program could be undertaken, then raising a fleet of five hundred ships was certainly possible. That all of these conditions would be fulfilled was unlikely. But, in view of Thucydides' statement that the Greeks were favorably inclined toward the Spartans, it was equally unlikely that none of them would. With the aid of hindsight, we know that this is precisely what happened, but the only thing this proves is that the Spartans seriously miscalculated the willingness of their fellow Greeks and the Persians to come to their aid. It does not justify dismissing Thucydides' plain statement that they hoped to acquire a fleet of five hundred ships, a figure that, for what it may be worth, receives vague support from Diodorus.³⁰ Finally, if there was any sincerity in the Spartan claim that they were going to war for the liberation of the Greeks,³¹ they must have known that this could only be accomplished with naval forces. On balance, to believe that the Spartans misjudged the situation seems just as reasonable as to believe that Thucydides made a mistake in his reporting. He was not, to be sure, infallible, but neither were the Spartans. Thucydides provides evidence of other Spartan miscalculations, and one of these occurred in an area particularly pertinent to the present discussion.

Figure 1:

Profile view of a Greek trireme. Line drawing reproduced courtesy of Cambridge University Press from J. S. Morrison and R. T. Williams, *Greek Oared Ships*, (Cambridge, 1968), [plate 31.]



The Spartans would have encountered, as Brunt has pointed out, many drawbacks in attempting to wage naval warfare against the Athenians.³² Even if the money necessary to finance the construction of ships, hire crews to man them, and defray the cost of conducting naval operations had become available to the Spartans, they would have had a far more difficult time facing the Athenians on the sea

than they initially anticipated. They seriously underestimated the value of Athenian experience in naval warfare and the handicap under which they themselves would be operating as a result. Although it is an exaggeration to say that Spartan interest in the sea was wholly nonexistent before the war,³³ the Spartans had never paid close attention to naval matters. Raphael Sealey has recently placed the depth of their inexperience in perspective; he has shown that the nauarch was not even an annual official at Sparta during the Archidamian War.³⁴ Yet the Spartans optimistically believed they would have no trouble gaining the naval experience necessary to compete with the Athenians. One incident reported by Thucydides makes this abundantly clear. In 429, when news of Phormio's brilliant victory over a much larger Corinthian fleet reached Sparta, it was greeted with rage and utter disbelief that inexperience could have had anything to do with the defeat. The Spartans blamed it, rather, on *makhia*, a lack of energy or vigor.³⁵ Obviously, they had not yet learned to appreciate fully the value of Athens' greater expertise in seamanship, and, if in the third year of the war they could still be guilty of such self-deception, they could easily have misjudged the problems involved in raising a fleet of five hundred ships.

No discussion of Spartan strategy in the Archidamian War would be complete without some mention of the speeches in Book I of Thucydides' *History*. If we could be at all sure that the ideas contained in them reflect the views of the speakers rather than the views of Thucydides, we would have irrefutable proof that talk of Peloponnesian naval activity against the Athenians was very much in the air shortly before the outbreak of the war. This theme plays a substantial role in the speeches of the Corinthians, of Pericles, and of Archidamus.³⁶ The Corinthians, in setting forth the reasons why the Peloponnesians will emerge victorious, include their superiority in land warfare, their unity and obedience to a single command, and their ability to equip and man a fleet as well as gain the experience to compete with the Athenians in naval warfare. They speak also of encouraging Athenian subjects to revolt, of planting forts in Athenian territory, and, more vaguely, of "other measures which one cannot now foresee." Many of the points put forth by the Corinthians are countered in the speech of Pericles, but the speech of Archidamus is especially important. He expresses the belief that invasion of Attica alone will not win the war and that the only way the Spartans can hope to emerge victorious is either by gaining mastery of the sea or cutting off Athenian revenue. Neither seemed very likely to Archidamus, who, like the Corinthians, acknowledged Athenian superiority in ships, naval experience, and financial resources. Unlike the Corinthians, however, Archidamus was not at all confident that

Peloponnesian deficiencies in these areas could be easily overcome, and he advocated avoiding war until adequate preparations had been made, particularly with respect to the fleet and financial reserves.

Too many of the ideas expressed in these speeches smack of composition in the light of later events to inspire much confidence that they were actually delivered on the eve of the war. The allusion in the speeches of the Corinthians and Pericles to fortifying Athenian territory might well have been written with the occupation of Decelea in mind, and Archidamus' admonition that the war could not be won by invading Attica is inconsistent with Thucydides' report that he expected the invasion of 431 to produce results.³⁷ Although the speeches may be helpful, our understanding of Spartan strategy ought not rest on them but, rather, on the narrative of Thucydides. And to this we must now turn.

WHEN HOSTILITIES BEGAN IN THE SPRING of 431, the Spartans had neither sufficient ships nor adequate naval experience to challenge Athens on the sea. Unless and until aid could be obtained from Sicily, Italy, or Persia, their only recourse was to invade Attica. The Athenians, on the advice of Pericles, remained behind their fortification walls and refused to engage the Spartan army. Although Pericles' policy of abandoning Attica to the enemy gave rise to serious discontent, his will prevailed.³⁸ The Spartans were apparently taken by surprise; even Archidamus was sure that the Athenians would not stand idly by and allow their fields to be ravaged. When, in the first few weeks of the war, it became apparent that they were resolved to do so, the Spartans, if they had not recognized it before, must now have realized that any strategy based solely upon invading Attica could lead only to a lengthy war of attrition.³⁹

The second Peloponnesian military operation in this first year of the war must be viewed with these events in mind. In the spring, the Athenians sent out a fleet of one hundred triremes, reinforced by fifty Corcyrean ships. After ravaging the Peloponnesian coast, the Athenians conducted operations in Acarnania, where they expelled Euarchus from Astacus and took this city into their alliance. In the winter of 431–30 Euarchus persuaded the Corinthians to assist him in regaining control of Astacus. To this end they dispatched a force of 1,500 hoplites and forty ships, and Euarchus was successfully restored to power. Before returning home, the Corinthians attacked other coastal areas of Acarnania as well as Cephallenia, but without success.⁴⁰ Little has been made of this expedition, but it is not likely that the Corinthians were acting on their own. Although Thucydides makes no mention of the Spartans in conjunction with the operation, it is difficult to believe that they did not at least tacitly approve. In any case, the first Peloponnesian military initiative of the war was an

invasion of Attica, but the second was a naval expedition to Acarnania. In the very first year of the war the Peloponnesians had served notice that they were able to conduct operations outside of Attica and, more to the point, were willing to employ their naval forces to do so.

This did not occasion any surprise at Athens. Indeed, a number of Athenian military initiatives in 431 were designed to make it as difficult as possible for Sparta and its allies to wage war at sea. Immediately after the Theban attack on Plataea, the Athenians prepared to dispatch embassies to the Persians and other barbarians; ambassadors were actually sent to Corcyra, Cephallenia, Zacynthus, and Acarnania.⁴¹ According to Thucydides, the Athenians believed that if they could maintain friendly relations with these states they might be able to encircle and subdue the Peloponnesus. It was essential that Corcyra with its large fleet and strategic location not fall into enemy hands. Neither Cephallenia nor Zacynthus nor Acarnania had any substantial naval resources,⁴² but their location, individually and collectively, was strategically even more important than that of Corcyra. They were situated between Leucas and Ambracia, two major contributors to the Peloponnesian fleet, on the one hand, and Corinth, Sicyon, and Elis, also major contributors to the fleet, on the other. So long as these states remained friendly, the Athenians could count on being kept informed of any movement of enemy ships in these waters. More importantly, the two islands, Cephallenia and Zacynthus, would provide the Athenians with secure bases from which their fleet could operate to seal off the Gulf of Corinth and thereby prevent Corinthian and Sicyonian ships from joining up with Leucadian and Ambraciot ships. As events turned out, the Athenians used Naupactus for this purpose during the war, but at the outset they quite possibly saw greater security in island bases rather than Naupactus, which was within easy reach of Spartan land forces.

Athenian interest in Corcyra, Cephallenia, Zacynthus, and Acarnania in 431 suggests that they did not discount the possibility of enemy naval operations in the war, and this suggestion receives strong reinforcement from other Athenian actions in this year. Immediately after Archidamus withdrew his forces from Attica, the Athenians posted guards by land and sea. The assembly voted to establish a reserve fund of 1,000 talents and a reserve force of one hundred triremes to be used only in the event of an enemy attack by sea. The seriousness with which they regarded the possibility of such an attack is apparent from the imposition of the death penalty for anyone proposing to use either the money or the ships for any other purpose. (In fact, only after the disaster at Syracuse were the funds finally expended in 412.)⁴³ We do not know if the embassy being prepared

for Persia actually set out in this year, but we do know that steps were hurriedly taken to bring Perdiccas back into line and to convert Sitalces, a former enemy, into a friend. With equal rapidity Aegina was occupied and its population displaced, for strategic reasons, as Thucydides clearly implies, and efforts were made to insure the safety of Euboea. A fleet consisting of one hundred Athenian and fifty allied vessels was sent to ravage the Peloponnesian coast,⁴⁴ and the very size of this fleet may well indicate that the Athenians were not at all certain they could attack the enemy by sea without opposition.

Clearly, these are not the actions of a state convinced that enemy military activity would be confined to invading Attica, and this should come as no surprise. The Athenians had no way of knowing that the aid so desperately needed by Sparta and its allies would not be forthcoming, and they could not operate on the assumption that it would not. Publicly, Pericles might scoff at Sparta's ability to compete with the Athenians on the sea, but privately the possibility had to be given serious consideration. If the Spartans had hopes, the Athenians had fears. Indeed, Thucydides, in a speech that he puts into the mouth of Phormio as he awaited attack by a much larger Peloponnesian force in the summer of 429, states the case in precisely these terms: "The contest," Thucydides has him say, "is a momentous one for you—whether you are to shatter the hope which the Peloponnesians have in their fleet, or to bring closer home to the Athenians their fear about the sea."⁴⁵

If events of the first year of the war did much to alleviate Athenian fears, they did little to encourage Spartan hopes. Sparta's appeals for aid went unfulfilled, and, as the war entered its second year, the Spartans were in no better position to engage the enemy at sea than they were when the war began. Hence, they had no choice but to invade Attica a second time, and this invasion, the most ambitious of the entire Archidamian War,⁴⁶ lasted almost forty days and penetrated as far as the vicinity of Laurium. During this summer the plague made its first appearance at Athens, but, even in the face of these dual adversities, the Athenians carried the war to the enemy. A fleet of one hundred Athenian and fifty allied ships was sent to ravage the Peloponnesus, and attacks were mounted on Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, Halieis, and Prasiae.⁴⁷ Before the summer ended, however, the disastrous effects of the plague coupled with the devastation of Attica led to a reaction against Pericles and his policies. Ambassadors were dispatched to Sparta in an effort to end the war. As has often been noted, Thucydides is depressingly vague about the details of the ensuing peace negotiations.⁴⁸ All we really know is that nothing came of them, and we must conclude that the Spartans were in no mood to compromise. Surely they drew confidence from the plague and the

hardship this inflicted on the enemy, and those Spartans who believed that invasion of Attica would end the war quickly could argue that this strategy was already wearing the Athenians down.

Sparta's unwillingness to compromise on this occasion, however, must be considered in a broader context. At the same time that they were refusing Athenian peace proposals, the Spartans were preparing their first substantial naval expedition of the war. Although none of the aid they anticipated at the outset of the war had materialized, they were able in the summer of 430 to put to sea a fleet of one hundred ships under the command of Cnemus. What exactly they hoped to accomplish with this fleet we do not know. Cnemus made a half-hearted attack on Zacynthus, but sailed away without achieving anything.⁴⁹ Whether the Spartans expected a mere display of force to produce results, whether they were serving notice that they did have ships and were not afraid to employ them, or whether they had no further aim than to gain experience for their crews we cannot say. The essential point is that the dispatch of this fleet was not an isolated event. Shortly after Cnemus returned from Zacynthus an embassy left Sparta for Persia; the Spartans hoped Artaxerxes would contribute money and join the war. The ambassadors had the additional mission of persuading Sitalces to desert his Athenian ally and send a force to relieve Potidaea. Much has been made of this embassy's failure to reach its destination. Seized by Sadocus, the son of Sitalces, the ambassadors were transported to Athens where they were immediately executed without trial.⁵⁰ The importance of this embassy lies not only in its dispatch, but also in its timing, just after the outbreak of the plague at Athens. If the Spartans were soliciting aid from Artaxerxes and Sitalces, they were obviously not convinced that invasion of Attica alone would achieve victory over the enemy—not even an enemy suffering the effects of a debilitating plague.

Sometime during the winter of 430–29 the Athenians sent Phormio with twenty ships to take up station at Naupactus. This was an extraordinary measure; only on rare occasion were ships dispatched during the winter months.⁵¹ Apparently Athens anticipated enemy naval activity in these western waters, but Sparta appears to have had no such intention for the approaching campaigning season. The Spartans did resolve to reduce Plataea,⁵² but, so far as we know, they had no other plans for offensive operations, either by land or sea. That the Spartans did not even contemplate an invasion of Attica in 429 is especially significant. This third year of the war was crucial for those Spartans who believed that such invasions would end the war in three years or less. A variety of reasons for the absence of an invasion in this year have been offered. It has, for example, been suggested that the Spartans feared contracting the plague, that after two years of

devastation they could inflict little additional damage, and that they expected the Athenians, who would not come out from behind their fortification walls to defend their own fields, would now be forced to come out to aid their Plataean allies.⁵³ Although any or all of these considerations may have contributed to Sparta's decision not to invade Attica in this year, that decision all but forces us to conclude that, if they had not realized it earlier, they were now well aware that any hope they may have had of winning the war by invading Attica was illusory.

The only other offensive operation undertaken by Sparta and its allies in this year reinforces this conclusion. As the summer progressed, the allies became increasingly restless and finally prodded the Spartans to act. Just after mid-summer, the Ambraciots proposed a plan they hoped would lead to the subjugation of the whole of Acarnania and its detachment from alliance with Athens. The Corinthians were eager to undertake this operation, but the Spartans, Thucydides says, were reluctant to do so. Only after they were persuaded by Ambraciot arguments that the plan would lead not only to the occupation of Acarnania, but also the takeover of Cephallenia, Zacynthus, and, possibly, Naupactus did the Spartans agree to equip a fleet and send 1,000 hoplites.⁵⁴

The Peloponnesian plan was ambitious and led to the first naval engagement of the war. It called for a joint land and sea offensive under the command of Cnemus, the Spartan nauarch. He was dispatched to Acarnania with the hoplites and a few ships, while the allies were ordered to assemble the fleet at Leucas. As Cnemus moved inland with the army, the fleet was to cruise along the coast, harassing the inhabitants of the area so that they could not aid their countrymen in the interior. The primary objective of the army was Stratus, the largest city in Acarnania, whose conquest, Cnemus believed, would bring the whole territory over to the Peloponnesians. Unfortunately, nothing went as planned. Cnemus was not victorious at Stratus; the cavalry promised by Perdiccas arrived too late to assist in the attack; and the fleet failed to assemble at Leucas, much less harass the coastal areas.⁵⁵

The key to the failure of the mission was the presence of Phormio and his twenty ships at Naupactus. The Peloponnesians had clearly underestimated the importance of this fleet and the resolve of its commander. As Cnemus and his army moved inland, forty-seven Corinthian ships sailed through the Gulf of Corinth to join up with the fleet assembling at Leucas. The Corinthians never expected that Phormio, with his small command, would attempt to hinder their passage. So confident were they, in fact, that they had not even bothered to equip their ships for fighting at sea. But Phormio did

attack. His superior tactics and better knowledge of the winds, coupled with Peloponnesian inexperience and unpreparedness, enabled him to capture twelve enemy ships without incurring any losses. As the Corinthian ships that survived straggled on to Cyllene, news of Phormio's victory reached Sparta. As noted above, the Spartans could neither understand the defeat nor believe that inexperience had anything to do with it. They blamed the loss, rather, on *mahkia*, and in this they were absolutely sincere. The dispatch of Brasidas, Timocrates, and Lycophron to serve as advisers to Cnemus was intended to remedy this "lack of energy," and preparations to resume the offensive at sea were begun immediately.⁵⁶ This time they were more thorough, but no more effective.

The second naval engagement of 429 must rank as one of the most significant battles of the Archidamian War. While a fleet of seventy-seven Peloponnesian ships assembled at Cyllene, Phormio sent a hurried call to Athens for reinforcements. Twenty additional ships were dispatched but with orders to sail first to Crete. Until they arrived, Phormio had to make do with the twenty ships under his command. When preparations were completed, the Peloponnesian fleet anchored off Achaean Rhium, while the Athenians took up station off Molycrian Rhium. The Peloponnesians wished to provoke an engagement before Athenian reinforcements could come up, and their plan was skillful. When Phormio refused to initiate hostilities, they sailed toward Naupactus, forcing him to put to sea to defend his base. Nine Athenian ships were quickly separated from the remaining eleven and either captured or disabled, but this success made the inexperienced Peloponnesian crews over-confident. Phormio regained the initiative, recovering the lost ships and capturing six enemy triremes. After the dead were exchanged, each side set up a trophy commemorating its victory, but this would fool no one. The Athenians had overcome odds of nearly four to one, and they remained masters of the sea beyond all doubt. Even though they still greedily outnumbered the Athenians, whose reinforcements had not yet arrived, the Peloponnesians refused to offer battle. Rather, they awaited the cover of darkness before the Leucadians sailed home and the rest of the fleet proceeded to Corinth.⁵⁷

We can only imagine how Sparta reacted to Phormio's second victory, for Thucydides does not tell us. Clearly, however, neither Cnemus nor his advisers were anxious to return home on this sour note; accordingly they agreed to a proposal of the Megarians, to launch the forty ships at Nisaea and attack the Piraeus by sea. Men bearing naval equipment marched across the Isthmus, but, by the time the ships put to sea, the objective had been scaled down to an attack on Salamis. The island was ravaged, three enemy triremes were

captured, and the Athenians were thrown into a panic.⁵⁸ The operation certainly did not change the course of the war, but Cnemus, Brasidas, and Lycophron were now able to return home with something besides defeat to show for their efforts.

This attack on Salamis ended the third campaigning season of the war, but, despite Thucydides' pronouncement that no one believed that the Athenians could hold out for more than three years, the war was still far from over. The Athenians had paid dearly in men and money, but they had withstood invasion of their territory, the ravages of the plague, and the loss of Pericles. They had demonstrated, moreover, their overwhelming superiority in naval warfare. On the Peloponnesian side, most of the damage had fallen on Sparta's allies; the Spartans had not suffered severely, but they had little to show for their efforts. If in the past they had deluded themselves into believing they could compete with the Athenians on the sea, Phormio had proven otherwise, and the size of the Peloponnesian fleet had declined rather than grown as they had earlier anticipated. In short, three years of warfare had shown that Athens could not easily, if at all, be reduced by invasion, that neither the Persians nor friendly Greek states were eager to come to Sparta's aid, and that Athenian naval experience was an even more formidable obstacle than the Spartans imagined.

THESE LESSONS WERE NOT LOST ON THE SPARTANS, and before the next campaigning season began they adopted a policy to widen the war, particularly its naval side. In the spring of 428 the Spartans once again invaded Attica, but even as they did so they were encouraging revolt at Mytilene on the island of Lesbos. We do not know when they decided to become involved in affairs there, but the decision to do so must have been made not long after the attack on Salamis late in 429. Since the revolt entailed time-consuming preparations, such as sending abroad for grain and building ships and walls, the revolt must have been contemplated for some time before it actually broke out in June 428. The Lesbians would scarcely have gone ahead with these preparations without some assurance from Sparta.⁵⁹

Encouraging revolt at Mytilene was a bold and daring measure. In view of the humiliation at sea in the previous summer, it was not something to be undertaken lightly. Lesbos was, after all, an ally of Athens, an island located far away from the Peloponnesus and in waters long regarded as an Athenian lake. The issue of supporting revolt there seems to have been a divisive one at Sparta, and interest in the project vacillated from lukewarm to enthusiastic throughout the summer of 428. In June, a Spartan ambassador brought encouraging news to the rebels, but, when Lesbian ambassadors arrived at Sparta

in July, no immediate pledge of assistance was forthcoming. They were ordered to present their case at Olympia when members of the Peloponnesian League would be assembled there for the celebration of the games in August. When the Peloponnesian allies voted to assist the Lesbians, the Spartans eagerly embraced the vote.⁶⁰ This was an opportunity they could not afford to pass up, because if all went well, an important ally would be detached from the Athenian empire and the first addition to the Peloponnesian fleet since the war began would be made.

For the second time in two years the Spartans prepared for a combined land and sea offensive against the enemy. This time the objective was not some remote corner of the Greek world, but Athens itself. The allies present at Olympia were directed to prepare two-thirds of their forces and assemble at the Isthmus as quickly as possible. The Spartans arrived first and began constructing machines to haul ships across the Isthmus, but their allies gathered slowly. Spartan indecisive-ness in firmly committing aid to the Lesbians earlier in the summer had cost precious time; by now the campaigning season was drawing to a close, and crops had to be harvested. As a result, many allies did not join the expedition, and those who did were treated to an unexpected show of strength by the Athenians. Acting on advice from the Lesbians, the Spartans had assumed that Athens, weakened by the plague and with one fleet of thirty ships on station at Lesbos and another of the same size cruising the Peloponnesus, would offer little opposition unless it recalled the fleets. Without resorting to this expedient, however, the Athenians hastily put one hundred additional ships to sea. Confronted with this display of force, the mission was dismissed as impractical and hastily called off. No longer threatened by invasion the Athenians were able to deal directly with the Lesbian rebels. A force of 1,000 hoplites serving as rowers arrived at the scene, and by the onset of winter Mytilene was encircled, cut off by land and sea.⁶¹

If Spartan ardor was at all cooled by these setbacks, there is no evidence in Thucydides; on the contrary, the Spartans were still determined to capitalize on events at Mytilene. It was imperative that the rebels not capitulate before the next campaigning season began, and they were encouraged to hold out. During the winter, probably toward the end of February, Salaethus was sent to take charge of things at Lesbos. Evading the Athenians, he brought news that, come spring, Attica would be invaded and a fleet would be sent to relieve the blockade.⁶² For the third time in three years the Spartans had plans for simultaneous land and sea operations against the enemy; indeed, the year 427 marks the high point of Peloponnesian naval activity in the Archidamian War.

The invasion of Attica and the naval expedition to Mytilene, though separated by many miles, was conceived as a joint operation. The fleet, under the command of Alcidas, was dispatched first, and the invasion followed. It was hoped that the land attack would deter the Athenians from sending a fleet to intercept the force heading for Lesbos. Initially all went as planned. While the army ravaged Attica at will, the fleet managed to avoid detection by the Athenians. Yet the crossing was not as expeditious as it might have been. Precious time was wasted, and, when he arrived at Myconos, Alcidas learned that Mytilene had fallen. This turn of events jeopardized the entire operation. The original plan had called for the army to remain in Attica until the fleet reached its destination, but, when no news came from Mytilene and its food supply was exhausted, the army was forced to withdraw.⁶³ For the third time in three years a land and sea campaign had ended in failure.

Much of the blame for this failure must be placed squarely on the shoulders of Alcidas. Thucydides pictures him as a thoroughly unimaginative Spartan who allowed one opportunity after another to slip through his fingers. He had wasted valuable time crossing over from the Peloponnesus, and, on learning that Mytilene had already succumbed, he declined to attack the city and take the Athenians by surprise. Moreover, he also refused to seize a city on the mainland of Asia Minor for use as a base for promoting other revolts from Athens, and the cruelty he displayed in putting to death potentially friendly Teians did nothing to aid Sparta's cause among the eastern Greeks.⁶⁴ In fairness to the man, however, we do not know precisely what his orders were, and his mission was not easy under any circumstances. Presumably, he was to lift the siege of Mytilene, as promised; and, had he arrived in time, he might, with assistance from the Lesbian fleet, have had some chance of success. Without such assistance he faced a difficult task; the fleet he commanded was no larger than the Athenian force maintaining the blockade,⁶⁵ and in view of Peloponnesian naval setbacks of the previous summer this could hardly inspire confidence. We do not know what, if any, contingency orders he may have had, but his decision to return to the Peloponnesus without once engaging the enemy did not, so far as we know, give rise to displeasure at Sparta.⁶⁶

Sparta's inability to exploit the revolt at Mytilene must be regarded as one of its most serious failures in the entire Archidamian War. The appearance of a Peloponnesian fleet in Ionian waters was totally unexpected. It generated fear and anger at Athens and generated momentary hope among Greek states disenchanted with Athenian domination.⁶⁷ Yet there were no long-range gains, only long-range losses. Alcidas may have picked up some contributions to the

Peloponnesian war effort,⁶⁸ but otherwise Sparta and its allies had little to show for their activities. The revolt was crushed, the Lesbian navy taken over by the Athenians, and cleruchs sent to the island.⁶⁹ Athens' ability to suppress the revolt while withstanding an invasion of its territory, coupled with Sparta's inability to provide any meaningful assistance to the rebels, provided a lesson that could hardly be lost on the Greeks in the east. Even though anti-Athenian feeling seems to have been high among them,⁷⁰ the possibility of other revolts had been lessened. Indeed, not for another fifteen years did Peloponnesian ships once again ply Ionian waters.

Assistance from the eastern Greeks was now unlikely, but the Spartans quickly seized another opportunity to augment their naval forces. No sooner did the Spartans learn that Mytilene had capitulated when they began, this time with no hesitation, laying plans for further use of Alcidas' fleet. The prize they sought was Corcyra with its large naval reserves. The series of events leading up to Sparta's involvement at Corcyra had begun long before. In 433 the Corinthians had taken some 1,000 prisoners in their victory over the Corcyreans at Sybota. Most were slaves and immediately sold, but 250 of these prisoners, among them the most influential men in the city, were removed to Corinth, where they were treated with consideration. The Corinthians hoped that, when repatriated, they would work to bring Corcyra over to the Peloponnesian cause. We do not know how long they were in Corinthian custody, but, when they returned home, they began working against the Athenians.⁷¹ By the summer of 427 there was growing sentiment at Corcyra in favor of closer ties with the Peloponnesians. There was also opposition, of course, and in the end an impossible compromise was struck. The Corcyrean assembly voted to continue the defensive alliance with Athens but, at the same time, to renew their former friendship with the Peloponnesians. A bitter and hotly contested civil war erupted, the excesses of which led Thucydides to one of his most famous digressions, and the Spartans hastened to take advantage of the situation.⁷²

On the return voyage from Ionia, Alcidas apparently did not even stop in Laconia, but sailed straight for Cyllene. On arriving, he found thirteen Leucadian and Ambraciot ships ready to join his fleet and Brasidas waiting to assume the role of adviser for a new mission.⁷³ The Spartan plan called for the fleet of fifty-three ships to move on to Corcyra before reinforcements could be summoned from Athens to assist the small fleet of twelve ships stationed at Naupactus. The Peloponnesians reached Corcyra before Athenian reinforcements arrived, but found the twelve ships from Naupactus, commanded by Nicostratus, already anchored in the harbor. Although there was much confusion in the city, the presence of the Athenians had shifted the

initiative from the supporters of Sparta to the supporters of Athens.⁷⁴ As a result, Nicostratus could count on some assistance from the Corcyrean fleet, and Alcidas was now faced with the prospect of engaging a sizable enemy naval force.

As the Peloponnesian fleet approached, the Corcyreans hastily manned sixty ships, but so volatile were the issues separating the two factions that the fleet sailed out in total disarray. Two ships immediately surrendered to the Peloponnesians, while on others crewmen expended as much energy fighting among themselves as against the enemy. Aware of this, Alcidas prepared to send twenty ships against the Corcyreans, while reserving thirty-three triremes for battle against the Athenians. The Corcyreans offered little resistance; thirteen of their ships were captured. But, when the Athenians sank one Peloponnesian ship, Alcidas reassembled his fleet, and the Corcyrean and Athenian ships retreated into the harbor. The battle was over and the city itself ripe for attack. Once again, however, Alcidas proved to be an irresolute commander. The Peloponnesians retired to Sybota. On the following day, they ravaged the territory around Leucimne, but again refused to attack the city directly or engage thirty Corcyrean ships that put to sea. By noon they had decided to withdraw, and, after receiving a signal toward nightfall that sixty Athenian ships were approaching, their single-minded goal became a safe return. By sailing close to shore at night and hauling their ships across the isthmus at Leucas, they managed to avoid the Athenians and make it back to the Peloponnesus.⁷⁵

The year 427, it bears repeating, marks the high point of Peloponnesian naval activity in the Archidamian War. Although their fleet had sailed from Asia Minor to Corcyra and could boast a minor victory over the disorganized Corcyreans, Sparta and its allies had not shown they could compete with the Athenians at sea. Indeed, events of this year had demonstrated the very opposite. They had steadfastly shied away from any confrontation with the Athenian fleet, and, although it is easy to blame Alcidas, his reluctance to engage the Athenians may reflect his wisdom as much as his incompetence. On the one occasion when he did so, it must be remembered, one of his thirty-three ships was sunk by a force of only twelve Athenian ships. Evidently, Athenian experience was still a decisive factor. Moreover, the number of ships Sparta and its allies were able to put to sea had declined by nearly one-half, fifty-three in 427 as opposed to one hundred in 430. Yet, for our purposes, the important consideration is that they twice put to sea in this year, and in each instance with the expectation that success would significantly add to the Peloponnesian fleet. By contrast, their only activity on land was an invasion of Attica for the primary purpose of distracting the Athenians while the fleet

crossed the Aegean. Clearly, these are not the actions of a state convinced it could win the war by invading Attica.⁷⁶

It is likely that Archidamus passed away sometime during the winter of 427–26. On his death Pleistoanax was recalled, but it does not follow, as has sometimes been argued, that Sparta was now inclined to come to terms with Athens. As Donald Kagan has noted, there is no evidence of any peace initiatives,⁷⁷ and, as the new campaigning season opened, the Spartans certainly had plans, though not very decisive ones, for continuing the war. Even though the plague had once again broken out at Athens during the winter, at the beginning of spring, Peloponnesian forces assembled at the Isthmus for an invasion of Attica. As they were assembling, earthquakes occurred, and they decided to turn back. It is difficult to believe that the Spartans really expected another invasion of Attica to resolve the war,⁷⁸ but we know of no other plans for offensive operations. In contrast to the previous year, the Peloponnesian navy was inactive; not a single Peloponnesian ship was dispatched anywhere in 426. It was only the persuasion of their friends and allies—the Trachinians and Dorians in one instance and the Aetolians and later the Ambra-ciots in the other—that finally moved the Spartans to action. It is more than mere coincidence that in each case their decision was heavily influenced by naval concerns and considerations.

Early in the summer of 426, the Spartans, acting on the appeal from the Trachinians and the Dorians of Doris, proceeded to establish a colony at Heracleia Trachinia.⁷⁹ They wished to aid both states in their struggle against the Oetaeans, but other considerations were involved. The Spartans were fully cognizant of the advantages of the site, particularly with respect to naval operations. They recognized it as well suited for equipping a fleet and attacking Euboea and for conducting expeditions along the coast toward Thrace. Sparta's seriousness in the venture is evident from the size of the colony and the inclusion of Spartan citizens, as well as *penokoi*, among the original settlers. Thucydides assures us that the Spartans clearly anticipated that the colony would be used as a base for naval operations against the enemy. In this connection it may be significant that Alcidas, who had practical naval experience, was one of the three *oikistai* sent out with the colony and that shortly after the colony was founded dockyards were constructed there. Although Heracleia proved useful as a stopping place for Peloponnesian land forces on their way to Thrace later in the war,⁸⁰ it seems never to have been used as a base for naval operations. This has led some scholars to question Thucydides' report of Sparta's original intent,⁸¹ but, if the founding of Heracleia is considered in connection with the only offensive operation undertaken against the Athenians in this year, his report

gains credibility.

In the spring of 426 Demosthenes had set out from Athens with a fleet of thirty ships, cruised the Peloponnesus, and, after ravaging the territory around Leucas, sailed on to Naupactus. There he was persuaded by the Messenians to attack Aetolia. The campaign accomplished nothing, but in retaliation the Aetolians appealed to the Corinthians and Spartans to launch an attack on Naupactus.⁸² Toward autumn a force of 3,000 allied hoplites, including 600 from the newly established colony at Heracleia, marched into the area. They achieved some success on the outskirts of Naupactus, but, thanks to the resourcefulness of Demosthenes, they were not able to take the city. Apparently, the Spartan commander, Eurylochus, did not wish to return home without success of some sort, and he was persuaded by the Ambraciots to attack Amphilocian Argos in an effort to secure control of all of Amphilocia and Acarnania as well. The campaign continued into the winter, when the Peloponnesian force suffered a staggering defeat and Eurylochus was killed.⁸³

The connection between this campaign and Spartan efforts to conduct war at sea is more intimate than initially meets the eye. In a very real sense Naupactus was the Spartan Aegina—the eyesore of the Gulf of Corinth.⁸⁴ Its importance as an Athenian naval base was clearly demonstrated initially in 429, when Phormio, with a mere handful of ships, was able to prevent the Peloponnesian fleet from assembling at Leucas according to plan; its importance was reaffirmed in 427, when Spartan efforts to capitalize on events at Corcyra were thwarted by an Athenian fleet based at Naupactus. Hence, it is not surprising that in 426 the Spartans attempted to take the city. The operation takes on added significance, however, in view of the civil war at Corcyra, which was still far from resolved. The Spartans had not yet abandoned hopes of exploiting the Corcyrean struggle to their own advantage.

After the withdrawal of the Athenian fleet from Corcyra in 427, Sparta's supporters had managed to escape from the city and move to the mainland opposite the island, where they seized territory belonging to Corcyra. They began plundering their homeland so effectively that famine soon resulted. The exiles appealed to both Corinth and Sparta for assistance, but, when no help came, they hired mercenaries and procured vessels, returned to Corcyra, and captured and fortified Mt. Is tone. From their fortifications they dominated the countryside and conducted raids against the city.⁸⁵ All of this was known to the Spartans when they attacked Naupactus in the autumn of 426. Thucydides does not say so, but it is difficult to believe that this attack was not part of a larger scheme designed to bring Corcyra once and for all under Peloponnesian control. We know that the Spartans

had such plans ready to be set in motion a few months later when the next campaigning season began. Although they had failed to take Naupactus, and the Athenians had a fleet stationed there, sixty Peloponnesian ships were ready to sail to Corcyra early in the spring of 425.⁸⁶ The two operations dovetail together too neatly to be anything but individual parts of a single plan.

The invasion of Attica in the spring of 425 must be seen as part of the same plan. The Spartans could hardly have expected this invasion to alter the course of the war, when four previous invasions had failed to do so. Further damage could, of course, be inflicted upon the enemy, but the Athenians had long since demonstrated their ability to endure such destruction. Nor is it insignificant that this invasion was launched earlier in the season than any other during the war.⁸⁷ Time was of the essence, for during the winter of 426–25 the Athenians had voted to dispatch a fleet to Sicily. A few ships were sent out immediately; the remainder were to be sent in the spring of 425. The Spartans were undoubtedly anxious to secure control of Corcyra before the rest of the fleet should be sent out and while only twenty ships were on station at Naupactus.⁸⁸ In short, this invasion is most easily explicable as a diversionary strike, much like the invasion of 427, when the Spartans hoped to divert Athenian attention from the fleet sailing to Lesbos. Now, if all went well, the land attack would occupy the Athenians sufficiently to allow the Peloponnesian fleet to gain control of Corcyra, where, Thucydides assures us, they expected quick results.⁸⁹

The fleet under the command of Thrasymelidas reached its destination, but we hear nothing of its success or failure; in any case, it did not remain there long enough to accomplish much. While it was at Corcyra and even as the Peloponnesian army ravaged Attica, the Athenians dispatched the rest of the fleet destined for Sicily—forty ships under the command of Eurymedon and Sophocles—with orders to put in first at Corcyra. Demosthenes accompanied the fleet in a private capacity and had been given authorization to use the fleet as he saw fit during the Peloponnesian portion of its journey. Over the objections of Eurymedon and Sophocles, he decided to occupy Pylos, an event that was to alter dramatically the course of the war. To meet this threat, the Spartan army hastily withdrew from Attica, and the fleet was recalled from Corcyra, as the Spartans were determined to oust the Athenians from their territory.⁹⁰

The details of the battle that followed are well known and need not be treated here.⁹¹ The Peloponnesian fleet was defeated, and Spartan troops were trapped on the island of Sphacteria, which the Athenians then blockaded. To relieve this desperate situation the Spartans asked for a truce. Part of the price demanded by the Athenians was that all

ships that had taken part in the battle and all other warships in Laconia be surrendered for the duration of the truce. Sixty vessels were turned over to the Athenians, who were to retain them until Sparta's ambassadors returned from Athens.⁹² Although the Spartans offered to desert their allies and grant favorable terms, they found the Athenians unwilling to compromise, and no settlement could be reached. On the expiration of the truce, the Athenians accused the Spartans of violating its terms, and refused to return any of the sixty Peloponnesian ships in their keeping.⁹³ Without these vessels, the Spartans could not rescue the men trapped on Sphacteria, and, when they were not starved into submission quickly enough to suit the Athenians, Cleon was dispatched with a force to take the island by storm. The 292 survivors, including 120 Spartiates, surrendered and were taken to Athens as prisoners.⁹⁴

It has long been recognized that events at Pylos forced the Spartans to change their strategy. So long as the Athenians held these Spartans prisoner and threatened them with death should Attica again be invaded, this tactic would have to be abandoned.⁹⁵ Yet the other, and equally important, consequence of the events at Pylos has received scant attention. When the Athenians refused to return the sixty Peloponnesian warships, Sparta and its allies were left without naval forces, and they could no longer conduct operations, however futilely, on the sea. In a single stroke, the Spartans were deprived of both tactics they had thus far employed in the war.

To trace the course of events in the closing years of the Archidamian War is unnecessary here. After Pylos, Spartan opinion was generally inclined toward peace;⁹⁶ only Athenian intransigence perpetuated the war. The Spartan war effort was half-hearted at best. The dispatch of Brasidas to continue the land war in Thrace, it is well to remember, seems to have been motivated as much by a desire to remove helots from the city as to inflict damage upon the enemy. Apart from Brasidas himself, moreover, not a single Spartan citizen took part in the venture, and even his success in capturing Amphipolis did not revive Spartan enthusiasm for all-out war.⁹⁷ Other, similarly desultory measures suggest that some Spartans were still looking for ways to continue the war at sea. Efforts to reach some accord with the Persians were stepped up, but, plagued by indecisiveness, once again came to naught.⁹⁸ It may also be significant that in the winter of 425–24 the Athenians suspected the Chians of planning revolt and that one of Brasidas' first acts after the capture of Amphipolis was to begin the construction of triremes there.⁹⁹ Such activities suggest, but do not prove, that the Spartans were intent upon continuing naval warfare against the Athenians. The capture of the Spartan troops and the loss of the Peloponnesian fleet at Pylos provides, nevertheless, a more

logical *terminus* than the Peace of Nicias.

THE DISASTER AT PYLOS OCCURRED in the seventh campaigning season of the war. In these seven years, the Spartans invaded Attica five times; two other invasions were planned but did not take place. Numbers alone do not, however, tell the whole story; we must also take into account the aim of each invasion. Of the two that were planned and then aborted, one had nothing to do with a strategy of winning the war by invading Attica. It was designed solely to divert Athenian attention from events at Lesbos. Similarly, of the five invasions that actually took place, that of 427 was intended to distract the Athenians while the Peloponnesian fleet sailed to Mytilene, and that of 425, which lasted but fifteen days,¹⁰⁰ was probably undertaken to keep them occupied while the fleet was enroute to Corcyra. Of five invasions of Attica, only three—those in 431, 430, and 428—were primarily intended to force the Athenians to sue for peace. By way of contrast, in this same seven year period the Spartans employed their land forces in a lengthy attack on Plataea and two land campaigns in Acarnania, where they hoped to conquer Naupactus and thereby curtail Athenian naval activity in the Gulf of Corinth. More to the point, the Spartans sent out a fleet no fewer than six times in these seven years: to Zacynthus in 430; twice engaging the Athenians in the Gulf of Corinth in 429; to Lesbos and then to Corcyra in 427; and to Corcyra in 425. In addition, during the winter of 431–30, a Corinthian fleet sailed to Acarnania. Admittedly, these naval expeditions were notoriously unsuccessful on the whole and resulted in only three battles with the Athenians. Yet, Peloponnesian operations on land were hardly distinguished and seem to have been conducted with no greater vigor than the war at sea. The Spartans ravaged Attica when no opposition was offered, but quickly withdrew from Salamis when the Athenians appeared; and both campaigns in Acarnania ended in failure. Arnold W. Gomme has succinctly summarized Sparta's efforts to this point in the war as "a series of miserable failures and but one success, the inglorious victory over Plataia!"¹⁰¹

If the arguments presented here are valid, we must conclude that in seven years of warfare the Spartans spent less than 120 days ravaging Attica¹⁰² with the single aim of forcing the Athenians into submission. To put it another way, they spent less than 120 days in seven years pursuing the strategy Thucydides tells us they expected would win the war. In this same period, however, they expended at least as much effort putting ships to sea and conducting land operations outside Attica. Indeed, they may well have spent more time reducing Plataea than in invading Attica.¹⁰³

These figures offer little or no support for Thucydides' proposition that they expected to win the war quickly by invading Attica and, by

extension, little or no support for modern arguments based upon that proposition. When Thucydides tells us that no one in Greece believed the Athenians could withstand more than three years of Spartan invasion of its territory or that the Spartans expected such invasions to end the war in a few years, he is making the most general of general statements. He did not, of course, know what everyone in Greece believed, nor was he privy, as his own lament testifies,¹⁰⁴ to the thinking of all Spartans. Such generalizations undoubtedly capture the essence of what the Greeks believed or the Spartans expected at any given moment, but they cannot be taken as literally true and universally applicable.¹⁰⁵ Above all, they cannot be accorded greater weight than the factual information Thucydides himself provides, and this information strongly suggests that Spartan strategy was considerably more complex than he realized.

Many of the ideas expressed here were originally given in a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association of Ancient Historians, held in Seattle, May 1–4, 1979.¹ I have profited much from the formal commentary delivered on that occasion by Professor Raphael Sealey. I am also grateful to Professor Richard C. Nelson for drawing the map.

¹ Thucydides 5.14.3, 7.28.3. In addition to these two passages, also see Thucydides 1.81.1–2, 4.85.2, where invasion of Attica is alluded to in Thucydidean speeches.

² Thucydides 2.7.2.

³ Brunt, "Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War," *Phoenix*, 19 (1965): 255–80. I do not cite specific portions of Brunt's article here.

⁴ Thucydides 5.14.3.

⁵ For Samos, see Thucydides 1.40.5, 1.41.2; both references are in a speech of the Corinthians. For Potidaea, see Thucydides 1.58.1. On the date of the Samian revolt, see Charles W. Fornara, "On the Chronology of the Samian War," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 99 (1979): 7–19.

⁶ See, for example, Donald Kagan, *The Archidamian War* (Ithaca, 1974), 18–20; Geoffrey E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, 1972), 210; and Paul A. Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History* (London, 1979), 234–35. The discussion of Spartan strategy in each of these works is based on Brunt's article.

⁷ Cawkwell, "Thucydides' Judgment of Periclean Strategy," *Yale Classical Studies*, 24 (1976): 53–69.

⁸ Thucydides 3.26.1.

⁹ Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford, 1972), 152–75.

¹⁰ For these events, see Thucydides 1.113.1–1.115.1; and Diodorus 16.6.1–2. Also see Ste. Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 196–200.

¹¹ For full accounts of the war, see Donald Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, 1969), 77–130; and Edouard Will, *Le Monde grec et l'orient* (Paris, 1972), 149–70. On Sparta's role in the war, see Ste. Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 181–200; and A. J. Holladay, "Sparta's Role in the First

Peloponnesian *Miar*,” *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 97 (1977): 54–63. Holladay has argued that the Spartans were cautious in going to war against a state whose strength differed so radically from their own.

12 On these naval battles, see Thucydides 1.105.1–2; and Diodorus 11.70.2.

13 Thucydides 1.107.2–1.108.3. Thucydides does not say specifically here that Peloponnesian forces moved into Phocis by sea, but Ste. Croix has forcefully argued that they did; *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 190–95. T. T. B. Ryder has offered a translation of Thucydides 1.107.3 that has the Athenians moving a fleet into the Gulf of Corinth to confine the Spartans in central Greece; Ryder, “Thucydides and Athenian Strategy in the Early 450’s: A Consensus of Mistranslations,” *Greece and Rome*, 25 (1978): 121–24.

14 On Tolmides’ circumnavigation, see Thucydides 1.108.5; and Diodorus 11.11.84. On the settlement of the Messenians at Naupactus, see Thucydides 1.103.3; and Diodorus 11.84.7–8. For further discussion of the events treated in this paragraph, also see Norbert Brockmeyer, “Athens maritime Strategie gegenüber dem Peloponnesischen Bund von Themistokles bis Perikles,” *Der altsprachliche Unterricht*, 14 (1971): 37–63.

15 On Pericles, see Thucydides 1.111.2–3; Diodorus 11.85.1–2, 11.88.1–2; and Plutarch *Pericles* 19.2–3. For the occupation of Troezen, see Thucydides 1.115.1. For the submission of Aegina, see Thucydides 1.108.4; and, on the role of Aegina in the First Peloponnesian War, see Thomas J. Figueira, “Aeginetan Membership in the Peloponnesian League,” *Classical Philology*, 76 (1981): 1–24, esp. 19–23.

16 Thucydides 2.7.1–2. For this and all other direct quotations from Thucydides, I have relied on the translation of Charles F. Smith, *Thucydides*, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1919).

17 Arnold W. Gomme, in commenting on this passage, has called five hundred ships “an impossible number”; Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 5 vols. (Oxford, 1945–80), 2: 7. Gomme’s view is shared by most scholars. Diodorus says that the Spartans persuaded their allies in Sicily and Italy to come to their aid with two hundred triremes; Diodorus 12.41.1.

18 Thucydides 2.9.3. Kagan has set the size of the Peloponnesian fleet at “about 100”; *Archidamian War*, 21. Others have placed it a bit higher, at 150 ships; see, for example, B. W. Henderson, *The Great War between Athens and Sparta* (London, 1925), 83. Nicholas G. L. Hammond has credited Sparta and its allies with a fleet of 300 ships; Hammond, *A History of Greece* (2d edn., Oxford, 1967), 311–12. But, on this figure, see the observations of Ste. Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 67 n. 12. I have more fully examined the naval strength of Sparta and its allies elsewhere; see my “Peloponnesian Naval Strength and Sparta’s Plans for Waging War against Athens in 431 B.C.,” in *Studies in Honor of Tom B. Jones: Alter Orient und Altes Testament*, no. 203 (1979): 245–55, where additional bibliography can be found.

19 On the number of ships contributed by each state, see Thucydides 1.46.1; and, on the number lost, see Thucydides 1.54.2. Only one state, Anactorium, is listed as contributing to the Corinthian fleet in 433 but not to the Peloponnesian fleet in 431, and its contribution was but a single trireme. Note, however, that Nicholas G. L. Hammond has argued that some of the 120 ships that survived the battle were disabled beyond seaworthiness; Hammond, “Naval Operations off Corcyra,” in his *Studies in Greek History* (Oxford, 1973), 466–68. On the number of Megarian ships, see Thucydides 1.46.1, 2.93.2.

20 Thucydides remarks that the Spartans preyed on merchant shipping along the Peloponnesian coast, so they must have had some ships of their own;

Thucydides 2.67.4. Later in the war, these three states, along with Megara, were ordered to build a combined total of ten ships; Thucydides 8.3.2.

21 On the Peloponnesian fleet in 430, see Thucydides 2.66.1, 2.93.2. The latter passage proves that the fleet did not at that time include the ships in drydock at Nisaea. For especially useful comments on the latter passage, see Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 2: 237–39.

22 On the size of the fleet in 435, see Thucydides 1.27.2; on the losses suffered at Leucimne, see Thucydides 1.29.5; and, on the size of the fleet in 433, see Thucydides 1.46.1. Only fifteen Corinthian ships survived the battle at Leucimne, but in 433 the Corinthians had ninety ships. Although Thucydides speaks of feverish building activity specifically only at Corinth, the Ambraciot contingent went from eight ships in 435 to twenty-seven in 433. Ronald P. Legon has properly labeled this rapid growth in Peloponnesian naval strength as “among the most significant military developments of the fifth century”; Legon, “The Megarian Decree and the Balance of Greek Naval Power,” *Classical Philology*, 68 (1973): 169.

23 Thucydides says that the Athenians “did not wish to give up Corcyra, which had so large a fleet, to the Corinthians, but hoped to wear them out upon one another as much as possible, in order that the Corinthians as well as other naval powers might be found weaker in case they had to go to war with them”; Thucydides (Loeb edn.) 1.44.2–5. Also see Ste. Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 75. In addition to understanding the military importance of sea power, the Athenians appreciated its political uses as well; Edward N. Luttwak, *The Political Uses of Sea Power* (Baltimore, 1979), 71–72.

24 Thucydides 1.67.2, 2.27.1.

25 Thucydides 3.2.1, 3.13.1. On the date of the Lesbian overtures, see the discussion in Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 2: 252.

26 Thucydides 1.67.4. Thucydides also states here that Perdiccas kept sending envoys to Sparta in an effort to bring about a war between Athens and Sparta. Later in the war, Perdiccas financed Spartan operations in the north; Thucydides 4.83.6. Also see Thucydides 4.80.1. For confirmation of Athenian concern for Macedonian timber, see *IG*, I², 71. The dating of the inscription is insecure, but the date must fall somewhere between 437 and 422 B.C.; Hermann Bengtson, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* (Munich, 1962), Nr. 186. Richard J. Hoffman has argued that the treaty recorded on the stone dates from the summer of 431; Hoffman, “Perdikkas and the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War,” *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*, 16 (1975): 359–77.

27 Thucydides 1.55.1, 3.70.1. On the size of the Corcyrean fleet, see Thucydides 1.25.4.

28 Thucydides says that Artaxerxes’ envoy, Megabazus, believed the king’s money was being spent in vain, although Diodorus says it was not accepted by the Spartans; Thucydides 1.109.1–2; and Diodorus 11.74.5–6. And, for a discussion of this issue, see David M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden, 1977), 62–63. On the interest of the Persian King in Greek affairs, see Alfred T. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago, 1948), 346–48; and Samuel K. Eddy, “The Cold War between Athens and Persia, ca. 448–412 B.C.,” *Classical Philology*, 68 (1973): 253–54.

29 On the western allies of Sparta, see Thucydides 3.86.2. The possibility of Spartan aid from the western Greeks is frequently discounted; see, for example, Brunt, “Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War,” 262. But, as H. D. Westlake has pointed out, the Athenians certainly could not discount this

possibility; Westlake, "Athenian Aims in Sicily, 427–424 B.C.," in his *Essays on Greek Historians and Greek History* (Manchester, 1969), 113–16. Also see Kagan, *Archidamian War*, 183–84.

30 Diodorus says the Spartans persuaded their allies in Italy and Sicily to come to their aid with 200 triremes; Diodorus 12.41.1. Also see note 17, above. If this number were added to the number of ships already available to the Spartans, Thucydides' figure of 500 becomes more reasonable.

31 Thucydides 1.140.3, 2.8.4.

32 Brunt, "Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War," 259–61. Also see Eduard Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums* (Stuttgart and Basel, 1956), 4, 26–28.

33 For the evidence, see Luigi Pareti, "Ricerche sulle potenze marittime degli Spartani e sulla cronologia dei navarchi," *M entone dell' Accademia delle Scienze di Torino*, 2d ser., 59 (1908–09): 71–159, reprinted in *Studi minori di storia antica*, 2 (Rome, 1961): esp. 1–14. Werner Peek has published an inscription recording a treaty between Sparta and the otherwise unknown Erxadieis of Aetolia; Peek, "Ein neuer spartanischer Staatsvertrag," *Abhandlungen der sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaft zu Leipzig, Philologische-historische Klasse*, 65 (1975): 1–15. The treaty is a clear indication of Sparta's willingness to enter an alliance with a state lying beyond the Peloponnesus. In one of the provisions of the treaty, the Erxadieis agreed to follow the Spartans "wheresoever they shall lead by land and by sea" (κα[τὰ γὰν κ]αὶ ὅθ' ἄλλαν), but this may be merely formulaic; see Arnaldo Momigliano, "Terra manque," *Journal of Roman Studies*, 32 (1942): 62–64. Peek's date for the inscription is the early decades of the fifth century ("500–470?"). This date is accepted by Fritz Gschnitzer, but Paul A. Cartledge has suggested a date in the 420s; Gschnitzer, *Ein neuer spartanischer Staatsvertrag und die Verfassung des peloponnesischen Bundes* (Meissenheim a./G., 1978), 34; and Cartledge, "A New 5th Century Spartan Treaty," *Liverpool Classical Monthly*, 1 (1976): 87–92. This lower dating would fit well with the arguments advanced here, but it is too uncertain to be pressed.

34 Sealey, "Die spartanische Nauarchie," *Klio*, 58 (1976): 335–58.

35 Thucydides 2.85.1–2. On the meaning of *malakia*, see Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 2: 220. That the Spartans were sincere in this belief is clear from their hurried dispatch of three advisers—Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron—to provide the energy and vigor that was lacking under Cnemus.

36 For the Corinthian speech, see Thucydides 1.120–24; for Pericles' speech, see Thucydides 1.140–44; and, for Archidamus's speech, see Thucydides 1.80–85. For a fuller discussion of the naval implications of these speeches, see my "Peloponnesian Naval Strength," 249–50. And, for an examination of their importance for understanding Spartan strategy, see Cawkwell, "Thucydides' Judgment of Periclean Strategy," 65–68; and Ian Moxon, "Thucydides' Account of Spartan Strategy and Policy in the Archidamian War," *Rivista Storica dell' Antichità*, 8 (1978): 7–26. I am less convinced than most that the speeches provide us with valid evidence for assessing Spartan plans in 431; and, in the case of Archidamus in particular, I think it highly unlikely that such a speech was ever delivered by the Spartan king. It bears noting, however, that the sentiments expressed in the speech are clearly not those of a pacifist, as Archidamus is sometimes made to appear. Elie Bar-Hen has pointed out that, although Archidamus does express a willingness to arbitrate, he does not speak against war with Athens—only against a declaration of war before adequate preparations had been made; Bar-Hen, "Le Parti de la paix à Sparte à la veille de la guerre du Péloponnèse," *Ancient Society*, 8 (1977): 21–31.

37 Thucydides has Archidamus express his expectation in a speech, and he twice relates the same information in his narrative; Thucydides 2.11.6–7 and 2.18.5, 2.20.1–3. In both narrative passages Thucydides employs the term λέγεται (“it is said”), and he may not, therefore, have been absolutely sure of the accuracy of the report; on this point, see H. D. Westlake, “ΑΕΓΕΝΑΙ in Thucydides,” *Mnemosyne*, 30 (1977): 352–54. Also see Jacqueline de Romilly, “Les Intentions d’Archidamos et le livre II de Thucydide,” *Revue des études anciennes*, 64 (1962): 287–99.

38 For the invasion, see Thucydides 2.18–23. According to Thucydides, the first place the Peloponnesian forces attacked in Attica was Oeonoë, a fortress on the Boeotian-Athenian border, and, when they retreated, they withdrew via Boeotia; Thucydides 2.18.1–3, 2.23.3. On the basis of these passages, W. P. Wallace has argued that Archidamus must have transported his army across the Gulf of Corinth by sea and returned to the Peloponnesus the same way; Wallace, “The Spartan Invasion of Attica in 431 B.C.,” in Mary E. White, ed., *Studies in Honor of Gilbert Norwood* (Toronto, 1952), 80–84.

39 To assume that the Spartans learned nothing from this series of events is to underestimate seriously Spartan intelligence. C. A. Powell has argued that Spartan foreign and military policy toward Athens was more profound and intelligently applied than is commonly recognized; Powell, “Athens’ Difficulty, Sparta’s Opportunities: Causation and the Peloponnesian War,” *L’Antiquité classique*, 49 (1980): 87–114.

40 On the Athenian fleet, see Thucydides 2.23.2–3, 2.25.1–5. On the expulsion of Euarchus, see Thucydides 2.31.1; and, on Corinthian participation in his restoration, see Thucydides 2.33.1–3.

41 Thucydides 2.7.1, 2.7.3.

42 Cephallenia, however, may have been viewed as a potential trouble spot by the Athenians. Although the Cephallenians had not aided the Corinthians in 433, four ships from Cephallenia were part of the Corinthian fleet that sailed against Corcyra in 435; Thucydides 1.47.2.

43 On the establishment of the reserve, see Thucydides 2.24.1–2; and, on the expenditure of the fund, see Thucydides 8.15.1.

44 On Athenian activities with respect to Perdiccas, see Thucydides 2.29.4–7; with respect to Aegina, see Thucydides 2.27.1–2; and Diodorus 12.44.2–3; with respect to Euboea, see Thucydides 2.26.1, 2.32.1; and, with respect to the Peloponnesian coast, see Thucydides 2.17.4, 2.23.2–3, 2.25.1. It is worth noting that the fleet dispatched in the following year also consisted of one hundred Athenian and fifty allied vessels; Thucydides 2.56.1–2. The size of these fleets accords well with Pericles’ boast to the Athenians that the enemy would not be able to acquire naval experience, because every time the Peloponnesian fleet sailed it would be confronted by many ships; Thucydides 1.142.7–8.

45 Thucydides (Loeb edn.) 2.89.10.

46 Thucydides 2.47.2, 2.55.1–2.

47 Thucydides 2.56.1–6.

48 Thucydides 2.59.1–2. Diodorus adds nothing significant; Diodorus 12.45.5. Donald Kagan has discussed the matter fully and, on the basis of Aristophanes *Acharnians* 646–54, has concluded that the return of Aegina to the Aeginetans was one of Sparta’s conditions; *Archidamian War*, 81–84.

49 Thucydides 2.66.1–2.

50 Thucydides 2.67.1–4; and Herodotus 7.137. This was, as Lewis has pointed

out, a well-planned mission, including three Spartans, a Corinthian, a Tegean, and an Argive; Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 64. Thucydides seems to imply that there had been earlier contact between the Spartans and Persians, for, upon their arrival in Asia Minor, these ambassadors were to be escorted to the king by Pharnaces.

51 Thucydides 2.69.1. But Diodorus does not mention the winter sailing; Diodorus 12.47.1. Lionel Casson has listed only four instances reported by Thucydides and noted that in each case the circumstances were exceptional; Casson, *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World* (Princeton, 1973), 270 n. 3. To this list, add Thucydides 2.33.1; see note 40, above.

52 Thucydides 2.71.1; and Diodorus 12.47.1–3.

53 Kagan has discussed Spartan motives and suggested that the attack was forced on the Spartans by their Theban allies; *Archidamian War*, 102–03.

54 Thucydides 2.80.1–7. Noteworthy is the secret agreement of Perdiccas to aid the Spartans; Thucydides 2.80.7.

55 For the land campaign, see Thucydides 2.81–82. Diodorus adds little of value; Diodorus 12.47.4–5. Also see R. L. Beaumont, “Corinth, Ambracia, Apollonia,” *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 72 (1952): 62–73; and Nicholas G. L. Hammond, “Military Operations in Amphilochoia,” in his *Studies in Greek History*, 471–85. Beaumont has provided valuable observations on the topography of the area and a summary of military activity during the Archidamian War.

56 For these events, see Thucydides 2.83–85.

57 Thucydides 2.86–92; and Diodorus 12.48.1–3. The battle has been much discussed, and Gomme’s commentary on these passages of Thucydides remains invaluable; *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 2: 222–37. Also see August Köster, *Studien zur Geschichte des antiken Seewesens* (Leipzig, 1934), 81–96; and William L. Rodgers, *Greek and Roman Naval Warfare* (Annapolis, 1937), 129–36. Kagan has analyzed the significance of Phormio’s victory; *Archidamian War*, 115.

58 Thucydides 2.93–94; and Diodorus 12.49.1–4.

59 On the events themselves, see Thucydides 3.1–2. On the chronology, see Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 2: 237, 252. According to Gomme’s chronology, the attack on Salamis occurred about November 429, and Spartan involvement at Mytilene was certainly known there before the revolt broke out the following June. On the unlikelihood of the Lesbians revolting without promises of assistance from Sparta, see Thucydides 3.2.1; Thucydides tells us they wanted to rebel before the war but did not because the Spartans refused to ally with them. For the dispatch of an adviser to Mytilene before the outbreak of the revolt, see Thucydides 3.5.4.

60 On the events themselves, see Thucydides 3.8–15. On the chronology, see Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 2: 259. Kagan has argued that the Spartans were eventually won over by the speech of the Lesbians, but, even if such a speech had been delivered, it hardly contains anything the Spartans did not already know. See Kagan, *Archidamian War*, 139–41; and Thucydides 3.9–14.

61 For Sparta’s military operations, see Thucydides 3.15–16; and Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 2: 270–78. On the encirclement of Mytilene, see Thucydides 3.18.3–5.

62 Thucydides 3.25.1–2.

63 On the invasion of Attica, see Thucydides 3.26.1–4. On the fleet crossing the Aegean, see Thucydides 3.29.1–2.

64 For a description of Alcidas’ behavior in the east, see Thucydides 3.29–33. For a discussion of his character, see H. D. Westlake, *Individuals in Thucydides*

⁶⁵ The Athenians originally dispatched a fleet of forty ships under the command of Cleippides and two others, and this force was later reinforced when Paches was dispatched with 1,000 hoplites serving as rowers, presumably on five triremes; Thucydides 3.3.2, 3.18.3. For what it may be worth, Diodorus says the fleet commanded by Cleippides, whom he mistakenly calls Cleinippides, collected reinforcements from the allies before it arrived in Lesbos; and he gives the size of Alcidas' fleet as forty-five ships; Diodorus 12.55.3, 12.55.6. Thucydides gives the number of ships in Alcidas' fleet as forty in three places, although he does say forty-two at one point; Thucydides 3.16.3, 3.29.1, 3.69.1, but 3.26.1. For a discussion on the size of Alcidas' fleet, see Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 2: 288.

⁶⁶ Westlake has suggested that the appointment of Brasidas to serve as adviser to Alcidas on his return from Ionia is a reflection of Spartan disapproval of his performance; Thucydides 3.69.1; and Wesdake, *Individuah in Thucydides*, 145. This is certainly possible; but Alcidas had been in the east for some time, and the decision to send the fleet to Corcyra had apparently been made in his absence; Thucydides 3.69.2. He would have had to have been brought up to date, and the appointment of Brasidas may have been made for this reason. If Alcidas had fallen into disfavor at Sparta, it is unlikely that he would have been one of three *oikistai* sent out to the colony of Heracleia Trachinia, which was founded in the following year; Thucydides 3.92.5.

⁶⁷ On anti-Athenian feeling in the east, see Thucydides 3.31.1.

⁶⁸ Thucydides 3.50.1–3. The evidence for contributions to the war effort comes from a Spartan inscription; Russell Meiggs and David M. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford, 1969), Nr. 67. But the dating is not absolutely certain. Frank E. Adcock has argued for the year 427, but other dates, including 396–95 B.C., have been suggested; Adcock, “Alcidas ἀργυρολόγος,” in *Mélanges Gustave Glotz*, 1 (Paris, 1932): 1–6; and Meiggs and Lewis, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 183–84.

⁶⁹ Thucydides 3.50.1–3.

⁷⁰ Thucydides 3.31.1; and Meiggs and Lewis, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, Nr. 67. Line 9 of the inscription specifically mentions Chians friendly to Sparta. There was also trouble at Notium; Thucydides 3.34.1–4.

⁷¹ Thucydides 1.55.1, 3.70.1; Diodorus 12.57.1–2; and Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 2: 359–60.

⁷² Thucydides 3.70.3–6.

⁷³ Thucydides 3.69.1–2. The decision to attempt to capitalize on events at Corcyra seems to have been made while Alcidas was in the east with the fleet; see note 65, above.

⁷⁴ Thucydides 3.69.2, 3.75.1–5.

⁷⁵ On the battle and its aftermath, see Thucydides 3.76–81.

⁷⁶ It may be worth noting that, toward the end of this summer of Peloponnesian naval activity, the Athenians first dispatched a fleet to Sicily to prevent the importation of grain into the Peloponnesus and to test whether they could bring the affairs of Sicily under their control; Thucydides 3.86.4. Timothy E. Wick has argued that the main aim of the mission was to end the flow of grain to Megara through Pegae, but, as Westlake has pointed out, the Athenians seemed to have differed over the precise aims of the mission, and they could not completely discount the possibility of Sparta receiving aid from the west; Wick, “Megara,

Athens, and the West in the Archidamian War,” *Histona*, 28 (1979): 1–14; and Westlake, “Athenian Aims in Sicily, 427–424 B.C.,” 104, 110–13. Besides, as Georg Busolt long ago recognized, Syracuse was in a better position to aid the Spartans in 427 than it had been at the outbreak of the war; Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, 3 (Gotha, 1903): 1055.

77 On the recall of Pleistoanax, see Kagan, *Archidamian War*, 193–95. Kagan here has argued forcefully against the use of Aristophanes *Acharnions* 646–54 as proof of Spartan peace initiatives in this year. Nowhere does Thucydides note or comment upon the death of Archidamus, but he did not lead the invasion of Attica in the spring of 427. Spartan forces on that occasion were commanded by Cleomenes, and the aborted invasion of 426 was led by Agis; Thucydides 3.26.2, 3.89.1.

78 Thucydides 3.89.1; and Diodorus 12.59.1–2. Gomme has suggested that one reason plans for the invasion were abandoned is that the Spartans lacked enthusiasm for it; Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 2: 395. But Thucydides leaves no doubt that the earthquake was severe, and it may well have led the Spartans to change their plans.

79 On the foundation of Heracleia, see Thucydides 3.92.1–6; and Diodorus 12.59.3–5. The number of inhabitants—10,000—given by Diodorus is unrealistic, but Thucydides implies that it was sizeable. Gomme has regarded the founding of the colony as proof that the Spartans were beginning to understand that their original strategy of invading Attica would not win the war and that other means would have to be found, a position that Kagan has adopted as well; Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 2: 394–99; and Kagan, *Archidamian War*, 195–97.

80 Thucydides 4.78.1, 5.12.1.

81 Antony Andrewes and Donald Kagan have both seen the establishment of the colony as an indication of Sparta’s plans to expand the land war; Andrewes, “Spartan Imperialism?” in P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker, eds., *Imperialism in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, 1978), 95–99; and Kagan, *Archidamian War*, 196. Interestingly, Livy reports that in 191 B.C. the area around Heracleia was thickly wooded with tall trees; Livy 36.22.

82 On Demosthenes’ campaign in Aetolia, see Thucydides 3.94–98; and Diodorus 12.60.1; and, on the Aetolian appeals to Corinth and Sparta, see Thucydides 3.100.1.

83 For a description of the Peloponnesian campaign, see Thucydides 3.100.2–3.102.7, 3.105–14. Also see Diodorus 12.60.2–6; and Hammond, “Military Operations in Amphilochia,” 476–84.

84 It is worth noting in this connection that in 401 B.C. the Spartans drove the Messenians from Naupactus and settled friendly Locrians there; Diodorus 14.34.2–3.

85 Thucydides 3.85.2–4.

86 Thucydides 4.2.3, 4.3.1, 4.8.2.

87 This is the only invasion of the war that took place in the spring “before the grain was ripe” (

Ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ ἔρος, πρὶν τὸν σῖτον ἐν ἀκμῇ εἶναι); Thucydides 4.2.1, 4.6.1. All other invasions came “in summer” (τὸ θέρος); Thucydides 2.19.2, 2.47.2, 3.1.1, 3.26.1, 3.89.1. The invasion of 431 came “when the grain was ripe” (καὶ τοῦ σῖτου ἀκμαζόντος), and that of 428 “when the grain was ripening” (ἄμα τῷ σίτῳ ἀκμαζόντι); Thucydides 2.19.2, 3.1.1.

88 For the Athenian decision to send forty additional ships to Sicily, with a few to be dispatched immediately and the remainder to follow later, see Thucydides 3.115.3–5. The rest did leave in the spring; Thucydides 4.2.2. On the twenty vessels stationed at Naupactus, see Thucydides 3.114.2.

89 Thucydides 4.2.3. George Grote long ago observed that this invasion did not carry the same hope for the Spartans as their earlier efforts had, but he did not go beyond that observation; Grote, *History of Greece*, 6 (New York, 1899): 313. Busolt, however, correctly recognized that this invasion, like that of 427, was a diversionary strike; *Griechische Geschichte*, 1086.

90 Thucydides 4.2.2–4.6.1.

91 For a description of the battle, see Thucydides 4.13–14. The battle at Pylos has been much discussed, most recently by John B. Wilson in his *Pylos 425 B.C.: A Historical and Topographical Study of Thucydides' Account of the Campaign* (Warminster, 1979). I have profited much from H. D. Westlake's study of the battle, which points out the shortcomings in Thucydides' account; Westlake, "The Naval Battle at Pylos and Its Consequences," *Classical Quarterly*, 24 (1974): 211–26.

92 Thucydides 4.16.1–3. But, as Westlake has remarked, the Spartan position was not nearly so desperate as a casual reading of Thucydides might suggest; "The Naval Battle at Pylos and Its Consequences," 217–24.

93 Thucydides 4.17.1–4.23.1.

94 Thucydides 4.28–39.

95 Thucydides 4.41.1. On the importance of the "hostages" for Spartan strategy, see, among others, Kagan, *Archidamian War*, 148; and Cawkwell, "Thucydides' Judgment of Periclean Strategy," 57.

96 Thucydides graphically captures Spartan despondency; Thucydides 4.55.1–4. Also see Westlake, "The Naval Battle at Pylos and Its Consequences," 222–24.

97 Thucydides 4.80.1–2, 4.108.7.

98 Thucydides 4.50.1–2. Gomme has suggested that Spartan indecision resulted from a reluctance to sign away the independence of the Asiatic Greeks in return for Persian aid, but Kagan has claimed that it may have arisen from factional politics at Sparta; Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 3: 499; and Kagan, *Archidamian War*, 257–58.

99 On Amphipolis, see Thucydides 4.108.6; and, on Chios, see Thucydides 4.51.1. Exiles from Mytilene stepped up their efforts to harass the Athenians in Lesbos and the cities of Aeolis in the summer of 424, but Thucydides makes no connection between their activities and encouragement from Sparta; Thucydides 4.52.1–4. He does mention that Samian exiles were supplying pilots for Peloponnesian ships, but the time reference is somewhat vague; Thucydides 4.75.1.

100 Thucydides 4.6.2.

101 Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 3: 459. R. T. Ridley has pointed out that Athenian armies generally did fairly well in the field, even against the Spartans; Ridley, "The Hoplite as Citizen: Athenian Military Institutions in Their Social Context," *L'Antiquité classique*, 48 (1979): 508–48.

102 The figure of 120 days is an absolute maximum. Thucydides tells us that the invasion of 430 was the longest of the war, lasting for "almost 40 days"; Thucydides 2.57.2. He gives no precise figures for the invasions of 431 or 428, but, since each must have lasted less than 40 days, a total of 100 days for the three invasions might be closer to reality. In this connection, the well-known

remark that, before the occupation of Decelea, Spartan invasion of Attica caused only slight damage should be noted; *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 12.5. For a full discussion of this matter, see William G. Hardy, "The *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* and the Devastation of Attica," *Classical Philology*, 21 (1926): 346–55.

103 Archidamus led an army to Plataea in the summer (presumably May) of 429; Thucydides 2.71.1. After its arrival, some time was spent in negotiations, but, when these broke down, the Spartans began building mounds from which to attack the city's fortifications. According to Thucydides, the mound-building lasted seventy days. Gomme and others have dismissed this figure as unlikely; see, for example, Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 2: 207. It may well be too high, but, in any case, while part of the Peloponnesian army was discharged sometime during the summer of 429, not until the city had been surrounded by a wall "about the time of the rising of Arcturus"—that is, mid-September—was the main army finally withdrawn; Thucydides 2.78.1–2. Guards were left behind to continue the siege throughout the winter, and not until the following summer did the inhabitants finally surrender; Thucydides 3.20–24, 3.52–68.

104 Thucydides 5.68.2. Also see Westlake, "The Naval Battle at Pylos and Its Consequences," 211–26.

105 Anyone so inclined will have no difficulty locating similar general statements in Thucydides, along with proof of their general reliability and evidence against their universality. I cite just one example here: In 421, Thucydides tells us that "the Lacedaemonians . . . favoured peace because the war was turning out contrary to their expectations"; Thucydides (Loeb edn.) 5.14.3. The accuracy of the general statement needs no further proof than the conclusion of the Peace of Nicias shortly thereafter. Yet we know, from no less an authority than Thucydides himself, that two of the five ephors elected to office for the following year not only opposed the Peace of Nicias but actively sought to disrupt it; Thucydides 5.36.1. For a discussion of the activities of these ephors, see my "Cleobulus, Xenares, and Thucydides* Account of the Demolition of Panactum," *Historia*, 21 (1972): 159–69.

Wylie Graham

For one who claims to have checked the evidence “with as much thoroughness as possible” (1,22), Thucydides seems to have given us strangely distorted portraits of leading military figures in the Peloponnesian War — Brasidas, Demosthenes, Pericles, Nicias, Cleon. Thus, Demosthenes and Brasidas were both bold, aggressive, enterprising generals; in my view, Demosthenes was the better of the two — more innovative, less reckless (Diod. 12, 43, 2). Yet one of his greatest successes, the victory at Pylos in 425, is played down (4, 39, 3) as due mainly to *tyche*, while those of Brasidas are lauded almost without exception. Again, in Thucydides’ narrative the figure of Pericles towers over all others, though as a field commander he is shown as no more than cautious and competent – about on a par with Nicias, in his time a successful and innovative (e.g. 3,51) general, who is dismissed as a failure, albeit a noble one. Even Pericles’ general strategy (2,13), the soundness of which is taken by Thucydides as axiomatic, can be questioned as over-cautious¹. And despite Thucydides’ hostile portrait of Cleon – admittedly a novice in military matters – he did not do too badly at Pylos or in Thrace; until his own error, rather than Brasidas’ superior battle tactics, led to his rout and death at Amphipolis.

It may be that this seeming distortion was an integral part of the overall scenario of the war as Thucydides saw it, and essential to the conclusions which he thought should be drawn from it by posterity². The purpose of this paper, however, is not to examine his views on *how* history should be written, nor his techniques, but specifically to appraise his account of Brasidas’ military career and of the operations in which he was a protagonist. Did Thucydides here keep strictly to the truth, or did he, at times, become the “artful reporter” that Hunter has dubbed him³? Brasidas was described by the late Viscount Montgomery (*ibid.* 70) as “the last of the great Spartan hoplite generals in the old tradition”. Was he any more than that? Was he even “great”?

The Thucydidean Brasidas, romanticized as a war-hero, has fired the imagination of modern historians, rather at the expense of his Athenian contemporaries. One writer even extols him in verse as “the knight *sans peur et sans reproche*”⁴. Another⁵ hails him as a “greater than Leonidas”: “Brasidas ... excelled [all Spartans], if not other Greek generals ... in grasp of military principles, in energy, enterprise,

leadership, in military genius". He was an able general, no doubt better than Leonidas, though perhaps not quite meriting this encomium. Nor were his dealings in Thrace always *sans reproche*. Whether his restless, un-Spartan activity always pleased a home government mainly concerned with conserving Spartiate manpower is another matter.

The Young Brasidas

Brasidas' military career was short and spectacular — less than 9 years in total duration. He first came into prominence in his late twenties when a raiding Athenian fleet attacked Methone (Messenia) in summer 431 (2, 25, 2). Direct assault on a fortified town was unusual in those days, for Greek siegecraft was primitive and attackers could incur heavy losses. But here the fortifications were weak and the defenders few. Brasidas, then probably a company commander (*lochagos*), was in the vicinity with a small force, and at once went to their relief. He burst through the besiegers' lines — which were probably thin, for part of the Athenian force was scattered over the countryside looting — and threw himself into the town with 100 hoplites. The besiegers, evidently deciding that the siege was hopeless against a now reinforced garrison, drew off and departed. Brasidas received official congratulation at Sparta for this prompt action, the first person in the war to be thus honoured. The following year he became an eponymous ephor.

In the next few years he was involved in several unsuccessful naval operations, though never, it should be said, holding an independent command. In 429 he was one of a commission of three sent to "advise" the Peloponnesian admiral Cnemus after his disastrous defeat in the Corinthian Gulf off Rhium by a much smaller Athenian fleet under Phormio (2, 85f). The victorious Athenian fleet was still in the Gulf, and Brasidas and the others advised battle, but the Peloponnesians were again routed, though now outnumbering their opponents by nearly four to one⁶. Brasidas is next recorded as taking part in a naval expedition in 428 to attack Piraeus, then unguarded (2, 93), an ingenious scheme suggested by the Megarians, which according to Thucydides might well have succeeded but for an inexplicable panic among the attackers which led them to turn aside and raid Salamis, whence they were promptly dislodged by Athenian forces.

In August 427 Brasidas, again as "adviser", joined the admiral Alcidas as he lay before Corcyra with 53 ships, preparing to crush a democratic revolt there while the main Athenian fleet was out of the way (3, 69; 3, 76–79). Alcidas attacked the large Corcyrean fleet

which came out to meet him, and threw it into confusion, but was prevented from following up his advantage by the 12 Athenian ships present. These by superior manoeuvring stood off the Peloponnesians until sunset, enabling most of the Corcyrean ships to escape. Thucydides, however, describes the action as a Peloponnesian “victory”. Alcidas (contrary, it is said, to Brasidas’ advice) failed to attack the town, which was in turmoil, and at the approach of a larger Athenian fleet he hastily made off.

Brasidas appears again briefly (4, 11–12) in June 425, in the Spartan seaward assault on the Athenian fortifications at Pylos (SW. Peloponnesus). He was commanding one of several triremes trying to force a landing on difficult and rocky ground, with enemy troops lining the shore. While the other ships hung back, he hurled his ship on to the rocks and stood ready to leap ashore – only to collapse on the gangway with multiple wounds. The assault failed.

What have we learned of Brasidas’ generalship, then, in the first six years of his career? He had two daredevil exploits to his credit, plus unspecified services to two admirals as military adviser. He had shown courage and initiative — yet so far, officialdom had not seen fit to entrust him with an independent command. Why not? A clue may be provided by comparing his death or glory exhortation to his followers (4, 11) with the canny appreciation of the situation shown in Demosthenes’ speech to *his* troops before the same action (4,10). Perhaps Brasidas was a little too much the daredevil. We may note that he was- badly wounded at Pylos and killed at Amphipolis – in each case while leading a charge (cf. Diodorus 12, 43, 2; 12, 74, 2).

The very depression into which Sparta had fallen after the Pylos disaster, however, perforce gave Brasidas the chance he wanted. Pylos and Cythera were lost, Athenian fleets were raiding Laconian coasts almost at will, Mesenians sent from Naupactus were waging guerrilla warfare from Pylos, a revolution among the helots was feared (4, 41). When the Macedonian king Perdiccas invited the Spartans to send an army under Brasidas to help Chalcidian towns which were ripe for revolt from Athens (4, 80, 1), they welcomed the chance to hit back, perhaps also to get rid of this restless young soldier, together with some 700 of the troublesome helots⁷. But while Brasidas was still recruiting in the Corinth-Sicyon area, a new emergency arose.

The Siege of Megara

In August 424, democratic leaders in Megara had offered their help to the Athenian generals Hippocrates and Demosthenes in seizing the city, a useful preliminary to an Athenian campaign secretly projected against Boeotia (4, 66, 3). The Athenians were able to break into and

occupy the Long Walls running between Megara and its seaport Nisaea, and the Peloponnesian garrison in Nisaea then surrendered; but the conspirators were unable to deliver over the city, though it was thrown into confusion. At this point Brasidas, who had heard Megara was in danger and acted at once, appeared before the city with an army, but the citizens refused to admit him, as well they might. Sparta had done nothing in the past to protect them from the regular Athenian invasions. Brasidas was undeterred, though doubtless he would have liked to plant a garrison inside, to discourage peace negotiations. Instead, he moved his main army to a position closer to the city and drew them up in battle formation. The Athenians formed up their forces outside the Long Walls, but made no immediate move to take up the challenge.

Brasidas' move was an astute one (4, 73, 1) — if a gamble. If the Athenian generals wanted to begin siege operations, they had first to drive off or destroy him and his relief army. That meant a pitched battle, in which both armies might suffer severely, for they were almost evenly matched — Brasidas with c. 6000 and the Athenians with something over 5000. If anything, the odds might have favoured the Athenians. Their horsemen had bested the Boeotians, they had light-armed troops which Brasidas probably had not, and all or most of their hoplites were Athenians, under a unified command; whereas Brasidas' troops were a mixed bag, many probably without battle experience. Brasidas may have reasoned, however, that he was not risking any Spartan lives, while the Athenians could lose heavily in manpower⁸. At any rate, his gambit was refused. The Athenian generals, no doubt impatient to get on with the invasion of Boeotia, broke the deadlock by retiring to Nisaea. This was hailed as a “victory” for Brasidas — though it was no more than a draw, both sides retaining their winnings. The only permanent result was the setting up of an oligarchy in Megara.

Brasidas at Large

To Brasidas, however, the Megara episode had been merely a wayside venture. It was still summer when he set off for Thrace, his real objective. He was now a free agent, with a small but independent force of 1700 hoplites: free to follow his star — free to hit the enemy when and where he chose, to negotiate and form alliances as he saw fit, in a remote region where interference from Sparta was unlikely — or could be ignored. It is primarily from the events of the next three years that his aims and generalship are to be assessed.

But first he had to march through Thessaly, a region friendly to Athens and not fond of uninvited visitors, especially those with

armies. There was one bad moment, when he was challenged at the river Enipeus by a Thessalian force presumably (4, 78, 4) larger than his own. He craftily let the friends escorting him, some of them Thessa-lians, do the talking, only adding mildly that he came in friendship, and would go no further without their permission – but he did not explain his unauthorized entry with an army into their country, an action which, as he well knew, would not have been tolerated by any Hellenic state, and might have led to immediate hostilities in a more highly organized one, such as Sparta! He thought, however, that it would not be right for them to stop him. As 1700 hoplites, armed to the teeth, seemed to be of the same opinion, the challengers temporarily withdrew; and Brasidas, pushing on at top speed, was able to join Perdiccas and the Chalcidians in Macedonia without further incident.

Here we have a further example of the bluff, based on cool calculation of risks, that had worked at Megara. There is also more than a hint of the distinctive Brasidean mix of soft soap, impudence, mendacity and old-fashioned Spartan bullying which chroniclers have dignified by the term “diplomacy” and which is seen later in full flower in his speech at Acanthus. This enabled him to win over many of the Chalci-dian cities from the Athenian alliance almost without striking a blow, and with surprisingly little fallout of ill-will.

After disabusing Perdiccas of the notion that he was acquiring a private army for the destruction of his enemies rather than to enlist allies for Sparta against Athens, Brasidas pushed on to Acanthus, a city on the neck of the Acte peninsula which was a subject-ally of Athens - probably chosen as his first target because it lay on the route to his main objective, the important Athenian colony of Amphipolis, and its alliance would close off an escape route for other cities on Acte which he intended to subdue later (4, 109).

The arrival of an army alarmed the peaceful wine-growers of Acanthus, who hastily retreated within their walls. Brasidas then appeared alone, demanding speech with their assembly. His speech as reported by Thucydides (4, 83–87) merits examination, as the most detailed example we have of the “nerve war” he used for the painless capture of cities. Its gist was as follows.

(1) We Spartans have accepted the risks of war with Athens simply to liberate Hellas. We ourselves have no territorial ambitions.

(2) We assumed that we came to allies who wanted and were awaiting us. Yet you, whom I approached first because of your importance and known intelligence, have closed your gates against me. If you persist in this unreasonable attitude, will not other cities, too, doubt my good intentions, or my ability to free you?

(3) As to my ability, was it not this same army that the Athenians,

though in superior numbers, feared to attack at Megara? (Cf. 4, 108).

(4) I assure you that I have no intention of gaining your alliance by force or treachery, of enslaving you, of interfering with your constitution, or of supporting one group of you against the rest. We Spartans, unlike false-hearted Athenians, always keep our word; and I see no reason why you should mistrust me.

(5) But if, despite what I have said, you still refuse to help me, I shall lay waste your land and try to bring you over by force. We Spartans are justified in liberating people against their will, since we are acting for the good of all.

(6) Think it over, and let me know your decision.

The decision reached, of course, was inevitable. We need not suppose that Acanthians in general took these protestations seriously, or were genuinely “swayed by Brasidas’ oratory” (4, 88, 1), even if as Thucydides assures us (4, 84, 2) he “was not at all a bad speaker for a Spartan”. He may have heartened his supporters, or convinced a few waverers — there were invariably diverse factions in a Greek city. But all saw that it was a choice between losing their livelihood with the destruction of their vines, or becoming part of a Spartan empire. Their decision was natural, if a little short-sighted.

Whether Brasidas believed his own rhetoric (which seems unlikely), he must have believed in its efficacy, for according to Thucydides he repeated the speech with variations elsewhere (4, 114; 4, 120). Indeed some cities, such as Stagirus, did not wait to be orated to before changing their allegiance (4, 88, 2). A Spartan general who took the trouble to orate at all, and appeared to be actually doing something (4, 108, 6), was an agreeable phenomenon, which might presage better things.

Brasidas set out for his next objective, Amphipolis, in stormy winter weather (Dec. 424), with snow in the air (4, 103). He began with an epic march, by day and night, from Arnae in the Chalcidice round the Strymonic Gulf to Amphipolis, fording a river *en route* and covering more than 40 miles (65 km) in under 24 hours. He forced the lightly guarded bridge over the Strymon below Amphipolis before dawn, and appeared without warning before the city walls, taking a few prisoners and throwing the citizens into a panic. Thucydides (4, 104, 2) suggests that he could have captured the city then and there if he had attacked at once.

One would think, however, that a walled city protected on two sides by steep cliffs and a river 200 yards wide⁹ and with a majority of citizens against surrender (4, 104, 4) would not be so easily stormed, and Spartans were no experts at siege work. Brasidas had obviously expected a betrayal; his allies the Argilans had already subverted some of the citizens. When — as at Megara — this did not happen, he

camped outside to await events, and left his troops to loot the countryside in the usual Spartan fashion. Meanwhile Eudes, the Athenian general at Amphipolis, had sent for help to his colleague at Thasos, one Thucydides, who by his own account at once set sail with a fleet, hoping at least to save Eion, the seaport at the mouth of the Strymon, if Amphipolis was already lost. Thasos, he tells us, was “only half a day’s sail” from Amphipolis. Nevertheless, by the time he reached Eion Amphipolis *had* surrendered, and he had barely time to organize the defence of Eion before it too was attacked by Brasidas. Brasidas, it appeared, had become alarmed at the approach of Thucydides, and hurriedly proposed generous surrender terms which the Amphipolitans had accepted.

Thucydides’ account of these events appears to be somewhat telescoped, though he nowhere specifies the actual time frame¹⁰. One commentator, Henderson¹¹, even concludes that they all took place within one short winter’s day. That is, Brasidas, after marching all night and most of the previous day, fought an action and then pitched camp, allowing his troops to disperse; but hearing later that Thucydides was approaching, hastily formulated and offered surrender terms. These were accepted by the citizens after some discussion, and he was received into the town. After that he still had time to assemble all his men again and collect some small boats for an attack on Eion. Meanwhile Thucydides, on receiving a message from Amphipolis about midday, had embarked his men and sailed for Eion, arriving there late in the day to find refugees already streaming in. Later he beat off a night attack by Brasidas.

All this sounds rather improbable. One would expect that Amphipolis, which unlike Acanthus was an Athenian colony and knew that help was at hand, would hold out for some days at least before giving up hope. Why should a smallish force under Brasidas, relatively a newcomer to Thrace, at once inspire such terror among the citizens that they would accept almost any terms to escape? He had missed his chance of a surprise entry, and the traitors had failed him. “When he had overrun the country outside... he merely settled his army in camp and kept quiet” (Thuc. 4, 104, 3). After a few days of camping in the bitter cold of a Thracian winter, he might well have given up.

Again, if Brasidas had settled down for a long siege, what led him to change his mind so abruptly and stitch up surrender terms? How did he know Thucydides was on his way? Since Amphipolis was not encircled (4, 104, 3), a messenger may have escaped on horseback or by ship down-river. He intercepted no messenger, and he could not have learned much from signal fires¹².

Also I would doubt Thucydides’ casual assertion that Thasos, 50 miles (80 km) distant by sea, could be reached from Amphipolis in

half a day. This might possibly be so in summer, sailing eastward¹³. But a winter voyage in the reverse direction, with every likelihood of stormy weather, and predominantly foul winds from the north and west, would be much more prolonged — and highly dangerous for heavily laden transports. Thucydides might have reached Eion in half a day *if he had waited for favourable weather*. But how long did he wait? I suspect that Thucydides did not want to discuss the weather at all, knowing the popular opinion of naval commanders who pleaded bad weather as an excuse for inaction — as after Arginusae.

Thucydides' own share of responsibility for the loss of Amphipolis remains unclear. Most historians agree that he does not provide enough information for firm conclusions. Ellis¹⁴ thinks this was intentional, describing his narrative as a “loaded and misleading version” whose prime purpose was self-justification. His obscuring of the time factor then may have been deliberate. He gives no reason for his banishment (5, 26, 5) — yet even a capricious and vindictive Athenian *demos* must have had *something* to go on¹⁵. What seems to emerge is that Thucydides was a dilatory, possibly a timid commander, who made a prolonged spell of bad weather an excuse for lingering at Thasos while Amphipolis waited vainly for relief. If bad weather had prevented sailing, he knew the country and could have gone on another tack — crossed to the mainland, skirted Mt Pangaeus and entered the city at the northern (Thracian) gate, or made a surprise attack on Brasidas, or cut off some of his scattered followers. He could have rustled up more troops from his Thracian allies. But a middle-aged general, probably with little campaigning experience, would be more likely to shun field encounters. (Again, we are not told how many troops he had: one would guess less than half as many as Brasidas, if he loaded them all on to seven ships)¹⁶. It may have been his inaction, if it was inaction, that prompted Cleon later to demand a mission to Thrace, to show what *he* could do — as with Nicias at Pylos.

However it came about, the capture of Amphipolis can hardly be described as a *military* success. Yet it was Brasidas' greatest achievement, both in itself and in its wider political implications. It inflicted a heavy and permanent loss on the Athenians; it pleased the home government in Sparta (though not to the extent in negotiating the hoped-for peace with Athens; and it gave fresh heart to factions in other Thracian cities who wanted to secede from Athens. Here his “oratory” and still more, his clement treatment of the citizens of Amphipolis undoubtedly played a large part (4, 108).

It was still winter when the indefatigable Brasidas marched back with his army to the Chalcidice, which he could now consider as even more fertile ground for revolt. He came first to the Acte peninsula (4,

109), where there were a number of small cities inhabited by Greek-speaking barbarians; most of these joined him, but when two, Sane and Dium, held out, he hung around in the vicinity for a time while the army laid waste their lands. Again we notice Brasidas' reluctance (or incapacity) to besiege even a small city unless he could contact a traitorous faction within. One wonders, in fact, why he bothered at all with these small fry, which would need to be continuously garrisoned against Athenian reprisals, when he was already short of men and had appealed in vain to Sparta for reinforcements. They could be of little value as allies. But his next prize was a worthwhile one – Torone, the chief city on the Sithonian peninsula, second only to Amphipolis in importance.

Thucydides (4, 110–116) devotes more space than usual to this episode, which indeed deserves recording — the taking of a fortified city with an Athenian garrison, within a few hours and almost without bloodshed, by means of a well-planned and skilfully executed surprise assault by night. Torone itself stood on a hill, but was protected against naval attack by an outer wall on the sea front. This was apparently unmanned, and traitorous elements from the city were able to admit a small party of light-armed allied troops, armed with daggers, from Brasidas' force. These stole uphill in the dark, killed the guards at the key watch-post below the city walls, and with the traitors' help broke open a gate on the (south?) side and the main gates opening into the market square. An advance force of allied peltasts who had followed them now entered through both gates and spread out, while at a prearranged fire-signal Brasidas and the main army marched up at the double into the square, all shouting to create confusion, and rousing 50 Athenian hoplites who had been sleeping in the square — and now broke and ran, most of them to the nearby fort of Lechythos. Brasidas with the army continued up the hill to cover all possible boltholes, and by dawn the whole city was in his hands. Summoning the citizens, he made another of his famous speeches (4, 114, 3–5), exhorting (or warning) them to remain loyal to their new allies and not think unkindly of their fellow-citizens who had let them in.

In the spring (April 423) Sparta and Athens agreed to an *armis tice*, with both sides retaining the territories they then held; but this was at once disrupted by a piece of skulduggery by Brasidas, who encouraged two important cities on Paliene, Scione and Mende, to continue their revolt against Athens after the peace was made (4, 119–123). Brasidas possibly felt justified in evading a truce to which he had been no party. But the hollowness of his protestations to the revolted cities appeared when, at this critical point, he vanished into Macedonia on an expedition with Perdikkas, leaving only a small part of his forces,

which in the event proved inadequate to protect them against the fury of Athens. The truth probably was that he was desperate for money to pay his soldiers. The indignant Perdiccas had already cut down his contributions and was no doubt threatening to stop them altogether; Sparta would give him none, and he could hardly ask Thracian cities to join the Spartan alliance and then demand money to defend them against Athens. But when he returned in late summer, it was already too late to save the luckless cities.

Macedonian Interlude

The Macedonian expedition, indeed, marked the beginning of Brasidas' decline. With his aid Perdiccas defeated in pitched battle his old enemy Arrhabaeus, king of the Lyncestae, an Illyrian tribe inhabiting the mountainous region of the upper Erigon, near modern Bitola (Yugoslavia). Perdiccas was impatient to go on and lay waste the country — until news arrived that a large body of Illyrian mercenaries which were to join him had gone over to the enemy. He then agreed that it would be prudent to retreat. But his camp and that of Brasidas were some distance apart; and in the morning Brasidas awoke to find that he was left to fight his way back to Lower Macedonia, with Arrhabaeus and the Illyrians already preparing to attack him. The entire Macedonian army had disappeared from the field.

Here he demonstrated his undoubted talent for instantly sizing up a situation and taking quick action (4, 125, 3). He at once formed up the hoplites in a hollow square, with the light-armed troops in the centre. Whether he had any cavalry we do not know; probably they were all Macedonians and had run off with the rest. The younger hoplites were ordered to charge out wherever attacks were made on the column, while he himself, with a rearguard of 300 picked men, would face about and beat off assaults by the enemy's main army. These were orthodox Spartan tactics. He does not seem to have envisaged using the light-armed troops (probably Chalcidians) at all, though being less encumbered they would have been better than hoplites for keeping assailants at a distance. Possibly he did not trust them; at Torone some had refused a dangerous mission (4, 110, 2). After a few words of encouragement, he gave the order for the army to move off.

All went well for a time. As Brasidas had predicted, the enemy pursued, "shouting and making a great din" (4, 127, 1), but soon became discouraged on finding all their attacks stoutly met. Most of them lost interest and ran on ahead to cut off Macedonian stragglers; the rest confined themselves to harassment. Only after the retreating

army had left the open country and approached the mountain pass (the Monastir gap?), where the road leading out of Lyncestis ran between two hills, did they again come in contact with the enemy's main body.

The enemy were waiting there. They were already occupying the two hills; and as the column toiled up the most difficult section of road, it was suddenly confronted by yelling enemies on every side. The Greeks were in a trap.

Brasidas' reaction was quick and decisive (4, 128, 1). At once identifying the weak link in the encirclement, he sent his 300 in a wild charge up the nearer hill, where they drove away the few enemy troops in possession and opened up a way of escape. The main force followed; the enemy, discouraged, drew off; and the army crossed into Lower Macedonia.

The fine fighting withdrawal which Thucydides describes, apparently with few losses, would certainly testify to Brasidas' competence as a commander of hoplites and to their confidence in his leadership. But one wonders whether that large body of Illyrians, feared by both Perdiccas and Brasidas (4, 125, 1), *really* gave up the pursuit so easily. By all accounts, the Illyrians were a formidable and warlike people, feared by all their neighbours and a nuisance even to the Romans centuries later. Were they really no more than an undisciplined pack of yelling savages, scared off by a mere show of resistance? Light-armed hillmen naturally would not close with heavy infantry, but with their greater mobility they could have inflicted many casualties with javelins, especially with the Lyncestian hoplites to fall back on. About 30 years later, the Athenian general Iphicrates, using peltasts only but with hoplites in support, annihilated a Spartan hoplite regiment which used the same defensive tactics as attributed to Brasidas (Xen. *Hell.* 4, 14–17). My guess is that the Illyrians were much more persistent and inflicted much heavier losses than Thucydides tells us, and that the Greeks did well to get out alive. Their bitterness towards the Macedonians who deserted them (4, 128, 4) might indicate as much.

No doubt Brasidas too felt some bitterness; but if so, he was foolish to gratify it by letting his men plunder as they passed through Macedonia — still more to quarrel with the king. Perdiccas may not have been responsible for the desertion (4, 125, 1); and he would certainly have been feeling sore and disappointed at the failure of his expedition and perhaps inclined, though unreasonably, to blame Brasidas. Their final break came soon afterwards. Not that Perdiccas and his army figured much in Brasidas' future plans; but his money did. So did his prevention of Spartan reinforcements from coming through Thessaly (4, 132, 2), and his decision to make peace with

Athens.

When Brasidas returned to Torone with his army (c. Feb. 422) he found his new allies immobilized. Mende had been recaptured, following an uprising against the Peloponnesian garrison, and Scione closely invested by an Athenian force under Nicias and Nicostratus¹⁷. With Potidaea, in the neck of the Paliene peninsula, strongly held and closely guarded by the Athenians and a large enemy fleet in the vicinity, he could reach Paliene neither by land nor by sea. A night attempt on Potidaea came to nothing (4, 135). By the time hostilities were resumed, probably in late summer¹⁸, a new threat had arisen.

The Last Battle

In September 422 Cleon, having prevailed on the Athenians to give him an expeditionary force and 30 ships to subdue the revolted cities, had sailed for Thrace (5, 2). With him went 1200 Athenian hoplites and 300 cavalry, with a larger force from the allies; and calling at Scione, which was still under siege, he took more hoplites from the army there. He then proceeded to Torone, which he carried by storm in simultaneous land and sea assaults. Thucydides plays down this victory, even implying (5, 3, 2) that the soldiers from the ships acted on their own initiative. It was, however, a remarkable feat, more than equalling that of Brasidas (4, 110–116), who had the help of traitors. The operation must have been skilfully planned and directed, for it seems that the Spartan commander Pasitelidas was taken quite unawares, and was outmanoeuvred. The hapless Toronean defenders, who had relied on Brasidas to protect his own headquarters, were shipped off to Athens as prisoners, and their families enslaved. Brasidas himself — for reasons unexplained — was conspicuous by his absence. Perhaps Cleon took him by surprise too.

Cleon then sailed round the Strymonic Gulf to Eion, which he made his base, capturing Galepsus, along the coast, and other towns¹⁹, but failing at Stagirus. His main objective, of course, was the recovery of Amphipolis, which commanded the coastal route from Greece to Thrace and gave access to valuable timber as well as gold and silver mines. His forces, however, were insufficient for a direct assault on the city, and he prudently postponed hostilities there until reinforcements from Perdiccas and the Thracian king Pelles should arrive. Meanwhile Brasidas had appeared and stationed himself with 1500 hoplites on Mt Cerdylum, west of the Strymon in friendly Argilan country, from which he could observe Athenian movements (and frustrate any attempt at a blockade)²⁰. The rest of his force and the allied troops joined the garrison in the city commanded by Clearidas, another Spartan. Both armies numbered c. 4000 men²¹, but

the Athenian army was of better quality according to Thucydides (5, 8, 2), while those of Brasidas included more cavalry and Chalcidian peltasts. Cleon came up from Eion and stationed his army “on a strong hill in front of Amphipolis” (5, 7, 4)²² from which, as he thought, he could watch the enemy’s movements and “retire whenever he wished without fighting”. For reconnaissance purposes, he would no doubt have been wiser to take a small force rather than risk the whole army, but we have only Thucydides’ word for it that he did not intend to fight. Thucydides’ elaborate and uncomplimentary explanation (5, 7, 3) of *why* Cleon had sought this vantage point would appear somewhat pointless. Was it so unusual for a general about to besiege a city to reconnoitre the surrounding terrain?

Seeing the Athenians moving up from Eion, Brasidas “went down from Cerdylum and entered Amphipolis” (5, 8, 1). This simple statement raises several problems. How did Brasidas cross the Strymon? Presumably by the bridge he had forced when he captured Amphipolis, which was then outside the city’s defences (4, 103, 4). Where was this bridge? Scholars have differed, but the most likely location seems to be below the city, near the site of the modern bridge²³. Why did the Athenians stand idly watching, instead of sending out cavalry or light-armed troops to harass him, or even a hoplite force to hold the bridge? Pritchett²⁴ postulates that a palisade (*stavroma*) had been built from the city walls to the river to enclose the bridge. If so, the palisade was outside the city and Brasidas now inside; why then did he later have to pass through it before charging out of a city gate (5, 10, 6)? It would be simpler to assume that the palisade, of which no trace remains, had nothing to do with protecting the bridge. Traces of a wall exist, but its date and exact course are still uncertain²⁵,

If Brasidas *was* open to attack, he may have moved his forces by night, or at dawn — a reasonable precaution, since an army is most vulnerable on the march. If the Athenians saw him on the move, it would have been too late to intercept him; they might also have been slow to act, with Cleon absent on reconnaissance (5, 10, 2). Thucydides is silent on this point, possibly because he was anxious to exonerate Brasidas from the suspicion of fearing a pitched battle (5, 8, 2). His explanation of Brasidas’ tactics in the battle (5, 8, 3) also seems rather laboured. Like any good commander, Brasidas was an opportunist. Like any good commander, he preferred to take his enemy by surprise rather than to attack him in a position of strength. He simply awaited his opportunity. And presently it came (5, 10).

Before the action began, the Athenians had been drawn up in battle order, apparently on the road facing the city, where they could watch for any activity within and be ready to repel attackers — a game of

bluff, as at Megara. But when scouts reported to Cleon, who had gone further north, probably to reconnoitre the eastern approaches or the defences of the city, that an enemy attack through the Thracian gates seemed imminent, he decided on an immediate withdrawal to Eion. Since these gates were well north of his position, he no doubt thought he had time to retire (5, 10, 3). And it was here, in Anderson's view²⁶, that he made a fatal error, issuing his orders simultaneously by trumpet signal and by verbal messages to the various taxiarchs, which naturally took some time to pass on. This threw the whole line into confusion, some men moving on hearing the trumpet and others standing fast. The left wing, furthest south, turned into left column at once and moved off, while the right hesitated. The impatient Cleon now compounded his error by ordering all the rest of the line into left column ready to march off, thus exposing the whole army to attack on their unshielded right sides without leaving a standing part to protect them. But the city gates remained closed, the city walls unmanned. It was not until nearly half the army had passed the southernmost gate that Brasidas sprang his trap.

The Athenian troops were perhaps marching at ease, and starting to relax, when the southern gate swung open and Brasidas himself rushed out at the head of 150 picked men and charged at the double downhill to the road — probably only a few hundred yards (metres) distant. They would have had barely a minute to prepare before the enemy group struck the centre of the column like a projectile. Simultaneously the rest of the enemy army under Clearchidas poured through the northern gate and attacked the Athenian right wing, throwing the whole line into confusion. The leading left wing bolted down the road towards Eion. The right wing, who may not have completed their evolution into column, put up more resistance. Some of them rallied higher up the hill and held out for a time, but were finally surrounded and massacred by the Chalcidian cavalry and peltasts. Others got away over the mountains and, if not mopped up later, found their way back to Eion. In all, the Athenians lost 600 hoplites, about one-seventh of their total strength. Brasidas was fatally wounded early in the conflict, and Cleon too was killed — we need not accept Thucydides' sneer (5, 10, 9).

Cleon's lack of field experience in commanding hoplites must be held largely responsible for the disaster to his army; though Anderson²⁷ thinks his manoeuvre might have succeeded if it had been carried out more quickly and he had programmed his senior officers beforehand. Nevertheless this, the only occasion when Brasidas was supreme commander in a major battle, was probably his greatest victory — a well-planned and well-executed surprise attack. One wonders whether he might have trapped even more Athenians, and

incidentally saved his own life, if he had split his forces more evenly instead of handing over practically the whole army to his junior colleague and placing himself at the head of a small suicide group²⁸. As it was, the entire Athenian left wing escaped almost unscathed.

Brasidas the General

What strikes us most forcibly in reviewing Brasidas' military career is not so much his gifts – which were considerable, and almost unique among Spartans – as his limitations. He was an inspiring leader who, like Caesar, could call forth supreme efforts from his men – as in the winter march from the Chalcidice to Amphipolis, and in his final heroic charge on the Athenian column. But he did not seem at home in commanding troops other than hoplites; even with them, his tactics were conventional Spartan tactics. We know of only two major battles in which he was general, and have no details of the one in Lyncestis. At Amphipolis, it is at least arguable that he delayed his attack too long; and highly probable that if he had been opposed by a more experienced general, such as Demosthenes, he would merely have got himself killed without winning a victory. We look in vain for examples of his effective use of other arms such as cavalry or peltasts. He never captured a city without the help of traitors. He probably knew little of naval tactics; few Spartans did. His special talent seems to have been for smaller operations — night onfalls, surprises and the like — which called for cunning, speed, and daredevil courage. If he had learned to use light-armed troops, he might have become a great guerrilla leader, like Sertorius.

In fairness, it must be said that Brasidas was always handicapped by his slender reserves of men and money. Unlike the Athenians with their vast resources and their command of the sea, he had to avoid prolonged campaigns and sieges, and especially pitched battles. As against this, his attractive personality and undoubted gift for conciliating captive populations — always recognizing the need to allow the coerced to save face – and his reputation for keeping his word, often enabled him to achieve his ends peacefully. He enjoyed widespread popularity among the Greek cities in the north, and after his death was raised to the status of “founder-hero” in Amphipolis with extraordinary honours (Thuc. 5, 11).

Not the least of Brasidas' successes in human relationships was his welding of a large body of helots into an effective and disciplined fighting force, which remained loyal while far from home and were later enfranchised for their services (Diod. 12, 76, 1) – probably the first *neodamodeis*²⁹.

However, his relations with the Spartan government were always

somewhat ambivalent. There were deep divisions within the administration. Although some members agreed with the aggressive attitudes of Corinth and Thebes, a conservative majority headed by king Archidamas were able to confine the war to little more than yearly invasions of Attica for several years – no scope for a Brasidas. When he was at last granted an independent command after the Pylos disaster, the government risked nothing but one general and a few hundred expendable helots; if he wanted more troops, he had to find and pay them himself. His successes in Thrace, especially the capture of Amphipolis, must have earned him some goodwill, but the help sent to him was scanty and belated — Sparta, lacking the allied contributions available to Athens, was chronically short of money as well as manpower. He probably forfeited much of this goodwill by defying the Spartan commissioner Aristonymus, sent up to arrange an armistice with Athens, over the revolts in Scione and Mende (Thuc. 4, 122–123); even more so by quarrelling with Perdiccas and so cutting off funds to himself and access of Spartan armies to the north through Thessaly. The despatch by Sparta of Ischagoras and others shortly afterwards to “inspect the state of affairs” in Thrace (Thuc. 4, 132, 3; cf. 5, 21) was certainly no indication of confidence; nor was the inclusion of “very young men” to take over as governors of cities rather than Brasidas’ nominees. “Sparta the liberator”, a policy inspired by Corinth, may have been good propaganda; but Sparta’s real motive in going to war had been fear of Athens rather than imperial ambition (Thuc. 1, 23). After Brasidas’ victories, a durable peace with Athens under more favourable terms seemed possible, and was not to be imperilled by a general obsessed with winning military glory (Thuc. 5, 16). No wider war aims were wanted or envisaged.

The lack of a larger strategic vision, indeed, would seem to be where Brasidas himself fell short of real greatness. What he was trying to do in Thrace remains obscure. No underlying plan is evident. Was he simply fishing in troubled waters — carrying on a general vendetta against Athens? Or did he dream of a new empire ruled by Sparta — or himself? Whatever his aims, they were not shared by the Spartan authorities, who must have been relieved at his timely death (Thuc. 5, 16), and were happy to erect a handsome and well-deserved cenotaph in his memory (Pausanias 3, 14, 1) – after concluding the Peace of Nicias. And we are probably safe in questioning his capacity to organize and direct the widespread campaign needed to establish such an empire — even if he had not been cut off from help by both land and sea.

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* All references are to Thucydides unless otherwise stated.

1 (F. M. Vise.) Montgomery, *History of Warfare*, London 1982, 67.

2 V. J. Hunter, *Thucydides the Artful Reporter*, Toronto 1973, briefly discusses current views on Thucydides' motives (pp. 3–9), and gives many examples of his techniques. See also H. D. Westlake, *Individuals in Thucydides*, Cambridge 1968, 308–319, and *passim*.

3 Unfortunately we have no other major source on Brasidas' career except Diodorus Siculus (12, 43, 62, 67–68, 72–74), who adds little to Thucydides and indeed appears to have used him as his authority (cf. Diod. 12, 62, 1–5 and Thuc. 4, 11–12).

4 G. B. Grundy, *Thucydides and the History of his Age II*, Oxford 1948, vi.

5 T. R. Harley, 'A Greater than Leonidas', *Greece a. Rome* 11, 1941, 68–83.

6 Thucydides' account of this engagement (2, 90–92) is not enlightening. After an initial success by the Peloponnesians, who destroyed nearly half the small Athenian squadron, their entire fleet was thrown into a panic, dispersed and routed, because *one* ship was rammed and sank!

7 He was not given any Spartiate troops. The faction in control in Sparta at the time apparently chose to treat the expedition as a semi-private venture, of which the Chalcidians were to bear the cost (Grundy, *op. cit.* 217).

8 Thucydides' suggestion (4, 73_t, 4) that contingents from states risking only a small portion of their manpower would 'show more daring' would hardly appeal to the soldiers who *were* risking their lives. One would rather expect *esprit de corps* from an all-Athenian force.

9 Grundy, *op. cit.* 137.

10 Diodorus (12, 68, 3) says the city surrendered on the day after Brasidas' arrival.

11 B. W. Henderson, *The Great War between Athens and Sparta*, New York 1973, 272.

12 J. R. Ellis, 'Thucydides at Amphipolis', *Antichthon* 12, 1978, 57.

13 L. Casson, *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World*, Princeton 1971, ch. 12, sect. 4, gives the following estimates for the overall speed per hour of ancient vessels on voyages – sails were used wherever possible: 4–6 knots (4, 6–7 miles or 7, 4–11 km per hr) under favourable winds; less than 2 to 2, 5 knots (2, 3–3 miles, 3, 7–4, 6 km) against the winds; for fleets, including slow supply vessels, 2–3 knots (2, 3–3, 3 miles, 3, 7–5, 4 km) with favourable winds, 1–1, 5 knots (1, 15–1, 7 miles, 1, 85–2, 8 km) with unfavourable or very light winds.

14 See Ellis, *art. cit.* 52–59, for a detailed analysis of the narrative, revealing various inadequacies most simply explained as subtle attempts by Thucydides to cover up his own delinquency.

15 They may have felt that he should have stationed himself at Eion earlier, knowing that a Spartan force was in the vicinity, but as Ellis (*art. cit.* 57) points out, if Brasidas could have taken the town within minutes of his arrival, it would not have mattered where the relieving force was.

16 Thucydides' seven ships, described simply as *naus*, were probably not fast combat triremes (*tacheiai*), which were not designed to carry passengers, but slower *stratitides* ("soldier ships"), a form of trireme which served for such non-combat functions as guard duty and doubled as transports. L. Casson (*op. cit.* 93 n. 85) estimates their carrying capacity as c. 85 men, citing Thuc. 6, 43.

17 As regards Seione, Sparta had objected to the expedition as a violation of the truce (4, 122, 4), but could not make an issue of it, being cut off from transporting troops by sea.

18 The truce actually expired in late March, but was apparently extended until after the Pythian games, held in the latter half of August to 1 September (C.F. Smith, n. 1 to Thuc. 5, 1, Loeb. ed.; some editors disagree with this interpretation).

19 Epigraphical evidence that other rebel towns were recovered is provided by A. G. Woodhead, *Mnemosyne* 13, 1960, 304–306. Westlake, *op. cit.* 77, considers this conclusive.

20 Opinions differ widely as to where Brasidas' encampment was; most scholars favour a location on St Catherine's Hill, c. 0, 6 mile (900 m) from the modern bridge. W. K. Pritchett from a detailed topographical study (*Studies in Ancient Greek Topography* I, Univ. Calif. Press 1965, 38–40) nominated Hill 339 further west, the site of an ancient village, c. 2,4 miles (3,8 km) from the bridge. A still more remote site proposed was higher up the mountain, at the former village of Kato Kerdyllion. However, N. Jones in a later study ('The Topography and Strategy of the Battle of Amphipolis', *Class. Ant.* 10, 1977, 81–86) preferred St. Catherine's Hill, pointing out that Brasidas' primary purpose was military – to guard the bridge against assault or blockade.

21 J. Kromayer, quoted by Pritchett, *op. cit.* 42.

22 Usually identified with a ridge of the western foothills of Mt Pangaeus east of Amphipolis. Pritchett (*op. cit.* 38–40), however, believes that it was a large freestanding hill (Deghli Peak, or Hill 133) about a mile beyond the ancient city, to the north-east. It seems unlikely on the face of it that Cleon would take up a position with an enemy city between himself and his base and still assume he could escape to Eion. Moreover, Thucydides states (5, 10, 3) that Brasidas, from within the city, attacked the Athenian column almost as soon as they began their retreat, after observing (5, 10, 5) "their spears and heads wagging" – at a distance of a mile or so! For these and other reasons Jones (*op. cit.* 87–90) rejected Pritchett's view and returned to that of earlier scholars that the hill was the one now known as the Hill of the Macedonian Tomb, directly opposite the southern circuit wall of the city and giving easy escape to Eion along the Kavala road.

23 Pritchett, *op. cit.* 36–38; Jones, *art. cit.* 72–76.

24 Pritchett, *op. cit.* 34.

25 Jones (*art. cit.* 76–79) considers that the Long Wall laid out by Hagnon (4, 102, 2–4) had already been extended to the Strymon east of the bridge by 422 (5, 10, 6), and that the palisade was west of the bridge. His reconstruction appears to agree better with Thucydides' narrative.

26 J. K. Anderson, 'Cleon's Orders at Amphipolis', *Journ. Hell. Stud.* 85, 1965, 1–4.

27 Anderson, *art. cit.* 4.

28 Gomme and others consider that the figure of 150 is corrupt (Pritchett, *op. cit.* 45 n. 48, who concurs with this view).

29 In view of the common Spartan fear of helot revolt and the drastic measures sometimes taken against them, such as the infamous *krypteia* (Plut. *Lycurg.* 28, 2–3) and the alleged mass murder (possibly Athenian propaganda) recorded by Thucydides (4, 80, 3–4), it seems unbelievable that helots were ever entrusted with arms or allowed to accompany their masters into battle. However, L. F. Fitzhardinge (*The Spartans*, London, 1980, 157) points out that all recorded "helot revolts" were actually Messenian revolts, national, not social, in origin. "Revolts of Laconian helots existed only in the nightmares of the hoplite class". While the helots were tied to the land, they were *not* personal slaves or serfs, but

“collective bondsmen” to the Spartan state, with some property rights and much wider rights in the sphere of marriage and family law (M. I. Finley, *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology*, London 1983, 71–72); many, if not most, no doubt had quite amiable relations with their masters. In a sense, the Spartiates were bondsmen to the state too; their personal lives were far more restricted than those of Athenians.

Part V
The Age of Xenophon and Epaminond As : 400–
362 BC

Xenophon's Theory of Leadership

BY
WOOD NEAL

Xenophon deserves to be better known and more widely appreciated by students, scholars, and the reading public. The purpose of this essay is to indicate something of the intellectual originality of the ancient Greek soldier and country squire. His importance in founding the theory of the art of war, often forgotten by laymen, is generally acknowledged by military specialists. But scholars have curiously neglected his pioneer achievement in the realm of political thought, an achievement arising from his military interests. He was apparently the first western thinker to be deeply concerned with both military and political theory. One result of the dual concern was a momentous intellectual discovery: the idea of an army as a community to be founded and maintained by the general. Another closely related result was a unique preoccupation with leadership as the central political problem. Despite the radicalness of the approach, Xenophon remained faithful to the classical outlook of his contemporaries, Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Demosthenes.

I

Time, as if unsatisfied by the perpetual destruction of all men, must even obscure the records of the most fascinating among them. Such has been the fate of Xenophon, whose long life of over three score and ten years is largely a matter of informed conjecture and scholarly disputation.¹) What is known of his outlook and conduct has become practically synonymous with the highest Hellenic ideal of the gentleman. He was that rare combination of thought and action: warrior, sportsman, and farmer, who was able to write superbly on each of these activities. He was less successful in the *Hellenica* in recounting the history of his age, to which in practice he had made more than a minor contribution, and in providing posterity in the *Memorabilia* with a portrait of Socrates. But these efforts in history and philosophy suffered not so much from his own intellectual mediocrity as from the fact that they were overshadowed by the incomparable work of Thucydides and Plato. Xenophon's life was a full one, touched briefly but with lasting effect by the inspiration of Socrates, a life that had triumphed heroically over man and nature in the epic trek through Asia Minor, that knew the passion of the chase, the peace of

the countryside and the quiet contemplation of studious hours. And his was a full life in the sense that he had experienced personal tragedy as well as triumph, for his career was that of the wanderer, the exile, the bearer of arms against his *patria*, and his greying years were spent in fruitlessly exhorting his countrymen to arise from their slough of corruption.

Xenophon like Plato was born of an aristocratic Athenian family, and about the same time as Plato, 427 or 426 B.C. Their famous contemporary, Isocrates, was somewhat older, and outlived both. Between Xenophon's birth and the beginning of his immortal journey in Asia (401 B.C.), he became acquainted with Socrates, although never one of his regular students, and probably saw active military service as a cavalryman in the defense of his city during the final years of the Peloponnesian War. In early 401 B.C. an old family friend, the Boeotian soldier of fortune, Proxenus, who commanded a contingent of Greek mercenaries, invited Xenophon to be his companion and aide, on the military expedition that Cyrus the Younger, Satrap of Asia Minor and brother of King Artaxerxes II of Persia, was organizing at Sardis, nominally for the purpose of conquering the long unsubdued Pisidians. Cyrus, very favorably impressed by the fighting ability of Greek infantry, was forming the largest army of Greek mercenaries ever before assembled, about 12,900, and 30,000 of his own native troops, largely cavalry and archers. Xenophon writes that he consulted Socrates,²⁾ who cautioned him to seek the advice of Apollo at Delphi, fully realizing that it might be extremely imprudent for an Athenian to become too closely associated with Cyrus whose support of Sparta had contributed to ultimate Athenian defeat in the recent titanic thirty year struggle between the two cities. By nature, an adventurer impatient for action and youthfully unmindful of the future, Xenophon instead of asking Apollo whether he should go or not, simply inquired what gods he should worship in order that his journey might be successful.

Joining Proxenus at Sardis, Xenophon marched for six months with the army 1,500 miles to the Euphrates, where the real purpose of the campaign was revealed to be part of a carefully contrived plot of Cyrus to wrest the Persian throne from Artaxerxes. Too deeply involved to turn back, the Greeks took part in the battle against the monarch's forces at Cunaxa, sixty miles north of Babylon. With victory all but in his grasp, Cyrus was killed, while rashly pressing forward to slay his brother. The Greeks, stranded in hostile territory without patron or guardian, and deserted by the rapidly disintegrating forces of their Persian allies, elected a seasoned veteran, the Spartan Clearchus, to be their commander. However, Clearchus, Proxenus and the other Greek captains were treacherously murdered by the royal

general, Tissaphernes, with whom they were negotiating. The *Anabasis* is the saga of the subsequent retreat homeward of the “Ten Thousand” under the leadership of the young, untried Xenophon, selected to replace Clearchus.³⁾ It was a trip of well over 2,000 miles by land and sea, accomplished in eighteen months: northwards from Mesopotamia, through the alpine fastness of the fierce Kurdish tribesmen, to the eastern frontier of Armenia, across the river Araxes flowing into the Caspian Sea, and eventually westward to the modern Black Sea port of Trabzon, from where they were able to proceed mainly by ship. Xenophon’s baptism of command consisted of persistent harassment by marauding bands, first the Persians and then the Kurds, of the trials of arduous terrain, of the climatic extremes of desert and highland, of sickness, frost-bite, and snow-blindness, of the never ending problems of supply, of quarrel and conspiracy. Not least among his achievements of generalship was the transformation of the inflexible Greek phalanx into a highly adaptable military instrument, employing such innovations as a reserve, light infantry tactics suitable for mountain warfare, and infantry approach formations anticipating modern practice.

After the return of the Ten Thousand in the early part of 399, Xenophon, banished by Athens as Socrates had feared, evidently remained in Asia where he married Philesia, sired two sons, Diodorus and Gryllus, and served Sparta in various military capacities. When in 396, to defend Spartan interests against the Persians under Tissaphernes, Agesilaus II, King of Sparta, personally led a large task force to Lydia, he was probably assisted by Xenophon, who became his close friend and great admirer, writing the well-known eulogy after his death in 360. Agesilaus, so we learn from the *Hellenica*,⁴⁾ decided to create large cavalry units in order to contend with the Persian horse on the great open plains to the east of the major Spartan base of Ephesus. It seems likely, although positive evidence is lacking, that Xenophon, because of his interest in cavalry and his experience in fending off the Persian attacks upon the rear-guard of the Ten Thousand retreating from Cunaxa, was involved in the training of the troops and the devising of tactics for the new enterprise. At any rate we do know that the Spartan cavalry proved itself in meeting the Persians, and won a substantial victory against the Thessalians in 394 under Agesilaus,⁵⁾ who was then back in Greece on his way to attack the Athenians and their allies at Coronea. Never before had a battle taken place between massed Greek cavalry formations,⁶⁾ and for Agesilaus to defeat experienced masters of the craft like the Thessalians is tribute not only to his generalship, but also, if our speculation is correct, to the military prowess of Xenophon. Sometime following the Battle of Coronea in which Xenophon (at least according

to Plutarch) fought under Agesilaus against his own city, he was honored by Sparta with the gift of an estate at Scillus in Elis, in the northwestern corner of the Peloponnesus. But Xenophon, without doubt engaged in military missions for his foster city over the next six or seven years, was unable to enjoy immediately the life of a country squire.

Nearly two decades of retirement at Scillus were spent in supervising the estate, for Xenophon was keenly interested in agriculture and farm management as we know from the *Oeconomicus*, and, of course, there were his other two loves, riding and hunting. Here also he had ample leisure to reflect upon things past, to read and to write. Since the chronology of his writings is a matter of lively debate among scholars, the best that can be done is to list the works that must have been commenced during this period, if not before, mindful that very few, if any, were completed at the time: *Cynegeticus*; *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians*; *Anabasis* ; *Apology of Socrates*; the first two books of the *Memorabilia*, a defense written to counter the anti-Socratic pamphlet of the sophist, Polycrates, which appeared between 393 and 390 ; *Oeconomicus*; *On Horsemanship* ; and *Hellenica*, a continuation of Thucydides' history down to the Battle of Mantinea (362 B.C.). War between Sparta and Elis in 371 necessitated Xenophon's giving up the idyllic life of Scillus. He moved to Corinth where he remained until permitted to return to his native city, between 365 and 360, a reconciliation facilitated by the alliance signed by Athens and Sparta in 369. Reunion with Athens after an exile of over thirty-five years seemed to release within Xenophon a reserve of creative energy enabling him to complete the works already begun and several important new ones: *Symposium*, *Cyropaedia*, *Hiero*, *Agesilaus*, *Hipparchicus*, and *Ways and Means*. The last two were patriotic addresses to his fellow citizens urging particular reforms of the military and the economy for a decaying city that was never able to approach her former greatness. Of the final days of Xenophon there is no trace.

II

Xenophon's reputation has suffered a very obvious decline since the last century. Although by the time Milton was guiding his nephews through the pages of the *Anabasis* and the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon was becoming staple English schoolboy fare, today few Americans, except for students of Greek, trouble to read him. Even the *Anabasis* seems to have lost much of its former literary appeal. Primarily because of the meticulous researching of German scholarship, Xenophon is no longer generally considered a creditable source for the character or the

intellect of Socrates. Upon careful scrutiny the *Hellenica* has failed to pass muster as either good history or chronology. Sophisticates since the Abbé Fénelon generally apply the somewhat condescending descriptions “historical novel” or “philosophical romance” to the *Cyropaedia*. In sum, the all too apparent contemporary verdict is one of a lack of intellectual profundity and creative invention.

Nowhere is the neglect of Xenophon more noticeable than in the history of political thought. This is not so much a matter of a decline of prestige as the fact that recognition has never been accorded. However high his reputation was until recent years, Xenophon was never ranked among the great political thinkers. Two widely read textbooks, Raymond G. GettelPs *History of Political Thought* (1924) and George H. Sabine’s *A History of Political Theory* (1937), pay no heed to Xenophon. A more specialized volume, long judged something of a classic, Sir Ernest Barker’s *Greek Political Theory: Plato and His Predecessors* (1918) attests to little of significance in Xenophon, allotting less than two pages to a discussion of his political thought (half the space given to Isocrates). Professor T. A. Sinclair, in *A History of Greek Political Thought* (1951), dismisses the *Memorabilia* as “not of much importance in political thought” and criticizes the *Cyropaedia* for being “so barren of thought and lacking in coherence.” About the only recent sympathetic studies of Xenophon available to the English reader and relevant to the history of political thought are the short work of Professor Leo Strauss on the *Hiero*, and the late Werner Jaeger’s valuable essay, “Xenophon: The Ideal Squire and Soldier,” in the third volume of his *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*. To the French we are greatly indebted for a recent revival of interest in Xenophon, in particular two excellent works: *Les Idées politiques et sociales de Xénophon* (1947) of M. Jean Luccioni, and the exhaustive and imaginative reconstruction by Professor Edouard Delebecque in his *Essai sur la vie de Xénophon* (1957).

Students and practitioners of military science, however, have always held Xenophon in high esteem. Ancient military writers refer to him with respect. Arrian, who called himself Xenophon and came to be known as “Xenophon the Younger,” entitled his important history of Alexander, the *Anabasis*. The first modern military writer, Machiavelli, does not hesitate to acknowledge his debt to the Greek. The great reformation of the western European army in the seventeenth century was in no small part due to the revival of interest in the classical military writers, Xenophon, Polybius, Aelian Tacticus, Frontinus, and Vegetius.⁷) In our own age Colonel Theodore A. Dodge writes:

Xenophon is the father of the system of retreat, the originator of all that appertains to the science of rear-guard fighting. He reduced its

management to a perfect method. More originality in tactics has come from the *Anabasis* than from any other book. Every system of war looks to this as to the fountainhead when it comes to rearward movements.⁸⁾

The conclusion of Colonel J. M. Scammell writing in *The Army Quarterly* is: “He proved himself a great soldier and a consummate leader of men. He was the pupil of a great philosopher and the master who taught our forefathers the Art of War”,⁹⁾ These opinions are seconded by Colonel Oliver Lyman Spaulding who terms the *Anabasis* the earliest work on military theory,¹⁰⁾ and concedes Xenophon to be the founder of military science.¹¹⁾ The Cambridge historian, Mr. G. T. Griffith, suggests that “More signs of the inventive spirit were shown during the one year of the adventures of the Ten Thousand than in ten years of maneuvers and fighting by the standing army of Jason or of the Phocians”,¹²⁾ and M. Luccioni describes the *Anabasis* as a “kind of breviary of command”.¹³⁾ Major General J. F. C. Fuller refers to Xenophon as a “noted cavalry tactician”¹⁴⁾ and an expert on mountain warfare,¹⁵⁾ and gives the *Cyropaedia* its due by calling it “largely a textbook on generalship”.¹⁶⁾ Xenophon, according to Professor Delebecque’s final evaluation, is “the founder of modern cavalry, the first theoretician of encircling tactics; he foresaw the advantages of the surprise attack like Pearl Harbor, and the perils of gigantic expeditions like the campaigns in Russia”.¹⁷⁾ Obviously Xenophon was not the only military commentator of his age. However, technical manuals, a fairly common genre by the late fifth century, if any were written on military subjects, have not survived. But Xenophon, perhaps, must still share honors as the founder of the theory of the art of war with Aeneas Tacticus, whose *On the Defense of Fortified Positions* (ca. 357-356 B.C.) is the only extant military writing of his large corpus. Even if certain of the details of Book VII of the *Hellenica*, Book III of the *Memorabilia*, and the *Hipparchicus* are indebted to Aeneas, as suggested by Professor Delebecque,¹⁸⁾ one may still argue that Xenophon’s most fundamental military ideas were conceived long before the publication of the treatise of Aeneas.

All of this, nevertheless, is a matter of speculation not central to the opinion that Xenophon was the *first* Greek to write extensively on both military and political theory. In view of the very basic role of war in the life of classical antiquity,¹⁹⁾ it is surprising to note that of the Hellenic “political thinkers” of the fifth and fourth centuries whose works have come down to us Xenophon was alone in writing on military science and generalship. Herodotus and Thucydides, of course, describe in detail conspiracies, military expeditions and battles. From Thucydides, especially, a great deal can be learned about the ancient art of war,²⁰⁾ yet his brilliance is not that of a military analyst. Despite Thucydides’ incomparable superiority as a

historian, Xenophon's description of military formations and operations is generally more detailed, more accurate and more lucid.²¹⁾ Nor does Thucydides ever discuss the theory of the art of war and its implications for life as a whole. In Plato and Aristotle we discover little systematic discussion of the art of war, except qualified praise of the military virtues and extensive prescriptions for the military training of youth. The student invariably comes away from reading Plato with a rather meager impression of the vital part played by war in the ancient world. Considering that Aristotle devoted the first of eight books of the *Politics* to economics (estate management), and wrote a treatise on rhetoric, two arts absolutely indispensable in the eyes of the educated Greek to the political art, his lack of attention to military science is puzzling, all the more so since he tutored the young warrior-prince destined to be one of the great masters of warfare. Admittedly specialists wrote on and taught the subject, like Xenophon and Aeneas Tacticus, and the sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus of Chios,²²⁾ but there were also experts on rhetoric and economics. A lack of personal knowledge of war cannot excuse the neglect of military science because most of these men of letters, like all Greek citizens of the age, had borne arms for their polis. One need only recall Alcibiades' eloquent description of the valorous behavior of his mess-mate, Socrates, on the campaign in Potidaea,²³⁾ or Laches' praise of Socrates' example in the retreat from Delium,²⁴⁾ or Socrates' obvious pride in his own military conduct.²⁵⁾

Therefore, although fused in classical practice, political and military considerations tended to be separated in classical theory, forming as it were "two cultures," to use Sir Charles Snow's felicitous expression,²⁶⁾ with the political theorists from Plato to Cicero forming one culture, and the military writers from Aeneas Tacticus to Vegetius forming the other. Only Xenophon and perhaps Polybius, whose military treatises are unfortunately lost, participated in both cultures. To do justice to Xenophon's unique contribution to classical intellectual history the nature of the relationship between his military and his political ideas must be analyzed. The obvious place to begin is with what he knew best and excelled in, the military art. The distinctiveness of his thought upon the subject can be appreciated most adequately by comparison with the views of Plato and Aristotle.

III

The attitude of Plato and Aristotle toward war may be summarized in terms of their moral condemnation of war, their realistic acceptance of war as a necessary means of realizing a higher good, and their classification of war as an acquisitive art. Plato's rejection of war on

moral grounds is best illustrated by his remarks upon the causes of war. War, he affirms, results from all that is irrational in life. Men may quarrel because they differ as to what is just and unjust,²⁷⁾ or because of the lust of body and the need for money to satisfy this lust.²⁸⁾ With the growth of a luxurious society, the appetites increase and are contained only with the greatest difficulty.²⁹⁾ The original territory of the polis will prove too small for the new demands for luxury, for the insatiable appetite for wealth, and for the unrestrained growth of population. Wars of an imperialistic nature seem to be the only means of satisfying the expanding demands of a luxurious society. And, naturally, a luxurious society will be threatened by internal strife arising from the concentration of excessive wealth in the hands of a few and the widespread poverty of the many.³⁰⁾ The consequence will be a condition in which tyrants attempt to seize power and foment war with neighbouring cities in order to externalize domestic discontents and to create a continual demand for their leadership.³¹⁾ War then is an important symptom of deep-rooted social malignancy.³²⁾ Moreover, it is an activity as irrational as the matrix from which it springs, for the outcome of armed conflict is subject to the whims of fortune, and is never precisely calculable.³³⁾ Plato renounces the extremely pessimistic view that all men live and must live in a state of perpetual war.³⁴⁾ Peace is far superior to military victory just as a sound body is to be preferred to one that has been brought back to health by the purging of the physician. The glorification of war by the Spartan poet, Tyrtaeus, and of the military virtue of courage by Theognis are not acceptable to Plato. Courage is obviously important, although only as part of virtue, and not as the sole or highest virtue. Neither amusement nor learning of any value can be gained from the waging of war.³⁵⁾ Aristotle agrees with Plato in regard to the irrationality of the origins and nature of war.³⁶⁾ Perhaps because warfare was so much a part of their lives, the Greek contemporaries of Plato and Aristotle shared their aversion to it, particularly after the thirty year holocaust between Athens and Sparta.³⁷⁾ No longer individual sportive duels between heroic antagonists, war had become a grim, organized, and ruinous affair. Even Isocrates, who called upon his fellow Greeks to unite behind the banner of Philip of Macedón for an invasion of Persia, advised that sovereign in 342 B.C. to conquer the goodwill and friendship of a people instead of their cities.³⁸⁾

However, Plato and Aristotle realistically accept war as a necessary evil that can be ignored only at the peril of extinction. In condemning cities whose sole purpose is war,³⁹⁾ Sparta and Crete, for example, they nevertheless uphold preparations for defense and wars of defense and in their prescriptions for the rational organization of society they

gave ample attention to military arrangements. Aristotle expresses the attitude of Plato when he maintains that training in war is of the utmost importance for the prevention of enslavement,⁴⁰⁾ believing that an essential qualification of the political orator is a sound knowledge of war and national defense.⁴¹⁾ In their recommendations, both thinkers stipulate that war should always remain instrumental and never be an end in itself. Plato reasons that the art of war is a ministerial art, along with rhetoric and the administration of justice, all properly subordinate to and serving the sovereign art of politics.⁴²⁾ The political art determines what should and should not be done. Is force or persuasion to be used against a people? Is war or peace to be declared? Policy formulation, direction, and coordination are the functions of the royal art, while the ministerial arts are to execute its orders. From a somewhat different perspective the art of war may be said to be a cooperative art in relation to the causal art of politics, in much the same way as the art of making spindles and combs is related to the actual fabrication of cloth.⁴³⁾ Or the royal art vis-a-vis the art of war may be designated the art that uses what another art makes or acquires.⁴⁴⁾ Finally, Plato insists that the royal art is qualitatively distinct from, and higher than the practical and manual arts, such as the art of war, because of its intellectual nature.⁴⁵⁾ At the very beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics*⁴⁶⁾ Aristotle distinguishes between the purposes of various arts, suggesting a hierarchy of ends. The arts he mentions are medicine, shipbuilding, war, and economics with their respective ends of health, ships, victory, and wealth. If each of these is a master art, then subordinate to each are lesser arts with lesser ends. For example we can start at the bottom of such a hierarchy as he indicates and ascend to the top: from bridle-making, to riding, to warfare, to the political art at the apex. As an end the military art is only a qualified good, a means to the good life that results from the happiness of living in association with friends.⁴⁷⁾ The art of war, part of the *vita activa*, must be pursued in order to secure peace ; without peace there can be no leisure so necessary for the supreme end, the *vita contemplativa*.⁴⁸⁾

Because Plato and Aristotle term the art of war an acquisitive art, they seem to overlook one of its cardinal features. Plato identifies generalship with the art of hunting man.⁴⁹⁾ Like the hunter the general captures the prey to be used by a superior art ; in the one case, economics, in the other, politics. This major characteristic of the art of war is made quite explicit in a lengthy disquisition in the *Sophist* on the distinction between the acquisitive and the creative arts.⁵⁰⁾ All the acquisitive arts are concerned with conquest by word or deed, or the prevention of such conquest, and not with the production of anything new, the field of the creative arts. Among the

acquisitive arts are learning and cognition, trade, fighting, and hunting. Creative arts include agriculture, politics, shipbuilding, painting, sculpture, and poetry. Two kinds of acquisitive art are exchange and conquest, or voluntary conquest by means of gifts, hire and purchase, and conquest by force of deed or word. In turn, conquest by force is accomplished by fighting or by hunting. Hunting of tame animals, i.e. man, is either by violence or persuasion. Piracy, kidnapping, tyranny and the art of war are violent types of hunting man ; while the arts of the lawyer, the conversationalist, the sophist and the lover are the persuasive kinds of hunting man. Aristotle develops this idea of war as an acquisitive art by comparing it to economics (estate management). The acquisition of property differs from the management-of property by providing what the other is to use.⁵¹) Hence hunting must be separated from economics, because the huntsman furnishes the estate manager with food and is subordinate to his supervision. In a comparable fashion the soldier supplies the polis with slaves ; featherless bipeds are his prey. Economics and politics are moral arts because they deal with human relationships, which should be rendered as excellent as possible.⁵²) The connection between economics and politics is concisely made by Plato in the *Statesman* when he draws the analogy between a small polis and a large estate, between king and estate manager.⁵³) Plato and Aristotle see no similarity between the art of war on the one hand, and politics and economics on the other. Neither hunting nor war is a moral art ; they are not concerned with right and wrong, simply with mastery by violence, an activity that can never characterize the essence of statesmanship or stewardship.⁵⁴) The shortcoming of the approach of Plato and Aristotle to the art of war is their close identification of it with the huntsman's tracking and capture of his prey. By so doing the crucial managerial function of the general is completely neglected. If the hunting metaphor is to be used, then the general must be conceived as a master huntsman leading a large party in the chase. He is the center of a friend-foe relationship. Against the foe, his prey, he must employ all the skills of deceit and violence. Toward the friend, the member of his hunting party, he must exert all the arts of persuasion and direction, if the foe is to be captured. Plato admits that war is a highly skilled art,⁵⁵) much more advanced than that of architecture, or that of making clothing and household furnishings.⁵⁶) Generalship is an empirical art dependent upon long experience and infinite attention to detail,⁵⁷) requiring the practical use of arithmetic and geometry,⁵⁸) and calling for great courage.⁵⁹) But Plato and Aristotle fail to examine the general's skill in commanding his troops, a skill comparable to the economic and the political art.

IV

Xenophon concurs with Plato and Aristotle that peace is preferable to war, and that military science is an instrument to be used by the royal art. Naturally, as a professional soldier, and one long associated with Sparta, he tends to give greater emphasis to the military virtues and to technical military matters than his two contemporaries. In addition and more importantly, he views all things from a military perspective. When it comes to the relationship between the art of war and the other arts, he repeats some of the ideas of Plato and Aristotle. The difference between the art of war and the art of politics is the difference between dealing with friend and foe.⁶⁰) Life in the spoils is concerned with friends and fellow-citizens; it calls for uprightness, honesty and justice in all human relationships, virtues that should be stressed in civic education. War on the contrary is a relationship between foes. Victory against the foe is the end. In such an activity one should never by choice meet the foe on equal terms, but always attempt to gain every advantage over him by using every kind of craft and strategem.⁶¹) An adversary in war is to be treated like a beast of prey tracked by the huntsman. Consequently civic education should be supplemented by hunting, for although youth must not be taught to be deceitful toward their neighbors, they can certainly utilize in wartime what they learn from long training and experience in the chase.⁶²)

It is in Xenophon's lengthy descriptions of the ideal general and the nature of his art, the first in classical literature, that we find him radically departing from the views of Plato and Aristotle, and herein is his genius. Three such quotations are given below, each from a different work,⁶³) that illustrate his originality as a thinker:

But your true cheat and prince of swindlers is he who can lure the enemy on and throw him off his guard, suffer himself to be pursued and get the pursuers into disorder, lead the foe into difficult ground and then attack him there. Indeed as an ardent student you must not confine yourself to the lessons you have learnt; you must show yourself a creator and discoverer, you must invent stratagems against the foe; just as a real musician is not content with the mere elements of his art, but sets himself to compose new themes. And if in music it is the novel melody, the flowerlike freshness, that wins popularity, still more in military matters it is the newest contrivance that stands the highest, for the simple reason that such will give you the best chance of outwitting your opponent.⁶⁴)

But, after all, no man, however great his plastic skill, can hope to mould and shape a work of art to suit his fancy, unless the stuff on which he works be first prepared and made ready to obey the craftsman's will. Nor certainly where the raw material consists of men, will you succeed, unless, under God's blessing, these same men have been prepared and made ready to meet their officer in a friendly spirit.⁶⁵)

A general must be ready in furnishing the material of war: in providing the commissariat for his troops ; quick in devices, he must be full of practical resource; nothing must escape his eye or tax his endurance ; he must be shrewd and ready of wit, a combination at once of clemency and fierceness, of simplicity and of insidious craft ; he must play the part of watchman, of robber ; now prodigal as a spendthrift, and again close-fisted as a miser, the bounty of his munificence must be equalled by the narrowness of his greed; impregnable in defense, a very dare-devil in attack—these and many other qualities must he possess who is to make a good general and minister of war ; they must come to him by gift of nature or through science. No doubt it is a grand thing also to be a tactician, since there is all the difference in the world between an army properly handled in the field and the same in disorder ; just as stones and bricks, woodwork and tiles, tumbled together in a heap are of no use at all, but arrange them in a certain order—at bottom and atop materials which will not . crumble or rot, such as stones and earthen tiles, and in the middle between the two put bricks and woodwork, with eye to architectural principle, and finally you get a valuable possession—to wit a dwelling-place.⁶⁶⁾

These three passages comprise a milestone in the history of social and political thought because each compares some aspect of the art of war to the creative activity of the three supreme fine arts of ancient Greece: the devising of new stratagems against the enemy, to musical composition ; the disciplining of an army, to the imposition of the sculptor's will upon his material; the tactical training of an army (ordering of troops in camp, in march, and in battle), to architecture. Together, the statements are an argument by a soldier against the commonly held "layman's" view, articulated by Plato and Aristotle, that military science is solely an acquisitive art, quite distinct from the creative or productive arts. Xenophon contends that the acquisitive aspect of war entails an innovating activity, and even more significantly that the vital role of the general is the creation and maintenance of an army that will be able to execute his commands.⁶⁷⁾

With this discovery Xenophon can proceed to make comparisons between a military community and other forms of human association. Perhaps his most interesting analogy, unheard of in the writings of his contemporaries, is that between the estate manager and the general.⁶⁸⁾ Both are concerned with providing their subordinates with supplies, with the selection of the right man for the right job, with the safety and welfare of their charges, with winning their affection, gaining their obedience, and punishing and rewarding evil-doers and good-doers as the case may be. Both must win friends and supporters, go about their business in an industrious and meticulous fashion, prudently planning their future course of action. While Plato and Aristotle compare estate management and statecraft, Xenophon dwells upon the similarity of generalship to both economics and politics,⁶⁹⁾ reasoning that the chief difference between private and public affairs

is one of quantity, not of kind. The ship, the estate, the army, and the polity, Xenophon fully realizes, are social organizations, which are alike in that they are dependent upon the proper ordering of the relationships among the individuals who compose them for the sake of achieving specific ends. One essential factor, however, separates the activity of directing sailors, farmers, and soldiers from civic rule. In the first three the end of management can be easily defined and readily agreed upon: a safe voyage to the destination; agriculture productive of wealth; victory over the enemy. A theoretical treatment of these arts will center upon the means of gaining these ends. Not so is the theory of politics which in the ancient world concentrates upon the question of defining the ends of human activity. The great "political debates" of the philosophers of antiquity were over the nature of the highest human ends: "justice," "happiness," the "good life." Any comment upon means was only incidental to and contingent upon the values of the philosopher. Given, for example, the description of ends and means in *The Republic*, the reader is never told except in broadest outline how he as a man confronting other men can effect Plato's recommendations. But if someone should approach political theory from an intensely practical interest in how to command an army and lead it to victory, or in how to manage a country estate and make it profitable, he might well tend to emphasize means rather than ends, to think of politics in terms of administration, the management of men, the struggle to achieve and secure power.⁷⁰) Xenophon does exactly this, approaching all fields of human endeavor from the standpoint of a soldier, a commander of men. Regardless of whether he is speaking of an estate or a polity, he thinks as the general of an army. To him the squire is essentially a general, the king is a general, and the central problem of each is that of the general, recruiting, training, marching his army, and engaging the enemy in battle.⁷¹) It is the problem of the technique to be used to get men to do one's bidding, of exercising one's will over others, in short the problem of command and obedience. Each action and utterance of the leader is judged by the criterion of its usefulness in solving this problem.⁷²) Of course, Xenophon does not disregard moral values ; from our knowledge of him, he is the model of the Greek gentleman. But he accepts these values uncritically and focuses his intellectual talents upon what he deems to be the secret of success in public and private affairs, the knowledge of handling men or the art of command, necessary for success in polity, army, farm, household, even in love.⁷³) With Xenophon, then, begins what in modern jargon might be called the psychology of human relations.⁷⁴)

According to Xenophon the foundations of obedience are compulsion, self-interest, and rational organization. Rules of behavior must be established and compliance to them expected of all. The leader exacts obedience in his followers through instilling fear among them by threat of punishment for incompetent and disloyal service and through the reward of good behavior. Animals are trained by punishment and reward,⁷⁵) an indispensable means also of exerting command over men, whether by estate managers, military commanders, or civic rulers.⁷⁶) He who aspires to leadership, however, must employ the compulsion of punishment and reward in a discriminating fashion if he is to avoid the hatred and contempt of his subordinates. Clearchus, the Spartan commander serving Cyrus the Younger, who took pride in his severity, believing that soldiers should fear their superiors more than the enemy, lost a great many men through desertion.⁷⁷) In contrast, Xenophon's friend, the Boeotian Proxenus, strove to win the love of his subordinates, and ended by being an object of contempt because instead of punishing wrongdoers, he merely withheld praise from them.⁷⁸) Even if punishment and reward are applied circumspectly they certainly do not constitute a sufficient means of instituting and maintaining a discipline that is characterized by a spirited and determined loyalty. To achieve this, obedience must be given voluntarily rather than under compulsion, as Cambyses explains to Cyrus.⁷⁹) Those who obey voluntarily do so because they realize that it is in their positive interest to do so.

The true test of the leader is whether his followers will adhere to his cause from their own volition, enduring the most arduous hardships without being forced to do so, and remaining steadfast in the moments of greatest peril.⁸⁰) They will so act if their leader by his kindness and thoughtfulness, by his superior example, and by the incentives he provides, becomes an object of affection and admiration, and establishes a lasting conviction that it is to their advantage to obey.⁸¹) In his all-important efforts to win the affection of his men, the leader of whatever kind,⁸²) must treat them as friends,⁸³) a precept relevant, as Xenophon believes, even to the art of the courtesan who by adopting the manner of friendship can be assured of an ardent and idolizing clientele, which continually contends for her favors.⁸⁴) All that the leader does must be a demonstration to his subordinates that he constantly thinks of their welfare and works for their benefit.⁸⁵) The safety and security of his charges should be a matter of continual concern to the farmer, and to the cavalry commander who directs an attack or retreat, superintends a camp or a march.⁸⁶) Good food and adequate housing are of supreme importance in the exercise of command.⁸⁷) Xenophon is the first to stress the crucial logistical role of supplying an army.⁸⁸) Highest priority must

be given by the general to his soldiers' rations. No leader can afford to neglect the health and physical well-being of his wards, seeing that they receive proper medical attention when needed.⁸⁹⁾ Every dealing with his men must be marked by justice⁹⁰⁾ and generosity.⁹¹⁾ But affection for the leader will not be enough to strengthen discipline and morale unless his ability is acknowledged. Xenophon's "good leader" excels his men in their tasks.⁹²⁾ By personal example he must convince them of his superiority. If he fully succeeds, his men, with awe in their hearts, will follow him through thick and thin to the ends of the earth. Contempt and disrespect will be the penalty of his failure, especially if his excellence proves to be fraudulent.⁹³⁾ The squire must set an example of painstaking and persevering care.⁹⁴⁾ The cavalry commander must distinguish himself by his skill in riding and in arms, by his tactical mastery, by his courage and physical endurance.⁹⁵⁾ Personal qualities of conduct and character are as necessary as expertise. King Agesilaus II of Sparta was a model of industry and respect for law, cheerful and dignified, leading a simple life of moderation.⁹⁶⁾ Cyrus the Great, outstanding in his piety and justice, his honoring of obedience, and his temperance, was like a "living law" to his subjects.⁹⁷⁾ He would always lead his nobles in the chase, and offer them for emulation a high standard of the gentlemanly attainments.⁹⁸⁾ Words without deeds to substantiate them are disastrous, but the powers of oratory and persuasion are extremely helpful to the leader when they serve as the proper setting for his acts.⁹⁹⁾ Oratory, used sparingly and at the right moment by the general or the statesman, will quiet the discontented and subdue the mutinous, lift men's flagging spirits, rally them in defeat, spur them to attack, dramatize their leader's prowess, and inspire them anew with the confidence that under his guidance everything is to be gained and little is to be lost. The willingness to obey and to do one's best can be bolstered effectively if the leader deliberately provokes the spirit of competition among his followers by a planned program of incentives offering suitable prizes for winners. The farmer will see to it that his worthiest hired hands will receive clothing of finer quality than those whose work is not up to par.¹⁰⁰⁾ In periods of preparation before extensive military campaigns, while an army is being trained, new units are being formed and new tactics are being contrived, competitions can be held among the soldiers to increase their proficiency and morale.¹⁰¹⁾ A similar scheme may be employed to good purpose with a peacetime civilian population. Simo-nides urges Hiero to organize contests of all sorts between the different districts within his kingdom.¹⁰²⁾ These rivalries would be designed not only to stimulate the military virtues, but also to promote fairness and industry in business and commerce, and to advance agricultural

pursuits. Moreover, suggestions for civic improvement would be welcomed and rewarded according to their usefulness. Cyrus, who realizes that to a great extent the military power of his empire rests upon a thriving populace living in economic abundance, takes pains to adopt comparable methods to raise agricultural production and the élan of his subjects.¹⁰³)

VI

The main function of the rational organization of society as conceived of by Xenophon is to facilitate good discipline and strong purposeful leadership. In a rational society the individual has no difficulty in recognizing the center of authority and his immediately superiors in the chain of command. He knows that the hierarchy of which he is a part and his particular station in it depend upon the principle of ability. The exact nature of his duties and privileges, what he can and cannot do with impunity, is quite clear to him. Hence, the fact that he lives in such an orderly, stable, and predictable world gives him a sense of security and well-being that results in a greater willingness to comply with the directives of the leader. From the standpoint of the leader, the more rationally organized the society over which he presides, the more effective his control and the more efficiently he is able to utilize the resources of the society for winning his goals. Xenophon exhibits a decided penchant for order and efficiency. He dearly loves the beauty and harmony of rational organization.¹⁰⁴) An untidy household in which implements and goods are stored in a haphazard fashion, and activities are conducted without attention to routine and exactness can be compared to a chorus whose singers and dancers lack well-drilled precision. Likewise to be condemned are an unruly mob supposed to function as an army, or an ill-managed ship. Everything and everybody must be in their place according to their function so that if needed they can be located readily and used without difficulty. System, method, and regularity are the premier qualities that the leader should give to the society he is molding.

If the ultimate of rational communities is the well-organized and well-commanded army, its form most nearly resembling the polity is the encampment. In his recommendations for a military encampment Xenophon begins a long tradition that includes Polybius, Vegetius, and Machiavelli, a tradition, inspired, perhaps, as much by the rational city planning of Hippodamus and the classical ideal of a harmonious urban order,¹⁰⁵) as by actual military practice. No matter where the camp is established its plan must be the same so that each soldier knows his place.¹⁰⁶) Encamping and decamping must always proceed in the same regular way. Orderliness is even more important in

military society than in the household because war always brings the need to seize and capitalize upon unexpected opportunities as they arise. The rationale of the plan is based on defensive considerations. In case of attack the most easily mobilized troops are always on the outside thereby creating a protective shield for types of troops taking longer to prepare for combat. In the center is the tent of the commander facing east, with the tents of his most trusted immediate associates, the accommodations for his body guard, servants, cooks, bakers, and his stables. Surrounding this central compound is the area for the cavalry and charioteers. To the north and south are the billets of the targeteers, and to the east and west those of the bowmen. The hoplites constitute the encircling outer wall, ready on instant notice to fend off any surprise attack. All officers fly distinctive banners so that they and their units may be easily located by the commanding officer. Each company of one hundred men lives and messes in a single tent,¹⁰⁷) an arrangement that possesses several advantages for the maintenance of discipline and morale. No longer is there any excuse for inequality of performance in battle on the grounds that some are treated better in camp than others, for all can now see that they are treated alike. From this close association a real comradeship is likely to arise among the members of the company, substantially increasing their effectiveness as a combat unit. More considerate and mutually helpful behavior becomes the rule, a fraternal atmosphere in which desertions are less likely. Finally, each soldier grows more familiar with his fighting position in the field because the same order is kept in the tent, squads and platoons eating and sleeping together.

To Cyrus the Great, Xenophon ascribes the creation of an ideal civic community, one consciously patterned after the military model,¹⁰⁸) with authority centralized in the hands of the king, and a hierarchical chain of command. Unless excused by the crown, the nobles are required to be in attendance at court where they are always available for the performance of particular services, and can be kept under the watchful eye of the sovereign.¹⁰⁹) State bureaucrats like tax collectors and paymasters, and the heads of household departments such as the royal estate keepers and superintendents of horses and hounds are selected by the king.¹¹⁰) More important is his responsibility of choosing the close associates and advisers upon whom he will depend in the future: the commanding officers of the armed forces, royal governors, and ambassadors.¹¹¹) Extreme care must be taken to appoint the most qualified man to each of the posts, a point stressed by Xenophon in his discussion of the general and the estate manager,¹¹²) as well as the civic ruler.

Throughout the realm, greater excellence of work is assured because of the increasing specialization of function made possible by a

highly developed urban life. In a remarkable passage, Xenophon refers to the breakdown of operations in the fabrication of shoes, one man cutting out the parts, another assembling them, and still others doing the stitching.¹¹³) Even chefs, specializing in the various modes of preparing food, replace generalists in the royal kitchens. So as to be free from the petty details of administration and to enjoy the necessary leisure to devote to broad policies for the general welfare, Cyrus institutes a hierarchical civil service, each level with clearly defined functions and responsibility for the level immediately below, as in a military system of organization.¹¹⁴) A civilian and military division of function is maintained in each province, where both the governor and the military commander are directly appointed by and responsible to Cyrus. If either officer observes any shortcoming in the behavior of the other he is required to report it immediately to his royal master.¹¹⁵) Linking the whole kingdom together are post stations placed at convenient distances, which allow Cyrus to keep in constant touch with his subordinates, receiving intelligence and transmitting directives.¹¹⁶)

All activities in a rational community are carefully prepared and planned, and their execution meticulously supervised.¹¹⁷) The leader calculates the resources and reserves at his disposal and those of the forces opposed to him ; he weighs the alternative courses of action and the consequences of each before a final choice of policy is made. Although to be successful, statesman, farmer, and lover must all engage in this kind of rational estimate, the ultimate in precise and thorough planning is for a well organized military operation. Thorough planning is the very essence of military science.¹¹⁸) The commander must spend all his wakeful hours thinking how he will deceive and overcome the enemy. Our first detailed record of the planning of an extensive military campaign by a master of the art of war is Xenophon's account, to which the entire sixth book of the *Cyropaedia* is allotted, of the preparations of Cyrus for the great battle in which he was to defeat the army of Croesus. The first thing to be attended to during the readying period is the security, health and provisioning of the army. Then spies are dispatched to gather information about the strength, disposition and intentions of the enemy. Siege engines are constructed for the purpose of destroying hostile forts. Cavalry units are strengthened and a corps of chariots created. Intensive training of all troops is begun, aided by contests among the troops to raise them to peak combat condition. The order of march and the supplying of the invading army, their food, drink, equipment, together with the nature of the service corps are worked out. Finally, on the basis of the intelligence that has been gathered and assessed, the tactics for the coming battle are discussed and

formulated.

To ensure a high degree of obedience, morale and operational efficiency in the preparation and execution of planning and in the day-to-day functioning of his organization, the leader can never relax and allow others to run the show. His presence must be felt everywhere, his vigilance must be never-flagging. Infinite pains and attention to detail usually make the difference between success and failure in civic affairs, on the battlefield, and in estate management.¹¹⁹) The able leader examines personally as many arrangements as possible, and constantly scrutinizes the behavior of his associates and subordinates. While the most conscientious and energetic leader can himself only check a small proportion of the affairs of his organization, he can by example instill in his men a devotion to detail.¹²⁰) Cyrus makes frequent inspections and undertakes periodic progresses through his Kingdom.¹²¹) What he is not able to investigate he delegates to circuit commissioners, officers who perform a function similar to the inspectors-general of a modern military establishment. Hence a community so organized and supervised as to decrease the element of the unpredictable, the haphazard and the arbitrary, will measurably increase and secure the leaders control over his followers.

One can argue that all of Xenophon's precepts regarding the art of leadership are the result of his own intimate acquaintance with handling men: his march with the Ten Thousand, his service with the Spartan forces, and his management of the estate at Scillus. On the other hand many of his emphases have a definite Socratic flavor.¹²²) Whatever the source, belief in some of the Socratic teachings could very well have been reinforced by what Xenophon had learned from actual military experience. The concepts of rule by men of ability and of a rationally organized society in which each individual performs the function for which he is best suited might be lessons that the young Xenophon had first learned from his one-time teacher. In addition the view that friendship is a much more adequate and lasting foundation for the exercise of power than mere constraint is characteristically Socratic. Xenophon concludes the *Oeconomicus*¹²³) by stating that although much about the mastery of others can be taught and learned, it remains essentially a divine gift to those who have mastered themselves. Self-knowledge and the consequent self-discipline, at the heart of the philosophy of Socrates, are also central to Xenophon's conception of leadership. The leader must have a thorough understanding not only of his own capacities and how they may best be used to advantage, but also of his limitations and how they may most suitably be offset, remedied, or disguised. He must be able to keep under tight rein his sorrows, worries, fears, and doubts, and know how to feign the disposition that the occasion demands. He

must assume many different roles,¹²⁴) and must be capable of estimating the affects of his acting upon the audience, calculating their mood, knowing when one role should be abandoned for another, and exactly how the role should be played at the particular moment.

VII

We have seen that Xenophon is a perceptive and inventive thinker. Although he has long been recognized by military theoreticians as the father of their craft, intellectual historians have overlooked his highly original conception of the social nature of the army. This basic insight led to another, an elementary theory of leadership, perhaps his most significant accomplishment, and one that surely entitles him to be called an ancestor of modern political science. Several aspects of the theory remain to be examined: law and utility, kingship and tyranny, and the question of deception in human relations.

It is tempting to make certain assumptions about Xenophon's views upon the basis of what we know of the influence of his military experience upon his intellectual outlook. For instance, we might mistakenly suspect that he believes law to be the command of the leader, a suspicion seemingly confirmed by the absence of any comment upon the nature of law in both the *Cyropaedia* and the *Hiero*. Law, as a matter of fact is defined in the *Memorabilia* by Pericles as the command of the ruler, even a tyrant, but he immediately qualifies this definition at Alcibiades' insistence that violence rather than law exists when one is forced rather than persuaded to act in a particular way.¹²⁵) Xenophon, then, is not a kind of legal positivist. He would define law as the *rightful* command of the statesman, the general, the ship's captain, or the estate manager. "Rightful" ultimately means adherence to commonly accepted moral principles of divine origin such as the worship and reverence of the gods, honoring one's parents, the prohibition of marriage between parents and children, and the return of a good for a good.¹²⁶) The leader who disregards these principles is not a true leader. He is if he heads civic society, a tyrant, not a king, and his commands are not laws in the normative sense employed by Xenophon.¹²⁷) Yet Xenophon would certainly never condone civil disobedience on the grounds that the command of the leader violates the natural law. Obedience to the law (apparently true of unjust "law" also) is the supreme civic virtue, and Sparta is the polity in which it has always been the most highly esteemed.¹²⁸) A major reason for Athens' deplorable civic condition is the decline in respect for law and constituted authority.¹²⁹) That laws are repealed from time to time, Xenophon warns, cannot excuse disobedience before their repeal, just as in the army during war, the fact that peace

will eventually ensue does not excuse insubordination.¹³⁰) The law in the normative sense, therefore, is the just and the good. Conformity to its prescriptions will benefit the individual by enabling him to realize his inherent nature.¹³¹) Although again it would be a misinterpretation to label Xenophon a utilitarian,¹³²) as a military commander and country squire, he seems to identify the good with what is useful in achieving the ends of the military and the agricultural arts. If a general consistently defeats the enemy, or the farmer's annual harvests increase his wealth substantially, the means they employ are good by their utility. However, the means of greatest utility in leading men are always inherently good. The successful leader by virtue of his success and the nature of his craft cannot have employed fundamentally vicious and evil methods in managing his men, since he must have aroused their enthusiastic support by winning their affection and respect.

Xenophon's distinction between king and tyrant may best be explained by first recalling Aristotle's view upon the subject in the *Politics*.¹³³) Aristotle maintains the conventional classical distinction between kingship and tyranny, respect to intention, origin, and behavior. Kings are motivated by a desire for the good; tyrants lust after personal wealth and aggrandizement. Kingship is instituted by consent; tyranny, by force and fraud. Once in power the king will act as guardian and steward of the people; the tyrant will suppress and exploit them in order to satisfy his insatiable and uncontrollable lust. He will use every means to sow distrust among his subjects and to sap their strength and spirit, for example, by forbidding various essential forms of associational life: education, common meals and clubs. Any possible opposition to his regime will be prevented by the elimination of all outstanding men in the community, and by the reliance upon a secret police and a praetorian guard of foreign mercenaries. To fill his own pockets the people and their country will be ruthlessly impoverished. As the fancy strikes him he will dishonor his subjects, particularly by violating the women. Naturally, this systematic despoiling produces the chief cause of the overthrow of tyrants, the hatred and contempt of the people. Aristotle suggests a second kind of tyranny by which this result can be avoided. The unconventional tyrant should *appear* to be a king, striving to benefit instead of looting his commonwealth. By acting in a manner exactly opposite to the ordinary tyrant, he will gain energetic and loyal supporters, his rule will be more durable, and he himself if not wholly good will neither be wholly bad. In contrast to Aristotle, Xenophon pays little attention to the motives of the leader. Whether the ruler has as his goals the general welfare or personal power seems of little concern to him. Indeed, he appears to suggest in the *Hiero* that the desires for personal

wealth and power can be better satisfied by being a king than a tyrant. Likewise, the way by which sovereignty is established appears to be of small relevance to Xenophon. The question of legitimacy is never considered. To Xenophon the significant difference between king and tyrant is in their behavior, and the resulting relation with their subjects. Are we concerned with the underlying intentions of a general or with how he has secured his position? No, our interest is in regard to his performance as a military commander. So Xenophon judges political leadership. Cyrus is a king because by his activities he has captured the imagination and won the devotion of his subjects. Hiero is a tyrant because he has alienated his subjects, who in their hatred and contempt, conspire to overthrow him. But Hiero can become a king, regardless of his intentions and the illegitimacy of his reign, if he exerts selfdiscipline and follows the policy of prudence recommended by Simonides, a policy, interestingly enough identical to that pursued by Cyrus. A Hiero can become a Cyrus. We know nothing of the “real” intentions of Cyrus. Nevertheless we do know that his empire was founded by military violence and guile. Who is Aristotle’s unconventional tyrant but a reformed Hiero, and who is a reformed Hiero, but a kingly Cyrus! Xenophon’s distinction between king and tyrant solely upon the basis of performance is one rather explicit formulation of the then very popular idea of the possibility of creating a well-ordered polity by reforming a tyrant, an idea that had intrigued both Plato and Aristotle and their followers. The doctrine stated by Xenophon is potentially revolutionary since by implication it is an attack upon legitimacy and a defense of political activism. Authority, it radically suggests, needs not rest upon legitimacy, but can be manufactured by an artful leader who seizes power; and most radical of all, the selfish and not the altruistic intentions of the leader may in the long run be the best guarantee of the general good. But these implications are never perceived by Xenophon.

In describing how a leader should act, Xenophon is ever mindful of the consequences of the action upon the followers. All behavior should be calculated to encourage them to advance whatever goals he may have in mind. Despite the insistence that in dealing with friends one must never resort to the same kind of trickery and deception employed against his enemies,¹³⁴) Xenophon quite clearly thinks that the able leader must often appear to be what he is not, and devise various artifices in order to win and hold friends and allies. This is the advice that Socrates gives to the courtesan, Theodote.¹³⁵) She must cleverly enmesh her prospective friends by the web of her charm and personality in much the same way as the hunter’s net entangles the prey of the chase. Ensnarement of the enemy in war and politics depends upon the ensnarement of friends. Oratory is one of the

principal ways by which the leader ensnares his friends.¹³⁶) His words will have the greatest impact if used sparingly. He should address his followers only when a special effort is required or in a moment of crisis, as on the eve of battle or in retreat, and on other occasions the responsibility should be delegated to others.¹³⁷) A number of interesting ruses are suggested by Xenophon. In order to increase the affection of his followers and to become in their minds a symbol of benevolence, the ruler himself should confer awards and honors, the duties of chastisement and punishment being performed by his subordinates.¹³⁸) To ensure the good will of his servants, Cyrus has them fed from his own table, as is the practice of ensuring the loyalty of dogs.¹³⁹) The lavishing of gifts upon his subjects serves the ruler in acquiring countless faithful “eyes and ears” throughout his realm, who will report any happenings that might be prejudicial to his interests.¹⁴⁰) By far the most interesting of Xenophon’s recommendations are those concerning the personal appearance and demeanor of the ruler and his entourage. The figure they present should be striking and majestic, calculated to inspire the populace with awe and devotion.¹⁴¹) Clothing should be designed to conceal physical defects and give the impression of tallness and handsomeness. Additional aids in the creation of this public image are shoes that will increase one’s height, and facial makeup. Cyrus always contrives to tower above his tall charioteer while riding in public.¹⁴²) Crude habits of deportment should be scrupulously avoided, every act characterized by calm, poise, and dignity.¹⁴³) Deceptions of the kind described seem mild and innocuous enough, when we realize that they are used only to supplement ability, like a fine setting designed to enhance the affect of an already lustrous jewel. Yet they are important to note because of what Xenophon says on the matter in the *Oeconomicus*.¹⁴⁴) Ischomachus, who is Xenophon himself speaking, the country gentlemen, expert in all the arts of agriculture and estate management, tells Socrates how one day his young bride attempting to make herself more attractive, appears in high-heeled shoes with face powdered and rouged. Rather taken aback, he gently suggests that between husband and wife there is no need to employ deception. Such artifices can be used to deceive the outside world, but among intimates they serve no purpose for they are easily recognized for what they are. Moreover, the user under these circumstances will suffer a loss of respect and esteem. Apparently, Xenophon believes that in regard to the use of deception and artifice three classes of people exist: intimates, friends (fellow-citizens), and enemies. Toward our intimates no type of deception ordinarily should be employed ; toward our friends, moderate deception for good purposes is justifiable;¹⁴⁵) toward our enemies any kind of fraud and trickery is

permissible.

Conclusion

Xenophon's genius lies in his having conceived of civic society and the civic ruler after the model of the army and its general. Consequently, from his military perspective, he sees the central political problem as one of leadership, chiefly the exercise of command and in that exercise he emphasizes the role of force, affection, manipulation, deception, rational calculation and organization. By so doing Xenophon gives a new direction to political thought, not to be followed, however, until the modern era. But he is never intellectually so daring as to break with the commonly held classical values of reason, virtue, and justice. His civic ruler commands a society of friends or fellow-citizens, and behaves toward them as the enlightened ancient Greek gentleman would usually expect one to treat friends. So bound by the classical ethos, Xenophon could hardly envisage the more radical implications of the idea of a military analogy of society.

1 The following biographical summary relies to a great extent upon Edouard De-lebecque, *Essai sur la vie de Xénophon* (Paris; 1957); and Werner Jaeger, *Vaidēta: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, tr. Gilbert Highet (New York, 1943), Vol. III, pp. 156-181.

2 *Anabasis*, III, i. 5-7.

3 A lucid and detailed account of the Ten Thousand is in H. W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers: From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus* (Oxford, 1933) pp. 23-42. Upon the command of the army see Gerald Nussbaum, "The Captains in the Army of the Ten Thousand," *Classica et Mediaevalia*, XX (1959), pp. 16-29.

4 *Hellenica*, III, iv, 15.

5 *Hellenica*, IV, iii, 3-9.

6 J. F. G. Fuller, *The Generalship of Alexander the Great* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1960), p. 42.

7 See the provocative essay by David Rapoport, "Military and Civil Societies: the Contemporary Significance of a Traditional Subject in Political Theory/" *Political Studies*, XII (June, 1964), pp. 178-201.

8 Theodore A. Dodge, *Alexander* (Boston and New York, 1890), Vol. I, p. 105. Non-military men who write on the ancient art of war seem less favorably inclined toward Xenophon than do professional soldiers who are students of military history. For example, compare the works cited below by Scammell, by Spaulding, and by Fuller with the following: F. E. Adcock, *The Greek and Macedonian Art of War* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962); H.W.Parke, *op. cit.*; W.W.Tarn, *Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments* (Cambridge, 1930).

9 J. M. Scammell, "The Art of Command According to Xenophon," *The Army Quarterly* IX (January, 1925), p. 365.

10 Oliver Lyman Spaulding, *Pen and Sword in Greece and Rome* (Princeton, 1937), p. 18.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 14, and Spaulding, "Ancient Warfare: To the Death of Julius Caesar," Part I of *Warfare: A Study of Military Methods from the Earliest Times*, ed.

Oliver Lyman Spaulding, Hoffman, Nickerson, and John Womack Wright, preface by General Tasker H. Bliss (New York, 1925), p. 71.

12 G. T. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge, 1935); p. 5.

13 Jean Luccioni, *Les Idées politiques et sociales de Xénophon* (Paris, 1947)? p. 47.

14 Fuller, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 241.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 53. Spaulding in *Pen and Sword* also thinks that the *Cyropaedia* is more than a historical romance. He maintains: "So, to get the opportunity to discuss his military theories, he had to invent a new form of *writing*: the result was the *Cyropaedia*. This is neither history nor biography, nor yet a historical novel ; but shares in the characteristics of all, and it gives the writer the chance he sought." (p. 34) and again in regard to the description of the battle plans of Cyrus against Croesus in *Cyropaedia*, VII, "Xenophon here is far ahead of this times. No Greek succeeded in getting such cooperation out of his various arms." (pp. 42-43).

17 Delebecque, *op. cit.*, p. 504.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 430,

19 On the importance of war in Greek civilization see Adcock, *op. cit.*, pp. i—13 ; Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, *The Ancient City: A Study on the Religion, Laws, and Institutions of Greece and Rome* (New York, n.d.), pp. 205-10; Victor Ehrenberg, *The Greek State* (Oxford, 1960), pp. 80-82; Fuller, *op. cit.*, pp. 16—18 ; Max Weber, *The City*, trans. and ed. Don Martindale and Gertrud Neuwirth (Glencoe, Ill., 1958), pp. 75-80, 143-49; 208-12, 220-26. The role of military training in Greek life is particularly emphasized by David Rapoport, "A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types," in *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, ed. Samuel P. Huntington (New York, 1962), pp. 80-82.

20 Thucydides' value in this respect is stressed by Adcock, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-100.

21 Dodge, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 137 ; Francis R. B. Godolphin in the introduction to his anthology, *The Greek Historians: The Complete and Unabridged Historical Works of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Arrian* (New York, 1942), I, p. xxxii ; Spaulding, *Pen and Sword*, pp. 13, 18. Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, *op. cit.*, relies much more upon Xenophon than upon Thucydides (contrary to Adcock) for the details of the ancient military art. His references to the former are pp. 18, 19, 42, 44-45, 50n, 53 , 5 73 75, 763 79, 148n, 241 ; to the latter, pp. 18, 43, 47, 57. In this connection see fn. 10, above.

22 Plato in *Euthydemus*, 271-73, mentions that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are skilled in the art of armoured combat- Xenophon in *Memorabilia*, III, i, refers to Dionysodorus as a teacher of generalship, and discusses the lessons he has given a young student, perhaps himself.

23 Plato, *Symposium*, 220—21.

24 Plato, *Laches*, 181.

25 Plato, *Apology*, 28.

26 C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*, The Rede Lecture, 1959 (Cambridge, 1959). Sir Charles, of course, is referring not to classical times, but to the "gulf of mutual incomprehension" (p. 4) existing between the literary and scientific worlds today.

27 *Euthyphro* 7 ; *I Alcibiades*, 111-12.

28 *Phaedo*, 66.

- 29 *The Republic*, II, 373.
- 30 *The Republic*, IV, 421-22.
- 31 *The Republic*, VIII, 567.
- 32 All of Book VIII of *The Republic* can be considered an illustration of this precept.
- 33 *The Republic*, V, 467.
- 34 *Laws*, I, 626-30.
- 35 *Laws*, VII, 803.
- 36 *Politics*, 1253 a.
- 37 Adcock, *op. cit.*, 1-2, 9-11.
- 38 Isocrates, *To Philip I*, 21.
- 39 Plato, *Laws*, I, 626 ; Aristotle, *Politics*, 1333 b.
- 40 *Politics*, 1333 b.
- 41 *Rhetoric*, 1359 b—1360 a.
- 42 *Statesman*, 304-305.
- 43 *Statesman*, 281-82.
- 44 *Euthydemus*, 289-91.
- 45 *Statesman*, 258.
- 46 *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1094 a-1094 b ; 1097 b.
- 47 *Politics*, 1325 a.
- 48 *Politics*, 1333 1-1333 b.
- 49 *Euthydemus*, 289-91 ; also *Laws*, VII, 823-24.
- 50 *Sophist*, 219-23.
- 51 *Politics*, 1256 a-1256 b.
- 52 *Politics*, 1259 b.
- 53 *Statesman*, 259.
- 54 *Politics*, 1329 a.
- 55 *The Republic*, II, 374.
- 56 *Protagoras*, 322.
- 57 *Philebus*, 55-56.
- 58 *The Republic*, VII, 522.
- 59 *Laws*, I, 639-40.
- 60 *Cyropaedia*, I, vi, 26-41.
- 61 Also see *Hipparchicus*, V.
- 62 For the civic value of hunting see *Cynegeticus*, XII-XIII, and Plato, *Laws*, VI, 763.
- 63 The quotations are from works in the chronological order suggested by Dele-becque, *op. cit.*, Ghs. 10-12. They span the last years, from 365 to 355/54 B.C.
- 64 *Cyropaedia*, I, vi, 37-38 (Dakyns' translation).
- 65 *Gipparchicus*, VI, 1 (Dakyns' translation).
- 66 *Memorabilia*, III, i, 6-7 (Dakyns' translation).
- 67 A recent highly regarded practitioner of the art of war, Field Marshal The Viscount Slim of Burma, might be taking a leaf from Xenophon when he writes:

“To watch a highly skilled, experienced, and resolute commander controlling a hard-fought battle . is to see, not only a man triumphing over the highest mental and physical stresses, but an artist producing his effects in the most complicated and difficult of all the arts.” See William J. Slim, *Defeat Into Victory* (New York, 1961), p. 371.

68 *Memorabilia*, III, iv.

69 M. Luccioni in his penetrating analysis, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-46, stresses the importance of Xenophon’s military experience for his general outlook. On p. 102 he refers to the assimilation of politics, economics and the art of war in Xenophon’s thought, and on p. 103 to the fact that the identification of economics and politics is found in Plato, reflecting a common classical proclivity. But Luccioni fails to note that Xenophon was the first to extend this identification to include the art of war. Since this essay was sent to press I have discovered that Georges Sorel in an early work, *Le procès de Socrate* (Paris, 1889), offers an interpretation of Xenophon parallel in certain respects to my own, particularly in the stress upon how the Greek’s military interests shaped his general outlook on life. See his insightful remarks on the *Oeconomicus*, pp. 377 ff. Sorel’s position will be outlined briefly in my forthcoming paper, “Some Reflections on Sorel and Machiavelli.”

70 *Ibid.*s pp. 53-54, for a similar discussion of Xenophon’s “practical approach.”

71 *Ibid.*, esp. pp. 53-59, 87, 104, for Luccioni’s idea of Xenophon’s general theory of the “chief.”

72 *ibid.*, p. 49.

73 *Memorabilia*, III, iv, 12; *O económicas*, XXI, 2.

74 Luccioni, *op. cit.*, p. 55, the “chief as psychologist.

75 *Oeconomicus*, XIII, 6-8.

76 *Oeconomicus*, IV, 7—11 ; IX, 14-15; XIV, 3-7; *Memorabilia*, III, iv, 8 ; *Hiero*, IX, 1-2; *Cyropaedia*, I, vi, 1-2, VIII, i, 16-20, 29.

77 *Anabasis*, II, vi, 9-14.

78 *Anabasis*, II, vi, 20.

79 *Cyropaedia*, I, vi, 21.

80 *Oeconomicus*, IV, 18-19; XXI, 7.

81 *Memorabilia*, III, iii, 11-15.

82 *Memorabilia*, III, iv, 9; *Oeconomicus*, XII, 5-7; *Hipparchicus*, VI, 1.

83 *Hiero*, I, 33; III.

84 *Memorabilia*, III, xi, 11-13.

85 *Cyropaedia*, VIII, ii, 2 ; *Hipparchicus*, VI, 3.

86 *Memorabilia*, III, ii, 2-4; *Hipparchicus*, VI, 2.

87 *Memorabilia*, III, ii, 1-4; *Hipparchicus*, VI, 3.

88 *Cyropaedia*, I, vi, 9, 12. Note the comment of Major-General Fuller, *op. cit.*, p.53.

89 *Oeconomicus*, VII, 37; *Hipparchicus*, VI, 3; *Cyropaedia*, I, vi, 15; VI, i, 23-25; VIII, ii, 24-25.

90 *Oeconomicus*, IX, 13—15; *Cyropaedia*, VIII, ii, 27.

91 *Cyropaedia*, VIII, ii, 7-23 ; *Hiero*, XI.

92 *Cyropaedia*, I, vi, 8.

- 93 *Cyropaedia*, I, vi, 22-25.
 94 *Oeconomicus*, XII, 18-20.
 95 *Memorabilia*, III, iii, 9-10; *Hipparchicus*, VI, 4-6 ; VIII, 21-22.
 96 *Agesilaus*, V, 3; VII, 2.
 97 *Cyropaedia*, VIII, i, 22-23.
 98 *Cyropaedia*, VIII, i, 34-37.
 99 *Memorabilia*, III, iii, 11-15; *Oeconomicus*, XII, 9-10; *Hipparchicus*, I, 24; VIII, 22.

- 100 *Oeconomicus*, XIII, 10-12.
 101 *Hellenica*, III, iv, 16; *Cyropaedia*, II, i, 22-24; *Hipparchicus*, I, 25-26.
 102 *Hiero*, IX, 4-11.
 103 *Cyropaedia*, VIII, ii, 26.
 104 *Oeconomicus*, VIII.
 105 Aristotle, *Politics*, 1330 b-1331 a.
 106 The detailed description of the camp of Cyrus is in *Cyropaedia*, VIII, v, 2-16.

- 107 *Cyropaedia*, II, i, 25-28.
 108 *Cyropaedia*, VIII, i, 13-15.
 109 *Cyropaedia*, VIII, i, 6.
 110 *Cyropaedia*, VIII, i, 9.
 111 *Cyropaedia*, VIII, i, 10-11.
 112 *Memorabilia*, III, iv, 8.

113 *Cyropaedia*, VIII, ii, 5-6. See the comments on this discussion of the division of labor in Karl Marx, *Capital*, tr. S. Moore and Edward Aveling, ed. Friedrich Engels (Chicago, 1932), I, pp. 400-402. Both Plato and Xenophon discuss the division of labor from the standpoint of use value rather than in reference to exchange value and the cheapening of commodities. Plato is concerned with the division of labor as the basis of social classes, Xenophon, “with characteristic bourgeois instinct,” with the workshop. Georges Sorel in *Reflections on Violence*, tr. T. E. Hulme and J. Roth (Glencoe, Ill., 1950), p. 263, fn. 50, writes that Xenophon “understood the importance of production, an importance of which Plato had no comprehension.” Cf. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Garden City, N.Y., 1959), p. 313, fn. 35.

That Xenophon was one of the first to consider the division of labor as the atomization of one activity into several different tasks performed by different individuals may very well have been a result of his military experience.

- 114 *Cyropaedia*, VIII, i, 13-15.
 115 *Cyropaedia*, VIII, vi, 1, 9; *Oeconomicus*, IV, 9-10.
 116 *Cyropaedia*, VIII, vi, 17.
 117 *Memorabilia*, III, iv, 11 ; vi, 8; xi, 5-10; *Oeconomicus*, IX, 14; X, 10; XX, 16-20; *Hipparchicus*, IX, 2.
 118 *Cyropaedia*, I, vi, 27—42; *Hipparchicus*, IV, 6 ; V, 9-15; VI, 3.
 119 *Oeconomicus*, XX, 1-20.

120 *Oeconomicus*, XII, 9-20.

121 *Cyropaedia*, VIII, vi, 16; *O económicas*, IV, 6-8.

122 The Socratic origin of Xenophon's principles is stressed by Luccioni, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 47, 49, 50, 53-56 ; Scammell, *op. cit.*, pp. 352-53.

123 *Oeconomicus*, XXI, 9-12. For a general discussion of self-command see *Memorabilia*, IV, v.

124 *Memorabilia*, III, i, 6-7. So many of these qualities of leadership are illustrated in the numerous speeches of the *Anabasis* and *Hellenica*.

125 *Memorabilia*, I, ii, 41-46.

126 *Memorabilia*, IV, iv, 18-25. See Luccioni, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

127 *Memorabilia*, III, ix, 10-15.

128 *Memorabilia*, IV, iv, 13-17.

129 *Memorabilia*, III, v, 4-24. Compare with Plato, *Laws*, III, 698-701.

130 *Memorabilia*, IV, iv, 14.

131 For the identification of the just, the useful, the good and the legal see *Memorabilia*, III, ix, 4; IV, iv, 12-13; vi, 8.

132 Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 107, calls Xenophon "something of a utilitarian" and the Xenophonic Socrates, "a respectable Benthamite."

133 *Politics*, 1310 b-1315 b.

134 *Cyropaedia*, I, vi, 27-28.

135 *Memorabilia*, III, xi.

136 *Memorabilia*, III, iii, 11-15.

137 *Cyropaedia*, I, vi, 19.

138 *Hiero*, IX, 1-3.

139 *Cyropaedia*, VIII, ii, 4.

140 *Cyropaedia*, VIII, ii, 7-23.

141 *Cyropaedia*, VIII, i, 40-41.

142 *Cyropaedia*, VIII, iii, 14.

143 *Cyropaedia*, VIII, i, 42.

144 *Oeconomicus* X, 2-8.

145 *Cyropaedia*, I, vi, 31.

Identity and Community Among Greek Mercenaries in the Classical World: 700-322 BCE

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The purpose of this paper is to discuss those Greeks who left their homes and communities to seek adventure and reward beyond the boundaries of mainland Greece. It focuses on the nature of community outside of community in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. In particular it seeks to examine how those Greeks who lived beyond the boundaries of mainland Greece identified themselves and each other. Robin Osborne saw identity as crucial to understanding the development of Greek society. He saw Greek history as

a story of how ... small groups struggled to distinguish themselves and to remain distinct as individuals within communities, as communities among other communities, and as Greeks among barbarians who were at least as wealthy, as organized and as skilled as themselves.¹

In this light the efforts of the Greeks of the sixth to fourth centuries BCE to remain distinct while overseas take on a very significant role in the pursuit of understanding Greek society. The numbers of Greeks found in the sources active in the Near East, Egypt and Sicily rose sharply in the late *polis* period. Many Greeks found military service with the Great King and other potentates of the ancient world. What follows examines the ways in which these ‘mercenaries’ identified themselves as Greeks surrounded as they were by so-called barbarians. It seeks to assess how they identified with each other, their allies and paymasters, their enemies and their friends and those states and communities that they had left behind.

In antiquity outsiders were perceived as a threat to any community. Any stranger could have been a run-away slave, an exile, a criminal on the run or a spy. While there was a natural antipathy towards outsiders, some foreigners might be treated with trust and friendship through ancestral connections and family alliances often referred to as guest or ritualized friendships. As a result of these two different conceptions outsiders were polarized into enemies and friends. Moses Finley stated there was confusion due to the ambivalence that characterized all of the dealings with the stranger in the Greek world.² The nature of identity, community and even the creation of polarity amongst the ancient Greek peoples has attracted interest recently.³ The establishment of identity and with it community for men who essentially had neither are the predominant themes of this paper.

Greek mercenaries are particularly instructive for analyzing the nature of identity in the Greek world. Greek mercenary service became a major phenomenon in the fourth century BCE. The subject has attracted a wide bibliography.⁴ Mercenary service carried no stigma in and of itself. It was an acceptable way of maintaining oneself while outside of the community. This acceptability can be found in the way in which the heroes of the Homeric poems networked with their friends from great distances to wage war together. Families found connections of a warrior past which united them in distant friendships. Indeed it is modern historians who call those Greeks who took service overseas mercenaries. The Greeks never truly developed a word for a mercenary that would fit the modern definition and they referred to mercenaries by a variety of terms: *epikouros*, *xenos*, *misthophoros*.⁵ Mercenary carries a broad meaning in what follows to encompass all those Greeks discussed. Identity among mercenaries, as with any member of any community, was both a public as well as a personal thing. Individuals took service with other individuals. They formed regiments and armies that in turn served under more powerful individuals. The network was formed quickly. The community had no roots of ancestry or tradition, unlike the city-states from which the men came, but in many cases the men in the community came together with other men from their homes. The mercenary army gives insights into Greek conceptions of community and belonging because of this lack of tradition.

In antiquity parentage was integral to one's identity.⁶ It did not simply determine wealth and upbringing, but made the difference between citizenship—full membership within the community and therefore all the rights and privileges therein—and slavery. There was an enormous range of status groups between these two poles within most communities. The group consented to status through birth. Once outside the community (and isolated) any status conferred by birth was threatened, if not irrelevant, without the necessary witnesses or evidence to support claims to status and background. Other communities did not have the tools to recognize the status of one man away from his own environment. Without witnesses and therefore evidence of status a man was bereft of his right to belonging and privileges. Even within the native community there was a hierarchy of status and privilege as not all free-people were equals. Meties, women, the legally disenfranchised (*atimoi*) and often, certain kinds of illegitimate children (for example the *nothoi* in Sparta) did not enjoy full rights within the community. These people were usually theoretically prohibited from owning or holding land. The importance of land ownership to the communities of the Greek city-states cannot be overstated. In traditional communities, like Sparta, the holding of a

kleros was a *sine qua non* of full membership in the community. Once beyond the boundaries of one's community the usual rules did not apply in assessment of one's status. How then did one assess status and therefore relationship to the community within mercenary armies?

The starting point for status overseas was naturally one's status at home. Aristocrats in one community cultivated ties with aristocrats of another through a series of rituals and ancestral relationships.⁷ These family alliances extended to military service. They enabled overseas military activity and, naturally, mercenary service. Ritualized friendships, guest friendships and even simple friendships made it possible for the less powerful to find connections overseas which they could cultivate to their own advantage. The creation of armies overseas was the product of close connections and networks on the Greek mainland. The role of close connections is demonstrated in the sources through hearsay in recruitment, relatives serving together and the overwhelming presence of both *xenia* and *philia* to describe the relationships of those involved in mercenary service.⁸ Indeed, *philia* played a significant role in binding the various echelons of command and cementing relationships between officers and their men. Communities of mercenaries are found serving together through thick and thin despite the bleak nature of their situation and the hostility of the sources towards specific commanders.⁹ Simple friendships must also have been important. Xenophon noted that some men had brought others with them from their own states.¹⁰ This suggests that community in the *Anabasis* really did begin at home. Nussbaum and Roy suggested that the officers of the units in which the men served had originally recruited these same men for the campaign.¹¹ If this was the case identity had been established at the outset of the campaign and underpinned the networks of the army's structure.

In spite of the important role played by relationships in the creation of mercenary armies the organization and construction of such armies remained a haphazard affair. Many men came to mercenary service through other ways than simply through networks and friendships. Those who had suffered exile from their native state theoretically had lost their identity as well as their community. Exile was a theme of Greek politics. These men were true outsiders. The outsider could expect a poor existence irrespective of the period. Homer, Tyrtaeus and Isocrates all paint a bleak picture of those men and their families forced to wander beyond the boundaries of their communities.¹² Despite their loss of status at home some exiles maintained a high position overseas by virtue of their connections with powerful men there. Alcibiades and Clearchus, one a refugee from Athens the other from Sparta, both found status with the Persian nobility.¹³ It might be

worth noting that despite his exile, Clearchus remained a Spartan in the minds both of the men he led and with whom he fought as well as in Xenophon's descriptions of his character.

Exiles were on the increase in the Greek world of the fourth century BCE.¹⁴ Those who lacked the influence and friendship of powerful men became wanderers— *planomenoi*.¹⁵ These wanderers and their families formed moving communities. They had no land and no traditions. Paul McKechnie noted that the sources described such wanderers as joining together (*syllegmai*) to form larger communities and so perhaps became almost wandering cities.¹⁶ A parallel might be found in the process of *synoikismos* that occurred in the archaic period on the Greek mainland. The armed heads of static households (*oikoi*) and their sons effectively became the citizen body of haphazard communities. Mercenary armies appear to have interacted in a similar way. The armies of traditional Greek city-states could be described as the citizen body (the *demos*) under arms.¹⁷ The *demos* can be found in roving armies overseas. The armed body of men formed the assembly of 'citizens' politically organized below the army's commanders who made up the political council. As with any army there were a vast number of camp followers and families. These people were effectively disenfranchised. They were not only women, but traders, sappers and slaves. This mass of people is almost invisible in the sources. G.B. Nussbaum drew on this theme of the mercenary army as the rootless city-state using as his example the Cyreans who Cyrus the Younger had employed to overthrow his brother, the Great King of Persia, in 401 BCE.¹⁸ Dalby saw parallels between large armies in the field and rootless cities, but he also noted the similarity that they had to colonizing ventures, remarking that Thucydides expressed this opinion regarding the Athenian expedition to Sicily.¹⁹

The male heads of households maintained a status within these wandering groups. This meant that they had inherited an identity from their former states. As heads of a household these men would have had a status in their native state. Outside of that state they maintained that status purely by virtue of the traditional position of the *kyrios* holding a position of authority within the *oikos*. There were many other connections with home that those outside the cities found in their social organization. Ancestral ritualized friendships made it common for specific nobles to find service with the same rulers overseas.²⁰ Among the less notable Greeks who took foreign-service graffiti illustrates that fathers and sons served together in Egypt in the fourth century BCE.²¹ A common feature of ritualized friendship which transcended and united different generations were names. The Greek tyrants of the late archaic age signified their interstate family ties through names.²² Herodotus remarked that Pisistratus was named

after the son of Neleus of Pylos as a way of indicating his family's connection with the early Athenian kings, Melanthus and Codrus.²³ Two otherwise unknown mercenaries are found with names of Egyptian pharaohs, Psamettichus²⁴ and Amyrtaeus.²⁵ Both men were Greeks and it is possible that their respective fathers sought community with their Egyptian benefactors. Communal food associations—*pheditia* and *syssitia*—are found operating within mercenary armies overseas as late as the fourth century.²⁶ Dalby argued that men on campaign prepared and cooked their food together and so instilled a sense of community amongst themselves. He found parallels for this practice with Greek colonizing expeditions.²⁷ These were obviously phenomena that the Greeks brought with them from their native communities.

Full membership within the community of the army derived from specific phenomena not unrelated to those that granted membership to those within static Greek city-states. The ownership of the requisite arms and armour for hoplite warfare was significant. Hoplites seem to have enjoyed a higher status within the community than their lighter equipped counterparts. These latter were invariably non-Greek (or associated with non-Greek equipment like that worn by Thracian peltasts) and from socially inferior backgrounds.²⁸ This association of the rank of hoplites was also made in the more traditional communities of the Greek mainland. The hoplite remained the cornerstone of the Greek city-state armies even in the fourth century BCE. Most Greeks who served outside of Greece were themselves hoplites, because a hoplite arm was what Near Eastern rulers needed in their armies.²⁹ To what extent they had all come from a 'hoplite-citizen-farmer' background can be debated, but hoplite warfare, by its nature, forced these men to fight together at very close quarters.³⁰ Conversely most mercenaries who found service within the Greek mainland were specialist light troops or cavalry.³¹ It is probable that most mercenary armies found homogeneity from their hoplite arms and equipment.³²

Another important emblem of acceptance within the community of an army was the receipt of remuneration by individuals within it. Just as Spartiates belonged to messes as an emblem of their status within the community, a practice found amongst Greek armies overseas, so payment of a salary, of food, or of common plunder recognized belonging to the community under arms. Xenophon mentioned the presence of a common fund from which the men could be rewarded or compensated for their good work for the community.³³ By the late fifth century the payment of a wage (*misthos*) in coin was common. At Athens those who received coin payments from the state were wage-earners (*misthophoroi*) but were also full members of the community as

the work they did to warrant *misthos* was for the state: council and jury service, military and ambassadorial service.³⁴ Non-citizens were prohibited from such paid state service. A wage reflected a status within the community and this was probably true within mercenary armies as it was in the city-states. Payment recognized social distinctions within the mercenary community. Generals (*strategoi*) received four times the wage of an ordinary soldier and officers (*lochagoi*) twice as much.³⁵ Remuneration levels reflected the fact that the officers generally came from better socio-economic backgrounds than the rank and file.

Payment—specifically in coinage—and the identity of those for whom it was minted had further repercussions in the relationships it established between employer and the community. The coinages that were minted specifically for mercenaries in the late fifth century and later illustrate a trend to represent neither states nor gods, but the individuals who were responsible for paying the men. Coinage established a direct relationship between the man who minted and provided the coin and the man who received it. There are plenty of examples of this trend. A famous coin attributed to the Persian satrap Tissaphernes whose face appears on the obverse demonstrates this well.³⁶ It was minted in the later fifth century, probably to pay Greek rowers, and carried the Greek legend ΒΑΣ. an abbreviation of the Greek word for belonging to the Persian Great King, next to the Attic owl and olive branch. The Persians undoubtedly minted this coin for a Greek audience. It starkly reminded the recipient that the source of his income was not Athenian, but Persian resources. There are many other similar coins from other parts of the Near East and Egypt in the early fourth century and the practice appeared on the Greek mainland at Phocis during the Third Sacred War of 355-346 BCE.³⁷ These coins were the first upon which Greek mainlanders placed individuals' names, in this case those of the Phocian generals. After the Phocian defeat in 346 Philip II outlawed the possession of such coins.³⁸ The coin identified the owner as part of the Phocian 'mercenary' community.

Membership within the mercenary community was not guaranteed. Roving armies were fickle and might banish members from their ranks. Banishment by mercenary armies was all the more remarkable when one considers that the community itself was un-rooted. The general had the power of banishment.³⁹ The assembly of men could also, simply by popular demand dismiss any one of its number. This happened to a man who served with Cyrus and Xenophon for suspicion that he was not a Greek, but a Lydian.⁴⁰ Xenophon does not take the time to explain the mechanics of how his banishment was achieved. It appears to have been the product of paranoia and mob

rule. It is interesting that at that particular moment the individual's rights (if he had any) were submerged beneath the suspicions of the majority.

This example of Greeks disenfranchising a man on suspicion that he was not like them (as they thought he was a Lydian because he had pierced ears!) raises important considerations for the Greekness of Greek mercenary communities overseas. Greekness, regardless of the city-state of origin, was of paramount importance to those who fought in the East and Sicily. At least the sources would have their readers believe that it was. It is far from clear that all Greek mercenary armies were entirely Greek in descent even amongst the hoplite forces. It is worth remembering that at least 50,000 Soviet nationals fought for the German army at Stalingrad in 1942-3. Greek writers from the time of Herodotus laboured to identify the otherness of the barbarians.⁴¹ Nowhere did Greeks serve together with non-Greeks in the same regiments. This was probably because most Greeks served as the hoplite arm of Near Eastern armies. Greek units were deliberately kept apart from native contingents even while encamped or on the march.⁴² There is evidence of mutual suspicion and fear between the two groups. While xenophobia was a significant theme of Greek writers in regard to Greek soldiers overseas, Greekness and its accompanying virtues were important tools in bolstering the spirits of beleaguered armies.

Nationalism (if it can be called such) of this kind is unsurprising given that most armies had little homogeneity other than the cause of their current employer. As situations worsened the more employers and commanders called upon Greekness to engender unity. The commanders appealed to the notion of fatherland several times in the *Anabasis*.⁴³ Generals also appealed to a notion of Greece—*Hellas*.⁴⁴ Deep in the Near East and surrounded by enemies Clearchus exalts his fellow Cyreans in the following terms: 'For I think of you to be my fatherland and friends and allies.'⁴⁵ At one point Xenophon reminded the army of the achievements of their forefathers.⁴⁶ The forefathers in question were the collection of Greeks who defeated the Persian invasions of the early fifth century BCE. This is a remarkable appeal given how few Greek states actually fought against the Persians.⁴⁷ Indeed the ancestors of many mercenaries may have fought on the other side. Alexander invoked the Greekness of his cause and emphasized the relative weaknesses of the opposition.⁴⁸ Ordinary soldiers from Syracuse appealed to Greeks in Carthaginian service not to fight against their fellow Greeks in Sicily.⁴⁹ To what extent the invocation of Greekness and its accompanying attributes or indeed the reality of Greekness in Greek mercenary armies at all held any currency can not be gauged.

Strongly linked to this notion of national unity was a notion of common religion. Zeus, in several manifestations,⁵⁰ Herakles⁵¹ and Ares (Enyalios in battle)⁵² each played their part in bringing the Greeks with Xenophon safely back to the sea. These three gods were the army's gods. Oaths were a common feature of the bond between friends and foes alike and were often accompanied by a handshake, itself a traditional symbol of peaceful intent.⁵³ Religious offerings united men with each other and their employer. A dedicational inscription to the pharaoh brought a kind of community to eleven Greeks from different city-states in Egypt in the fourth century BCE.⁵⁴ It certainly established a relationship with their Egyptian employer. Athletic contests were also a common feature of armies on campaign. Homer's heroes held Funeral Games at Troy and later armies held Games while on campaign.⁵⁵ Most notable of these were the games held by the men who served with Cyrus. Mark Golden implied that these games framed their enterprise as they occurred at the outset of their expedition and upon their return to the Greek world when they reached Trapezus.⁵⁶ All Greeks must have been aware of the Pan-Hellenic nature of games. Other common attributes from Greece unified armies. Language assisted greatly in the community of men away from Greece. Language and religion found a common bond in the singing of the paean. This was not only the song that the army sang at the moment of battle, but also after sacrifice, in festive mood and at moments of extreme crisis.⁵⁷

Greekness and the unity it engendered requires assessment. It should not cover up the real nature of mercenary service. All of the Greeks in 'mercenary service' were employed by foreign paymasters. They often fought against the Greek soldiers of another foreign ruler. This they did willingly. It has been pointed out that more Greeks died fighting in the service of Persians than died in the defence of Greece in the Persian wars.⁵⁸ Xenophon admitted that Cyrus' brother and opponent, Artaxerxes, had Greeks in his service against which he and his fellow Cyreans would (presumably) have fought.⁵⁹ He stated too that they would have taken service with Artaxerxes after the death of Cyrus.⁶⁰ On only one occasion do the sources reveal the Greeks of one side physically helping the Greeks of another. This occurred in Egypt in the 340s.⁶¹ The Greeks in Persian service attacked their Persian allies to prevent them from harming the Greeks in the Pharaoh's service as these latter retired under terms. There are plenty of examples of the opposite of this: the hostility of the Greeks who fought against Alexander the Great and their dogged allegiance to Darius III;⁶² the ruthless way in which Nicostratus of Argos fought against the Greeks while in Persian service in the 340s;⁶³ above all the willingness of Greeks, without any stigma attached whatsoever, to

take service overseas. All of these instances bear witness to the absence of common identity, and to Greekness, in the eastern Mediterranean in the fourth century BCE.⁶⁴

The very diversity of backgrounds and states from which the Greeks who took mercenary service came highlights this lack of common identity. There were differences between those Greeks who fought together. Athenians and Spartans enjoyed high status among the Greeks as a whole. They are often found as commanders rather than serving as soldiers in the ranks of the army. Xenophon explicitly stated this in regard to the Cyreans.⁶⁵ Spartans it seems were natural commanders of mercenary armies. The sources make it seem expected of Spartans to provide leadership.⁶⁶ Athenians were jealous, but even Athenian sources cannot deny this to the Spartans. Athenians at least were aware of the differences between their two nations. Of most significance for national identity were the Peloponnesians who made up the bulk of mercenaries in service in the later fifth and early fourth centuries BCE and in particular the Arcadians. Their political identity had been harnessed to the Peloponnesian League since the sixth century, but mercenary service gave them an outlet into the world beyond the mainland.

Arcadians were proud of their mercenary traditions. Lycomedes, the Arcadian statesman, was made to say in the *Hellenica* that Arcadians were chosen for service overseas because they were the best fighters with the sturdiest bodies amongst the Greek peoples.⁶⁷ Arcadians made up approximately 4,000 of the men on the Anabasis campaign.⁶⁸ As part of the Peloponnesian league they also served in Spartan armies under Spartan command. There are plenty of examples of Arcadian dissatisfaction with Spartan leadership.⁶⁹ On the march back to the sea during the *Anabasis* they attempted to form their own army (with dire consequences) under their own commanders.⁷⁰ The context of the campaign had changed by this time. The imminent danger presented by the forces of the Great King had dissipated and the Greeks felt that they were relatively safe having reached the sea. At this time the ties of their Greekness could be submerged beneath more parochial identities. It is interesting that just prior to the army splitting into these distinct regional groups the Arcadians had attended a dinner party. There they had danced traditional dances in arms that were common to Arcadian customs.⁷¹ The Arcadian aspirations to political and regional independence in 401 BCE reflected the changing nature of power in the Greek world that was to follow in the fourth century. Arcadia's political freedom came with the defeats of Sparta in the 360s BCE, but they were aware of their own identity at a much earlier date.⁷² Arcadians had an identity through their mercenary service. It is perhaps significant that after the foundation of the Arcadian League

in 369 BCE the sources did not mention a single named Arcadian in mercenary service.⁷³

It is fitting that mercenary service brought Arcadians back to the homeland from which they came. It is fitting also that they found service in the Arcadian League rather than for the Spartans, Syracusans or Persians. They had fought for others for so much of the previous century. The identity of the Greeks overseas came from home. These Greeks overseas seem outwardly as more Greek than the Greeks with their traditional *syssitia* and hoplite dominated communities. Identity and community came from witnesses who could validate status. They came from those with whom contact had already been achieved. Those who fought, ate, slept and sacrificed together vouched collectively for each other as belonging to the group. The officers and generals created a network of friendships beneath the great men of the age and they in turn rewarded all around them (or not) in acknowledgement of that community. Like their citizen counterparts on mainland Greece the soldiers were hoplites united by common messes and a military assembly not to mention the special bond forged by hoplite battle. The Greeks in overseas service had their own ideas about community and belonging founded in their own traditions and customs. It is an irony that so many of these Greeks were stateless wanderers and did not belong to the Greek communities from which they purported, at least, to have come.

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¹ Osborne, R., *Greece in the Making* (London and New York, 1996) 17.

² Finley, M., *The World of Odysseus* (London, 1956) 109.

³ Cartledge, P., *The Greeks: A Portrait of Self and Others* (Oxford and New York, 1993), 38-41, under the tell-tale sub-heading 'The Invention of the Barbarian'; Hornblower, S., *The Greek World 479–323 BC* (2nd edition, London, 1991), 11, for Persia's role in providing the Greeks with their identity; Hall, J.M., *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity* (Cambridge, 1997).

⁴ Parke, H.W., *The Greek Mercenary Soldier from Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus* (Oxford, 1933); Griffith, G.T., *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge, 1935); Nussbaum, G.B., 'The Captains in the Army of the Ten Thousand', *C&M* 20 (1959) 16-29; Aymard, A., 'Mercenariat et histoire grecque', *Etudes d'Istituto ancienne* (Paris, 1967) 487-98; Nussbaum, G.B., *The Ten Thousand: A Study of Social Organisation and Action in Xenophon's Anabasis* (Leiden, 1967); Roy, J., 'The Mercenaries of Cyrus', *Historia* 16 (1967) 292-323; Best, J., *Thracian Peltasts and their Influence of Greek Warfare* (Groningen, 1969); Seibt, G., *Griechische Söldner im Achaimenidenreich* (Bonn, 1976); Miller, H.F., 'The Practical and Economic Background to the Greek Mercenary Explosion', *Greece and Rome* 31 (1984) 153-60; Marinovic, L.P., *Le mercenariat grec au IV^e siècle av. n.è. et la crise de la polis* (Paris, 1988); McKechnie, P., *Outsiders in the Greek Cities in the Fourth Century B.C.* (London and New York, 1989); Lavelle, B., 'Epikouroi in Thucydides', *AJP* 110 (1989) 36-9; Dalby, A., 'Greeks Abroad: Social Organisation and Food Among the Ten Thousand', *JHS* 112 (1992) 16-30; Tagliamonte, G., *I*

figli di Marte: mobilità, mercenari e mercenariato Italici in Magna Grecia e Sicilia (Rome, 1994); Bettali, M. 1995. *I mercenari nel mondo Greco* (Pisa); Burckhardt, L., *Söldner und Bürger als Soldaten für Athen: Aspekte der politischen und militärischen Rolle Athenischer Bürger im Kriegswesen des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Stuttgart, 1996); Foulon, E., 'Μισθόφοροι et ξένοι hellenistiques', *REG* 108 (1995) 211-18; Trundle, M.F., 'Epikouroi, Xenoï and Misthophoroi in the Classical Greek World', *War and Society* 16 (1998) 1-12.

5 Lavelle 1989: 36-9; Gauthier, P., 'Les xenoï dans les textes athéniens de la seconde moitié du Ve siècle ay. J.-C' *Revue des études grecques* 84 (1971) 44-79; Trundle 1998:1-12.

6 Lane Fox, R., 'Some aspects of Inheritance in the Greek World' *Crux: Essays in Greek History Presented to G.E.M. de Ste Croix on his 75th Birthday*, eds Cartledge, P. and D. Harvey (London, 1985), 208-32, especially 228-9; MacDowell, D.M., *The Law in Classical Athens* (New York, 1978), 67-70, 91-2.

7 Herman, G., *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City* (London New York, 1987), discussed aspects of ritualized friendship throughout his book, but see 97-108 for its role in facilitating mercenary service.

8 There are many examples of the role of *xenia* and *philia* in mercenary service in Xenophon, *An.* III.1.4, VI.2.4, VI.4.8. Diodorus, XVI.52.1-3, remarked that Mentor was raised above all of the Great King's *philoï*. Mentor had done the King service and according to Diodorus, XVI.50.7, one service was the recruitment of mercenaries from Greece. Aristotle, *Poetics* 1453b 19-22, described *philia* as a most intimate relationship between close relatives, but it clearly had a more broad application. Thucydides, VIII.47-50, recorded the *philia* of Alcibiades with the Persians and the notion that the Athenian could make his colleagues the Persians' *philoï* as well. Sitta von Redden, *Exchange in Ancient Greece* (London, 1995), 45, has some interesting ideas regarding the obligation inherent in *philia* and particularly noted that the relationship did not need to be between equals.

9 This is best exemplified by those men who followed Phalaecus after the collapse of Phocis in 346 BCE see Diod. XVI.61.3-64.3; but also by the Greeks who remained loyal to Darius when all hope was lost, see Diod. XVII.27.2, Arrian, *Anab.* III.21.4 and Curtius Rufus V.8.4.

10 Xen. *An.* VI.4.8.

11 Nussbaum 1959:16-29; Roy 1967: 295, 317. Roy noted Xen. *An.* VI.4-8 at which Xenophon remarked that a man on the anabasis campaign had assembled a company of soldiers (*lochos*) for a former campaign in which he served. This may not always have been the case as there is evidence for specific recruiting officers (*xenologoi*) from Isocrates, V.96, but Aeneas Tacticus, XXII.29 attested that the unit's commanding officer was very much involved in recruitment.

12 Horn. *Od.* IX.269; Tyrt. X; Isoc. V.121.

13 Xen. *An.* I.1.9 for Clearchus, exiled by the Spartans, but supported by Cyrus. Roy 1967, 292-293, noted that it was Cyrus' favour that made Clearchus into the nominal leader of the Greek armies on the campaign. See Thuc. VI.47-50, for Alcibiades' interaction with the Athenian trierarchs and the Persians.

14 Parke 1933: 228 n.1; McKechnie 1989: 22-29, especially for the growing numbers of exiles in the fourth century.

15 Isoc. V.121.

16 McKechnie 1989,90, following Isoc. IV. 144 and V.121.

17 Ridley, R.T., 'The Hoplite as Citizen: Athenian Military Institutions in their

Social Context', *Antiquite Classique* 48 (1978) 508-548; Burckhardt, L. 1996: 26-71, 76-9, 86-138; Hanson, V.D., *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece* (New York, 1979); Hanson, V.D., *The Other Greeks: The Family Farm and the Agrarian Roots of Western Civilization* (New York, 1995), 305-306; Vernant, J.P., 'City-State Warfare', *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece* (New Jersey, 1974), 19-44.

18 Nussbaum 1967: 9, identified the close relationship of Xenophon's army to the socio-political organisation of a city-state.

19 Dalby 1992:17-20; Thuc. VII.77.4-5.

20 Only a few examples need to be cited here. Pindar, Ol. VI.7,74,101-105 and Pausanias, V.27.1, referred to fifth century Arcadian nobles having connections with Gelon in Sicily. Diodorus, XV.29.4 and XV.41-43, recorded that Iphicrates served with the Persians at their request and his son is found on an embassy to the Persian empire in Arrian, *Anab.* II. 15.2. Chabrias had ties with Egypt, according to Theopompus, *FGH* 115 F 105 and Diodorus, XV.29 and XV.92.3. Diodorus, XV.90-92 and Plutarch, *Ages.* 36, both recorded that the Spartans were also tied in some way to Egypt. There is plenty of evidence, Diod. XIV.44.2, 58.1, 62.1; Xen. *Hell* II.15.2, to show that Dionysius I and II also had relationships with the Spartans which revolved around the supply of mercenaries.

21 *SEG* XXXI. 1549-55, represents graffiti found on the walls of the Chapel of Achoris at Karnak dated to the fourth century BCE. The first five names are Greek and a further fifty-five names are in Cypriote syllabic script. It is probable that they all represented the names of mercenaries from Cyprus who had been stationed at Karnak.

22 For example, Herodotus, VI.130-131, remarked that Cleisthenes, the son of Megacles, was named after Cleisthenes the tyrant of Sicily.

23 Hdt. V.65.

24 Tod, M.N. ed., *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford, 1948), no. 4; Hicks E.L. and G.F. Hill, eds., *A Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford, 1901), no. 122; Hdt. II.152-154; Herman 1987: 101-2.

25 *CIG* III.4702; Hicks and Hill 1901, no. 122; Hdt. II.140, III. 15; Thuc. 1.110; Christian Habicht, 'Athens and the Attalids in the Second Century BC', *Hesperia* 49 (1990) 561-77, noted evidence, 571-2, for the practice of ordinary Athenians naming their children after great men in the second century BCE.

26 Dalby 1992, 28-29, following Xenophon, *An.* III.5.7, 5.14. For other examples of messes in a mercenary context see Xen. *An.* V.8.5; Isae. IV.18; Bourriot, F., 'Kaloι Kagathoi Kalokagathoi à Sparte', *Historia* 45 (1996) 129-40; Forais, C. and Casillas, J-M., 'An Appreciation of the Social Function of the Spartan Syssitia', *AHB* 11 (1997) 37-46, argued that the Spartan mess system was integral to the maintenance of the Spartan social hierarchy. Messes in the context of mercenary armies may reflect an archaism of Greek social interaction similar to that found among colonists from the Greek mainland.

27 Dalby 1992: 29-30. See 30 n.111, for the evidence for colonizing parallels.

28 Xen. *An.* IV.8.4.

29 Pl. *Leg.* 697e; Xen. *Cyr.* VIII.8.25-26; Seibt 1976, 121-162.

30 There is currently much debate about the provision of arms for mercenaries. McKechnie 1989: 80-5 and 'Greek Mercenary Troops and their Equipment', *Historia* 43 (1994) 297-305, believes that provision came predominantly from the employers, while Whitehead, D., 'Who Equipped Mercenary Troops in Classical Greece?' *Historia* 40 (1991) 105-113, argued that

most mercenaries came to service with their own hoplite equipment.

31 Best 1969:138; Parke 1933:48.

32 Victor Davis Hanson 1989 and 1995, argued for such homogeneity among the so-called middle group, in part due to their relationship to and with each other on the hoplite battlefield. Salmon, J., 'Political Hoplites', *JHS* 97 (1977) 84-101, makes the case for the subconscious community formed by hoplite warfare in the late archaic period and the political effects which this may have created.

33 Xenophon implied that payment could come from a common fund at *An.* III.3.18, but specifically mentions the presence of a common fund at V.1.12. Dalby 1992: 26 believes this common fund to be the leader's share of the booty and that Xenophon was using an euphemism by the word '*koinon*.'

34 Humphreys, S.C., 'Economy and Society in Classical Athens', *Annali della scuola Normale Super*, di Pisa ser. II. vol. 39 (1979) 1-26; Hansen, M., '*Misthos* for Magistrates in Classical Athens', *Symbolae Osloensis* 54 (1979) 5-22; Sitta von Redden, 'Money Law and Exchange: Coinage in the Greek *Polis*', *JHS* 117 (1997) 154-76; Martin, T.R., 'Why did the Greek *Polis* Originally Need Coins?' *Historia* 45 (1996) 257-82.

35 Xen. *An.* VII.3.10 and VII.6.1.

36 Jenkins, G.K., *Ancient Greek Coins* (London, 1972), 103, nos. 218 and 219; for other examples see page 136, no 319 and page 141; Youroukova, I., *Coins of the Ancient Thracians* (Oxford, 1976), 13, for a coin of Seuthes which may be relevant to Xenophon's army. Worth noting are the arguments of Elayi, J., 'La présence grecque dans les cités phéniciennes sous l'empire Perse achéménid', *REG* 105 (1992) 305-27, especially page 321, who argued that the Greeks demanded coins which they could recognize as similar to their own, but which also had a decent metallic content.

37 Williams, R.T., *The Silver Coinage of the Phocians* (New York, 1976) 50-2.

38 Diod. XVI.60.1.

39 Polyaeus, *Strat.* III.9.56, noted that Iphicrates banished men from his army on suspicion of treachery.

40 Xen. *An.* III. 130-32.

41 Cartledge 1993:38-41.

42 Xen. *An.* 1.2.16, 8.4, II.2.8; Diodorus, XVI.47.1, stated that when Artaxerxes invaded Egypt in the 340s the Greek units under his command had with them a Persian to 'supervise' their activity.

43 Xen. *An.* 1.3.6.

44 Xen. *An.* II.1.16, III.1.30.

45 Xen. *An.* 1.3.6.

46 Xen. *An.* III.2.11.

47 Herodotus, VIII.24, told the story of the Arcadians who joined the army of Xerxes in 480 BCE.

48 Arrian, *Anab.* II.7.4-5.

49 Plut. *Tim.* XX.2-3.

50 For Zeus see Xen. *An.* III.4.12, V.3.11; Zeus the Saviour 1.8.16, III.2.9, IV.8.25, VI.5.25; Zeus the King m.1.12, VI.1.22, VII.6.44, Zeus (*Xenios*) the stranger's god III.2.4, and Zeus the Merciful VII.8.4.

51 For Herakles see Xen. *An.* IV.8.25, V.24.25, VI.2.15.

52 For Enyalios as a war cry see Xen. *An.* 1.8.18, V.2.14.

53 Xen. *An.* II.3.28,4.7, III.1.21-22, III.2.10. The handshake was a common feature of bonding suspicious parties. Herman 1987:50-54, discussed the handshake as part of ritualized friendships in detail.

54 CIG III.4702; Hicks and Hill 1901, no. 122, it was a votive monument set up by Greeks near Memphis in the fourth century BCE which is now lost. It dated to one of Chabrias' two expeditions to Egypt, 386-380 or 362-361. Eleven Greek names appeared on the monument (five were Athenians) including a special reference to Amyrtaeus the Rhodian who established the table for offerings.

55 Homer, *Il.* XXIII.297-897; Xenophon, *An.* L.2.10 and IV.8.25-27, noted games amongst the Cyreans and Alexander held games, Arr. *Anab.* V.29.2, while in the Far East.

56 Golden, M., 'Equestrian Competition in Ancient Greece; Difference, Dissent, Democracy', *Phoenix* 51 (1997)327-44, 328.

57 Xen. *An.* 1.8.17-18,10.10, III.2.9, IV.3.19, 3.31, V.2.14, VI.1.5, 5.29.

58 Seibt 1976, 13.

59 Xen. *An.* II.1.7-22.

60 Xen. *An.* II.1.14.

61 Diod.XVI.49.5.

62 Diod. XVII.27.2; Arrian, *Anab.* III.21.4.

63 Diod XVI.44.3, 47.3, 48.3.

64 John Buckler, 'Philip II, The Greeks and the King, 346-336 BC', *Illinois Classical Studies* 19 (1994) 99-122, argued that Isocratic notions of 'Common Peace' and Greek community on the Greek mainland were not reflected at all in the practical application of Greek politics in the fourth century BCE. Greek mercenary activity in this period would support this position.

65 Xen. *An.* VI.2.10; Roy 1967:307-308.

66 Xen. *An.* VII.26-29, 6.13.

67 Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.23.

68 Roy 1967:308.

69 Xen. *An.* VI.1.30.

70 Xen. *An.* VI.2.10-4.11.

71 Wheeler, E., 'Hoplomachia: Greek Dances in Arms', *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies* 23 (1982) 223-33; Xen. *An.* VI.1.7-12.

72 Disaffection with Sparta was not uncommon in the Peloponnese. Strabo, VII.337 noted that synoecism and democratic feelings of the cities of Arcadia led to revolt from Spartan hegemony. In 420 BCE Arcadian Mantinea sided against Sparta in an alliance with Argos and Athens. This alliance was crushed in a battle near Mantinea in 418 BCE.

73 The total absence of Arcadians seems unlikely given their history for mercenary service, but may be more than coincidental given the Arcadian League's large army.

On the Origin of the Scythed Chariots¹

Alexander K. Nefiodkin

Two classical sources on the origin of scythed chariots have survived. Xenophon (*Cyr.* 6.1.27) and following him Arrian (*Tact.* 19.4)² attribute their introduction to the Persian king Cyrus the Great (mid – 6th century B.C.). Hesychius (s.v. δρεπανηφόρα ἄρματα) tells us that “the Macedonians are said to have used them first” (τοὺς Μακεδόνας φασὶ πρώτους χρῆσασθαι). However, strictly speaking, the “Cyropaedia” is not a historical work (Cic. *Ad Qu.fr.* 1.1.23: *Cyrus ille a Xenophonte non ad historiae fidem scriptus*). In this work the author informs us about the introduction of some Persian institutions of his own time (the late 5th – early 4th centuries B.C.) by Cyrus II.³ The evidence of Hesychius is simply incorrect. Hence there is a problem of discovering the truth in the “Cyropaedia”. Though many scholars continue to trust the information of Xenophon, the problem must be solved in a different way, by comparing oriental and classical sources in order to try to confirm or to refute the information of the Athenian historian.

Abbreviations:

AAArchäologischer Anzeiger. Berlin.

AJAmerican Journal of Archaeology. New York.

AKAkkadisches Handwörterbuch von B. Meissner, bearbeitet von W. von Soden. Wiesbaden.

BET.8Clay, Legal and Commercial Transactions Dated in the Assyrian, Neo-Babylonian and Persian Periods, Chiefly from Nippur. (The Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania. Series A: Cuneiform Texts. Vol. 8). Philadelphia, 1908.

BET.10Clay, Business Documents of Murashû Sons of Nippur Dated in the Reign of Darius II. (The Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania. Series A: Cuneiform Text. Vol. 10). Philadelphia, 1904.

CHDAssyrian Dictionary of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. Chicago.

CTCuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets in the British Museum. Pt. 22. London, 1906.

DNStrassmaier, Inschriften von Darius, König von Babylon. Leipzig, 1892.

BS. 2Clay, Business Documents of Murashû Sons of Nippur Dated in the Reign of Darius II. (The University of Pennsylvania. The Museum Publications of the Babylonian Section. Vol. 2 / 1). Philadelphia,

1912.

Ruly's Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, neue Bearbeitung. Stuttgart.

University of California Publications in Semitic Philology. Vol. 9. 1928.

Vorderasiatische Schriftdenkmäler der Königlichen Museen zu Berlin. Hrsgb. A. Ungnad. Bd. 6. Leipzig, 1908.

As far back as 1671 J. Scheffer did not trust Xenophon. He based his arguments on the Latin translation of the Bible, which interprets the “iron chariots” of the Canaanites as “scythed chariots” (*Jud.* 1.19; 4.13: *falcatos currus*). He put forward the Canaanite hypothesis of the origin of the armed chariots.⁴ It became a widespread opinion in the 17th-19th centuries.⁵ Probably an error has been made in the Vulgate because in Late Antiquity any war chariot, especially any one described as an “iron” one, was usually considered scythed. However, the Septuagint translates the term “iron chariots” literally as τὰ ἄρματα σιδηρὰ (*Jud.* 4.3, 13). M.A. Littauer and J.H. Crouwel explain this designation as a name of the chariots which had iron tires and an iron connection between the pole and the front of the chariot body. The fittings made of this metal could have inspired the epithet of these chariots in the eyes of the Jews who did not yet know iron.⁶ Archaeological finds suggest that iron had become known (as ornaments, daggers, spearheads) in Palestine in the 12th – early 11th centuries B.C., and it spread there later, displacing bronze tools and weapons during the 10th century B.C.⁷ It is possible that under the name “iron chariots” one should see vehicles with the body covered with bronze scales which are anachronistically replaced in sources with iron ones.⁸

P.M. Kozhin and J.K. Anderson suggested a theory of the Assyrian origin for the scythed chariots.⁹ Thus they expressed the opinion that had already existed in the 17th century.¹⁰ However, their hypothesis is based on only a mention of scythed chariots in the “Pérsica” of Ctesias (Diod. 2.5.4). But this author’s unreliability was already clear to ancient critics (Strab. 11.6.3; Plut. *Artax.* 1, 6; Aul. Gel. 9.4.1). Neither Akkadian written sources, nor Assyrian iconography, nor the tactics of these chariots indicate that they were scythed.¹¹ The Assyrian theory of the origin of the scythed *quadriga* lacks support today.

N.V. Sekunda suggested the possible borrowing of the scythed chariot by the Persians from the Indians.¹² However, in 1881 Rājendrālāla Mitra had already written about chariots with sickles of the ancient Indians.¹³ In fact, “Bhagavati-sutra” tells us about the “two wonderful engines of war” in detail. Once Ajātaśatru, the king of Magadha (493–461 B.C.), used them in war against the republic of the

Lichhavis. The first innovation, known as *mahāsīlākapaṇṭaga*, is a stone-throwing engine. The second one is described as follows: “when the battle with the *rahamusala* took place, then a single chariot, without any horses yoked to it or charioteer or warrior mounted on it, effected such a bloody morass through the destruction, slaughter, carnage and massacre of men, that on every side everybody ran away; for this reason that fight is called the *rahamusala* fight”.¹⁴ The commentator on the text Abhayadeva considers “*rahamusala* to be a chariot to which a mace is attached and which, ranning about, effects a great execution of men”.¹⁵ Thus it seems obvious that this machine was not a scythed chariot. This is the only place where this machine is mentioned at all.

The only probable hypothesis of the origin of scythed chariots is that they arose in Persia. It is not a mere chance that the ancient authors recognised the Persian chariot as a separate type (Arr. *Tact.* 2.5; Poll. 1.141; cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 6.4.16; Asclep. *Tact.* 8; Ael. *Tact.* 22.3; Max. Tyr. 13.1). To determine when these vehicles appeared it is necessary to ascertain their functions in battle and also the enemies against whom they were used.

Tactics of scythed *quadrigae* differed from those of their predecessors, which were unarmed chariots. The latter usually fought against each other before a clash of the infantry, they secured the flanks of their troops, and they pursued the enemy after the fighting. The unarmed chariots participated to a lesser degree in the frontal shock on the infantry of an opponent. This usually occurred when the enemy had no chariots.¹⁶

The scythe-bearing chariots were a device used only to charge the infantry of an enemy. Therefore these chariots were designed not only for a direct shock at the enemy, but also for a psychological effect to frighten him.

Against what opponent could the scythed *quadrigae* have been devised? Probably not against Asian foot levies consisting mainly of archers, as the outcome of battle was at that time usually decided by cavalry. First, the cavalry charge overwhelmed hostile horsemen, and then they attacked the latter’s infantry (Xen. *Cyr.* 1.4.23; 2.1.6–8). It was different with the charge of the scythed chariots: the fact is that the light-armed infantrymen of the enemy would have shot such a volume of missiles that these would have frightened both drivers and horses, and therefore the chariots would hardly have reached the foe.

It is obvious that scythed *quadrigae* were not created against Asian cavalry consisting mainly of troops equipped with missiles in the mid-1st millennium B.C. When the *quadrigae* were charging, the horsemen both dispersed and shot at the chariots. The scythed

chariots were invented just to break a close and numerous battle-array of heavy-armed infantrymen. Against such infantrymen cavalry charges were unsuccessful. The infantry could also be efficiently protected from the missiles of light-armed troops. The scythed chariots broke the order of the enemy infantrymen and facilitated actions of their cavalry and infantry.

Against what people could the scythe-bearing *quadrigae* have been used? The Persians relied on two main forces, mounted and foot archers (Hdt. 7.61, 84; Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.9; 2.1.11; Xen. *An.* 3.3.7, 15, 4.17). Later on, the Persian satraps also hired Greek mercenary hoplites. Troops of the Eastern Iranian peoples consisted mainly of horsemen (Hdt. 1.71, 215; 7.86; Xen. *Cyr.* 5.3.24; Curt. 7.7.32; Arr. *An.* 3.8.4). Mountain tribes of Iran fielded infantry armed with missiles, chiefly archers, as was natural for mountaineers (Xen. *Cyr.* 5.3.24; Xen. *An.* 4.1.10, 2.28; Strab. 11.13.6; Curt. 6.5.17). Anatolian people were armed mainly like peltasts (Hdt. 7.72–74, 76–77; Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.26; Polyb. 5.79.11). For the Neo-Babylonian period, the military organisation of the inhabitants of Southern Mesopotamia is little known. But probably it was based on the Assyrian model in many respects. In this model, the centre of a battle order consisted of bowmen under the protection of shield-bearers, and charging chariots and cavalry were placed on both flanks. The two latter bodies of troops were intended to attack the enemy's flanks and rear.¹⁷ The archers formed a large part of an Assyrian army. The so-called Display Inscription of Sargon II tells us that the king selected from "the land of Kummuhu" a force of 150 chariots, 1500 horsemen, 20000 bowmen, and 10000 spearmen and shield-bearers and "put them under his control".¹⁸ The ratio of the types of troops is significant; these soldiers were probably garrison troops and hence were intended mainly to defend fortifications, a task in which archers played an important part. The only infantry battle fought by the Assyrians that is known in detail is the battle of the Ulai river (655 B.C.).¹⁹ In that battle the Assyrian infantrymen fought in pairs composed of a shield-bearer and an archer. Therefore it seems that, in Mesopotamia, there was no deep massed formation of heavy armed infantry like the Greek phalanx.²⁰ Later, armoured shield-bearers continued to be used (Hdt. 7.63; Xen. *An.* 7.8.15) and the archers continued to play an important part (Jerem. 4.29; 6.23; 51.3; Aesch. *Pers.* 56).

In the 6th–5th centuries B.C., the Indians employed elephants widely in warfare. Because horses were afraid of elephants, it was necessary to train the former for a long time to fight against Indians (Diod. 2.16.18–19; *Mahābhārata.* 7.8.15ff; cf. *Bel. Afric.* 72; Polyæn. 4.21). But the basic point is that archers occupied an important place in ancient Indian armies (Hdt. 7.65; Strab. 15.1.52; Arr. *Ind.* 16.6–7;

Suid s.v. ἱππεῖς λευκοθώρακες; Phot. *Bibl.* 72. 49b; *Kautilya. Arthaśāstra.* 10.5).²¹

In my opinion, there were only two peoples able to fight the Persians with heavy-armed infantry: the Egyptians and the Greeks. The Egyptian foot soldiers were military settlers of Libyan origin, the Calasiries and the Hermotybies (Hdt. 2.163–166, 168; Diod. 1.73). In fighting, they formed a specially deep phalanx protected with their large shields and holding their spears forward (Xen. *Cyr.* 7.1.30, 33, 39; cf. Plat. *Tim.* 24b; Xen. *An.* 1.8.9; Achil. Tat. 3.13; Heliod. 9.20). Xenophon's "Cyropaedia" describes (7.1.29–32) how the Egyptians fought bravely at Thymbrara and even successfully sustained the charge of scythed chariots. However, as I have said above, the "Cyropaedia" is a work of fiction where the description of the battle is based on the author's ideas of tactics.²² Xenophon described the behaviour of the same Egyptian shield-bearers at the battle of Cunaxa (401 B.C.) in a different way. They did not enter into hand-to-hand combat at all, but merely ran away together with other levies of Artaxerxes from the attacking Greeks (Xen. *An.* 1.8.19). To the degree that the country of the pyramids was at that time under the power of Amyrtaeus, these Egyptian warriors were probably just military colonists who had been introduced by the Persian rulers (Xen. *Cyr.* 7.1.45). However, the Egyptians did not rely on their own troops, and widely employed Greek and Carian mercenaries from the 7th century B.C. onwards (Hdt. 1.152; Diod. 1.66.12). Besides that, the Greeks could successfully resist the Egyptian troops who had the advantage in number (Xen. *Ages.* 2.31; Diod. 15.92). Furthermore, I would like to note that the surviving classical sources do not contain, except for Heliodorus' novel (*Aeth.* 9.14, 20), any evidence of the use of Persian scythed chariots against Egyptian shield-bearers.

During the 5th century B.C. the permanent opponents of the Persians were the Greeks. They had at their disposal the firm heavy-armed infantry that was unsuccessfully charged by the Persian horsemen consisting mainly of mounted archers and javelinmen, who were employing hit and run tactics (Hdt. 9.20–25, 49; Diod. 11.30.3; Polyae. 7.14.3). At the same time, the Greeks made little use of troops with missiles who would be able to repulse the chariots. Therefore, their hoplites were vulnerable to charging chariots. But the main point is that the Hellenes understood the value of a close formation in a battle against individual warriors (Hdt. 6.112; 7.104; Thuc. 1.126.4–6; Xen. *An.* 1.7.3, 2.18; *Cyr.* 7.1.22; Diod. 11.6.2; Strab. 7.3.17).²³ The scythed chariots were designed to destroy this closeness. Moreover, the sources show that the Achaemenid scythed *quadrigae* were used against the Greek and, later, the Macedonian phalanx.

Let us establish chronological limits for the appearance of the scythed chariots. A *terminus ante quern* is obvious: the battle of Cunaxa (401 B.C.). In this battle both sides had numerous scythed chariots, a fact showing that they had come into existence some time earlier. A *terminus post quern* is not clear. It seems strange that Herodotus wrote nothing about scythed *quadrigae*, despite the fact that he described the structure of the Persian army in detail. Indeed, such chariots would have been collected from the whole empire in a large number, and this fact had to be known to the Father of History. Darius I had been preparing for a new war against the Greeks for three years after the battle of Marathon (Hdt. 7.1; Diod. 11.2.2; Just. 2.10.1). After his death, Xerxes spent nearly five years gathering his army (Hdt. 7.20; Diod. 11.2.3; Just. 2.10.12). The troops were assembled from all the satrapies. According to Herodotus (7.61–96), all types of troops were represented in Xerxes’ army: infantry, cavalry, camel-riders, marines, Libyan and Indian chariots. Besides that, we find a mention of war chariots in the “Persians” by Aeschylus (11. 45–47):

καὶ πολυχρύσοι Σάρδεις ἐπόχους
πολλοῖς ἄρμασιν ἐξορμῶσιν,
δίρρυμά τε καὶ τριρρύμα τέλη.

The ancients invariably interpreted the vehicles as many-poled chariots in which four or six horses were yoked (Schol. ad Aesch. *Pers.* 47; cf. Eustath. ad Horn. *Il.* 8.185 [p. 706.50]). Which chariots does Aeschylus describe, Persian or Lydian? It is possible to suppose that the author considered Sardis as an assembly point of the Persian armies. In the text of the tragedy, we see that in the parade the Asian troops of the Great King are described exactly as in Herodotus (Aesch. *Pers.* 12–58; Hdt. 7.61–96). Aeschylus tells us about the Egyptian seamen, Mysian javelinmen, Babylonian bowmen, and, most likely, Lydian chariot troops (cf. Sappho 27; Xen. *Cyr.* 7.4.14). Thus he shows that Xerxes’ army consisted of various types of troops and many nations. Aeschylus may be either depicting reality or lending an Eastern colour to his narration, because his description differs from Herodotus’ scrupulous catalogue of the Achaemenid army.²⁴ It must be noted that the tragedian, speaking about fear inspired by the chariots, tells us nothing about the scythes, which were the most terrible weapon of the vehicles in the ancients’ eyes (Diod. 17.53.1; App. *Mith.* 18; Veget. 3.24). More than that, Xenophon informs us that Cyrus preserved the ancient unarmed chariots of the defeated Lydians, instead of introducing a new kind of armed vehicle among them (*Cyr.* 7.4.14).²⁵ As far as we know, at that time the six-horsed chariot was used only as transport for parades, not in warfare. The Lydians

enjoyed driving chariots and, as Philostratus (*Imag.* 1.17.1) tells us, they were the first to yoke eight horses to the four-poled chariot (cf. Hdt. 7.40). Thus Aeschylus probably imagined the chariots of the Lydians as war vehicles, which were not scythed.

It should be noted that, according to Xenophon, armed chariots appeared at the time of Cyrus II. Thus he informs us that they had emerged long before him. On the other hand, Ctesias would have had less reason to mention the Assyrian scythed chariots, if he knew that the real armed vehicles appeared while he was staying at the court of Artaxerxes II (415/414–398/397 B.C.).²⁶

Does the Eastern evidence for the possession of land by the charioteers help us to date the appearance of scythed *quadrigaet*? As we see from Xenophon's narrative, charioteers were from the nobility who had the same social status as the Achaemenid "knights" – land-holding horsemen (*Cyr.* 8.6.10, 8.24). The former must have had the fiefs on which dependent people worked (*Xen. Cyr.* 8.4.28; cf. 7.5.72). There is no evidence in classical literature on these fiefs. However, Babylonian tablets (dating from the 6th through the 3rd centuries B.C.) mention a "land (literally "house") of the chariot (*bīt narkabti*)", which D. Head identifies with the fief for supplying a scythed *quadriga*.²⁷ However, this matter is not so simple.

The data of the tablets concerning the lands may be divided into two groups. The first group consists of documents dated from the mid-5th to the last third of the 3rd century B.C. The texts guarantee that a sold slave "has not the status of an oblate, of a *šušānu*, of a free person, of a royal slave, [that he does not belong]" to a horse land, nor to throne land, nor to a chariot land.²⁸ I would like to note that the lands of horses and those of chariots are put side by side in the documents, and that dependent people live on them. It is known that a horseman with his horse and armament served on a part of the horse land (*UCP.* 9: 275).²⁹ At the same time, these fiefs are not connected with the bow land, where land holders and their relatives were occupied with agriculture. We should also examine the second group of the economic documents dated to 530 (or 522, or 486/485)–491 B.C. (mainly from Sippar) and to 419–417 B.C. (from the archive of the entrepreneur house Murašu in Nippur). In the Sippar tablets we find (when a context has been preserved) that chariot land belongs to the chief priest of this city (*CT.* 22.74: 34) or a commissioner (*qīpu*) of the main temple, Ezida, in Borsippa (*VS.* 6.155: 3,7).³⁰ The tablet from Sippar probably refers to the military service of the chariot-land personnel (*CT.* 22.74). However, it is also possible that the text does not mention troops with chariots (cf. *Dar.* 154). The Nippur document tells us about the payment of rent to the chief (*šaknu*) of a chariot land (*BE.* 10.91: 8, 12; cf. *PBS.* 2/1.209: 2). Moreover, another document

mentions that “the commander of the bow (= archers) of the chariot fief of Nergal-Našir, the commissioner of Ezida” should pay silver intended for the payment of works for the king (VS. 6.155: 3; 492 / 491 B.C.). Hence, the archers were on chariot land, and their chief paid a huge tax to the king (18,3 kg of silver). So the information of the Babylonian tablets about the chariot land is far from completely clear. On the one hand, we have no direct evidence of military service from the fiefs. On the contrary, when we have evidence of the service of the charioteer, the land of chariot is not mentioned (cf. *BE*. 8.52; *Dar*. 154). On the other hand, the battle-chariot assistants (*taššališānu*) and sons of horse people (*mār amēl si-si-i*, probably horsemen) are registered to these lands.³¹ This may give evidence of the military character of the chariot land.

It is harder to understand the connection of the chariot land with temple economics. The members of the highest temple hierarchy, viz. the commissioner of Ezida in Borsippa and, probably, the chief priest of Sippar, held such land. It is to be assumed that these fiefs were given out from a temple fund to the sanctuary administration for service. It is possible that the name of the land is related to the “house of the chariot”, i. e. to the place in the temple where the ceremonial chariot of the god was kept.³² However, it is possible to put forward a counterargument to this assumption. In the second half of the 5th century B.C. a horse fief was held by scribes, and, therefore, soon after its foundation the land of chariot could be passed to other holders, and, as in this case, to the temple administration.³³ But, even if one accepts the traditional opinion that the *bīt narkabti* supplied a charioteer of the army,³⁴ it is not clear whether this warrior was a driver of a scythed vehicle, as D. Head suggests. In the late 6th and early 5th centuries B.C. Babylonia had most likely kept an old system of recruiting chariotry (cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 7.4.14; Susa g; s). Hence, the *bīt narkabti* could be a simple relic of a land possession of the Kassite chariotry.³⁵ Nevertheless, it is more probable that the *bīt narkabti* was introduced not to supply a charioteer, but to grant means for the chariot team and crew. This could have happened in the Neo-Babylonian period, but, more probably, in the Achaemenid epoch when duty to the king was assigned to the temples and their administration.³⁶

So one may accept an *argumentum ex silentio* of the ancient sources and consider the year 479 B.C. as a *terminus post quem*. A speech of the orator Maximus of Tyre (late 2nd century A.D.) is a unique exception. Here, the author attempts to describe the campaign of the Persians in Greece, using the words: “... the Barbarian clothes, Median horsemen, Persian chariots, Egyptian shields Carian slingers, Paphlagonian javelinmen, Thracian peltasts, Macedonian hoplites,

Thessalian cavalry” (13.1). Thus, all is mixed in this text, viz. both the campaigns of Xerxes and those of Alexander the Great. These Persian *quadrigae* are dated to the time of the Macedonian king (the battle of Gaugamela, 331 B.C.), but not to the time of the Achaemenid invasion of Greece in 480–479 B.C.

It should be taken into account that the introduction of a new armed force must have important reasons. The aim is to recover the expenses of training and supply of the warriors by using them in war. It is necessary to create a completely new type of troops in which the fighters would demonstrate high bravery by moving against the enemy lines with *quadrigae*, frequently lacking assistance from the cavalry. It is no mere chance that Xenophon testifies to the honour which the Persian kings gave to the chariotry (Cyr. 2.1.47; 8.8.24). Therefore, it seems most likely that the scythe-bearing chariot could appear and spread during the preparations for a future war. What is this war? To answer this question it is necessary to consider briefly Greek-Persian relations after Xerxes’ campaign.³⁷

After the battles of Plataea and Mycale (479 B.C.) the Persians did not fight actively against the Greeks. Xerxes, having left a part of his troops in Sardis, went to Ecbatana (Diod. 11.36.7). The Athenians seized Sestos on the Hellespont in 479 B.C. During the next two years they were involved in the organisation of the Delian League, while the Spartan leader Pausanias at the head of the allied forces subdued a larger part of Cyprus and took Byzantium (Thuc. 1.94; Diod. 11.44.2). In 476–475 B.C., the Athenians fought on the Thracian coast and captured Eion on the Strymon (Thuc. 1.98.1; Plut. Cym. 7). The Persians did not consider these actions important (cf. Just. 2.15.13). Xerxes began the real preparation for war only after Cimon had started to bring the Greek cities on the Anatolian coast under Athenian control (Plut. Cym. 12; Just. 2.15.17; cf. Diod. 11.58.2) and after the Persians had been defeated in the battle at the Eurymedon River in Pamphylia ca. 468 B.C. (Thuc. 1.100; Plut. Cym. 12–13). In 465 B.C., however, Xerxes was murdered by conspirators. The new king Artaxerxes I (465–424 B.C.) ascended to the throne. He replaced satraps, conducted reforms of his court, imposed taxes, and was then occupied with military preparations (Diod. 11.71.2: καὶ τῆς δυνάμεων κατασκευῆς; cf. Plut. Them. 29; Just. 3.1.7–8). In fact, he continued his father’s activities toward war against the Greeks. However, a revolt of the governor of Bactria distracted his attention from Greek affairs (464 B.C.)³⁸ and turned his attention to Central Asia (Plut. Them. 29). Meanwhile, ca. 460 B.C., an insurrection was begun by the Libyan Inarus in Egypt (Hdt. 7.7; Thuc. 1.104, 109; Plut. Them. 31). The Athenian assistance to him forced Artaxerxes to pay attention to Greece again. He began to assemble troops and called on

Themistocles to head them (Plut. *Them.* 31). New chariotry were probably gathered in the course of these long preparations, between 467 B.C. (Just. 2.15.17) and 458 B.C. (Diod. 11.74.1). Now it was the king himself who was occupied with the military preparations, but not the local satraps as before. He had both the authority and means for the introduction and spreading of the new weapon, viz. scythed chariots.

It is less probable that the scythed *quadriga* appeared later. About 449 B.C. the “Peace of Callias” was concluded. On land, there were no military actions between the Greeks and Persians until the beginning of 410 B.C. At this time, the satrap of Hellespontic Phrygia, Pharnabazos, became an ally of Sparta and actively helped it with his own troops. We could suppose that it was this satrap who invented the scythed chariots, as he skilfully used two chariots with scythes in the battle of Daskyleion (396 B.C.). However, it remains unclear why Ctesias and Xenophon thought that the scythed chariots had appeared in earlier times. Moreover, the reign of Darius II (424/423–404 B.C.) was a period of instability and, as a result, the administrative control over the Persian empire was weakened.³⁹ The presence of strong state power and some period of time were necessary for the introduction of a new type of troops. In addition, the realm of the Achaemenids was not menaced in that epoch, as it was in the previous one. Therefore I do not think that the author of this invention was Cyrus the Younger, who became, in many respects, a prototype of the future main hero of the “Cyropaedia”.⁴⁰ It is even less probable that the scythed *quadrigae* appeared in the course of conflicts between the satraps. They sometimes had armies comprising Greek hoplites who, however, were not numerous, and they usually formed the guards of the governors, while the main forces of the latter consisted of provincial militia and Persian land-holding cavalry.

Therefore, it is possible to assume that scythed chariots as an armed force emerged to charge on the phalanx of Greek hoplites in the 460s B.C.⁴¹

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¹ I am grateful to my friends Dr. V.P. Nikonorov, A.B. Xenophontov, and A.L. Zhmodikov for much material in the notes.

² A.M. Devine, “Arrian’s »Tactica«,” *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* II 34.1 (Berlin and New York 1993) 327.

³ See I.M. Diakonoff, *History of Media from the Origins to the End of the 4th Century B.C.* (Moscow and Leningrad 1956) 29–34 (in Russian); H.R. Breitenbach, “Xenophon,” *RE.* 9 A. 2 (1967) 1716.

⁴ J. Scheffer, *De re vehiculari veterum* II (Francofurti 1671) 190.

⁵ Q. Curtii Rufi *de gestis Alexandri Magni cum notis selectis variorum Raderi, Frein-shemii, Loccenii, Blancardi etc.* (Amstelodama 1684) n. ad Curt. 4.9.5; Q.

Curtius Rufus, *de rebus Alexandri Magni*, cum supplementis ... J. Minelli illustratus (Lipsiae 1707) n. 14 ad Curt. 4.9.5; “Char,” *Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers* ... publié par Diderot et d’Alembert III (Paris 1753) 184; ΞΕΝΟΦΩΝΤΟΣ ΞΥΡΟΥΠΙΑΞΔΕΑΣ ΒΙΒΛΙΑ ΟΚΤΩ recensuit et explicavit J.C. Zeunius (Lipsiae 1780) n. ad Xen. Cyr. 6.1.30; Xenophontis Atheniensis *scripta* in usum lectorum Graecis litteris tinctorum commentariis ad rerum et verborum intelligentiam illustrata a B.Weiske. I-II. Cyri disciplinam (Lipsiae 1795) n. ad Xen. Cyr. 6.1.30; “Char à faux,” *Dictionnaire de l’armée de terre* par Bardin. II (Paris 1851) 1165.

6 M. Littauer, J. Crouwel, “Chariots,” *The Anchor Bible Dictionary* 1 (1992) 891.

7 G.E. Wright, “Iron: The Date of Its Introduction into Common Use in Palestine,” *AJA* 43 (3)(1939) 459–463.

8 Cf. V. Karageorghis, E. Masson, “A propos de la découverte d’écaillés d’armure en bronze à Gastria-Alaas,” *AA* 90 (1) (1975) 220, fig. 21a; N. Stillman, N. Tallis, *Armies of the Ancient Near East 3000 BC to 539 BC. Organisation, Tactics, Dress and Equipment* (Worthing 1984) 142, fig. 93.

9 P.M. Kozhin, “Cnossian Chariots,” *Archaeology of Old and New World* (Moscow 1966) 79, n. 25 (in Russian); J.K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1970) 179, 317 n. 49.

10 For example, see “Char” (as in n. 5) 184; Zeune (as in n. 5) n. ad Xen. Cyr. 6.1.30; “Char, à faux” (as in n. 5) 1165. Cf. Xenophontis *de Cyri disciplina libri VIII*. Ex librorum scriptorum fide et virorum doctorum conjecturis recensuit, et interpretatus est J.G. Schneider (Lipsiae 1800) n. ad Xen. Cyr. 6.2.17.

11 See in detail B. Hrouda, “Assyrische Streitwagen,” *Iraq* 25 (2) (1963) 155–158; M.A. Littauer, “New Light on the Assyrian Chariot,” *Orientalia* N.S. 45 (1–2) (1976) 217–226; M.A. Littauer, J.H. Crouwel, *Wheeled Vehicles and Ridden Animals in the Ancient Near East* (Leiden and Köln 1979) 101–110, 128–133, 140–143.

12 N. Sekunda, *The Persian Army 560–330 BC* (London 1992) 26; cf. idem, “The Persians,” *Warfare in the Ancient World*. Ed. by J. Hackett (New York, Oxford, and Sydney 1989) 98–99.

13 R. Mitra, *Indo-Aryans: Contributions towards the Elucidation of Their Ancient and Mediaeval History* 1 (London 1881) 342; cf. E.W. Hopkins, “The Social and Military Position of the Ruling Caste in Ancient India, as Represented by the Sanskrit Epic,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 13 (1889) 236.

14 See A.F.R. Hoernle, “Appendix III,” *Uvāsagadasāo*. Translated by A.F.R. Hoernle (Calcutta 1885) 59–60.

15 Hoernle (as in n. 14) 59–60.

16 On chariot tactics see Stillman, Tallis (as in n. 8) 8, 18–19, 21, 25–26, 30, 36–38, 51, 55–56, 60–61, 65, 66–67; R. Drews, *The End of the Bronze Age: Changes in Warfare and the Catastrophe ca. 1200 B.C.* (Princeton 1993) 113–157; and especially see my Ph.D. thesis *War Chariots of Ancient Greece (the 16th–1st Centuries B.C.)* (St. Petersburg 1997, unpublished) 53–58, 133–136, 162–167 (in Russian).

17 Stillman, Tallis (as in n. 8) 60–61; D.J. Wiseman, “The Assyrians,” *Warfare in the Ancient World*. Ed. by J. Hackett (New York, Oxford, and Sydney 1989) 36–53; W. Mayer, *Politik und Kriegskunst der Assyrier* (Münster 1995) 452–453.

18 D.D. Luckenbill, *Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylonia*. II (Chicago 1927) 33, § 64; Stillman, Tallis (as in n. 8) 31.

19 See A.H. Layard, *The Monuments of Nineveh*. Series 2 (London 1853) Pis. 45–46; cf. Series 1. Pis. 70, 76; Series 2. Pis. 14–15; R.D. Barnett, W. Forman,

Assyrische Palastreliefs (Prague 1959) Taf. 109–110, 116.

20 Stillman, Tallis (as in n. 8) 32, 60–62; D. Head, *The Achaemenid Persian Army* (Stockport 1992) 50–51. Cf. Mayer (as in n. 17) 424–452.

21 In detail see G.F. Il'in, "Warfare in Ancient India," *Culture of Ancient India* (Moscow 1975) 388–389 (in Russian); D. Head, *Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars 359 BC to 146 BC* (Goring-by-Sea 1982) 31–33, 53–54.

22 Anderson (as in n. 9) 170; S.W. Hirsch, *The Friendship of the Barbarians: Xenophon and the Persian Empire* (Hanover and London 1985) 86–87.

23 V.D. Hanson, *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece* (London 1989) 10, 13, 31, 83–84, 103, 117, 151.

24 Cf. Ph. Keiper, *Die Perser des Aeschylus als Quelle für altpersische Altertumskunde*. Inaugural-Abhandlung (Erlangen 1877) 17.

25 On the Lydian war chariot of the Ionian type on a terracotta plaque from Sardis (ca. 530–520 B.C.) see W. Nagel, *Der mesopotamische Streitwagen und seine Entwicklung im ostmediterranen Bereich* (Berlin 1966) Abb. 52.

26 I.V. Piankov, *Central Asia According to the Account of the Ancient Historian Ctesias* (Dushanbe 1975) 11 (in Russian).

27 Head (as in n. 21) 4.

28 See CAD A: 212; CAD N: 359–360.

29 E. Ebeling, "Die Rüstung eines babylonischen Panzerreiters nach einem Verträge aus der Zeit Darius II.," *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie und vorderasiatische Archäologie* 50 (1952) 203–207.

30 See CAD N: 359. The author expresses his thanks to Prof. Dr. M.A. Dandamayev for his inestimable help in work on the tablets.

31 See AHW. 14 (1977) 1339. s.v. tašlišu; CAD S: 335; M.W. Stolper, *Entrepreneurs and Empire. The Murašû Archive, the Murašû Firm, and Persian Rule in Babylonia* (Leiden 1985) 30.

32 A. Salonen, *Die Landfahrzeuge des alten Mesopotamien* (Helsinki 1951) 69, 82: the original meaning of the *bīt narkabti* was a "body of a chariot."

33 W. Eilers believes that the fiefs passed into the hands of local inhabitants soon after their foundation, and, at the same time, that the priests possessed the fiefs as well (W. Eilers, rev. of O. Krückmann, *Babylonische Rechts- und Verwaltungs-Urkunden aus der Zeit Alexanders und der Diadochen*, Inaugural-Dissertation, Weimar 1931, *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung* 37 (2) [1934] 95). B. Funck considers that the king exploits the land through the temples (B. Funck, *Uruk zur Seleukidenzeit* [Berlin 1984] 242).

34 For example, see M.A. Dandamayev, *Slavery in Babylonia in the 7th–4th Centuries B.C.* (Moscow 1974) 34 (in Russian).

35 Cf. I.M. Diakonoff, "Middle-Babylonian Period in Lower Mesopotamia," *History of the Ancient Orient* 1. 1 (Moscow 1983) 432 (in Russian).

36 M.A. Dandamayev, "Achaemenid Babylonia," *Ancient Mesopotamia. Socio-Economic History* (Moscow 1969) 309–311; cf. the discreet position of A.L. Oppenheim, "The Babylonian Evidence of Achaemenian Rule in Mesopotamia," *The Cambridge History of Iran* 2 (Cambridge 1985) 575.

37 In detail see A.T. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago and London 1948) 262–268, 289, 303–304, 308–309; J.M. Cook, *The Persian Empire* (New York 1983) 126–128; M.A. Dandamayev, *Political History of the Achaemenid Empire* (Moscow 1985) 172–183, 188–190 (in Russian).

38 Dandamayev (as in n. 37) 177.

39 Stolper (as in n. 31) 153.

40 Hirsch (as in n. 22) 85.

41 The reconstruction of a bronze votive model of a two-horsed war chariot from a sanctuary at the hill of Gokheby (Eastern Georgia) by G. Lordkipanidze as a scythed chariot is very debatable: G. Lordkipanidze, "Model of War-Chariot from Gokheby," *A Collection of Articles in Archaeology Dedicated to the 70th Birthday Anniversary of the Famous Georgian Archaeologist Otar Japaridze*. Ed. by G. Avalishvili. I (Tbilisi 1994) 151–155. Pl. XXV-XXVI (in Georgian, the paper in Russian). Besides, the date of the find is not clear. It is dated from the late 2nd millennium B.C. to the first half of the 1st millennium B.C. (K.N. Pitskhelauri, *East Georgia at the End of the Bronze Age* [Works of Kakhety Archaeological Expedition. 31 [Tbilisi 1979] 43, 58, PL XIII [in Russian]; *Essays on the History of Georgia*. Ed. by G.A. Melikishvili, O.D. Lordkipanidze 1 [Tbilisi 1989] Fig. 51 [in Russian]).

Epameinondas, the Battle of Leuktra (371 B.C.), and the “Revolution” in Greek Battle Tactics

Victor Hanson

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. . . among my own acquaintances there was a man, who by chance having read two or three books by Ephoros, always used to bore every dinner guest by describing on every occasion the battle of Leuktra and its aftermath; consequently, he used to be nicknamed “Epameinondas.”

Plut. *Mor.* 514C

But when [Ephoros] describes the battle of Leuktra between the Thebans and the Lakedaimonians, or the battle of Mantinea between the very same peoples, in which Epameinondas lost his life, if in these accounts one in careful examination looks at his deployment and redeployment of forces during the actual battle, then he appears laughable, being both utterly inexperienced and unfamiliar with such matters. Granted that the battle of Leuktra, a simple engagement in which only one part of the army was engaged, does not make very clear the ignorance of the writer ...

Polyb. 12.25f.3–4

W. KENDRICK PRITCHETT, in reference to the quotation from Polybius cited above, recently remarked, “Ironically, there are more reconstructions of Leuktra than of any other Greek battle, and the end is not in sight.”¹ Professor Pritchett was referring to the steady stream of articles and books in which scholars have explained how at this **κίνδυνος ἀπλοῦς** Epameinondas “by his innovations had won his first great battle, Leuktra, before it began.”² Most have expressed regret over Xenophon’s brief description (*Hell.* 6.4.3–15)—the only contemporary account of the battle—and have concentrated instead on the more detailed, though secondhand, narratives of Plutarch (*Pel.* 20–23), Diodorus (15.52–56), and, to a lesser extent, Pausanias (9.13.3–12). Consequently, these efforts have led to disagreement over the role of the Sacred Band, the presence of a novel wedge formation,

the use of reserves, the integration of cavalry and infantry units, the deployment of an oblique attack, and the significance of the massed Theban phalanx on the left side of the battle line, as the literary evidence has been sifted through relentlessly in an effort to find the combination of maneuvers that might solve the “puzzle” of Leuktra. Despite these individual differences, such studies share *two* fundamental principles which have largely remained unquestioned: (1) something revolutionary, something decisive, something radically innovative was introduced by Epameinondas at the battle of Leuktra; (2) Xenophon’s account of the battle, which does not suggest any such breakthrough in tactics, is therefore unsatisfactory, due either to its incompleteness, its bias against the Thebans, or its simple inability to fathom the historic changes in warfare that Epameinondas had created.³ A few brief quotations illustrate these commonly held beliefs. To Cawkwell, Leuktra was “a revolution in the art of war.”⁴ Buckler has termed Epameinondas’s maneuvers “innovations which are undeniable.”⁵ Ducrey recently entitled a brief section of his book on Greek warfare “Un tacticien génial: Epaminondas.”⁶ It is no wonder, then, that Xenophon has taken a fair share of abuse. “The only logical conclusion,” remarked Buckler, “is that Xenophon was biased against the Thebans.”⁷ Anderson has written, “Above all, Xenophon falls short of the truth in his failure to give credit to the generalship of Epameinondas. Yet here again his fault seems to be that he, and his Spartan informants, did not immediately realize the genius of the Theban commander.”⁸

A different approach is needed—free from both ancient and modern preoccupations with the dynamic character of Epameinondas—if we are ever to understand the proper place of the Theban general and the remarkable victory at Leuktra in the history of Greek warfare.⁹ In what follows I shall suggest that there was nothing brilliant or revolutionary about Epameinondas’s tactics and capable generalship at Leuktra, and therefore nothing wrong with Xenophon’s brief description of the battle. Because another reconstruction of the events that took place at Leuktra is not needed, I will proceed directly to the general outline of the argument, which is presented in five separate yet interdependent sections: (1) the so-called innovations of Epameinondas at Leuktra will be examined to assess their novelty, their intrinsic value (if any) in tactical terms, and their basis in the historical record; (2) the relationship between the similar deployments at Leuktra (371 B.C.) and the later battle at Mantinea (362 B.C.) is critical and therefore needs reemphasis; (3) Xenophon’s narrative of the Theban battle plan also deserves careful reexamination; (4) all other accounts of Leuktra can be shown to derive directly from a laudatory, yet unreliable, “Epameinondas tradition”; and (5) finally,

an explanation for the victory at Leuktra is presented which is consistent with the contemporary description of Xenophon and therefore requires no belief in revolutionary tactical maneuvers drawn from later and generally inferior sources.

I Tactical Innovations Often Attributed to Epameinondas at Leuktra

The use of an exceedingly deep phalanx of fifty shields (Xen. *Hell* 6.4.12) by Epameinondas at Leuktra was, of course, not new; the Thebans had characteristically employed depths greater than the customary eight shields for over fifty years, since Pagondas in 424 B.C. had marshaled his men twenty-five ranks deep at Delion (Thuc. 4.93; Diod. 12.70; cf. Xen. *Hell* 4.2.18, 4.3.18; Plut. *Pel* 17.2). Pritchett has listed other examples that illustrate that most armies in Greece were well aware of this option of increasing their depth far earlier than Leuktra. He lists three advantages inherent in such a tactic: increased self-confidence; greater momentum added to the charge through the presence of such a concentrated mass; and, finally, adaptability to the confining terrain of the battlefield.¹⁰ Yet clearly there must have also been inherent disadvantages that account for the general tendency among armies to draw up only eight deep. First, any contingent that shortened its line essentially took a great number of men out of the clash of spears, placing them to the rear where their offensive weapons would play little role within the critical first collision of opposing battle lines. Men added to the rear also reduced the length of the battle line, increasing exposure to flank attack and perhaps incurring the distrust of allies who were then obliged to make up the difference by sending men from their own rear ranks to plug any gaps between contingents. While the image of terror created by adding depth to the charge may ultimately be the key factor behind such a deployment, there must have been a saturation point, say at sixteen or twenty-four shields, beyond which additional men to the rear added no real proportionate increase in the overall thrust of the phalanx, since the power of stumbling, pushing men in file diminished as the distance from the established point of contact increased.¹¹ The fifty shields of Kritias at the Peiraeus (403 B.C.) and the Syracusan use of sixteen ranks in their phalanx earlier against the Athenians (415 B.C.) seem to have offered little advantage to their respective losers, who faced adversaries deployed in far shallower array (Thuc. 6.67; Xen. *Hell* 2.4.11 ff.). Indeed, at Leuktra Xenophon believed that the Spartan right was turning the tide against the massed column of Thebans until Kleombrotos and his royal bodyguard suddenly went down. He cites the convincing argument that the king was carried off

the battlefield in the midst of the fighting—an occurrence which would have been impossible had the Spartans been smashed by the deeper column during the initial collision (*Hell* 6.4.13). The Theban phalanx of unique depth at Leuktra was, then, neither “novel nor particularly advantageous.

Yet, many would argue that the real innovation involved placing this unusual mass on the *left*, rather than the right wing (*Xen. Hell.* 6.4.12; *Diod.* 15.55.2; *Plut. Pel.* 23.1; *Polyaen. Strat.* 2.3.15). Cawkwell, for example, remarked that the transference of the decisive contingent from right to left was “the mark of a revolutionary conception in warfare,”¹² as the Thebans rejected outright the old idea that each respective right wing should strive to break through the weaker enemy line opposite before their own inferior left side collapsed and brought on a general defeat. However, this tactic of Epameinondas, too, was not an innovation. Over one hundred years earlier at Plataia, the Greeks had changed and then counterchanged their wings in an unsuccessful effort to pit the Athenians—who had had experience in fighting the Medes earlier at Marathon—directly against the Persians under Mardonios in order to make that collision especially decisive (*Hdt.* 9.46–48). At Solygeia, more than a half-century prior to the events at Leuktra, the Corinthians initiated the battle by charging directly against the Athenian right wing; in other words, their left wing took the initiative in an attempt to drive back the strong point of the Athenian line (*Thuc.* 4.43). On yet another occasion, eleven years before Leuktra, Teleutias had advanced against the city of Olynthos, leading his men on from the *left* wing of the army. That way he confronted the enemy directly with his Spartans as they issued forth from the gates of the city; after he suffered an initial defeat on his weaker allied right wing, his own infantry troops on the left were able to fight their way forward and drive the Olynthians back, thus winning the battle outright (*Xen. Hell* 5.2.40–43). Perhaps an even more significant example of the deployment of better troops on the left, rather than the customary right wing, occurred at Tegyra (375 B.C.)—a battle which Plutarch aptly called “a sort of prelude to Leuktra” (*Pel.* 16.1). There, Pelopidas and his colleagues stationed themselves on the left wing “in close array” in order that the first clash should occur “where the commanders of both sides stood”; again, if we believe Plutarch here, it is clear that Pelopidas had posted his best troops on his own left wing in order that he might lead them directly against the Spartan right, where he correctly surmised that the enemy high command was stationed. Once the Lakedaimonian polemarchs fell, Pelopidas easily led his men on to victory (*Plut. Pel.* 17). One could also argue that during the second phase of the battle of Koroneia (394 B.C.), the Spartans deliberately marched head-on

against the victorious Thebans, hoping to knock out their crack troops in a decisive second charge and thereby win the battle outright. Xenophon quite naturally observed the novelty of that head-to-head confrontation when he described the battle “to be like none other of our time” (*Hell.* 4.3.16).

This option of stationing the battlefield commander and his best troops on the left wing in an attempt to charge head-on into the enemy’s elite right wing was known well before Epameinondas employed the tactic at Leuktra. However, we must also ask whether there were any inherent tactical advantages within such a plan. Remember, once Epameinondas had insured a collision between elite troops, there was no guarantee either that his own massed phalanx of Thebans could break through the enemy phalanx opposite before they were taken in the flank by the longer and more mobile Spartan line, or that within such a collision he, rather than Kleombrotos, would survive the ordeal. Indeed, in one sense Epameinondas, like Agesilaos at Koroneia, rather than insuring victory, merely orchestrated a brutal and decisive collision, as the crack troops on each side themselves decided the outcome of the entire battle.

Concerning the other so-called innovations at Leuktra, there is the additional problem of our literary sources: we must ask not only whether the integrated use of cavalry, the use of reserves, the wedge formation, and the oblique attack were novel or advantageous, but also if they even occurred at Leuktra. The use of cavalry at the battle is a good example, for scholars such as Cawkwell and Buckler have identified the Theban mounted charge as an especially novel use of cavalry and infantry contingents, foreshadowing the later masterful tactics of Philip and Alexander. Cawkwell, for example, believed there occurred “for the first time in a major Greek battle that coordination of arms which was to be so remarkably developed by Philip and Alexander.”¹³ Yet, Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.4.9–14) alone mentions the presence of mounted troops at Leuktra, and what he says is especially interesting. From his account the following sequence of events takes place: (1) the Spartans in breaking with tradition *first* deploy their cavalry in front (προετάξαντο), rather than on the wings, of their phalanx; (2) *in reaction to this move* the Thebans likewise place (ἀντετάξαντο) their horsemen in front of the infantry; (3) the two sides engage in a mounted skirmish in the very moments before the advance of the Spartan infantry; (4) the Spartan horsemen are defeated and, as they retreat (φεύγοντες), fall afoul of their oncoming hoplites; and (5) the Theban infantry advances and meets the Spartan hoplites just as they fight their way forward through their own retreating and defeated cavalry units. Although Xenophon suggests that all this confusion was due to the poor quality of the Spartan

horsemen (6.4.10–11), many modern scholars have seen herein the birth of integrated cavalry tactics. Once again, however, Xenophon states quite clearly that it was the Spartans, not the Thebans, who chose to put their cavalry in front of the phalanx. Likewise, after their defeat, like most troops on the run, they turn 180 degrees and flee to the rear. There is no indication here at all that “the *Boiotian* cavalry deliberately drove the survivors back into their own line.”¹⁴ One must ask where else were the Spartan horsemen to flee once defeated? Few men, mounted or otherwise, can be expected to retreat sideways. Of course, there is no statement here that the Theban cavalry cut off a retreat to the flanks. Nor does Xenophon say that “by using the gap in the Spartan line as their escape route the horsemen prevented either Kleom-brotos or his allies from closing up the line,”¹⁵ as if the retreating Spartan cavalry were deliberately channeled back into their own line of infantry with the intention of separating Kleombrotos from his men. From this entire account there is *never* mention of any deliberate Theban moves, but, rather, of skillful reactions to poor deployment and performance on the part of the Spartan cavalry, which was clearly inferior and unsuited for its novel, though unwise, role at the head of the army.

If one were to search through Greek history for the first signs of a truly novel coordination between cavalry and infantry, there are plenty of *earlier* instances where there is no question that success is achieved by deliberate pre-battle planning and design. A fine example is the role of the Theban cavalry at the battle of Delion over fifty years earlier. There, the Theban commander Pagondas ordered a reserve contingent of horsemen to ride out to the support of his crumbling left wing. When they arrived on the scene the once victorious Athenians panicked “because they imagined another army was bearing down upon them” (Thuc. 4.93). Perhaps an even clearer example can be drawn from the experiences of Agesilaos in Asia Minor. For example, at the Paktolos River (395 B.C.) the Spartan general ordered his cavalry to lead the attack, assuring them “that both he and the entire army were following behind them” (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.23). And recently Rahe has argued that a veritable revolution in warfare occurred in Asia Minor when Cyrus, and later Agesilaos, for the first time sought to employ cavalry units as an integral part of the initial hoplite infantry attack—a tactic antedating Leuktra by over a quarter of a century.¹⁶

A few scholars also have added a novel use of reserves to the list of revolutionary maneuvers that Epameinondas supposedly employed at Leuktra. Yet, as in the case of the alleged innovation in cavalry usage, there remain the same two problems: (1) our sources do not indicate that Epameinondas ever used reserve troops at Leuktra; (2) even if

such a tactic was supported by the literary evidence, there are numerous *earlier* instances in Greek warfare where reserve troops played a vital role in hoplite battles. In the first case, the argument has been put forth that either the allied right wing of the Thebans or the rear ranks of the massed phalanx on the left constituted reserve units.¹⁷ But clearly this will not do. Properly speaking, reserve troops form quite separate contingents which are deliberately held back from the initial engagement for the purpose of strengthening weak points or exploiting success. Neither the allied left wing nor the rear ranks of Epameinondas's own phalanx were held back from the fighting with the intention that they be conserved for a decisive entry later in the battle. Others have turned to the role of Pelopidas and the Sacred Band. Not long ago Anderson, for example, revived the nineteenth-century German view of Köchly-Rüstow that Pelopidas and his elite corps were positioned behind the Theban left wing and then came up to the front in the nick of time to thwart the flanking movements of the Spartans.¹⁸ However, three reservations have been expressed that seem to preclude such a scenario.¹⁹ In the first place, neither Plutarch nor any other ancient source ever says explicitly that Pelopidas was stationed to the rear or that he marched around the Theban phalanx to confront the Spartans. Second, such a reserve contingent probably could not have known of the events at the front, when they were stationed behind fifty rows of shields. Finally, on another occasion Plutarch states that Pelopidas and his Sacred Band fought at the *forefront* of the city's battles—a statement that is hard to reconcile with the view that Plutarch believed Pelopidas stayed out of the initial collision at Leuktra (*Pel* 19.3; cf. *Nep. Pel* 4.2).

Nor should we be led to believe that by 371 B.C. the use of reserve contingents could be considered by anyone to have been revolutionary. The remarkable battles of Solygeia and Delion during the Peloponnesian War—mentioned earlier in another context—each saw the use of troops that were ordered into the battle at key junctures to bring fresh impetus to the fray (Thuc. 4.43; 4.93). Anderson has also cited three other examples earlier than Leuktra where detachments follow and augment the initial attack: Klearidas's forces at Amphipolis (422 B.C.), the Athenian square at Syracuse (414 B.C.), and the three reserve companies employed by the Ten Thousand against Pharnabazos (400 B.C.).²⁰ Years before Leuktra, the historian Thucydides made Brasidas say of his plans at Amphipolis, "The force that follows up is always more disturbing to the enemy than the one with which he is presently fighting" (Thuc. 5.9.8).

Recently, an intriguing argument has been put forth that much of Epameinondas's success at Leuktra can be attributed to the employment of an ἔμβολον or wedge formation, rather than a simple

massed square of fifty shields.²¹ Because an entire study has been devoted to a detailed refutation of this theory, further reservations need not be repeated here,²² and thus we can proceed to the sixth “innovation” of Epameinondas, the oblique attack (λοξή φάλαγξ) and the refused right wing, or the notion that Epameinondas for the first time in Greek history led a specialized contingent diagonally across the battlefield to inflict a concentrated blow, while ordering weaker and suspect troops on the right either deliberately to withdraw or to keep a careful distance from the enemy.²³ Because this maneuver or, more properly, set of maneuvers has become the capstone argument for the prevailing view that Leuktra marks a revolution in Greek warfare, it may be especially disturbing to many that I will suggest that it too cannot in any sense be seen as an innovative stroke. In the first place, all four ancient sources disagree over the oblique attack. Xenophon omits it entirely. He apparently saw nothing unusual in Epameinondas’s march to the left once the Theban general intended to mass his men in depth there. After all, where else might his Thebans go if they were to collide with the Spartan right wing opposite them? A march either straight ahead or, as customary, to the right would be suicidal, insuring that Kleombrotos’s longer line could take the Thebans on their unprotected sides or from the rear. Plutarch (*Pel.* 23.1) states that Epameinondas led his phalanx obliquely to the left (τὴν φάλαγγα λοξὴν ἐπὶ τὸ εὐώνυμον ἔλκοντος) and seems to imply a diagonal advance leftward by the entire Theban battle line. Yet, such an oblique march to the left could be anticipated as the only economical means of reaching the Spartans. There seems little drama, then, to Plutarch’s statement of the obvious, especially since he makes no mention at all that the Theban right wing was deliberately held back. Buckler would argue from Plutarch that the novel aspect of Epameinondas’s leftward march was that it “countered any rightward drift of the Spartan army” and “insured that the Theban striking-wing would hit Kleombrotos head-to-head.”²⁴ One could believe in the novelty of such a move if the two respective phalanxes posted opposite each other were of roughly equal depth and thus presented battle lines of approximately equal length. Under those circumstances it would be very alarming to see an enemy phalanx across the battlefield suddenly veer left in exactly the opposite direction from what had been anticipated, bearing full steam upon the right rather than the left flank. However, at Leuktra the Theban phalanx presented a far shorter front than the Spartan line opposite, and thus too a far greater unprotected flank of fifty men, all with their left sides exposed to the enemy.²⁵ Consequently, Plutarch’s brief notice of Epameinondas’s leftward march only records the obvious, for the Thebans really had no other path to follow. Diodorus (15.55.2)

adds a wrinkle to the description of Plutarch in that he believes an oblique attack also consisted in deliberately withholding the right wing of the Theban allies (παρηγγέλειν αὐτοῖς φυγομαχεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐφοδὸν τῶν πολεμίων ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ὀλίγον ὑποχωρεῖν). This is the source, then, for the “refused” wing at Leuktra among those scholars who see the deliberate withdrawal of the allies as yet another innovation by Epameinondas, who took pains to keep his weaker contingents out of the battle, thereby preventing a general collapse which could spoil his own attack.²⁶ Yet, many have rightly questioned the entire scenario. Why would the Boiotians need to withdraw when they faced equally suspect, allied Peloponnesian troops opposite? Moreover, were stich men even capable of carrying out the most difficult of maneuvers, a deliberate march to the rear under battle conditions? As Anderson has pointed out, “If they had begun to retreat, they would soon have been running in earnest.”²⁷ Finally, Pausanias, who drew either directly or indirectly on the same sources as Diodorus, seems to imply that exactly the opposite took place. In his account, far from deliberately withdrawing and staying out of the fray, the Theban right wing and the Spartan left actually came in contact: “when they began the battle, the allies of the Lakedaimonians, who before this time had not been especially friendly, now gave a vivid example of their hostility, since they were not willing to stand their ground, and gave in *wherever the enemy attacked them*” (Paus. 9.13.9; emphasis added). In short, this entire notion of the oblique attack of the Thebans at Leuktra as a revolutionary innovation in Greek warfare is mistaken. Pausanias, Plutarch, and Diodorus all differ on both the movement of the Theban battle line and the role of the Theban right wing. Such a diagonal march leftward took place, but given the deployment of the two armies before the battle, there was absolutely no other choice open to Epameinondas if he was to follow through on his intention to strike Kleombrotos. Since Xenophon records that Epameinondas’s elite troops were on the left wing and that they had shortened their front by massing in depth to fifty shields, his silence about the “oblique attack” is not a deliberate denial of the genius of Epameinondas but, rather, a reluctance to state the obvious and necessary course of events that must follow from his account of the pre-battle deployments.

In conclusion, the massed phalanx and concentration of elite troops under the general on the left wing were not novel, nor did they offer any inherent tactical advantages. The use of new, integrated cavalry tactics and reserve forces on the part of the Thebans is not evident from the descriptions of our ancient sources; such postulated “innovations” in any case were anticipated on numerous occasions

years earlier. The “oblique attack” is an elaborate description of the simple, obvious course of the Theban battle march, given the pre-battle formations of the respective sides. Our four sources on the battle cannot agree on the role of the Theban right wing, and so the idea that it served as a “refused” wing is not substantiated. Moreover, there was little tactical reason for these generally inferior troops to attempt such a complicated maneuver. Pausanias’s statement that they did engage the Spartans allies is therefore just as plausible.

II Leuktra and Mantinea (362 B.C.)

Nine years after the victory at Leuktra, Epameinondas met the Spartans at Mantinea. Epameinondas was on the left wing; once more he commanded a massed phalanx of unusual depth; once more his right wing of allied troops was to play little, if any, role. After a decisive initial success, however, his attack fizzled and his men lost the momentum of his advance once they saw their leader go down. Both sides set up victory trophies. Consequently Xenophon quite rightly observed that there was more confusion in Greece after the battle than before. If revolutionary innovations had been responsible for the victory at Leuktra earlier, what had happened at Mantinea, where the similar battle plan of the Thebans had failed to insure success?²⁸ Two explanations come to mind and seem decisive; neither involves pre-battle deployment or innovative tactics. The first, obviously, was the death of Epameinondas. Both the sources of the battle agree that the Thebans lost heart upon his exit from the battlefield (Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.25; Diod. 15.87.2). In other words, despite his tactical plan of attack, the Thebans were unable to achieve victory in his absence. This suggests that the deployment of the Theban troops was in itself not crucial to the final outcome of the battle. Indeed, the death of the Theban general in the midst of the attack illustrates the inherent hazards of staking the entire outcome of the battle on the collision of such elite units; at Leuktra, Kleombrotos had fallen and the men around him at that point had collapsed, giving victory to Epameinondas; nearly the opposite was true at Mantinea. Can we surmise what would have taken place if Epameinondas had gone down at Leuktra and Kleombrotos had survived that collision? Or, conversely, if Epameinondas had lived through the charge at Mantinea? First, there is an implication here that the tactical deployments of Epameinondas were less influential than the simple survivability of the battlefield commander. Xenophon, for example, says clearly that the Spartans (despite the collision with the massed column of Epameinondas’s troops) were victorious at Leuktra until Kleombrotos suddenly went down (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.13). Second, the

roles of the respective armies were now reversed. The Thebans in 362 B.C. were, like the Spartans of 371 B.C., an army of invasion, attacking men who were determined to repel them from their homeland; as Anderson has remarked, the enemy was now “not merely a Spartan army accompanied by a train of unwilling allies.”²⁹ In short, because the battle plan of Epameinondas was roughly similar at Leuktra to that at Mantinea, and because the final outcomes of the two battles were different, we may, as in a laboratory study where the control is constant, legitimately seek other explanations for the outcome. In this case, a near-exact reversal of factors in the equation seems to be the key: the death of the battlefield commander in an attack against stubborn troops on the defensive results in either stalemate or defeat for the invader; the survival of the general who commands troops who fight in defense of their homeland results in victory for the invaded. These simple considerations have had a long history in Greek warfare and they played a crucial role at a great many hoplite battles.³⁰ Their fundamental importance must not be forgotten in any attempt to identify revolutionary changes in tactics at Leuktra.

III Xenophon’s Account of Leuktra

Much has been written about Xenophon’s failure to mention Epameinondas by name at Leuktra; usually he has been criticized for his similar silence about the accompanying “innovations” that the unnamed general purportedly introduced in that battle.³¹ While this is not the place to reexamine the multitude of arguments, both pro and con, that have been advanced to account for his silence, it is important to reemphasize that much of this “problem” simply vanishes if we are correct in believing that there was really nothing revolutionary in the battle conduct of the Thebans at Leuktra. Other considerations also support this notion that Xenophon’s treatment of Epameinondas and his “innovations” was quite understandable and that his description of the battle makes good sense, both in factual detail and in emphasis.

1. Xenophon alone mentions both the Theban depth of fifty shields and the Spartan formation of twelve men deep. He alone describes the presence and role of the respective cavalry forces. He also makes it clear that the Thebans massed on their left wing with the intention of attacking Kleombrotos; in his narrative, then, and in his narrative alone these key components of the battle are found. It is ironic that those who postulate revolutionary innovations on the part of Epameinondas, who rely on Diodorus and Plutarch for proof of this revolution in warfare, and who find fault in Xenophon for his failure

to note such developments must, nevertheless, then turn to Xenophon alone for the critical information on the depth (and thus the length) of the Theban phalanx and on the fundamental role of cavalry in the battle.

2. Other contemporary writers likewise failed to appreciate the tactical genius of Epameinondas in general and his battlefield accomplishments at Leuktra in particular. Shrimpton, who surveyed the dearth of contemporary references, concluded: “As far as we can judge today, Epameinondas (like his great colleague Pelopidas) was either ignored or neglected by most writers in the fourth century.”³² In other words, there is no knowledge of any Epameinondan military revolution in the works of Isocrates, Demosthenes, Aeschines, or other fourth-century B.C. orators. Nor does it appear there was such notice in any contemporary historians such as Theopompos or the author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*.³³

3. Xenophon singles Epameinondas out for praise within his description of Mantinea. Although this topic has been the source of long-running controversy, the mention of Epameinondas later in the *Hellenika* seems to weaken the case that his conduct and battle plan at Leuktra were deliberately glossed over because of personal bias.³⁴ After a series of brilliant campaigns in the Péloponnèse that demonstrated quite clearly the strategic ability of Epameinondas, Xenophon understandably gave credit to the Theban general. As such, it is the *first* mention and praise of Epameinondas in Greek literature. This perhaps suggests that Xenophon was not above crediting Epameinondas nine years earlier at Leuktra—had he seen good cause.

4. Unlike Ephorus and Kallisthenes, whose ignorance of military affairs was noted in antiquity, Xenophon had seen long service in hoplite battles, was a keen student of military tactics, and himself may have been responsible in part for some of the military innovations that occurred during the march of the Ten Thousand.³⁵ Indeed, if any contemporary observer might appreciate a revolutionary breakthrough in warfare at Leuktra, Xenophon was the most likely candidate. His silence, given these unusual circumstances, seems to be an argument that no such revolution took place at Leuktra. Best, for example, has remarked concerning his similar failure to recognize the so-called innovations of Iphikrates:

Hence it seems to me out of the question that *jalousie de métier* induced Xenophon to be silent about the equally important reforms that Iphicrates carried out in the peltast corps. The fact that he does not mention them is to my mind a major *argumentum e silentio* against Iphicrates' reforms.³⁶

5. Xenophon terms the Theban leadership at Leuktra

τῶν δ' αὖ Ὀηβαίωνοι προεστῶτες (Hell. 6.4.6), apparently in the belief that the victory was the responsibility of a joint command rather than the sole genius of one man. For this he has been criticized. Anderson suggested that Xenophon's description "is a series of notes made shortly after the battle, and drawn from the Spartan side only, not a balanced narrative reviewed after the difference between Epameinondas and his fellow-*boeotarchs* had been made apparent in later campaigns."³⁷ However, the well-known contemporary inscription erected after the victory at Leuktra mentions three other Theban commanders, Xenokrates, Theopompos, and Mnasilaios, who "ran not second to Epameinondas"—a suggestion that there may have been disagreement on the Theban side over which general or generals were looked upon as the architects of the Theban victory.³⁸ Plutarch, too, remarked of Leuktra that though Epameinondas was *boiotarch*, Pelopidas "gained the same degree of glory for the victory and success" (23.4); later Xenophon himself seems to agree: "A significant contribution to the honor of Pelopidas was the Thebans' victory at Leuktra" (Hell. 7.1.35). Even Diodorus, whose reliance on the laudatory portrayal of Epameinondas found in Ephorus is recognized, records a council of *boiotarchs* before the battle; there it was Epameinondas and three other generals who carried the vote to advance into the battle (15.53.3). Consequently, it may well have been true that even the Thebans themselves, right after the battle, were squabbling over credit for the victory, as arguments broke out over whether Pelopidas, Epameinondas, other *boiotarchs*, or all three parties combined were responsible for the victory. This confusion probably could not have occurred if Epameinondas himself had engineered a series of revolutionary tactical maneuvers that alone accounted for the Spartan defeat.

IV "The Epameinondas Tradition"

Diodorus's description of the battle of Leuktra follows the account of Ephorus.³⁹ Plutarch's life of Pelopidas, including the narrative of Leuktra, is now believed to have been derived ultimately from the lost fourth-century B.C. historian Kallisthenes, who composed a *Hellenika* in the 330s or 340s B.C.⁴⁰ Our third source, Pausanias, most likely drew on Plutarch's lost *Epameinondas*, itself heavily indebted to Ephorus.⁴¹ We can surmise, then, that all these later accounts of Epameinondas, from which modern scholars postulate such "innovations" as the refused right wing, the oblique attack, and the presence of Pelopidas and the Sacred Band in an innovative reserve role, ultimately derived from Ephorus and Kallisthenes. Until the series of articles of the past twenty years, scholars had been suspicious

of both Plutarch and Diodorus either because of their own intrinsic bias and lack of judgment or because their information concerning Epameinondas and Leuktra derived largely from these two lost historians, writers who seem to have gone out of their way to glorify Thebes, Pelopidas, and Epameinondas.⁴² Polybius, at any rate, as the article epigraph illustrates, believed Ephorus's account of Leuktra was laughable and his treatment of battles in general inadequate.⁴³ And from Plutarch we receive the picture that Ephorus's account of Leuktra went to great lengths to magnify the role of Epameinondas.⁴⁴ Kallisthenes likewise was criticized by Polybius for his poor accounts of battles (e.g., Polyb. 12.17–22). Thus in antiquity the two authors shared a reputation of being pro-Theban and yet unskillful in describing military affairs. Yet, Shrimpton concluded that all later information was ultimately based on their accounts.

We noted that the laudatory tradition of Epameinondas, and the lesser one concerning Pelopidas, could be traced back to about the time of the appearance of Callisthenes' *Hellenica* and Ephorus' *Histories*, but no earlier. So, in view of the probability that the two historians saw a reversal in Theban fortunes after Pelopidas and Epaminondas had died, it appears likely that they explained Thebes' success in terms of the brilliance of these generals—a very abrupt change from the attitude of earlier writers, who scarcely mention them. It therefore becomes probable that the received traditions surrounding Epaminondas and Pelopidas were founded by the efforts of Callisthenes and Ephorus some time after the events had transpired.⁴⁵

Consequently, we should be skeptical of the tactical maneuvers of Epameinondas at Leuktra as described in Plutarch and Diodorus. Composed hundreds of years after Leuktra, by men who had never seen a phalanx, these narratives of the battle draw on accounts that were themselves written forty to fifty years after the fact by authors who had their own reasons to magnify the circumstances surrounding the Theban victory over the Spartans.

V Conclusion

Examination of the various “innovations” in Greek battle tactics that Epameinondas has often been credited with at Leuktra reveals that none can be seen as either revolutionary or even especially novel. Much of the battle plan (e.g., the massed phalanx on the left wing) lacked inherent tactical advantages and, in any case, was not new. The use of cavalry in concert with infantry or the presence of reserve troops had been known to Greek generals for years; however, there is no evidence that Epameinondas even used such maneuvers at Leuktra. The oblique attack is merely an embellished, misunderstood description of Epameinondas's simple march leftward across the

battlefield to meet the longer flank of Kleombrotos—a move which we would expect, given his pre-battle deployment and the arrangement of his forces. The idea that his troops on the right wing were ordered deliberately to retreat or, at least, to stay out of the fight rests only on the authority of Diodorus—an account which is contradicted by Pausanias, who probably drew on the same source, Ephorus. In any case, some scholars realize that a deliberate withdrawal was not needed and was probably beyond the capability of such suspect allied troops. Comparison with the battle at Mantinea nine years later illustrates that this tactical “revolution” on the part of Epameinondas had no significant bearing on either battle; instead, the death of the battlefield commander and the inherent advantages in terms of morale and fighting spirit of troops on the defensive better explain the failure of the invaders at both Leuktra and Mantinea to achieve victory. On the one hand, Xenophon’s silence about these “breakthroughs” in military tactics is consistent with all other writers of the following forty or more years who likewise missed this “revolution.” That Xenophon was biased against Epameinondas at Leuktra seems strange, given his laudatory portrayal of the Theban general at Mantinea; that he was unable to appreciate these changes seems unconvincing, given his own firsthand knowledge of a variety of unusual campaigns; that he saw Leuktra instead as the product of a joint Theban command seems substantiated by both literary accounts and the contemporary inscription in which three other generals claimed their fair due along with Epameinondas. On the other hand, those who postulate dramatic breakthroughs in military practice at Leuktra must ultimately rely on the battle narratives of Plutarch and Diodorus, both written hundreds of years after the battle and drawn from sources who were inexperienced in military affairs, who had no firsthand knowledge of Leuktra, and whom many ancient and not a few modern scholars suspect of embellishing the exploits of the long-dead Epameinondas for their own contemporary historiographical needs. These accounts make no mention of either the critical depths of the respective phalanxes or the presence of cavalry. Much more basic explanations found in Xenophon’s account provide a clearer picture of what happened at Leuktra: poor morale (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.2–6); the sudden, unexpected death of a Spartan king and his companions in the midst of the attack; quick, decisive moves on the part of Epameinondas and his associates to capitalize on these openings (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.13); and the *excessive drinking* in the Spartan ranks, which led to confusion at the very start of battle (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.8)⁴⁶—all were instrumental in the defeat. If this argument is correct, it may be of some importance in understanding the undeniable transformation in Greek warfare during the fourth century B.C. Until now, most have understood the shift

away from the simple, traditional collision of hoplites in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. to more complicated maneuvers involving increased depths, strengthened wings, cavalry, reserves, and specialized contingents as largely the work of one man who revolutionized Greek infantry battle in a bold single stroke at Leuktra. Is it not more likely that these changes were more subtle and had been going on for years before the battle? Known to a wide array of gifted Spartans, Boiotians, and Athenians, such new ideas in fighting were employed, adapted, modified, or rejected by men such as Pagondas, Brasidas, Xenophon, Agesilaos, Iphikrates, Pelopidas, Kleombrotos, and Epameinondas in a century-long, slow transformation of infantry battle that led, at last, irrevocably to Macedón.⁴⁷

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¹ *The Greek State at War Part IV* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1985) 54 n.159.

² F. E. Adcock, *The Greek and Macedonian Art of War* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1957) 89.

³ For both recent and traditional criticisms of Xenophon's treatment of the Thebans at Leuktra and the tactics of the unnamed Epameinondas, see J. Buckler, *The Theban Hegemony* (Cambridge, Mass. 1980) 266, 320 nn. 14–17; H. D. Westlake, "Xenophon and Epaminondas," *GRBS* 16 (1975) 23–40; "Individuals in Xenophon, *Hellenica*," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 49 (1966–1967) 246–69; J. K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1970) 199; J. Wolter, "Leuktra," in J. Kromayer, *Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechenland*, I–IV (Berlin 1903–1926) IV, 301–2. H. Delbrück (*Geschichte der Kriegskunst*. I: *Das Altertum* [2d ed. Berlin 1908] = *History of the Art of War*. I. *Antiquity*, trans. Walter Renfroe [Westport, Conn. 1975] 167–68) long ago took a much more sensible view of Xenophon's narrative. See, too, G. Shrimpton, "The Epaminondas Tradition," diss. Stanford University, 1970, 4–8, and in general C. J. Tuplin, "The Leuctra Campaign," *Klio* 69.1 (1987) 84–93.

⁴ G. L. Cawkwell, "Epameinondas and Thebes," *CQ* 66 (1972) 262.

⁵ J. Buckler, "Epameinondas and the *EMBOAON*," *Phoenix* 39 (1985) 142.

⁶ P. Ducrey, *Guerre et guerriers dans la Grèce antique* (Freiburg 1985) 79–80.

⁷ Buckler (*supra* n.3) 266.

⁸ Anderson (*supra* n.3) 199.

⁹ Implicit in this study is an acknowledgment of the important recent work of scholars such as Anderson and Buckler who have contributed much to our understanding of the battle. A valid objection to my approach is that I often agree with a particular scholar's criticism of other reconstructions but rarely, if ever, follow his own subsequent suggestions. For example, I am convinced by Anderson's reservations about the withdrawal of the Theban right wing, but cannot agree with his idea of a reserve role of Pelopidas—a criticism well argued by Buckler. Yet, Buckler's views on the role of the cavalry seem to me in a similar fashion to exaggerate the battle plan of Epameinondas. Far from being cynical, I hope that this line of reasoning reflects the current scholarly dilemma over Leuktra: tactical innovations are justifiably criticized, dismantled, and yet then replaced by other equally suspect maneuvers on the part of Epameinondas. Cannot all these various objections to each particular innovation be synthesized into one unified position: there were no tactical innovations at Leuktra?

10 *The Greek State at War Part I* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1971) 141. See his table (135) for a list of battles before Leuktra where depth was increased beyond eight shields.

11 For these ramifications of increasing the depth of the phalanx beyond the standard eight shields, cf. the discussion in Anderson (supra n.3) 175–77; J. F. Lazenby, *The Spartan Army* (Warminster 1985) 156–57; Delbrück (supra n.3) 53–55; and A. M. Devine, “EMBOΛON: A Study in Tactical Terminology,” *Phoenix* 37 (1983) 206–7. Keegan (*The Face of Battle* [New York 1976] 170–71) remarked of the French columns which were both outflanked and outgunned by the English lines at Waterloo: “For columnar formation, of course, effectively disarmed the majority of soldiers confined within it. Only those at the very front and along the margins could use their weapons; those in the interior, even if they glimpsed the enemy, could not raise their muskets to fire.”

12 Cawkwell (supra n.4) 261. Many others have seen the position of Epameinondas on the left wing as revolutionary: e.g., P. Lévêque and P. Vidal-Naquet, “Epaminondas Pythagoricien,” *Historia* 9 (1960) 296; J. Buckler, “Plutarch on Leuktra,” *SO* 55 (1980) 88; Adcock (supra n.2) 25; Lazenby (supra n. 11) 162; J. Kromayer and G. Veith, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung* (Munich 1928) 93.

13 See G. L. Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* (London 1978) 155; (supra n.4) 263; Buckler (supra n.12) 89; (supra n.5) 143.

14 Buckler (supra n.12) 89. Buckler cites Xenophon *Hell.* 6.4.13, but there it is stated only that the Spartan cavalry
φείγοντες δὲ ἐνεπεπτάκασαν τοῖς ἐκείνων ὀπλίταις, ἔτι δὲ ἐνέβαλλον οἱ τῶν Θηβαίων λόχοι.

15 Buckler (supra n.12) 89; Wolter (supra n.3) 311–12. But cf. Lazenby (supra n. 11) 159, 162, and esp. 202 n.22.

16 P. A. Rahe, “The Military Situation in Western Asia on the Eve of Cunaxa,” *AJP* 101 (1980) 94–95.

17 See, for example, Cawkwell (supra n.4) 261; Devine (supra n. 11) 208; cf. Buckler (supra n.5) 141 n.24.

18 Anderson (supra n.3) 213–16, following H. A. T. Köchly and W. Rüstow, *Geschichte des griechischen Kriegwesens* (Aarau 1852) 171ff.; and H. Droysen, “Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen,” in K. F. Hermann’s *Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquitäten*, (Freiburg 1888–1889) 99.

19 See Delbrück (supra n.3) 167–69; Buckler (supra n.12) 77–78.

20 Anderson (supra n.3) 179–80.

21 Devine (supra n. 11) 201–17.

22 Buckler (supra n.5) 134ff. Nor do I think that the Theban success at Leuktra derived from their experience in wrestling (cf. Plut. *Mor.* 233E).

23 Buckler (supra n.12) 88; (supra n.5) 143; Cawkwell (supra n.13) 155; (supra n.4) 261; Adcock (supra n.2) 25; Lévêque and Vidal-Naquet (supra n.12) 296.

24 Buckler (supra n.12) 88.

25 Devine quite rightly remarked that “such a formation of this type, with its narrow front, could easily be enveloped by the necessarily much longer Spartan formation which was only twelve deep”: (supra n. 11) 206. Cf. too Wolter (supra n.3) 302–6 and Tuplin (supra n.3) 93.

26 For apparent differences between Diodorus and Plutarch in the use of λοξή φάλαγξ see Anderson (supra n.3) 218, 324 n.60; Devine (supra n. 11) 205; Buckler (supra n.5) 137; Tuplin (supra n.3) 84–85.

27 Anderson (supra n.3) 208. Diodorus's statement that "the Boiotians retreated on the other [right] wing" (15.55.3) is the only evidence for the "refused" wing, an "innovation" which has traditionally been popular among scholars; at least one scholar attempted to see it as the forerunner of the deliberate Macedonian retreat at Chaironeia. Cf. E. Lammert, "Die geschichtliche Entwicklung der griechischen Taktik," *NJb* 2 (1899) 29. Tuplin's reservations (supra n.3) 84–85 concerning the notion of a refused right wing also seem decisive and suggest too that Plutarch (*Pel.* 23) meant only an oblique line of advance.

28 The tactical plans of the Thebans at the two battles were nearly identical (Xen. *Hell* 7.5.19–26; Diod. 15.82–87; Plut. *Ages.* 34; Paus. 11.5; Polyb. 9.8). For the battle, cf. Delbrück (supra n.3) 169–71; Buckler (supra n.3) 213–19; Devine (supra n.3) 210–12; Anderson (supra n.3) 221–24.

29 Anderson (supra n.3) 223.

30 In nearly all hoplite battles, the death of the battlefield commander either accompanied or brought on defeat (cf. Thuc. 1.63.3; 4.101.2; 5.10.9; Hdt. 7.224; Xen. *Hell* 4.4.10; 5.3.6). Often both generals or the entire command of the defeated perished (Thuc. 3.109.1; Thuc. 4.38.1; Thuc. 5.74.3; 2.79.7). Until Kleomenes ran away after Sellasia, there seems to have been not a single instance of a Spartan king who survived a defeat (Polyb. 2.65f ff. ; Plut. *Kleom.* 28.5).

31 See supra n.3.

32 G. Shrimpton, "The Theban Supremacy in Fourth-Century Literature," *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 318.

33 While neither author dealt in detail with the Theban supremacy, we might expect evidence of at least a short note concerning such a revolutionary change in Greek tactics and history in general. Buckler (supra n.3) 320 n.20 believes that "the fame of Epameinondas and Pelopidas quickly spread throughout the Greek world." He cites as evidence Plutarch *Pel.* 30.2 and *Ages.* 32.4, and Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.35; but two of these passages refer *solely* to the exploits of Pelopidas and do not mention Epameinondas by name—a curious oversight if Epameinondas was responsible for the tactical breakthroughs at Leuktra. In fact, the only proof that Epameinondas was recognized at all for his generalship at Leuktra in the aftermath of the battle is derived from the contemporary stone inscription where *other* generals claimed equal fame (see n.38). We must conclude, then, that it is much more likely that the reputation of Epameinondas in the first few years after the battle of Leuktra was confined largely to central Greece.

34 See supra n.3.

35 For Polybius's criticism of the first two historians see 12.25f.3–4; 12.17–22. On Xenophon's role in tactical innovations during the march of the Ten Thousand, cf. *An.* 3.3.6–4.6.

36 J. G. P. Best, *Thracian Peltasts and Their Influence on Greek Warfare* (Groningen 1963) 108.

37 Anderson (supra n.3) 199.

38 Cf. M. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions II* (Oxford 1948) 92, (no 130) = IG 7.2462; H. Beister, "Ein thebanisches Trophaion bereits vor Beginn der Schlacht bei Leuktra," *Chiron* 3 (1973) 65–84. Of the three named on the stone, Xenokrates in his role as boiotarch supported the plan to attack the Spartans at Leuktra (Diod. 15.53.3; Paus. 9.13.6); Theopompos was a colleague of Pelopidas's and took part in the attack on the Cadmeia (379 B.C.) (Plut. *Pel.* 8.2). Tuplin (supra n.3) 106 provides the necessary corrective to Beister's thesis concerning the battle monument, but his statement: "The reference to

Epaminondas is sometimes thought to disclose objections to the undue glorification of that leader, but it might just as well be intended to increase the credit of Xenocrates and the others by associating them with Epaminondas' admittedly excellent services" seems to be overly cautious concerning the most natural meaning of the inscription and is perhaps too an indication of the modern reluctance to question the contribution of Epameinondas at Leuktra.

39 The phrase "the Epameinondas tradition" seems to have been first coined by Shrimpton (supra n.3).

40 See Shrimpton (supra n.3) 32–34, 35–48 for a lengthy discussion of Diodorus's use of Ephorus and the reliance of the *Pelopidas* on Kallisthenes; he is followed by Buckler (supra n.12) 75–76 and (with reservations) by Tuplin (supra n.3) 84.

41 Shrimpton (supra n.3) 47–54; Buckler (supra n.12) 75–76.

42 For example, Westlake characterized the *Pelopidas* as "of no great value to the student of fourth-century history, as the advantages of a primary source are almost nullified by the partisanship of its author": "The Sources of Plutarch's *Pelopidas*," *CQ* 33 (1939) 22. Cf. the especially harsh criticisms of Wolter (supra n.3) 306 and Delbrück (supra n.3) 169: "This passage shows most effectively that Plutarch's entire account of this battle is unusable." Diodorus's narrative of Leuktra has generally been regarded as even less reliable. Cf. Anderson (supra n.3) 205: "The narrative of Diodorus cannot be accepted." See, too, his sensible remarks concerning Diodorus's mention of a supposed crescent-shaped Lakedaimonian formation, 208 (he is followed by Lazenby [supra n. 11] 156, 201 n.9). For the pro-Theban stance of both Ephoros and Kallisthenes and their admiration of Pelopidas and Epameinondas, cf. *FGrH* II D 417; E. von Stern, *Xenophon's Hellenika* (Dorpat 1887) 62ff.; Shrimpton (supra n.3) 34, 44; E. Schwartz, "Kallisthenes Hellenika," *Hermes* 35 (1900) 107; L. Pearson, *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great* (London 1960) 32. G. L. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus* (Oxford 1935) 131–33. See, too, M. Munn, "Agésilaios' Boiotian Campaigns and the Theban Stockade of 378–377 B.C.," *CA* 6,1 (1987) 109–10.

43 12.25f.3–4. Polybius, it is clear, objects to Ephorus's account of *both* Leuktra and Mantinea, emphasizing only that his ignorance is more evident at Mantinea than at Leuktra, since the simple train of events that took place at Leuktra gave Ephorus less opportunity (but opportunity, nonetheless) for error. G. E. Underhill may well be right in concluding, "while he [Polybius] severely criticizes Ephorus for his foolish descriptions of the land battles, Leuktra and Mantinea, he says not a word about Xenophon, implying we may perhaps not unjustly infer, that he was satisfied with Xenophon's description": *A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon* (London 1906) ix. Buckler (supra n.5) 137 remarks, "Polybius (12.25.4) testifies that Ephoros' ignorance of land warfare is not evident in his treatment of Leuktra." Yet, does Polybius really say that? Instead, he argues that *in comparison with the description of Mantinea* (cf. the force of

ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δὲ). Leuktra does not make very conspicuous his ignorance (οὐ λίαν ἐκφανῆ ποιεῖ τὴν τοῦ συγγραφέως ἀπειρίαν). Surely, a fair reading of the Greek suggests dissatisfaction (albeit in varying degrees) with both battles. The key here seems to rest with proper emphasis upon the λίαν. οὐ λίαν ἐκφανῆ ποιεῖ is very different Greek from οὐκ ἐκφανῆ ποιεῖ. On Polybius's objections to the military narratives of both Ephoros and Kallisthenes, see K. Sachs, "Polybius on the Writing of History," *UCCS*, 24 (Berkeley 1981) 73–75, 200–201.

44 *Mor.* 514C. Ephorus seems also to have highlighted Epameinondas at

Mantineia; cf. Diog. Laert. 2.53–55.

⁴⁵ Shrimpton (supra n.32). 318.

⁴⁶ For evidence of drinking before battle and while on campaign, cf. Horn. 77. 14.1–8; Archil. 2; Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.5; Men. *Asp.* 53 ff.; Plut. *Mor.* 182A2; cf. esp. too Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.40–44; Plut. *Dion* 30.3–4.

⁴⁷ At least three scholars have previously either questioned the traditional reputation of Epameinondas or suggested that others were equally responsible for the changes in fourth-century battle tactics: cf. Anderson (supra n.3) 224; Lazenby (supra n. 11) 160–61; and A. Ferrill, *The Origins of War* (London and New York 1985) 170.

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